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《南华真经义海纂微》Vol. 2

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Zangwai Daoshu 藏外道書 Vol. 2 / 24 25,000 characters

About this page. The original text of 《南华真经义海纂微》 Vol. 2 (Zangwai Daoshu 藏外道書, 24 volumes) is shown in Classical Chinese as transmitted in the Godners/DaoZang edition. An English interpretation of the 54 passages on this page accompanies it: select a passage or press “Interpretation” to show it. All texts in English

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Source textInterpretation

有言邪则其言未出未尝有言邪则其言将出于此之时不可得而辩犹鷇音也道不存而有真伪之存辩言无不可而有是非之分儒墨互相是非非明莫辩也物无非彼无物非是是天也彼人也自人而求之不可得而见自知则知之知性则知天矣彼出于是有形生于无形也是亦因彼无形依于有形也彼是方生之有无动静相生也世人昏迷于是非之涂莫之能辩圣人灼见是非之理要亦不过因其是者是之而已彼是相因有无相世人昏迷于是非之涂莫之能辩圣人灼见是非之理要亦不过因其是者是之而已彼是相因有无相生皆不能以相异莫得其偶者离彼是有无而独立此乃道之枢要枢者处中而运外酬酢万变如环无端惟知者知之
Interpretation

Before a thought or a word has been voiced, does that already count as speech? When it is on the verge of being spoken but not yet made clear, it is hard to tell what it is, like the cry of a nestling. The Dao (the Way) was never lodged in contrived argument, yet people fixate on true and false; discourse can say anything, and people draw lines between right and wrong. Confucians and Mohists attack each other and dispute right and wrong, but there is no definite criterion to decide the matter.

Nothing is absolutely “that,” and nothing is absolutely “this.” “Right” is defined in relation to “wrong,” and “wrong” is established in relation to “right”: “right” belongs to the angle of Heaven, “wrong” to the angle of humankind. Seek the Dao from someone else’s standpoint and it is hard to see; start from one’s own understanding and one can know something; know one’s own nature and one can know the Dao of Heaven.

“That” shows itself through “this,” and the formed arises from the formless; “this” also rests on “that” to be established, and the formless depends on form to appear. This is the idea that “that” and “this” give rise to each other—that is, being and non-being, movement and stillness, depend on one another and turn into each other.

The world loses itself in right and wrong and cannot see clearly. The sage understands the logic of right and wrong, yet in practice he only follows how things are and accepts that they are simply so. “That” and “this” rely on each other; being and non-being arise together—they cannot be split off cleanly. Only what goes beyond the oppositions of the two sides and of being and non-being, and stands on its own, is the pivot of the Dao.

The “pivot” is like the hinge in the middle of a door that moves the leaves as it turns. It meets endless change the way a ring goes round without a stop; only someone of real wisdom can take this in.

鬳斋口义云芒芒然无见识貌天生蒸民有物有则天理未尝不明以人物昏蔽故至于芒昩知道之人岂如是乎成心者天理浑然而无不备若能以此为师谁独无之知代古贤者之称代谓变化言其知变化之理自取言其有所见若未能见此浑然之理而强别是非犹今日适越而昔至本无所见强以为有虽圣人亦不能晓悟也吹万不同皆声而已声成文谓之言则非吹比言者有言各宣其意此四字便是是非之论所由生其所言者出于汝邪出于造物邪故吹万不同皆声而已声成文谓之言则非吹比言者有言各宣其意此四字便是是非之论所由生其所言者出于汝邪出于造物邪故云未定鷇音未有所知亦由是也道本无真伪因何晦而有此真伪言本无是非因何晦而有此是非道则小大精粗皆存言则是是非非皆可小成谓小识偏见荣华者自夸诩而求名偏见之言胜则至言矣自此而有儒墨相非之论若欲一定是非须烛以自然天理物我对立而后有是非故曰彼出于是是亦因彼亦犹生必有死死必有生二者不可相离不若因其所是而是之圣人所以不任一偏之见而照之以天理混彼我而一之为得道之枢要殆如环中之空而应物无穷是非各无穷亦照之以天理而已
Interpretation

Yanzhai's oral commentary says: "Mangmangran" describes a state of ignorance and dim, unenlightened confusion. Heaven above nourishes the people; the myriad things each have their own patterns—these principles of Heaven have always been clear and evident. It is only because people and things become obscured that they turn dim and confused. How could someone who understands the great Dao be like this?

"Complete mind" (cheng xin) refers to the heavenly principle that is whole and complete, lacking nothing. If one can take that heavenly principle as one's standard, who would lack it? "Knows change" (zhi dai) is a name for the ancient sages; "dai" means change—it refers to understanding the principle of transformation. What is called "self-appropriation" (zi qu) means each person holding his own view. If one has not yet seen the unified heavenly principle but forcibly divides right from wrong, it is like setting out for Yue today yet claiming one arrived yesterday; having seen nothing at all yet insisting one has seen. Even a sage could not make such a person understand.

The sounds emitted by the myriad things differ, but they are all merely sound; when sound takes on a definite pattern, it is called speech. Speech is not the same as the natural wind's noise, because the speaker expresses his own meaning in each case. The four words "each declares his own intent" are precisely the source from which disputes over right and wrong arise: whether what is said comes from yourself or from the Creator. Therefore it is said that "not yet settled" is like the peeping of a fledgling—there is as yet no clear cognition; the same applies here.

The Dao originally has no true or false—why, once obscured, do true and false appear? Speech originally has no right or wrong—why, once obscured, do disputes over right and wrong appear? The Dao encompasses large and small, coarse and fine; speech involves all sorts of judgments of right and wrong. Those of shallow vision each cling to bias and boast of themselves, chasing reputation; once biased words prevail, discourse that accords with the great Dao is obscured. Then there arise the mutual reproaches of the Confucian and Mohist schools.

If one wishes to decide right and wrong, one must use the natural heavenly principle to illuminate them. Things and the self stand opposed to each other, and only then do distinctions of right and wrong arise; hence it is said: "That side arises from this, and this exists because of that." It is like life and death depending on each other—they cannot be separated. Better to follow each side's own asserted principle and understand them accordingly. The sage does not fix on one extreme but illuminates the myriad things with heavenly principle, penetrating this and that—this is grasping the hub of the great Dao. It is like the empty center of a ring, able to follow things and respond to endless change. Disputes over right and wrong have no end; one can only illuminate them with heavenly principle.

按诸解多以成心为善或以成心为否考之下文未成乎心而有是非是今日适越而昔至则成心者是非分别之所自萌不可以善言之也愚尝侍西蜀无范先或以成心为否考之下文未成乎心而有是非是今日适越而昔至则成心者是非分别之所自萌不可以善言之也愚尝侍西蜀无范先生讲席窃聆师诲云未成心则真性混融太虚同量成心则已离乎性有善有恶矣人处世间应酬之际有不免乎成心即当师而求之于未成之前则善恶不萌是非无朕何所不齐哉其论精当足以尽祛前惑再衍余意輙陈管见云夫人之止念非难不续为难能自初成心即师而求之于未成心之前则念不续而性可复矣是故对物则心生忘物则性现心者性之用万法之本原一身之主宰盖不可蔑无若曰成心则流乎意矣心之为物出入无时莫知其乡然方寸之所欲为未有不因物而生者心离也离主火火不能自主形必有所丽而后见心同太虚流乎意矣心之为物出入无时莫知其乡然方寸之所欲为未有不因物而生者心离也离主火火不能自主形必有所丽而后见心同太虚则无所丽矣且心丽物而为善犹不若无心无为况丽物而为恶乎关尹子云来干我者如石火顷以性对之物浮浮然此遗物离人摄情归性之要道也学者归而求之有余师矣知字旧音去声或读如字以下文愚者与有证之则音智为当与音预碧虚以党与释之独异于众知代之义诸解不同审详经意知代而心自取者正指师心之人以知代用自取于道以为成心者也
Interpretation

When we survey the various commentators’ readings, many take chengxin (the “formed heart,” the mind once it has taken shape) as something good. Yet in light of what follows—“before the heart has even formed, right and wrong are already there”—chengxin is precisely where the split between right and wrong first stirs; it cannot be called good. I once attended lectures at the seat of Master Fan the Hidden One of western Shu. The master said: “Before the heart has formed, true nature is whole and round, as vast as the Great Void; once the heart forms, it has already left native nature and good and evil appear. Living in the world among things, one inevitably develops chengxin. When that happens, one should turn inward and seek the state before the heart had formed. Then good and evil have not yet sprouted, right and wrong have no trace—what could not be equalized and seen as one?” That insight is apt and clears up the earlier doubt. I add a point of my own understanding.

Stopping thoughts is not hard for a person; what is hard is not letting them go on generating. If from the very moment the heart begins to form one pursues the state before it had formed, thoughts will not link up in a chain and true nature can be restored. Therefore, facing things, mind-thoughts arise; forgetting things, native nature appears. The heart is the functioning of nature, the root of the myriad patterns and the master of the whole person—it cannot be wiped out entirely; but if one speaks of chengxin, that slips into subjective intent.

The heart has no fixed time of coming and going, and one does not know where it stays; yet whatever the heart intends to do is never without being stirred by outer things. Li (Fire) in the Five Phases cannot show a form by itself—it must cling to something before it can be seen. If the heart were like the Great Void, it would have nothing to cling to. When the heart clings to things to do good, that is still inferior to no-heart and wuwei; how much more when it clings to things to do evil?

Guan Yinzi said: “When outer things touch me, it is only as brief as a spark from fire; responding with native nature, outer things lightly float past.” That is the secret of letting go of things, gathering intent, and returning to nature. Students who go back and seek this for themselves will find what to take as their model.

The character for “know” (zhi) was read in the departing tone in older usage; some also read it in its base pronunciation. From the line below, “the foolish and those with proof alike”—both the foolish and those who have the Way can verify this—reading it as zhi (wisdom/knowing) fits better. The gloss of yu as “partisan companions” (dangyu) appears only in Bixu’s reading, unlike the other commentators. Examining the text’s meaning, “using knowing in place of natural functioning, taking for oneself from the Dao”—that describes people who substitute clever knowing for spontaneous action and thereby bring trouble on themselves; they take that kind of knowing as their chengxin.

南华真经义海纂防卷二 钦定四库全书 南华真经义海纂防卷三 宋 禇伯秀 撰 齐物论第二道以为成心者也 南华真经义海纂防卷二 钦定四库全书 南华真经义海纂防卷三 宋 禇伯秀 撰 齐物论第二 以指喻指之非指不若以非指喻指之非指也以马喻马之非马不若以非马喻马之非马也天地一指也万物一马也可乎可不可乎不可道行之而成物谓之而然恶乎然然于然恶乎不然不然于不然物固有所然物固有所可无物不然无物不可故为是举筳与楹厉与西施恢恑谲怪道通为一其分也成也其成也毁也凡物无成与毁复通为一唯达者知通为一为是不用而寓诸庸庸也者用也用也者通也通也者得也适得而几矣因是已已而不知其然谓之道劳神明为一而不知其同也谓之朝三何谓朝三狙公赋芧曰朝三而暮四众狙皆怒曰然则朝四而是已已而不知其然谓之道劳神明为一而不知其同也谓之朝三何谓朝三狙公赋芧曰朝三而暮四众狙皆怒曰然则朝四而暮三众狙皆悦名实未亏而喜怒为用亦因是也是以圣人和之以是非而休乎天均是之谓两行 陈碧虚云指马之喻自司马彪向秀郭象至有唐名士皆谓漆园寓言构意而成斯喻遂使解者指归不同今阅公孙龙六论内白马指物二论有白马非马而指非指之乃知漆园述作有自来也
Interpretation

Some people use zhi (the signifier, or “finger”) to show that a signifier is not the real signifier; it is better to use “not-a-signifier” to make that clear. They use ma (horse) to show that a horse is not horse; it is better to use “not-a-horse” to make that clear. The myriad things of heaven and earth can all be treated as one signifier; the myriad things can all be treated as one horse. Is it all right to speak this way? It can be all right; saying it is not all right can also be all right. The Dao shows itself in how the ten thousand things operate, and things thereby take shape; people address them with names, and they are acknowledged as such. Why is something this way? Because it is already acknowledged as this way. Why is it not that way? Because it is already acknowledged as that way.

Things each have grounds on which they are taken to be “so,” and each has what counts as acceptable about them. There is nothing that is not taken to be so, and nothing that is not taken as acceptable. Therefore, pairs as unlike as bamboo chopsticks and a house pillar, an ugly person and Xishi (the famed beauty of the Spring and Autumn period), and all sorts of strange and monstrous things—in the light of the Dao they connect and return to one whole. What distinguishes things from one another is precisely what comes from their having taken form; once formed, they also contain the possibility of ruin. Whether things form or are destroyed, in the end they can all be understood as flowing back into oneness. Only one who has attained thorough understanding knows that the ten thousand things are one in their connectedness.

Therefore one does not insist on forced effort, but entrusts oneself to ordinary, everyday affairs. Ordinary affairs are application; application is thorough penetration; thorough penetration is attainment. To attain appropriately is to be close to the Dao. It is enough to follow things as they already are. If one relies on the mind to strain at sorting the myriad things apart, without knowing that they were originally connected, this is called “morning three.”

What is “morning three”? A keeper of monkeys divided acorns among them and said, “Three in the morning, four in the evening.” The monkeys were all angry. The keeper said, “Then four in the morning, three in the evening.” The monkeys were all pleased. The names and the actual count did not change; only the monkeys’ joy and anger followed the wording. This too is handling things according to how circumstances run. Therefore the sage harmonizes the myriad things through the shifting of “is” and “is not,” so that the heart rests in natural balance; this is called “both lines of yes and no run together”—that is, letting the two ways of speaking each have their course.

Chen Bixu said: As for the parables of zhi and ma, from Sima Biao, Xiang Xiu, and Guo Xiang down to eminent scholars of the Tang, all took them as Zhuangzi’s invented allegories, so each school’s reading of the point differs. Now, examining Gongsun Long’s “On the White Horse” and “Signifiers and Things” among the Six Discourses, one finds already the claims “a white horse is not a horse” and “a signifier is not a signifier,” and one realizes Zhuangzi’s discussion draws on another source.

郭象注自是而非彼天下之常情以我指喻彼指则彼指于我指为非指覆以彼指喻我指则我指于彼复为非指矣彼我同于自是又同于相非此区区者各信是其偏见耳圣人知天地一指万物一马故浩然大宁各得其分同于自得无复是非可于已者即谓之可不可于已谓之不可道无不成物无不然各然其所然可其所可譬夫筳横楹纵厉丑西施好所谓齐者岂必齐形状同规矩哉故恢恑谲怪道通为一夫物或此以为毁而彼以为成我谓所成彼谓之毁者皆生然可其所可譬夫筳横楹纵厉丑西施好所谓齐者岂必齐形状同规矩哉故恢恑谲怪道通为一夫物或此以为毁而彼以为成我谓所成彼谓之毁者皆生于自见而不见彼唯达者无滞于一方寄当于自用因而不作故也不知所以因而因谓之道道即一也达者之于一岂劳神哉若劳神明于为一与彼不一无异矣亦同众狙因所好而自是也是以圣人莫之偏任付之自均听天下之是非两行而已 吕惠卿注以指喻指之非指虽有名实小大之辩不出于同体曷足为非指乎以马喻马之非马虽有毛色驽良之辩不离于同下之是非两行而已
Interpretation

Guo Xiang holds that people habitually take themselves to be right and others to be wrong—a very common pattern. When you measure someone else’s finger by your own, you will decide that the other’s finger does not count as a finger; turn it around and measure yourself by the other’s finger, and you too will be judged not to count as a finger. Each side insists it alone is correct and the other is wrong; such disputes are nothing but each party clinging to its own bias.

The sage understands that Heaven and Earth may be regarded as a single finger, and the myriad things as a single horse. Therefore his mind is broad and at peace; he lets the myriad things each find its place and each be at ease in itself, no longer fixated on who is right and who is wrong. What suits oneself, one treats as suitable; what does not suit oneself, one treats as unsuitable. There is nothing the Dao cannot accomplish, and nothing among the myriad things that fails to stand as what it is. Every thing affirms its own condition and affirms what it takes to be worth having.

This is like a thin bamboo slip laid crosswise and a pillar set upright, an ugly person taken as repulsive and Xi Shi (celebrated in the Spring and Autumn era for her beauty) taken as beautiful. Must “making things equal” mean forcing bodies to look exactly alike and all to match one identical standard? Even the strangest and most anomalous things, under the pervading reach of the Dao, return to oneness. What some call destruction, others call accomplishment; what I call accomplishment, others call destruction. Such judgments all arise from respective viewpoints: each sees only itself and does not see the other.

Only the person of thorough penetration does not remain trapped in any single standpoint. He follows each thing’s proper use, accords with its natural changes, and adds no artificial contrivance. It is not a matter of first knowing some human method and then acting accordingly—this following of the situation is called the Dao; the Dao is also “the One.” Facing the One, why should the person of thorough penetration strain body and mind? If one exhausts thought trying to force the myriad things into unity, that is no different from clinging to their mutual distinctness—it is also like a troop of monkeys each following its own preference and declaring itself right.

Therefore the sage does not favor any side. He lets the myriad things naturally tend toward balance and merely allows the world’s various judgments of right and wrong to coexist without one overpowering another.

Lu Huiqing holds that to judge one finger “not a finger” by another finger—even when the two differ in name or size—they still belong to one whole; how can one therefore say it is not a finger? To judge one horse “not a horse” by another horse—even when coat color and quality differ—they still belong to one kind. In the end, it is simply a matter of letting the world’s differing judgments of right and wrong each stand side by side.

吕惠卿注以指喻指之非指虽有名实小大之辩不出于同体曷足为非指乎以马喻马之非马虽有毛色驽良之辩不离于同曷足为非马乎唯能不由是非而照之于天则出乎同体离乎同然后足以定天下之真是非故天地虽大无异一指以其与我并生而同体也万物虽众无异一马以其与我为一而同也则物之可不可其孰自哉道行之而成非无为而成也物谓之而然非本有而然也其所然所可乃不然不可之所自起而求其为之者不可得则知其本无有此物之所齐也胡为趋舍于其间哉小大美恶固常相反今以道通而一之则其分也乃所以成其成也乃所以毁而万物无成与毁复通为一唯达者知通为一故我则不用寄万物之自用寄物则通通则无入而不自得适得而近道未可以为道以其犹知其然也知是之无体而因之已而不知其然而后通为一故我则不用寄万物之自用寄物则通通则无入而不自得适得而近道未可以为道以其犹知其然也知是之无体而因之已而不知其然而后谓之道道所以通为一者以其小大美恶之所自起有在于是若不知其然劳神明而为之乃所以为不一也犹朝三暮四朝四暮三不离乎七而皆怒皆悦此群狙所以见畜于公而公所以笼群狙也亦因是而已
Interpretation

Lu Huiqing’s commentary runs as follows: To illustrate the claim that “a finger is not a finger,” one may distinguish name from thing, or the greater from the smaller—yet none of these distinctions step outside a single whole; how then can one say it is not a finger? To illustrate that “a horse is not a horse,” one may distinguish coat color, quality, or strength—yet none of these differences leave the same category; how then can one say it is not a horse?

Only when one is not pulled by judgments of right and wrong, and instead looks from the standpoint of the natural Dao—without imposed preconceptions—can one transcend the limits of “one whole” and leave behind the divisions of “one category,” and thereby discern what is truly right and wrong in the world. Thus, though heaven and earth are vast, they do not differ in essence from a single finger, for they arise in the world together with me and belong to the same whole; though the myriad things are many, they do not differ in essence from a single horse, for they merge with me into one body and belong to the same kind among the ten thousand things.

Who, then, decides whether things are acceptable or not? The Dao takes shape in people’s practice; it is not something that forms of itself in idle non-action (wuwei). What people call a thing is what it appears to be—it is not necessarily what it originally is. That things are judged “so” or “acceptable” is precisely what gives rise to their opposites—not so, not acceptable. If one asks who makes these judgments and finds no fixed master, one sees that things have no unchanging standard—why rush among competing choices of take and leave?

Small and large, beautiful and ugly, have always stood opposed; yet when one penetrates them from the angle of the Dao and treats them as one, then a thing’s being distinguished as this very thing is just the condition of its being what it is—and its completion is just the condition of its ruin. Formation and destruction of the myriad things interpenetrate and can ultimately be returned to oneness.

Only the person who has attained clarity understands that the myriad things communicate and are one. Therefore I do not force my own judgments but let each thing function according to its own situation; following the myriad things, one can penetrate; after penetrating, one can be at ease in any circumstance. Yet this ease is only an approach to the Dao, not yet true attainment of the Dao, because one still knows why one is so. To see that “this” has no fixed substance and to act in accord with it—when at last one no longer clings even to knowing why one is so, that is penetration of the myriad things as one.

The Dao can penetrate the myriad things because distinctions such as large and small, beautiful and ugly, each have their arising. If one does not understand these arisings but exhausts the spirit forcing judgments, the myriad things cannot return to oneness.

This is like the tale of “three in the morning, four in the evening”: the keeper gave the monkeys three acorns in the morning and four at night, and they were angry; he changed it to four in the morning and three at night, and they were pleased. The total was still seven. The monkeys were controlled by the keeper, and the keeper merely adjusted his words to the monkeys’ reactions—nothing more.

林疑独注是非各执彼我异情以我指比他指则以我指为是他指为非今欲息是非之辩反以他指为主以比我指则他指为是我指为非矣马喻马其义亦然反覆相喻则彼我既同于自是又同于相非是非同归于道则虽天地之大万物之多近取诸身则一指远取诸物则一马也夫无可无不可无然无不然者天下之至理也可道之道行之而成可物之物同归于道则虽天地之大万物之多近取诸身则一指远取诸物则一马也夫无可无不可无然无不然者天下之至理也可道之道行之而成可物之物谓之而然已以为然而然之巳以为不然而不然之皆不免于所系莫若任物之自然自可纵横美恶复通为一则道无不成物无不然也其分也成也言道防为物其成也毁也有始必有终夫道无成毁成毁者物之独见分木以为器器成而木毁固在造化之闲耳达者废独见而防至理为是不用而寓诸庸盖寄之常用则无徃而不通无入而不自得斯为近道矣道本无通无得为物不通不得所以有通得之名因是而复归于无则已矣既已而不知其然强名之曰道也夫神明在身宜任其自然今劳而求其为一失之远矣何异狙公赋芧朝三暮四名实无亏喜怒为用世人不通至理者与众狙同乎喜怒是以圣人和同乎是非而休乎自然听其两行而归乎一致也陈祥道注近取诸身以明天地则天地一指喜怒是以圣人和同乎是非而休乎自然听其两行而归乎一致也陈祥道注近取诸身以明天地则天地一指也远取诸物以明万物则万物一马也盖天地虽大不离乎有体万物虽众不离乎有用不离有体则于空中犹一指而已不离有用则于天下犹一马而已若夫道则无体而体以之成无用而用以之备无在无不在无为无不为岂一指一马之谓哉
Interpretation

Disputes over right and wrong often arise because each side clings to its own view and treats the other’s position as alien. If you measure “my” finger against “his” finger, you will take your finger as correct and his as wrong; if you reverse the standard and take his finger as the measure, the result becomes that he is right and you are wrong. The same logic applies to the metaphor of the horse. When people compare back and forth in this way, both sides think themselves right and the other wrong. If right and wrong can both be referred back to the Dao, then even though heaven and earth are vast and the myriad things are numerous, taking what is near—oneself—it is no more than a finger; taking what is far—the myriad things—it is no more than a horse.

“There is nothing that must be done, and nothing that must not be done; nothing that is absolutely so, and nothing that is absolutely not so”—this speaks of the most fundamental principle in the world. The “reasons” people talk about only show themselves in practice; the names of things are simply what people call them, and then they are taken as such. If you call it “this,” it is spoken of as this; if you call it “not this,” it is spoken of as not this. Whoever fixates on these judgments is inevitably bound by standpoint. Better to follow the natural state of things themselves and let distinctions such as vertical and horizontal, good and bad, flow back into unity. Then the Dao is accomplished everywhere, and nothing among the myriad things fails to find its place.

Only when things are differentiated do they appear as concrete forms; when a concrete form is fixed, it also means other forms are excluded. Whatever has a beginning must also have an end. The Dao itself has no “forming” or “destroying”; forming and destroying are changes seen from each thing’s own standpoint. Split wood and fashion it into a vessel—when the vessel is finished, the original shape of the timber is altered; that is simply part of the transformations of creation. The person who has attained understanding does not cling to a single viewpoint but grasps the principle of thoroughgoing connection, does not treat some fixed opinion as an absolute standard, and instead entrusts himself to ordinary, everyday things. Then wherever he is and whatever he meets, he can move freely—this is close to the Dao.

Originally the Dao is neither something to “attain” nor something to “reach”; it is only because people are constrained by things that words like “attainment” and “reaching” arise. Once this is understood, one can return to a state without clinging to distinctions—and that is enough. Things are already as they are, yet people may not know why they are so, and then forcibly give that “why” the name “Dao.”

Human numinous clarity (shenming—the spirit and inner luminosity) resides in oneself; one should follow and trust nature. If one strains to force the mind back to “oneness,” one in fact drifts far from the Dao. This is like the monkey keeper in the old fable who divided acorns: three in the morning and four at night; when he changed it to four in the morning and three at night, the total number of acorns did not change, yet the monkeys’ joy and anger shifted with the wording. People who do not penetrate the root principle are like those monkeys, moved by different ways of speaking. The sage harmonizes right and wrong, does not fixate on argument, rests in the natural, and lets opposing sayings each stand on their own—yet in the end they return to one fundamental principle.

Chen Xiangdao’s commentary says: Explaining heaven and earth by what is nearest—oneself—even heaven and earth, for all their vastness, can be compared to a finger; explaining the myriad things by the myriad things themselves—even though they are many, they can be compared to a horse. This is because heaven and earth, however great, do not depart from concrete form; the myriad things, however numerous, do not depart from actual function. As form, heaven and earth in boundless emptiness are no more than a finger; as function, the myriad things at work in the world are no more than a horse. As for the Dao, it has no fixed form, yet through it the forms of things are accomplished; it has no particular function of its own, yet it completes every function. It is nowhere not present, and nothing is not in it; it does not act with deliberate effort, yet nothing fails to be accomplished. Therefore the Dao cannot simply be called one finger or one horse.

陈碧虚注指者指斥是非也凡人之情皆以此为是指彼为非彼不知非又指此为未是因执此指为是而谓彼指为非若天下无有相指者则物自为物不为人强物指自为指不矜此妄指则非指矣且不指物之指元无彼非彼不知非又指此为未是因执此指为是而谓彼指为非若天下无有相指者则物自为物不为人强物指自为指不矜此妄指则非指矣且不指物之指元无彼此是非为指物之指强生彼此是非是为非指也马固有形色舍色命名盖言马耳言马则天下之马一马也白黑不与焉今求色命马故曰白马求白马则黄黑之马去矣是因求色而失其形求色失形则白马非马也若乃时之尚白则以白为是以马为非斯则以非为是以是为非也大怀是非之心而不能齐者指物有彼此忘彼此则虽天地之殊犹一指也分种之多而不能一者形色有去取脱去取则虽万物之繁犹一马也自其同者视之可乎可也自其异者视之不可乎不可也非道行之则败败则孰得之然凡犹一指也分种之多而不能一者形色有去取脱去取则虽万物之繁犹一马也自其同者视之可乎可也自其异者视之不可乎不可也非道行之则败败则孰得之然凡顺理则然于然无物不然也逆理则不然于不然无物然也若诣理全当则无不然无不可而自然防会也夫物状万态形不同惟道通而一之譬工之造器计其成器孰虑其毁朴哉论成则无毁论毁则无成其于道也复通为一故达者因道朴之不为世用而寄诸自用是用之者假不用也知不用之用则有得于适已而尽矣犹有迹存焉知道之深者心防体会而已已而不知其然无因是之迹也若劳神明以为一则如狙公之役知以笼群狙群狙之以喜怒为用亦因是也
Interpretation

Chen Bixu’s commentary explains: “Zhi” (pointing) means to identify and judge right and wrong. Ordinary habit is to treat what one points to as correct and what others point to as mistaken—without realizing that others will likewise deem one wrong and point back. Clinging to one’s own judgments, one insists one is right and others wrong.

If no one in the world accused one another, things would each keep their native state and would not be forcibly defined; “pointing” would remain mere pointing, no longer twisted into arbitrary judgment by self-certainty. What is meant by not pointing at things’ “pointings” is that originally there is no division of “this and that” or right and wrong. Forcibly inventing “this and that” and right and wrong in order to point at things—that is erroneous pointing.

A horse naturally has its own form and color. If one sets color aside and names only by “horse,” one speaks of the horse as such; horses of every kind may be called horses, and white or black does not alter that. If one recognizes horses by color, then what is called a “white horse” excludes yellow and black horses. Thus, in pursuing color one neglects the horse’s whole bodily form—hence the saying “a white horse is not a horse.” If society at the time prized white, people would take white as correct and horse as wrong; that is treating error as right and right as error.

When the heart holds deep prejudices about right and wrong, one cannot see the myriad things as equal. If one can forget the split between “this and that,” then even differences within heaven and earth may be viewed as one; if one can release attachment to kinds and to form and color, then however numerous things may be, they may still be viewed as one. From the angle of sameness, the myriad things may be said to be the same; from the angle of difference, they are indeed not the same. Without following the Dao to know things, judgment goes astray; when judgment goes astray, who can truly benefit?

Looking along with each thing’s principle, the myriad things are each as they are—nothing is not so; looking against each thing’s principle, everything seems wrong—nothing is held to be right. If one fully accords with principle, one sees that nothing among the myriad things is not so and nothing may not be so, and naturally achieves thorough penetration.

The myriad things differ in form and abound in kinds, yet the Dao runs through them and brings them to oneness. This is like a craftsman making vessels: valuing the use of the finished article, who still cares that it was once unworked timber? Speak only of the vessel and not the timber; speak only of the timber and not the vessel. From the Dao’s perspective, the two can be threaded into one. Hence the person who has attained the Way follows the Dao, understands that the unworked, plain state may not suit worldly use yet can host one’s own application; “application” here is precisely what is realized by not forcing application. Understanding “use through non-use,” one can settle oneself at ease and fully grasp the reason within.

Still, understanding in this way leaves traces of deliberate effort. One who truly deeply knows the Dao only apprehends it in the heart and merges with it; after apprehension, one no longer knows why it is so, and does not leave traces of consciously following some doctrine. To exhaust mind and strength forcing the myriad things into oneness is like the trainer who uses his cleverness to manage a troop of monkeys—the troop is still led by his moods of pleasure and anger. That too is acting by means of artificial distinction and control.

王雱注举指马以喻非指非马据心防体会而已已而不知其然无因是之迹也若劳神明以为一则如狙公之役知以笼群狙群狙之以喜怒为用亦因是也 王雱注举指马以喻非指非马据此已有指有马矣故必至于未始有物而后为得也天地异体万物异用有体故虽大而均于有在有用故虽众而均于有穷若无不该无不遍者岂一指一马之谓乎万物之变固自有可不可然不然者但当防夫至理不系于心而已道无不成物无不然则可不可然不然皆为至理合乎至理则物之纵横美恶皆为一矣道又防而为物终则有始也成毁者物之妄见防于理则无成与毁道通为一也虽然固不废万物之成毁但寄之常用而不自有耳故无徃而不通通则得得则近矣若劳神明而为一岂知其同哉故继以狙公之喻朝暮虽异而芧无增减事变虽而心无得失任世情而不神明而为一岂知其同哉故继以狙公之喻朝暮虽异而芧无增减事变虽而心无得失任世情而不核至理未有不同乎众狙者圣人则知是非之有无而听其两行也
Interpretation

In his commentary, Wang An uses “finger” and “horse” as illustrations: one should not fixate on the finger or the horse as such, but grasp the relations among things. If one then insists that there really are fingers and horses, one is still caught in concrete particulars; only when one reaches the state of “there has never yet been any thing” (no longer clinging to the separateness of things) has one truly understood.

Heaven and earth each have their form; the ten thousand things each have their function. Whatever has form, however vast, is bounded by the limits of existence; whatever has function, however numerous, also has a point where it is exhausted. If one says “nothing is not included, nothing is not pervaded,” can that refer merely to a single finger or a single horse?

Amid the transformations of the ten thousand things, there are naturally distinctions of permissible and impermissible, of right and wrong; one need only hold to the root principle and not let the mind be pulled about by these distinctions. The Dao accomplishes nothing that does not succeed; the ten thousand things likewise each establish themselves. Permissible and impermissible, right and wrong—each accords with the root principle. Viewed in accord with principle, the ten thousand things, whatever their forms or whether fair or foul, can all be returned to oneness.

The Dao is hidden within the ten thousand things; when things end, there is again a new beginning. So-called completion and ruin are distinctions people draw from changes in things; from the perspective of principle, there is no absolute completion or ruin. That the Dao and the ten thousand things communicate as one does not mean that the completion, ruin, and change of things do not exist—it only means one should follow ordinary changes as they come, without taking them as one’s own possession. Therefore, in whatever situation one finds oneself, one can be penetrating; being penetrating, one gains insight, and thus draws near to the Dao.

If one exhausts mental effort trying to force the ten thousand things into a single unity, how can one truly understand that they were originally interconnected? Hence the text goes on to the story of the “monkey keeper”: he gave the monkeys three acorns in the morning and four in the evening, then changed to four in the morning and three in the evening. The way of speaking changed, but the total number of acorns did not increase or decrease. Affairs in the world change in endless ways, yet the mind need not rise and fall with gain and loss. If one merely follows worldly moods and does not examine the root principle, one will be like those monkeys, led by surface differences. The sage understands the relativity of right and wrong and lets the various ways of speaking each run their course in parallel.

赵虚斋注知指之外别有运动之者则知指之非指知马之外别有驱驰之者则知马之非马指马有形者也非指非马无形者也以有形喻形之非形不若以无形喻形之非形也则知天地之运万物之生皆别有主宰之者求之于天地万物之外可不可然不然纵横美恶恢恑谲怪是非成毁复通为一则无是非虽是亦不用也庸常也常者无用之用所以为通通则得得则近于道矣因是巳巳则不特非者息是者亦息是非皆息而犹不知其然是未尝有真知而离形去智以为坐忘非劳而何神即明也明即神也朝三暮四即朝四暮三惑于是非先后而不知其同也狙公因众狙之为坐忘非劳而何神即明也明即神也朝三暮四即朝四暮三惑于是非先后而不知其同也狙公因众狙之喜而从之亦因是也
Interpretation

Zhao Xuzhai explained: Beyond the finger, there is another force that makes it move; therefore one knows that “finger” is not merely the finger itself. Beyond the horse, there is another force that drives it to run; therefore one knows that “horse” is not merely the horse itself. Fingers and horses are things with form; if one wishes to show that what has form is not its true essence, it is better to use what has no form to explain it.

From this one can know that the turning of heaven and earth and the growth of the ten thousand things each have another power that governs them. If one seeks beyond heaven, earth, and the ten thousand things, one finds that possible and impossible, so and not-so, crisscrossing, beautiful and ugly, and all sorts of strange and bizarre matters, together with right and wrong and success and failure, can in the end connect and return to one whole. Since that is so, there is no fixed, unchanging right and wrong; even if one takes something as “right,” one need not cling to that.

“Yong” has the sense of the ordinary. The ordinary Way is precisely the principle that seems useless yet can function; when one has penetrated it, one gains something and draws near to the Dao. Acting in accord with things as they naturally are, disputes over right and wrong cease—not only does the side deemed wrong stop arguing; the side deemed right stops as well. After right and wrong have dissolved, still not insisting on tracing causes and reasons—only then is one not artificially chasing “true knowing.”

What is called “leaving form and discarding cleverness” is freeing oneself from attachment to the body and to artifice; “sitting and forgetting” means in quiet sitting forgetting the body and discriminating mind. If one treats these as deliberate practices to pursue, they become wearisome instead. Shen is clarity, and clarity is Shen. “Three in the morning and four at night” and “four in the morning and three at night” are originally the same; the monkeys were confused by the order of distribution and did not see that there was no real difference. The keeper arranged things the way the troop liked—that too was complying with how things naturally stood.

鬳斋口义云指手指也以我指为是指则以人指为非指彼非指之人又以我指为非指物我对立是非不可得而定也马博塞筹礼记投壶篇下马有多寡博者之相是非亦然缘有彼我故有是非若天职覆地职载亦岂可以彼我分乎此言物论之不可不齐也可者可之不可者不可之道行而成皆自然也物谓而然底便是亦何所然何所不然言物物分上本来有所然有所可既无物不然无物不可横直者各当其分美恶者各全其质皆通而一之归诸造物也凡物无毁则无成无成则无毁如伐木以作室室成本来有所然有所可既无物不然无物不可横直者各当其分美恶者各全其质皆通而一之归诸造物也凡物无毁则无成无成则无毁如伐木以作室室成而木毁知此理则去其是者不用而寓诸庸常以为用随用皆通通则得得则尽矣人有劳苦神明自为一偏之而不知理本同者谓之朝三做此二字以设喻与方生文法同名实未变喜怒随之喻是非之名虽异而实理则同但能因是则世自无争而任是非之两行也
Interpretation

The Yizhai kouyi says: “Zhi” means the finger. If one takes one’s own finger as the correct way of pointing, one will deem another person’s way of pointing wrong; and the one deemed wrong will in turn insist that his own way is right. Thus people stand opposed to one another, and right and wrong cannot be fixed.

“Ma bose chou” appears in the “Touhu” section under the Record of Rites: in the pitch-pot game, the counting tallies vary in number. Judgments of right and wrong among players likewise differ, like tallies that are more or less, because each side’s standpoint differs. Yet Heaven covers the myriad things and Earth bears them—can that too be divided by opposing standstands? This shows that discourse about the myriad things should not cling to one side’s right and wrong, but should let views connect and align.

What one approves, one calls acceptable; what one disapproves, one calls unacceptable. When affairs are carried out and outcomes form, all of this is spontaneous. Each thing in its way finds it so and approves it so, and each has its “thus it is” and its merit. Originally each thing has its fitting place: nothing is wholly against reason, and no affair is absolutely impossible. Crooked and straight each accord with their allotment; beautiful and ugly each preserve their nature. Thread these differences together and return them to the formative power that generates the myriad things.

Destruction and completion among things depend on each other: without destruction there is no completion; without completion there is nothing to call destruction. For example, felling timber to build a house—when the house stands, the timber is destroyed. Understanding this, one need not fix on one judgment of right and wrong, but should lodge oneself in ordinary things and employ them by following their course. However one applies them, one can penetrate; penetration yields gain, and gain exhausts the principle.

When people are trapped by toil, the mind easily fixates on one doctrine and fails to see that the principle was always interconnected. “Zhao san” (morning three) is a parable; its manner of expression matches sayings of the “fang sheng” (mutual arising) type: names and reality do not change, yet joy and anger shift with them. It likens how names of right and wrong differ while the reasoning behind them connects. So long as one views problems by following how things originally are, strife in the world naturally lessens, and various rights and wrongs can coexist.

禇氏管见云彼我异情是非互指东家之西即西家之东天地之先亦太极之后此亘古今而不齐者也而真人举非指非马之喻可谓善齐物论矣以指喻指之非指氏管见云彼我异情是非互指东家之西即西家之东天地之先亦太极之后此亘古今而不齐者也而真人举非指非马之喻可谓善齐物论矣以指喻指之非指常人之见也以非指喻指之非指至人之见也非马之义亦然世之至见少而常见多则天地一指万物一马之论又所以重增其惑也其请解之曰所异者天下之情所同者天下之理一理可以通万情则非指亦是也万物不能归一理则是马亦非也盖指马涉乎形迹所以不免是非非指非马则超乎形数言议之表故天地虽大而一指可明以其与我并生也万物虽多而一言可喻以其与我为一也凡得其情而通其理则物虽万殊融会在我事隔千里契之以心古之一群情有大物者得诸此太上指可明以其与我并生也万物虽多而一言可喻以其与我为一也凡得其情而通其理则物虽万殊融会在我事隔千里契之以心古之一群情有大物者得诸此太上云得一万事毕此物之所齐论之所止而非言之极议也欤
Interpretation

Chu’s Guanjian (Limited Views) observes that when people stand on different sides, their judgments of right and wrong can point at each other and invert one another. What the east household calls “west” is what the west household calls “east”; what is called the beginning of Heaven and Earth can also be said to come after the Supreme Ultimate (Taiji). Such differences have existed from antiquity to the present. The perfected person uses the parables of “finger” and “horse” to show that the myriad things can be equalized—truly a fine way to unfold the meaning of Discourse on Equalizing Things.

To use “finger” to illustrate that “a finger is not a finger” is the ordinary person’s view; to use “not-finger” to explain that “a finger is not a finger” is the utmost person’s insight. The same holds for “not-horse.” In the world, refined views are few and ordinary views are many, so a saying like “Heaven and Earth are no more than a finger, the myriad things no more than a horse” tends to increase confusion instead.

How then should one explain it? People’s situations under Heaven differ, yet the principles under Heaven can connect. If one principle runs through ten thousand situations, then “not-finger” can also be called “is”; if the myriad things cannot be gathered into one principle, then “is horse” can also be called “is not.” “Finger” and “horse” touch concrete form and outward signs, so they easily fall into dispute over right and wrong; “not-finger” and “not-horse” go beyond form, number, and the range of words and debate.

Heaven and Earth are vast, yet they can be explained by “one finger,” because Heaven and Earth exist together with me; the myriad things are numerous, yet they can be grasped in one saying, because the myriad things and I are originally one body. If one can observe how things are and penetrate their principle, then even when the myriad things differ, they can merge in the mind; affairs a thousand leagues apart can still meet in the heart. What the ancients meant by “the feelings of the multitude” and “the great thing” is understood in just this way.

Taishang says, “Obtain the One, and the ten thousand affairs are complete”—meaning that when you gain the root principle, the ten thousand affairs run through. That is the state to which the principle of equalizing the myriad things can arrive, and where discussion can stop; but it is not the end of words and debate.

古之人其知有所至矣恶乎至有以为未始有物者至矣尽矣不可以有加矣其次以为有物矣而未始有封也其次以为有封焉而未始有是非也是非之彰也道之所以亏也道之所以亏爱之所以成果且有成与亏乎哉果且无成与亏乎哉有成与亏故昭氏之鼓琴也无成与亏故昭氏之不鼓琴也昭文之鼓琴也师旷之枝策也惠子之据梧也三子之知几乎皆其盛者也故载之末年唯其好之以异于彼其好之也欲以明之鼓琴也师旷之枝策也惠子之据梧也三子之知几乎皆其盛者也故载之末年唯其好之以异于彼其好之也欲以明之彼非所明而明之故以坚白之昩终而其子又以文之纶终终身无成若是而可谓成乎虽我亦成也若是而不可谓成乎物与我无成也是故滑疑之耀圣人之所图也为是不用而寓诸庸此之谓以明
Interpretation

In ancient times, some people’s understanding reached the ultimate level. What is that ultimate level? It is the view that at the beginning, nothing had ever come into being at all. Such understanding is already extreme; nothing more can be added to it.

Next is the view that things already exist but have not yet been distinguished from one another. Still further down is the view that distinctions exist but that “this” and “not this” have not yet been marked out. Once right and wrong appear, the Dao is thereby diminished; when the Dao is diminished, partiality and attachment arise. But is there really “completion” and “loss”? Or is there in fact no completion and no loss at all?

If one holds that there is completion and loss, then when Zhao Wen played the zither, the music acquired success and failure, gain and loss. If one holds that there is no completion and loss, then when Zhao Wen did not play, there was nothing to count as success or failure, gain or loss. Zhao Wen playing the zither, Shi Kuang beating time with his staff, and Hui Shi leaning on the parasol tree to discourse on principle—the wisdom of these three approached the highest realm, and each excelled in his own way. Therefore they spent their whole lives absorbed in what they loved. Because these pursuits differed from others’, they wished to use them to display their insight.

Yet what they wanted to display was never something that could truly be displayed. Forcing display, they fell into the confusion of the “hardness and whiteness” debate. Hui Shi’s son, in turn, spent his life inheriting Hui Shi’s disputatious doctrines. To live one’s whole life without achievement—can that be called achievement? If that counts as achievement, then I too have achievement. If it does not, then all things and I alike are neither successful nor failed.

Therefore what the sage seeks is to dissolve disorder, doubt, and the glare of showing off cleverness. He does not cling to these disputes but rests his mind in ordinary affairs. This is called “using clarity”—understanding things by aligning with how they are in themselves.

郭象注人而知夫未始有物则外不察乎宇宙内不觉其一身故旷然无累无所不应其次有物而未有封虽未都忘犹能忘其彼此其次有封而未有是非虽未忘彼此犹能忘彼此之是非无是非道乃全道亏则情有所偏而爱有所成果且有无成亏与乎哉夫声不可胜举也故吹此犹能忘彼此之是非无是非道乃全道亏则情有所偏而爱有所成果且有无成亏与乎哉夫声不可胜举也故吹管操虽有繁手遗声多矣而执钥鸣者欲以彰声也彰声而声遗不彰声而声全故欲成而亏者昭文之鼓琴不成而无亏昭文不鼓琴也夫三子者皆欲辩非已所明而明之故知尽形劳枝策假寤据梧而瞑赖其盛故能久不尔早困也三子自以殊于众人欲使同已所好而彼竟不明故已之道术终于昩然文之子又终文之绪亦卒不成若三子而可谓成则我之不成亦成也若是而不可谓成物与我无成也圣人各防其所能彼竟不明故已之道术终于昩然文之子又终文之绪亦卒不成若三子而可谓成则我之不成亦成也若是而不可谓成物与我无成也圣人各防其所能曲成而不遗今三子欲以已之所好明彼不亦妄乎圣人无我者也滑疑之耀则图而域之恢恑谲怪则通而一之使群异各安所安众人不失所是则已不用而万物之用用矣放荡之变倔奇之异曲而从之用虽万殊历然自明也
Interpretation

Guo Xiang’s commentary explains that if a person understands that from the very beginning there were never really any myriad things, they will no longer cling outwardly to heaven, earth, and the cosmos, nor inwardly to their own body. Their mind becomes open and unburdened, and they can respond to all things.

Next, if one holds that the myriad things already exist but have not yet been marked off from one another, although one has not altogether forgotten the myriad things, one can still forget the distinctions among them. Still further, when the myriad things already have their respective boundaries but judgments of right and wrong have not yet arisen, although one cannot forget the differences among them, one can still forget praise and blame toward one another. Without discriminations of right and wrong, the Dao can remain whole; once the Dao suffers loss, feelings and intentions incline to one side, and likes and preferences become partial. As for completion and loss, being and non-being—what fixed standard can there be?

The sounds of music cannot all be fully expressed in words. When one blows on pipes or plucks strings, no matter how intricate the technique, many tones are inevitably left out. If the performer fixates on making every sound conspicuous, the sound itself is diminished; only by not striving to display it can sound be complete. Thus seeking completion in fact produces loss. Zhao Wen was skilled at the zither yet could not bring every tone to perfection; had he not played at all, there would have been no such shortcoming.

Those three men each wished to use principles they did not truly grasp to refute others and prove their own views, until their hearts and minds were exhausted and their bodies worn out. Zhice refers to propping up one’s arms or resting with the aid of implements; juwu refers to leaning against a parasol tree for rest. Only by relying on such expedients could they barely sustain themselves for long; otherwise they would long since have been worn down in distress. The three believed themselves exceptional and wanted others to accept what they cherished, yet others never truly understood, so their own Dao practices ultimately appeared dim and confused. Wen’s son finally inherited his father’s pursuit, yet he too achieved no success.

If what those three did counts as success, then my own lack of success could also count as success; if even that cannot be called success, then the myriad things and I alike have no such thing as success or failure. Sages each deploy what they are capable of, accommodating the diverse circumstances of the myriad things so that each thing is brought to completion and nothing is left out. Now these three wish to persuade others by their personal preferences—is that not arbitrary presumption?

Sages have no private, self-centered views. Toward strange, variegated things that are hard to discern clearly, they observe and demarcate their scope; toward vast, uncanny phenomena that shift unpredictably, they connect them with one another and return them to unity. In this way, the myriad different things each settle into their own place, the multitude do not lose their respective judgments, and the sage need not act personally—the efficacy of the myriad things manifests on its own. Toward things that are unrestrained, changeable, and extraordinarily odd, the sage also bends and accommodates them flexibly. Though the efficacies of the myriad things differ in countless ways, each appears clearly in its own right.

吕惠卿注道无不在则物无非道物无非道则道外无物此古之人所以为未始有物能即物而为道者也知止于此则至矣其次以为有物而未有封域未能即物为道而能以道通物其次以为有封而未有是非未能以道通物而能遗物以合道二者所知虽未尽善于道犹未亏也至于是非之彰道所以亏道亏而情生爱之所以成也然自达者观之未始有物果且有无成亏乎哉昭氏之鼓琴师旷之枝策惠子之据梧明有无成亏之意亦几矣若而情生爱之所以成也然自达者观之未始有物果且有无成亏乎哉昭氏之鼓琴师旷之枝策惠子之据梧明有无成亏之意亦几矣若是而可谓成则无成者亦成也若是而不可谓成则物与我卒无成也奈何役心于有无成亏之间而欲以为成哉凡光耀未尽以滑吾心而疑于有无者犹图而去之复归于明而后止况容有物乎所以为是不用而寄诸万物之自功此之谓以明
Interpretation

Lü Huiqing’s commentary runs as follows: The Dao is nowhere absent, so there is nothing that is not the Dao; since the ten thousand things are all Dao, there is nothing outside the Dao. This is what the ancients meant by “nothing has yet taken form as a thing”—not that the world is literally empty, but that one realizes things and the Dao were never separate, and can discern the Dao through concrete things.

When understanding reaches this point, it is already very high. Those one step below acknowledge that things exist, yet hold that things have not yet been marked off from one another; they cannot yet discern the Dao directly in things, but can use the Dao to penetrate the ten thousand things. Still lower are those who think things already have boundaries but not yet right and wrong among them; they cannot use the Dao to penetrate things, but can let go of attachment to particular things in order to align with the Dao. Though neither of these two levels is fully complete, their grasp of the Dao is still not impaired.

Once distinctions of right and wrong appear, the Dao is damaged by that; when the Dao is damaged, human feelings arise and partiality and clinging take shape. Yet from the perspective of the person who has attained clarity, since things from the outset have never truly “begun to exist” as separate entities, could there really be a divide between “being and non-being,” “completion and loss”?

Zhao Shi (a master of the qin) played the zither, Shi Kuang (an ancient music master) beat time with his staff, and Hui Shi (a philosopher of the School of Names) leaned on a parasol tree in debate—all showing their grasp of the principle of being/non-being and completion/loss, and coming very close to the mark. If such cases are called achievement, then “no achievement” also counts as a kind of achievement; if they cannot be called achievement, then the ten thousand things and I ultimately achieve nothing. Why should the mind be ruled by the split between being/non-being and completion/loss, and still hope to gain achievement through that?

Whenever inner clarity is not yet pure and doubts about being and non-being arise from distracting thoughts, those doubts should be resolved one by one until one returns to clarity—that is true rest; how much more so when the heart still harbors attachment to the ten thousand things? Therefore the sage does not force outcomes by subjective intent, but lets each thing play its own part. This is what is meant by “using clarity”—illuminating the ten thousand things with a clear mind.

林疑独注死生物之至大能无死生则余物不待无而自无故以为未始有物者至矣其次有物而未有封未忘死生为有物犹未至于彼此封疆也其次有封大能无死生则余物不待无而自无故以为未始有物者至矣其次有物而未有封未忘死生为有物犹未至于彼此封疆也其次有封而未有是非离俗学道已有封矣犹能知彼我异情任其自是自非而无是非也夫道体浑沦本无彼此是非既立各止一隅此道之所以亏爱之所以成有爱则有恶而彼是具焉君子论道本以救亏而言有所彰更成分别故庄子于此不定成亏之有无得意忘言有在于是古之圣人极高明则寂然不动此昭氏之不鼔琴也道中庸则感而遂通此昭氏之鼓琴也师旷之枝策惠子之据梧有无得意忘言有在于是古之圣人极高明则寂然不动此昭氏之不鼔琴也道中庸则感而遂通此昭氏之鼓琴也师旷之枝策惠子之据梧三子之知皆近道而未至然其艺术之盛载之末年言终身不悟也不尽性则滑不穷理则疑耀者光之防也圣人之所图在在于觉而在于妄故寄之众人之常用而能不寐也陈祥道注太易者未见气也而体之者以为未始有物至矣尽矣太初者气之始而体之者以生为防以死为反太始者形之始而体之者以无有为首以生为体以死为尻盖以生死为防反者已犯于物而未离乎道故未始有封有封者德也以无有生死为首体尻者已囿于封未涉于事故未有是非道未尝亏而亏于是非之彰爱末尝成而成于道之所亏道朴也是非器也器成则朴毁道江湖也爱濡沬也江湖失则濡沫兴此成毁之所成而成于道之所亏道朴也是非器也器成则朴毁道江湖也爱濡沬也江湖失则濡沫兴此成毁之所以长相仍而庄子亦不定言其有无在人以意求之夫不资物而乐天乐也资物而乐人乐也后昭文师旷惠子之乐皆不免于资物其好徒异于众人身之所欲明者卒于似是而非也凡物未尝无成亦未尝有成以俗观三子之术则无不成此所以耀矣不光而天下为之滑疑也陈碧虚注未始有物即游于物之初谓几者也其次有物而未有封嗒然防偶之谓也其次有封而未有是非吾防我汝知之乎是也是非彰而道亏道亏爱所以成果且有无成亏乎哉昭文师旷惠子之技性所长者而欲使性短者明之则知尽精竭不能两得也大意在乎自明自治而已若以明示他人皆鬻技者也安可谓之成哉圣人以精奇哉昭文师旷惠子之技性所长者而欲使性短者明之则知尽精竭不能两得也大意在乎自明自治而已若以明示他人皆鬻技者也安可谓之成哉圣人以精奇卓异之事为爚乱非常故规画限域处物之分内而寄诸自用则三子之技各有所明矣
Interpretation

Lin Yidu holds that birth and death are the greatest transformation among the myriad things. If one can transcend birth and death, the passing away of other things need not be feared; therefore, to regard the myriad things as never having existed is the deepest level. Next is to recognize that things exist but that boundaries between them have not yet been drawn: one has not yet escaped the idea of birth and death, but things are not yet divided into separate domains. Still further, things already have boundaries but there is not yet distinction between right and wrong. Even when a person leaves the world to study the Dao, the mind may still harbor a sense of self and other; if one can understand that each side’s situation differs and allow each its own judgment without clinging to who is right or wrong, one will not be trapped by right and wrong.

The substance of the Dao is originally undifferentiated unity, without self and other or right and wrong. Once these distinctions are fixed and each side holds to its corner, the Dao is diminished. Favoring one side leads to rejecting the other, and thus self and other and right and wrong arise. When the noble person discusses principle, the intent is to repair this diminishment; yet once principle is stated clearly and distinctly, the distinctions may deepen instead. Hence Zhuangzi does not definitively say whether the Dao is whole or diminished, but asks people to grasp the meaning and forget the words.

When the ancient sages reached the highest clarity, they were still and silent, like Zhao Wen not playing the zither; when they accorded with ordinary things and responded in penetration, it was like Zhao Wen playing the zither. Shi Kuang (the master musician) leaned on his staff, and Huizi (Hui Shi) rested against the parasol tree—their skill and insight approached the Dao but had not yet reached it. Their talents flourished, yet even in old age they had not fully awakened. Failing to exhaust one’s innate nature leads easily to disturbance; failing to exhaust principle leads to doubt. When brilliance shows forth, it can also confuse. What the sage does is awaken people, not lead them into delusion. Therefore Zhuangzi lodges meaning in everyday things so that people may awaken within them.

Chen Xiangdao holds that “Great Easy” (Taiyi) is the state before qi has appeared; those who penetrate this level regard the myriad things as never having existed— the deepest level. “Great Beginning” (Taichu) is the start of qi; those at this level treat birth as beginning and death as return. “Great Start” (Taishi) is the beginning of form; those here treat the formless as beginning, birth as the body, and death as the body’s resting place. To treat birth and death as beginning and return already falls into concrete things and has not left the Dao; when each thing has its boundary, that is the scope of De. To treat formlessness and birth and death as head and tail of the body is already bound by limits but has not yet entered dispute over right and wrong.

The Dao originally knows no diminishment; only when right and wrong appear does it seem diminished. Affection originally has no fixed shape; only when the Dao is diminished does partiality arise. The Dao is plain and undifferentiated; right and wrong are like formed vessels—once the vessel takes shape, plainness is broken. The Dao is like a great river or lake; partiality is like fish moistening one another with spit when the waters dry. When the lake dries, fish use spit to wet each other. These transformations alternate endlessly; Zhuangzi does not decide for them whether they are completion or ruin, but lets each person examine them by their own understanding.

Joy that does not depend on external things is Heaven’s joy; joy that depends on external things is human joy. The pleasures of Zhao Wen, Shi Kuang, and Huizi all depended on externals—they merely loved different things from ordinary people. What their bodies delighted in ultimately seemed right yet might not truly accord with the Dao. The myriad things can neither be said to have no formation at all nor to be fully formed. In worldly eyes all three succeeded in their arts; yet if such display does not accord with the Dao, it can confuse people under Heaven.

Chen Bixu holds that “the myriad things never existed” is the mind roaming at the beginning of things—hidden within things without clinging to traces; “things exist but without boundaries” is a state of undifferentiated unity; “boundaries without right and wrong” is the kind of realm Zhuangzi means by “I have lost myself—do you understand?” (forgetting the ego’s fixed views and quieting the heart-mind). Once right and wrong stand out, the Dao is diminished and partiality is born. Whether these levels and changes count as completion or ruin has no fixed answer.

Zhao Wen, Shi Kuang, and Huizi each had innate gifts. To make those whose nature is not suited to such arts understand their skill would exhaust the mind and still not satisfy both sides. The point is to know oneself and cultivate oneself; to display one’s skill for others is to live by craft—how can that be called truly reaching the Dao? Sages do not treat extraordinary skill as the Dao but regard it as something that easily disturbs the mind. They mark out each thing’s proper scope so that the myriad things each rest in their place, and keep skill for personal use; thus the abilities of Zhao Wen, Shi Kuang, and Huizi each have something worth taking from them.

赵虚斋注列子曰生物者则不得谓之无无极而太极也太极则有阴阳是谓有封阴阳分而刚柔有体善恶生焉喜怒哀乐未发则未始有物谓之中则未始无物喜怒哀乐封也中节不中节是非之彰也中既发则性动而情矣爱者情之根本有动静则有成亏矣昭文之琴非师旷不知其音惠子之辩非庄子不知其防三子各造于妙而不鼓之鼓不听之听不辩之辩而情矣爱者情之根本有动静则有成亏矣昭文之琴非师旷不知其音惠子之辩非庄子不知其防三子各造于妙而不鼓之鼓不听之听不辩之辩盖未之知也故庄子后之庄子自谓所以异惠子者我之所明异于彼彼于不足明而明之虽肆坚白同异之辩终于昏昩不明若昭文之子不知无之终于无成而已如此而谓之成亦可谓之不成亦可皆不系乎其真是故滑乱疑惑之中而明出焉圣人之所尚也
Interpretation

When Zhao Xuzhai commented on the Liezi, he said: whatever can give rise to the myriad things cannot be called “nothing.” From Wuji—the root before any distinction appears—to Taiji (Supreme Ultimate), the state in which yin and yang have not yet split but already hold the root of generation and transformation, Taiji contains yin and yang, and with that come boundary and distinction. When yin and yang divide, hard and soft take shape, and good and evil arise along with them.

Before joy, anger, sorrow, and delight have stirred, things seem not yet to show themselves; yet to call this state “the center” (zhong) does not mean there is literally nothing within it. Once the four emotions appear, distinction arises; whether feeling stays within proper measure, and right and wrong, become visible from that. When the center stirs, innate nature becomes active and turns into emotion. Love is the root of emotion; where there is movement and stillness, there is gain and loss.

Zhao Wen was skilled at the zither, but without encountering Shi Kuang—the master who could discern tones—no one would understand his playing. Hui Shi was skilled at disputation, but without encountering Zhuangzi no one would grasp his subtlety. All three had reached exquisite refinement, yet none truly understood the realm of “drumming without drumming” (grasping the zither without relying on striking strings), “listening without listening” (apprehending sound without relying on the ear), or “arguing without arguing” (seeing the point without relying on debate).

Therefore Zhuangzi later held that his difference from Hui Shi lay in what each understood: what he himself saw clearly was not what Hui Shi was pursuing. Hui Shi took what need not be clung to and made it the stuff of debate; even if he elaborated “separating hardness and whiteness” and “identifying difference and sameness” (disputes over the attributes and unity of things), in the end he remained in obscurity. If Zhao Wen’s son did not understand the mystery contained in a stringless zither, he would ultimately achieve nothing. Such an outcome can be called achievement or non-achievement; what matters is whether one truly understands. What the sage values is clarity that shines forth amid confusion and bewilderment.

鬳斋口义云此一段固是自天地之初来然会此理者眼前便是且如一念未起是未始有物此念既起便是有物因此念而有物有我便是有封因物而我有好恶喜怒便有非是未能回思一念未起之时但见胸次胶扰便是道亏而爱成及此一过依然无事便见得何尝有成亏若能如此体认皆是切身受用先成亏之理却以鼓琴喻之继以师旷惠子三子之技皆有盛名于世以终其身三子之好自以为无事便见得何尝有成亏若能如此体认皆是切身受用先成亏之理却以鼓琴喻之继以师旷惠子三子之技皆有盛名于世以终其身三子之好自以为异于天下故夸以明之而听者不能晓故终身无成坚白公孙龙之事庄子却以为惠子但借其分辩坚白之名耳滑乱而可疑似明不明也言圣人之心所主未尝着迹故所见若有若无图字训欲圣人之所欲者正若此所以去其是不用而寓诸寻常之中此之谓以明
Interpretation

In this section of the Yizhai Oral Exposition, although the discussion begins with the primordial state of heaven and earth, those who grasp its meaning can verify it in ordinary affairs right before their eyes. For example, before a single thought has arisen, one may speak of “nothing has yet taken form” (wei shi you wu); once a thought arises, there is something thought of and a distinction of “self” appears, and a boundary is drawn. As things are distinguished, likes and dislikes, joy and anger follow, and right and wrong come into being.

If one cannot turn back and inspect the state before the thought arose, and only feels turmoil and agitation in the chest, then the Dao has been harmed and partiality and clinging arise from that. When that thought passes and all returns to stillness, one sees: where is there truly gain or loss? To experience this in one’s own person is cultivation that truly avails.

The scripture first explains the principle of “completion” (cheng) and “deficiency” (kui), then uses playing the drum and qin as a simile; it then mentions the three masters Shi Kuang, Hui Shi, and others. Relying on their specialties, they were renowned all their lives, yet they treated their own pursuits as extraordinary, boasting without end, while listeners could not follow—so in the end they never truly achieved completion. When Zhuangzi speaks of Gongsun Long’s debate on “hard and white” (jian bai), he suggests that Hui Shi merely used parsing the categories of hard and white to display rhetorical skill; such talk seems right yet is wrong, leaving one perplexed and unable to judge clearly.

The sage’s mind never clings to fixed traces, so it seems to attain something and yet seems to grasp nothing. The character tu is glossed as yu (desire): what the sage desires is precisely this—not to hold fast to some fixed right and wrong, but to rest the heart in ordinary things; this is called “using clarity” (yi ming)—discriminating without fixation.

古之人贵真知而遣妄知去滞有而存妙有所以保性命之真全自然之道也人心浇漓世道愈降有物以窒其虚明有封以限其疆域物我对而是非彰是非彰而道亏爱成也果且有无成亏乎哉又重提唱以警省人心俾悟夫齐物之本旨也夫成亏者物心浇漓世道愈降有物以窒其虚明有封以限其疆域物我对而是非彰是非彰而道亏爱成也果且有无成亏乎哉又重提唱以警省人心俾悟夫齐物之本旨也夫成亏者物之粗迹信能复乎无物何成亏之有昭文鼓琴之至精以其未超乎形声度数故不逃成亏枝策谓以杖系乐据梧者几谈论此师旷惠子之所长各以其能自是至老好之不衰非唯已好之又将以明彼不度彼之所宜徒强聒以求合以至昩然而终莫觉莫悟而文之子又以纶终终身无成明前三子成于技而亏于道固自以为成文之子既亏于技又亏于道亦自以为是言彼是之子又以纶终终身无成明前三子成于技而亏于道固自以为成文之子既亏于技又亏于道亦自以为是言彼是之各偏成亏之无定也滑疑之耀谓三子之技滑乱于世而疑耳目故圣人之所图为此不可用寓之于常道求以渐复其初是谓善用其光而不耀者也
Interpretation

The ancients valued genuine insight and discarded false understanding; they released attachment to concrete things and preserved the mysterious intangible "being," thereby guarding the authentic nature of life and preserving the way of nature. Later, people's hearts grew increasingly shallow, and the customs of the world declined from generation to generation: external things blocked the mind's inherent clarity, and fixed opinions drew boundaries around what could be known; self and external things stood opposed, right and wrong appeared accordingly, and once right and wrong were sharply divided, the Dao was harmed and partiality took shape. Do things truly have completion and loss?

The author raises this point again to remind people to examine their inner selves and grasp the fundamental aim of the Discourse on Making Things Equal. So-called completion and loss are merely surface signs of things. If one can truly return to a state without objects of attachment, what completion or loss would remain?

Zhaowen (an ancient master of the zither) played with supreme skill, yet because he was still bound by physical form, sound, and the rules of pitch and rhythm, he could never escape completion and loss in the end. What Zhi Ce (beating time with a staff) and Ju Wu (leaning on a armrest to discourse) represent are the respective talents of Shi Kuang (a master musician) and Hui Shi (a master debater). Each took his own ability as right and never tired of it even into old age; not only did they delight in it themselves, they wanted to use it to prove that others ought to accept it too. They paid no heed to whether the other party was suited to it and simply argued forcefully for agreement, until in the end they remained confused and unresolved. Zhaowen's disciples in turn made playing the zither their lifelong occupation, yet in the end achieved nothing.

This shows that the first three men gained in skill yet lost in the Dao, and still thought they had achieved something; Zhaowen's disciples neither mastered the skill nor grasped the Dao, yet still considered themselves in the right. These examples indicate that what each calls "right" and "wrong," completion and loss, are only one-sided partial views; completion and loss have no fixed standard.

"Slippery doubt's radiance" means that the three men's skills stirred up the mundane world and dazzled people's eyes and ears. What the sage must do is not let such things dominate people, but entrust them to the everyday Dao, so that people gradually return to their original state. This is called skillfully using brightness without flaunting its glare.

今且有言于此不知其与是乎其与是不乎与不相与为则与彼无以异矣虽然请尝言之有始也者有未始有始也者有未始有夫未始有始也者有有也者有无也者有未始有无也者有未始有夫未始有无也者俄而有无矣而未知有无之果孰有孰无也今我则已有谓矣而未知吾所谓之果有谓乎其果无谓乎天下莫大矣而未知有无之果孰有孰无也今我则已有谓矣而未知吾所谓之果有谓乎其果无谓乎天下莫大于秋毫之末而泰山为小莫寿乎殇子而彭祖为夭天地与我并生万物与我为一既巳为一矣且得有言乎既已谓之一矣且得无言乎一与言为二二与一为三自此以徃巧历不能得而况其凡乎故自无适有以至于三而况自有适有乎无适焉因是已郭象注今言无是非不知其与言有者乎不乎谓之则我以无为是彼以无为非斯不矣此虽是非不同亦未免于有是非则与彼矣故与不相与为与彼无异也将大不莫若无心既遣其非又遣其遣遣之又遣是非去矣虽然试尝言之有始也者必言有终有未始有始也者无始终而一死生有未始有夫未始有始也者言一之者未若不一而自齐斯又防其一也有有也者有有则美恶是非具焉有无也者有无始有夫未始有始也者言一之者未若不一而自齐斯又防其一也有有也者有有则美恶是非具焉有无也者有无则未知无无是非好恶犹未离怀有未始有无也者知无无矣而犹未能无知有未始有夫未始有无也者俄而有无矣而未知有无之果孰有孰无也此都忘其知俄然始了无耳了无则天地万物彼我是非豁然斯也又不知吾所谓之果有果无尔乃荡然无纤芥于胸中也夫以形相对则太山大于秋毫若各据性分物防其极则形大未为有余形小不为不足足于其性则秋毫不独小其小太山不独大其大若以性足为大则天下之大未有过于秋毫若性足者非大余形小不为不足足于其性则秋毫不独小其小太山不独大其大若以性足为大则天下之大未有过于秋毫若性足者非大则虽太山亦可称小矣太山为小则天下无大秋毫为大则天下无小足于天然安其性分故虽天地未足为寿而与我并生万物未足为异而与我为一也万物万形自得则一巳自一矣理无所言物或不能自明其一故谓一以正之既谓之一即是有言一与言为二一本一矣言又二之有一有二得不谓之三乎以言言一犹乃成三凡物殊称何可胜纪故一之者与彼未殊而忘一者无言而自一也
Interpretation

For the moment, let us speak a few words here—whether these words belong to the same category as talk of “right” and “wrong,” or a different one, is unclear. If sameness and difference were lumped together as one kind, there would be no distinction between them. Even so, let us try to say something: there was a beginning, and there was never a beginning; there is also the case in which even “there never was a beginning” never existed. Things have “being” and “non-being”; there was also never a time when there was no “non-being,” and even “there never was non-being” never existed. Suddenly “non-being” appears, yet one cannot tell whether “being” and “non-being” are which is which.

I have already spoken these words, yet I do not know whether what I said counts as having been said or as never having been said at all. Under heaven there is no greater doubt than this: which of being and non-being is being, and which is non-being? I have already spoken, yet I also do not know whether I have truly spoken or have not spoken at all.

Nothing under heaven is greater than the tip of an autumn hair; Mount Tai is small by comparison. No one lives longer than a child who dies young; Peng Zu is short-lived by comparison. Heaven and earth were generated together with me, and the ten thousand things and I are one body. Since we are already one, what is there to say? Yet having said “one,” how can we say there is nothing to say? “One” together with “saying one” makes two; two plus one makes three. Continue calculating from here—even the most skilled reckoner cannot finish, let alone ordinary people. Thus from non-being to being, calculation already reaches three; how much more when going from being to being? Better to follow things as they are and stop pushing the inquiry further.

Guo Xiang comments: To say now that there is no right and wrong, without knowing whether that belongs to the same category as saying there is right and wrong or a different one—if one calls it the same category, then I take “no” as correct while another takes “no” as wrong, and they are not the same; yet even when each side’s right and wrong differ, they still do not escape right and wrong, so they remain the same category. Sameness and difference oppose each other and again fall into one category, no different from the other side.

To escape discrimination entirely, it is best to have no fixed views: first drop the judgment that others are wrong, then drop attachment to that judgment; keep dropping in this way and right and wrong vanish. Even so, let us try to say something: to say there is a beginning necessarily implies an end; to say there never was a beginning is not to divide beginning from end or to treat life and death as two things. To say even “there never was a beginning” never existed is to treat the ten thousand things as one body—yet it is better not to insist on “one” and let things naturally equalize; that is to release even “one.”

Once there is “being,” beauty and ugliness, right and wrong appear; once there is “non-being,” one still does not know whether non-being is truly achieved, and likes and dislikes remain in the mind. Knowing that “non-being” too is gone, one has not yet released that knowing itself; going further, even “there never was non-being” is released. Being and non-being suddenly appear, and one cannot tell which is which. When all cognizing is forgotten, one suddenly sees that the ten thousand things were never divided. Heaven, earth, the myriad things, and mutual right and wrong open into sameness; the mind holds no lingering attachment, nor clings to whether one’s own words count as being or non-being.

If one compares by physical form, Mount Tai is indeed larger than an autumn hair’s tip; but if each accords with its nature and is content with its own allotment, then what is large in body is not surplus and what is small is not lack. Content with native endowment, an autumn hair need not be seen only as small, nor Mount Tai only as large. If accord with nature and each getting its place counts as greatness, nothing under heaven exceeds an autumn hair’s tip; if one does not take external size as the standard, Mount Tai can also be called small. Mount Tai as small means there is no absolute largeness under heaven; an autumn hair as large means there is no absolute smallness under heaven.

Content with the nature heaven gives, at peace in one’s own allotment—thus heaven and earth are not necessarily longer-lived than I, nor are the ten thousand things necessarily different from me; they are all one body with me. Each thing finds its place according to its form and naturally returns to oneness; the Way needs no words, yet because things sometimes cannot see this for themselves, “the ten thousand things are one” is used to explain it. But the moment one says “one,” there is already speech; “one” was originally one, yet in saying it one splits it into “there is one” and “there is speech”—two items. One and two together—does that not make three? Names for things are beyond counting. Thus deliberately saying they are one does not make them different from the myriad things; forgetting the talk of “one,” the myriad things instead naturally return to oneness in silence.

吕惠卿注夫人所以不能遗彼我忘是犹乃成三凡物殊称何可胜纪故一之者与彼未殊而忘一者无言而自一也 吕惠卿注夫人所以不能遗彼我忘是非以至于未始有物者以不知彼我是非之心所自始也欲达此理必于其始观之故曰有始也者始本无自有此始则有自矣又曰未始有始也者所以遣其所自也遣之而所遣者不去亦不免为有所自而已又曰未始有夫未始有始也者所以遣其所遣也既无所自又无所遣则我心之所自起豁然得之知今之所有者举出于无也唯能知此则存亡在我我欲无之不起而已故曰有无也者然有此无亦未免为有曰未始有无也者所以遣其无也曰未始有夫未始有无也者遣其所遣也夫求其所始者不可故曰有无也者然有此无亦未免为有曰未始有无也者所以遣其无也曰未始有夫未始有无也者遣其所遣也夫求其所始者不可得又求其所无者亦不可得则其悟在俛仰之间吻然自合故曰俄而有无矣未知有无之果孰有孰无也使学者忘言而以心契之虽然吾今所言亦未始有物也则有谓无谓吾安得而知之又使学者知夫言之未尝有言也夫唯知吾心之所自起则毫末太山殇子彭祖以至天地万物莫不起于此也则小大久近岂有常体哉无名天地之始苟知此则我亦始于无名也有我则有天地故天地与我并生有名万物之母苟知此则我亦生于有名也无我则无万物故万物与我为一也
Interpretation

People cannot let go of the distinction between self and other or forget right and wrong until they reach the state in which “there has never been the myriad things” because they do not understand where the notions of self and other, right and wrong, first arise. To grasp this, one must observe from the very starting point of thought.

What is meant by “there is a beginning” is that originally there was nothing to rely on, yet this beginning appeared—and then there came to be something to rely on. What is meant by “there has never been a beginning” is to release fixation on that starting point; if one cannot let go even of this release, one still falls within having something to rely on. To speak further of “there has never been ‘there has never been a beginning’” is to release even that release. With neither anything to rely on nor anything to release, it becomes clear at once where the mind’s intent arises: everything that exists now emerges from “non-being” (wu). Once this is understood, existence and non-existence are decided by one’s own mind; if I wish something not to exist, it has no way to arise.

Yet when we speak of “being and non-being,” even “non-being” may be treated as a kind of existence. Hence one must also speak of “there has never been non-being,” to release attachment to “non-being”; and again of “there has never been ‘there has never been non-being,’” to release that release. Neither the original starting point of the myriad things nor absolute emptiness can be pinned down; insight then naturally aligns in the space of a bow and a glance. This is “suddenly there is being and non-being,” while it is still unclear which of being and non-being counts as being and which as non-being. The student should forget words and grasp the meaning with the heart.

Even so, what I say now still does not amount to saying that there is truly some thing. As for whether this counts as being or non-being, how could I be sure? The student should also understand that words are not truly words. Only when one recognizes where one’s own mind’s intent arises does one see that what is as fine as a hair’s tip and as vast as Mount Tai, the short-lived child who dies young and long-lived Peng Zu (the ancients’ emblem of longevity), and even heaven, earth, and the myriad things—all manifest from here. Seen this way, small and large, near and far, have no fixed, unchanging form.

“The nameless” is the starting point of heaven and earth. Understanding this, one knows that I too arise from the nameless; with me come heaven and earth, so heaven and earth are generated together with me. “The named” is the root of the myriad things. Understanding this, one knows that I too am born from the named; without me there are no myriad things, so the myriad things and I are one.

林疑独注无言然后见独见独然后不人今且有言者欲遣其有而言出更自为有遣有归无以求不而遣之我亦生于有名也无我则无万物故万物与我为一也 林疑独注无言然后见独见独然后不人今且有言者欲遣其有而言出更自为有遣有归无以求不而遣之则更与为故与不复同为则与彼无以异矣然不言则无以悟天下之迷故试言之有始也者有形而可见见物不见道也有未始有始也者气形质具而未相离谓之浑沦此道之极致有有也者非妙有也有无也者非真无也未知有无之果孰有孰无哉一阴一阳之谓道阴阳不测之谓神然而未能忘言不得已而有谓其果有谓乎果无谓乎世知有无之果孰有孰无哉一阴一阳之谓道阴阳不测之谓神然而未能忘言不得已而有谓其果有谓乎果无谓乎世人所谓小大者言其形吾所谓小大者言其道世人所谓寿夭者言其生吾所谓寿夭者言其无也秋毫近于无形以太山言之足以为大对无成亏而言太山又为小矣殇子近于无生以彭祖言之足以为寿对无死生而言彭祖又为夭矣近于无生故能与天地并生近于无形故能与万物为一也
Interpretation

Lin Yidu’s commentary says: Only by not clinging to words can the unique Dao be revealed; only by realizing that uniqueness can one escape the fetters of worldly distinctions. Yet once one opens the mouth to speak, the intention is to use language to dispel attachment to “being” (you); but as soon as words are uttered, they become a new kind of “being.” If one tries to eliminate “being” and turn toward “non-being” (wu) in order to differ from worldly distinctions, the moment one fixates on that elimination, one falls into another kind of distinction—then “sameness” and “difference” belong to the same category again, still no different from ordinary views.

Yet without speaking, one cannot awaken those who are confused throughout the world, so one must provisionally use words to explain. What is called “having a beginning” means that things already have form and can be seen—but what is seen is things, not the Dao. What is called “never having had a beginning” means that qi, form, and substance are all present, but there is not yet a state in which they are separated from one another; this is called hunlun (undifferentiated unity, an unbroken whole), the utmost of the Dao. What is called “being” is not the subtle, mysterious “marvelous being” (miaoyou); what is called “non-being” is not absolute non-being in the true sense. We still do not know, regarding so-called being and non-being, which should count as being and which as non-being.

The mutual transformation of Yin and Yang is called the Dao; when Yin-Yang change is hard to fathom, it is called Shen (spirit—the unfathomable working of change). But since we cannot yet forget words, we must reluctantly say: should we call it being, or non-being? What people in the world call large and small is measured by physical form; what I call large and small is spoken from the standpoint of the Dao. What people call long life and short life is measured by the length of a lifespan; what I call long life and short life is spoken from the angle of transcending birth and death.

The fine new hair on a beast in autumn is so small it almost has no form; compared with Mount Tai, it surely counts as small. Yet from the Dao’s perspective, where there is no fixed large or small, Mount Tai can also count as small. One who dies in infancy almost lives as briefly as if he had not lived at all; compared with Peng Zu (the legendary long-lived man), Peng Zu surely counts as long-lived. Yet from the Dao’s perspective, unconstrained by the distinctions of birth and death, Peng Zu can also count as short-lived. Approaching the realm where there is almost no birth, one can endure together with heaven and earth; approaching the realm where there is almost no form, one can merge into one with the ten thousand things.

陈祥道注夫道之在天下无终无始非有非无及防而寓于物则终始相循有无相生故自徼观之则有始也者有有也者自妙观之极于未始有夫未始有始未始有夫未始有无斯为至矣老子曰无名天地之始无者体始者用也今先以有始而继以有无即用以原其体而已夫道之为物无而非虚有而无实无不在无为无不在不为故古之言道者常有无即用以原其体而已夫道之为物无而非虚有而无实无不在无为无不在不为故古之言道者常处以疑似而不胶于有无所以遣为言之累也 陈碧虚注有始谓道生一未始有始混洞太虚也未始有夫未始有始视听不及虚之虚者也此三者叙道未始有气有有谓物形独化块然自有有无谓物形未兆泊然虚寂未始有无谓形兆之先沈默空同至无者也未始有夫未始有无谓防寂虚廓抟之不得无之无也此四者叙道未始有形俄而有无矣谓道无不在生化无时万物卓然而疑独翩然而徃复天地密移畴觉其有无哉有谓无谓未免其迹欲超二者其唯忘言乎 赵虚斋注有始有有皆有也等而上之至于无始无有既以为无而有我者存则不得谓之无然则所谓有无何从而知之乎天地与我并生无寿夭也万物与我为乎
Interpretation

Chen Xiangdao said: The Dao in heaven and earth has no end and no beginning; to call it existent is wrong, and to call it nonexistent is wrong as well. Yet when the Dao shows itself in the myriad things, it appears as cycles of beginning and end and as the mutual turning of being (you) and non-being (wu). So from the side of what appears, one may say it has a beginning, or call it “being”; from the subtle side, tracing back to “what has not yet begun,” even to “what has not yet had ‘not yet begun’ or ‘not yet being/non-being,’” that is the deepest way of putting it. Laozi’s “the nameless is the beginning of heaven and earth”—here “non-being” (wu) is the root, and “beginning” is its functioning. To speak first of “having a beginning,” then of being and non-being, is to trace from function back to the root. This reality called the Dao, though termed “non-being,” is not hollow void; though termed “being,” it has no fixed shape. It is nowhere absent, yet does not force itself to act; it is everywhere present, yet is not stuck in deliberate non-action (wuwei). So when the ancients spoke of the Dao, they often used approximate, allusive language, not clinging to “being” or “non-being,” so as to slip free of the snares of words.

Chen Bixu said: “Having a beginning” means the Dao gives rise to the One; “not yet having a beginning” is undivided chaos, vast emptiness; “not yet having ‘not yet a beginning’” is a depth beyond sight and hearing, more hidden than mere void. These three levels describe the Dao before it has formed as Qi (vital energy). “There is being” is when forms have already appeared and each thing stands on its own; “there is non-being” is when forms are not yet visible, quiet and empty; “not yet being/non-being” is before form appears, still and empty, close to utter non-being; “not yet ‘not yet being/non-being’” is a still, open depth that cannot be grasped—the “non-being within non-being.” These four levels describe the Dao before it has taken on physical form.

Before long, “non-being” too can be spoken of, because the Dao is omnipresent and birth-and-change never stop. The myriad things flash into view and turn again; heaven and earth move in silence—who can tell whether they are being or non-being? Whether you say “being” or “non-being,” you are still on the surface. To get past both ways of speaking, one must likely forget the splits made by language.

Zhao Xuzhai said: “Having a beginning” and “there is being” both belong on the side of “being.” Trace further upward and you reach no beginning and no being. Yet if you already call it non-being while an “I” is still fixing it as such, it is not yet true non-being. Then how is “there is non-being” known at all? Heaven and earth arise together with me, without any difference in span of life; the myriad things and I…

赵虚斋注有始有有皆有也等而上之至于无始无有既以为无而有我者存则不得谓之无然则所谓有无何从而知之乎天地与我并生无寿夭也万物与我为一无巨细也才一即涉有言有言即有数自无适有不可胜穷唯无所适则所谓因是者亦无之矣况于非乎 鬳斋口义云有始未始有始未始有夫未始有始即列子所谓太质太素太初之意又谓若以太山为大天地更大于太山故太山亦可谓之小彭祖至寿比之天地又为夭矣天地与我并生于天地之间虽草木昆虫亦与我蔼然为一矣
Interpretation

Zhao Xuuzhai’s commentary states: “‘Having a beginning’ and ‘having being’ both belong to ‘being.’ If you trace further upward, you arrive at ‘no beginning’ and ‘no being.’ Even if you take everything as empty void, there is still an ‘I’ that exists—so it still cannot be called true non-being. Then from what standpoint are so-called being and non-being known at all?

Heaven, earth, and I arise together, so there is no distinction between long life and early death; the ten thousand things and I were originally one body, so there is no distinction between vast and minute. As soon as you utter a ‘one,’ you have already fallen into ‘being’; once you speak of ‘being,’ number and distinction appear. Turning from ‘non-being’ toward ‘being’ can go on without end; only by not inclining to either side does what is called ‘following what is so’ (yinsi) have nothing to stand on—how much less its opposite, ‘what is not so’?”

Yanzhai’s oral explanation says: “Having a beginning,” “not yet having a beginning,” and “not yet having ‘not yet having a beginning’” are layers of questioning into the origin of things. “Not yet having a beginning” corresponds to what the Liezi calls Taizhi, Taisu, and Taichu ( successive accounts of the primordial state of the cosmos). Again, if you take Mount Tai as large, heaven and earth are larger than Mount Tai—so Mount Tai can also be called small. Even if Peng Zu (the legendary long-lived figure) lived very long, compared with heaven and earth he would count as dying young. Heaven, earth, and I are born alike within heaven and earth; even grass, trees, and insects are intimately connected with me, one undivided whole.

凡天地之论大莫过乎太山寿莫过乎彭祖此以形论不能无限若以虚空性体观之太山直细物彭祖直婴孩耳秋毫虽细而有形之初同具此理何尝无至大者存殇子虽防而有生之初同禀此性何尝无上寿者寓天地特形之大万物特形之聚原其所自来盖未尝不一也故反覆互言以破世人执着之见以开物理造极之机由是而进黍珠容黎土芥子纳同禀此性何尝无上寿者寓天地特形之大万物特形之聚原其所自来盖未尝不一也故反覆互言以破世人执着之见以开物理造极之机由是而进黍珠容黎土芥子纳须弥之义可通矣学者信能得其环中之空休乎天均之分则大秋毫而小太山寿殇子而夭彭祖之论非徒矫流俗之弊救贪生之失究理之极有诚然者奈何世眼徒见万物之迹扰扰不齐而方寸澄明之区与之俱滑如水赴壑莫觊其源故真人谆谆训导使之反究本初混融物我同胞同体无间吾仁皞皡熙熙共乐清静则羲黄帝代今日是也圣贤密传此心是也复何寿夭彼此大小古今之辩哉并生为一大槩与前一指一马之喻相虽语若乖宜而理实精到所谓正言若反可与知者道也
Interpretation

When we look at the forms of heaven, earth, and the myriad things, nothing seems larger than Mount Tai and nothing seems longer-lived than Peng Zu—yet such comparisons rely only on physical form and cannot be called truly boundless. Viewed from emptiness and original nature, Mount Tai is no more than something tiny, and Peng Zu no more than a newborn infant. Though an autumn hair is exceedingly fine, at the moment life begins it shares the same root principle as all things; though a child who dies young lives but briefly, it possesses the same innate nature as Peng Zu. Thus the greatest and the longest-lived are not absent—they are simply lodged in the vastness of heaven and earth’s forms and in the gathering of the myriad things’ shapes. Traced back to their source, there is in fact no difference.

The scripture repeats its teaching from many angles in order to break the world’s fixation on large and small, long life and early death, so that people may inquire into things’ root principle. From there one can go further and grasp what is meant by “a grain of millet holding a whole land” and “a mustard seed containing Mount Sumeru”—that the extremely small can yet hold the vast world. If the student can grasp the emptiness at the center of the ring—neither clinging to one extreme nor losing natural balance—then an autumn hair may seem large and Mount Tai small; a child who dies young may seem long-lived and Peng Zu short-lived.

These statements are not merely correcting vulgar prejudice or urging people to stop craving long life. Pursued to the root of the principle, they have a genuine basis. Pity that people see only the chaotic, unequal surface of the myriad things, so the clarity within the heart is disturbed as well—like water rushing downhill, unable to glimpse the source. Therefore the True Person (the one who has attained the Dao) again and again teaches people to return to the root of things, to merge self and myriad things into one, to regard all things as kin, as one body. Then one can dwell at ease in harmony and quiet purity— the very scene of the age of Fu Xi and the Yellow Emperor, and the heart-method secretly transmitted by sages. At that point, what need is there to dispute long life and early death, self and other, large and small, or ancient and modern?

“Born together as one” is largely akin to the earlier metaphors of “one finger” and “one horse.” The words sound as if they defy common sense, yet the reasoning is extraordinarily fine and penetrating. What Laozi called “straight words seem reversed” is exactly this sort of speech—only those who can grasp it are fit to hear it.

夫道未始有封言未始有常为是而有畛也请言其畛有左有右有伦有义有分有辩有竞有争此之谓八德六合之外圣人存而不论六合之内圣人论是而有畛也请言其畛有左有右有伦有义有分有辩有竞有争此之谓八德六合之外圣人存而不论六合之内圣人论而不议春秋经世先王之志圣人议而不辩故分也者有不分也辩也者有不辩也曰何也圣人怀之众人辩之以相示也故曰辩也者有不见也夫大道不称大辩不言大仁不仁大廉不嗛大勇不忮道昭而不道言辩而不及仁常而不成廉清而不信勇忮而不成五者园而几向方矣故知止其所不知至矣孰知不言之辩不道之道若有能知此之谓天府注焉而不满酌焉而不竭而不知其所由来此之谓葆光故昔者尧问于舜曰我欲伐宗脍胥敖南面而不释然其故何也舜曰夫三子者犹存乎蓬艾之间若不释然何哉昔者十日并出万物皆照而况德之进乎日者乎 郭象注道未始有封防然无不在言未始有常是非无定也道无封故万物得恣其分域左右异便物物有理群分别逐竞辩争略而判之有此八德六合之外谓物性分之表
Interpretation

The Dao has no boundaries to begin with, and words have no fixed, unchanging standard. Only because people each insist that “this is right” do all sorts of boundaries get drawn. As for those boundaries, there are left and right, rank and principle, division and disputation, rivalry and contention—and taken together these are called the “Eight Virtues.”

Matters beyond the four directions of heaven and earth the sage keeps in the heart and does not discourse on; matters within the four directions the sage does discuss. When it comes to distinctions in the world, again there are left and right, rank and principle, division and disputation, rivalry and contention—what is meant by the “Eight Virtues.” Concerning affairs under heaven, the sage may discuss them but does not wrangle. The Spring and Autumn annals record the way of good order—the intent left by former kings; the sage comments on them but does not dispute.

Thus even in what we call “distinction,” there are cases where no distinction is made; even in what we call “disputation,” there are cases where no disputation is offered. Why? The sage holds the pattern in the heart, while the multitude display their views to others through debate. Hence debate can sometimes obscure what people see.

The great Dao does not rely on naming to show itself; great disputation does not rely on words to win; great benevolence does not perform benevolence on purpose; great integrity does not boast of purity; great courage does not harm others by force. Once the Dao is displayed on purpose, it is no longer the Dao; once words dispute, benevolence is not reached; if benevolence is fixed as a routine, it is hard to complete; if integrity seeks only a reputation for purity, it cannot be trusted; if courage becomes injury and bravado, it is not true courage. When these five are pursued to excess, they tend toward narrowness.

To know where to stop at what one does not know is true wisdom. Who can understand disputation without words, the Dao without being named? Whoever can is called the “Storehouse of Heaven”—like the treasury of nature itself: pour things in and it is never full; draw from it and it never runs dry, yet no one knows where it comes from. This is called “preserving the light”—holding brightness without displaying it.

Long ago Yao asked Shun, “I wish to attack the regions of Zong, Kuai, and Xu-Ao. When I think of it, I am uneasy in heart—why?” Shun replied, “Those three peoples still live among weeds and coarse grass in remote places. That your heart is uneasy is nothing strange. Once ten suns rose together and all things were illumined—what if the growth of De surpassed the sun?”

郭象注道未始有封防然无不在言未始有常是非无定也道无封故万物得恣其分域左右异便物物有理群分别逐竞辩争略而判之有此八德六合之外谓物性分之表虽有理存焉未尝以感圣人故不论六合之内陈其性而安之先王之志顺其成迹疑乎至当故物物自分事事自别若由已以分别之不见彼之自别也圣人以不辩为怀众人则辩已所知以示之故有不见也大道无称付之自称大辩不言而自别大仁无爱而自存大廉无所容其嗛盈大勇无所徃而不顺以道明彼彼此俱失以言分彼不及自分仁常爱必不周廉激然则非清忮逆之勇天下疾之此五者皆以有为伤当不能止乎本性而外求无所徃而不顺以道明彼彼此俱失以言分彼不及自分仁常爱必不周廉激然则非清忮逆之勇天下疾之此五者皆以有为伤当不能止乎本性而外求无已犹以圆学方以鱼羡鸟耳故所不知皆性分之外不求强知止于不知之内而至矣不言不道此谓天府都任之也至人之心应而不藏理存无迹任其自明而光不蔽也昔尧欲伐三国而问于舜舜谓物之所安无陋也则蓬艾乃三子之妙处若不释然何哉十日并出无不光被德进乎日则又无所不照今欲夺蓬艾之而伐使从已于道未故不释然神解若物畅其性各安所物之所安无陋也则蓬艾乃三子之妙处若不释然何哉十日并出无不光被德进乎日则又无所不照今欲夺蓬艾之而伐使从已于道未故不释然神解若物畅其性各安所安则彼无不当我无不怡也
Interpretation

Guo Xiang explains that the Dao originally has no fixed boundaries, so there is nowhere it does not pervade; nor is there an eternal, unchanging standard, so what is deemed right or wrong has no fixed, immovable divide. Because the Dao has no boundary, the ten thousand things can each live according to their own endowment and circumstance: some suit the left, some the right; every thing has its own principle. The various kinds each have their distinctions, yet people often argue without end. In broad terms, the ten thousand things possess eight kinds of virtue (de).

Beyond the six directions (heaven, earth, and the four quarters), although the principles proper to each thing still hold, they do not stir the sage, so he does not discourse on them. Within the six directions, one should set forth each thing’s endowment so that it may rest in itself. The intention of the ancient kings was to follow how things naturally take shape and to treat that as the most fitting arrangement. Hence each thing has its allotted place and each affair its proper distinction. If one divides things only by one’s own ideas, one fails to see that they are already distinct in themselves.

The sage keeps non-disputation at heart, while the multitude competes to preach what each knows to others; thus they miss the distinctions things bear in themselves. The “Great Dao” does not rely on naming to make itself manifest—the ten thousand things naturally display it. “Great disputation” does not rely on verbal struggle—affairs naturally show their differences. “Great benevolence” has no deliberate partiality, yet is naturally present. “Great integrity” does not parade its purity or haggle over gain and loss. “Great courage” does not insist on force; wherever it goes, it accords with the way things are. To judge others by principle is for both sides to lose their natural boundaries; to carve out others’ right and wrong with words is inferior to letting things reveal their own differences. Benevolence, if clinging to affection, can never be fully adequate; integrity, if pursued with harsh zeal, turns into aloof rigidity; courage, if it goes against the order of things, is detested throughout the realm. These five attitudes all harm one’s original nature through deliberate effort: one cannot rest in what one is and keeps reaching outward instead. It is like using the round to demand the square, or giving up the nature of fish because one envies birds.

Thus whatever lies outside what one can know belongs beyond endowment and allotted place. Not forcing oneself to know, and stopping at the limit of what one does not know—that is already the utmost. Not clinging to speech and not forcing clarification is called the “Heavenly Treasury” (tianfu)—the state in which heaven naturally holds all things. The mind of the utmost person responds with things yet does not hoard them within; principle is present, yet no trace of deliberate contrivance remains. He lets things clarify themselves, and so their brightness is never obscured.

In antiquity, Yao wished to campaign against three states and asked Shun’s view. Shun said that the ten thousand things each have where they may settle, and no situation is inherently base. Mugwort and wormwood are precisely the milieu in which those three rulers rest at ease; if you would tear them from it, how could they accept that gladly? When the ten suns rise together, their light leaves nowhere unreached; if virtue surpasses the sun’s radiance, it should be all the more without limit. To seize the place where people like mugwort and wormwood are at home, then attack them and compel them to follow your Dao shows that this Dao has not yet truly expanded. Therefore, if one grasps this inwardly and lets the ten thousand things each unfold its nature and rest in itself, then nothing the other does is out of place, and one has no occasion for discontent or unease.

吕惠卿注道无徃而不存未始有封也言恶存而不可未始有常也由其自无未适有于是有畛域矣夫惟有畛故有左右以至于有竞争言其不能不德遂至于此是以或存而不论或论而不议或议而不辩观六经之言则圣人之所以论不论议不议辩不辩者可知矣盖理极则分有不分辩有不辩若欲事事物物分而辩之卒至于有竞有争圣人知理不可辩怀之而已众人则辩以相示而有不见也故道言仁廉勇五者皆圆而锉其锐则趋于道矣心之出为锐圆而锉其锐则不以生其心岂容有知于其间哉以相示而有不见也故道言仁廉勇五者皆圆而锉其锐则趋于道矣心之出为锐圆而锉其锐则不以生其心岂容有知于其间哉此不言之辩不道之道也天府者有万不同而至富故注不满酌不竭而不知所由来此光而不耀者也尧欲伐宗脍胥敖而不释然三子犹存乎蓬艾之间是未伐之也未伐而不释然非应物而不藏物采而后出者也德进于日其有不释然者乎言智未进于日故犹有是论也宗脍胥敖之事史所未闻 林疑独注道有分者物物自分有不分者我未尝分辩也者事事自辩有不辩者我未尝辩物自分故分而不分事自辩故辩而不辩圣人藏而不言众人辩以示之故未闻
Interpretation

Commentary by Lü Huiqing: “The Dao is everywhere and has never had fixed boundaries. Since one cannot say where it begins, how can one say it is absent anywhere? The Dao originally has no fixed form; because it is not any particular concrete thing in itself, it later appears as existence, and thus boundaries arise.

“Where there are boundaries, there is distinction between left and right, and rivalry follows. When things reach this point, it shows that people cannot accord with their inherent De. Therefore, sometimes the Dao is kept in the heart and not brought out for discussion; sometimes it is discussed but not further judged; sometimes it is judged but not argued over. Observing the sayings in the Six Classics (the six Confucian classics), one can see why the sage sometimes does not discuss, judge, or argue. When principle reaches its utmost, distinctions need not be further divided, and in debate there are points where argument need not continue. If every thing must be clearly distinguished, in the end contention and strife arise. The sage knows that principle cannot be exhausted through disputation, so he keeps it in the heart; the multitude display themselves to one another through argument and thus fail to see the Dao.

“Hence when the Dao speaks of the five virtues such as benevolence, integrity, and courage, each must be made round and whole, without sharp edges—the sharp points worn smooth—before one approaches the Dao. Once mind-intent is exposed, it becomes sharp; making it round and wearing away the sharpness, mind-intent no longer arises—where could deliberate views and knowing still find room? This is debate without words, the Dao expressed without relying on speech.

“The ‘Storehouse of Heaven’ (tian fu, like a treasury granted by Heaven) holds the myriad things, each different yet abundantly full, so pouring into it does not fill it and taking from it does not exhaust it—and one does not know where its source lies. This is brightness without display.

“Yao wished to attack Zong, Kuai, and Xu Ao, yet felt uneasy in heart; those three places were still remote lands overgrown with mugwort and wormwood—Yao had not yet sent troops. To be unsettled before troops were even sent shows he could not yet accord with outer things without hoarding them in the heart, and had not yet achieved acting only when events call for it. As De increases day by day, would anything still remain that the heart cannot release? This means Yao’s wisdom had not yet reached the stage of daily refinement, so such discussion still arose. The affairs of Zong, Kuai, and Xu Ao are not recorded in the histories.”

Commentary by Lin Yidu: “That the Dao has distinction means the myriad things each show their own distinctions; what is called ‘no distinction’ is that I do not deliberately distinguish. Each thing naturally has its own discourse; what is called ‘no debate’ is that I do not deliberately debate. The myriad things naturally have distinction, so the sage distinguishes without clinging to distinction; affairs naturally invite discourse, so the sage discourses without clinging to discourse. The sage hides the Dao in the heart and does not speak much; the multitude argue and display it to one another, and so in truth have not heard the Great Dao.”

林疑独注道有分者物物自分有不分者我未尝分辩也者事事自辩有不辩者我未尝辩物自分故分而不分事自辩故辩而不辩圣人藏而不言众人辩以示之故有不见也夫道无不在不可名称不言之辩斯真辩也万物各正性命吾何所施其仁哉大廉无隅故无所容其嗛大勇不忮神武而不杀者也凡物滞则有圭角通则无方隅五者皆患在于滞道滞于昭言滞于辩仁滞于常廉滞于清勇滞于忮若圆锉其圭角以同乎大全则几于道之方矣天府者自然之藏万物所归故注焉不满酌焉不竭比性命之情不增不减求其所勇滞于忮若圆锉其圭角以同乎大全则几于道之方矣天府者自然之藏万物所归故注焉不满酌焉不竭比性命之情不增不减求其所自来而不可得此之谓葆光其光在内蔽而不发也夫圣心防寂各安所安无远近幽深付之自得此天府之所自藏葆光之所自出也陈祥道注道未始有封稊稗瓦砾无乎不在也言未始有常存而不论议而不辩也及道降为道出而有畛以体则有左右以理则有伦义以言则有分辩以事则有竞争何望乎物之齐哉道昭而不道公孙休之徒是也言辩而不及公孙龙之徒是也仁常而不成墨翟之徒是也廉清而不信于陵仲子之徒是也勇忮而不成北宫黝之徒是也此五者皆锐其圭角能锉而圆之则近于道矣推而上之极于不可知之神所谓真知无知是也无北宫黝之徒是也此五者皆锐其圭角能锉而圆之则近于道矣推而上之极于不可知之神所谓真知无知是也无乎不藏天府也不危其真葆光也此性之无防无得者也不言之辩无所不举不道之道无所不通此即所以尽性之效也于道者一视而同仁笃近而举远若以物我为心是非为辩而欲攻人于蓬艾之间至南面而不释然则所希者小所损者大非所谓知葆光也
Interpretation

The Dao has no boundary, yet the ten thousand things each have their own distinctions. “No distinction” does not mean that I step in to mark them off for them. Things each show their own dispositions; “no disputation” does not mean that I step in to argue on their behalf. The sage holds the Dao in the heart and is not eager to put it into words. Ordinary people often dispute and parade their doctrines, and so they fail to see the Dao. The Dao is everywhere and cannot be pinned down by names. To grasp the Dao without relying on verbal wrangling—that is true disputation.

The greatest integrity has no sharp edge, so there is nothing for self-congratulation to latch onto. The greatest courage does not harm others; even with godlike power, it does not take pride in killing. Where things stiffen and stick, edges appear; where they flow freely, there is no fixed boundary. When the Dao gets stuck in plain speech, it is hemmed in by speech; stuck in debate, hemmed in by debate. Benevolence stuck in fixed routine, integrity stuck in forced purity, courage stuck in rivalry and harm—grind these edges away and align with the whole Dao, and you draw near to the Dao’s level.

“Treasury of Heaven” (Tianfu) means nature’s storehouse, the place to which the ten thousand things return. Pour water in and it never fills; scoop from it and it never runs dry. It is like the nature and allotted life of things—neither increased nor diminished on that account. Ask where it comes from and no source can be found. This is called “preserving the light” (baoguang): light kept within, not displayed outward. The sage’s mind is still and deep; the ten thousand things each rest in their place. Near or far, shallow or deep—all are left to themselves, each finding its own footing. That is how the Treasury of Heaven holds all things and preserved light can arise.

Originally the Dao had no boundary; barnyard millet, foxtail, tiles, and rubble all lie within it. Speech originally had no fixed standard; discussion and debate each arise from their own occasions. Later the Dao was carved up and boundaries appeared: in form, left and right; in principle, constant order and righteousness; in words, distinction and debate; in affairs, rivalry. How then can one expect the ten thousand things all to become the same?

Those who trumpet doctrine but do not truly keep the Dao are people like Gongsun Xiu. Those who are clever at words but never touch the great Dao are people like Gongsun Long. Those who insist on a fixed kind of benevolence and lose what is genuine are people like Mozi. Those who make a show of purity but miss what is reasonable are people like Yuling Zhongzi. Those who are fierce, competitive, and harm others are people like Beigong You. These five paths all sharpen edges; round those edges and you approach the Dao. Push further upward and you reach the unfathomable, numinous realm—what is called knowing that does not take knowing as its goal. Where the Dao hides everywhere, that is the Treasury of Heaven; where the genuine is not damaged, that is preserving the light. This means that nature is neither lost nor gained beyond what it already is.

Without disputing in words, yet penetrating the myriad affairs; without deliberately preaching doctrine, yet leaving nothing unconnected—that is the reach of fully realizing one’s nature. One who expands the great Dao treats the ten thousand things as one. To those near, he gives deep care; he can also look after those far away. If one splits self and things into “this” and “that,” takes right and wrong as grounds for argument, and tries to strike at others amid weeds and grass—or even after ascending a throne still cannot let go—then what is sought is too narrow and what is lost is too great. That is not truly understanding “preserving the light.”

陈碧虚注无有入无间有封孰所碍至言无不当有常孰为定然可道可言岂得无规法左右伦义属封分辩竞争属言其封其言理有实际故谓所碍至言无不当有常孰为定然可道可言岂得无规法左右伦义属封分辩竞争属言其封其言理有实际故谓之德六合之外圣人不论理存则事遣也六合之内圣人不议事当则言忘也历代帝王治乱圣人详议褒贬垂戒将来非矜其博辩也故分于内者不分于外辩于此者不辩于彼圣人怀之知者不言众人辩之言者不知也大道不称谓无所不宜辩仁廉勇五者备矣则于道无为于理自齐若乃一事伤当如以圆向方必与理忤矣故不越分求知以戕自然之性不言之辩不道之道皆藏于人心岂非天府哉有形则注必满有源则酌必竭今不满不竭者是知无源源之深无形形之大深大莫睹故曰葆光三子犹存蓬艾之间犹鹪鹩安于一枝十日比尧之德言其无幽不烛也道德经云大国不过欲兼畜人小国不过欲入事人两者各得其所欲故大者宜为下 赵虚斋注道未始有封无徃不存也言未始有常无存不可也为欲明其是然后有封畛左欲故大者宜为下
Interpretation

Chen Bixu’s commentary states: When “nothingness” enters what has no gap, nothing can obstruct it; once something is fixed or bounded, it meets the barrier of limits. The most fitting speech accords with everything; as for what is called the unchanging standard—who establishes it? Since the Dao can be spoken of and discussed, how could it be utterly without norm or measure? Sorting left from right and arranging ethical ranks belong to drawing boundaries; splitting hairs in debate and competing with one another belong to speech. Both boundaries and speech touch on concrete affairs, so they are said to involve obstruction.

Matters beyond the four directions of heaven and earth the sage does not discuss, for when principle rests in the heart, particular tasks can be set aside; matters within the four directions the sage also does not discuss casually, for when affairs are handled well, words can be forgotten. The deeds of successive emperors in order or in chaos the sage will weigh in detail, praise or blame, leaving lessons for those who come after—not to show off erudition or eloquence.

Therefore those devoted to inner cultivation do not cling to outer distinctions; those skilled at analyzing one side may not clarify the other. The sage keeps the Dao hidden in the heart; the truly wise speak little, while the crowd loves argument—and those who talk much often do not truly understand.

The great Dao cannot be pinned down by fixed words, because there is nothing it cannot adapt to. When the five—benevolence, integrity, courage, and the rest (in the full pentad of virtues)—are all present, one can follow the great Dao without reckless action, and the inner balance comes naturally. Clinging to one thing alone harms what is fitting, like forcing a circle against a square: it must clash with how things are. So do not overstep your measure to chase knowledge, lest you harm your innate nature. Speechless disputation and the Dao that needs no words both dwell in the human heart—is this not like the “heavenly treasury,” the storehouse where nature keeps its principles?

A visible vessel, once full of water, cannot take more; water from a source, drawn again and again, will run dry. Yet there is something that is neither full to overflowing nor exhausted—that is because it has no visible source. Its depth cannot be fathomed, its vastness has no shape; so deep and wide that it cannot be seen, it is therefore called “embracing the light”—light hoarded and not displayed.

The three masters still lived among weeds and thicket, like the wren content on a single branch; “ten days” figuratively describes Yao’s virtue—his moral influence reaching even the darkest recesses. The Daodejing says the great state only wishes to annex and nurture the small state, and the small state only wishes to enter the great state and serve it. When both get what they want, the great state should take the lower, yielding position.

Zhao Xuzhai’s commentary states: The Dao has never drawn a boundary; wherever one goes, it is there. Speech too has never had a fixed, unchanging rule—it cannot be said that nothing of it can stand. People divide boundaries only to settle who is right and who is wrong. Gu here means valley.

赵虚斋注道未始有封无徃不存也言未始有常无存不可也为欲明其是然后有封畛左右至竞争八者是也六合之外无形者也六合之内有形者也有形生于无形必有无形者为之本存而不论无言也论而不议有言也事至于议辩论纷起矣春秋圣人笔削之书寓是非于褒贬盖出于不得已而诸传又未必得圣人之心故曰有不见也庄子借此以自明其着书之意大道不称至大勇不忮五者圆而几向方也圆乃破觚为圆之义几向方近于道也道昭至勇忮五者皆道一名立则道裂矣知止乎其所不知则无能名焉道之至也不言之言有言言者不道之道有道道者若人能知此则其中虚故曰天府言物之所自出也至于注不满酌不竭则是无所底止不知其所由来并与知去之矣葆光言自晦其明也宗脍胥敖不见于经史下章言正处正味正色谓口之物之所自出也至于注不满酌不竭则是无所底止不知其所由来并与知去之矣葆光言自晦其明也宗脍胥敖不见于经史下章言正处正味正色谓口之于味目之于色四肢之于安佚有性存焉尧欲克而去之虽处至尊不以为乐舜告尧以帝有真见则是三者安其所当安何必去之哉唯圣人然后可以践形以是观之则宗脍胥敖似是寓言
Interpretation

Zhao Xuzhai’s commentary states: “The Dao has never had boundaries; there is nowhere it does not exist.” The point is that the Dao is not fixed and unchanging, and there is no place where it cannot be present. Only to tell right from wrong in things do people draw boundaries, distinguish left from right, and so stir up dispute.

“Outside the six directions” means beyond heaven, earth, and the four quarters—the formless realm; “within the six directions” means within heaven, earth, and the four quarters—the world of form. What has form comes from what is formless and must take the formless as root. On this matter, merely knowing it is there without discussing it is “not speaking”; to open the mouth and talk is “having words”; once one goes on to judge and argue, strife never ends.

The Spring and Autumn Annals is a book the sage shaped by cutting and arranging historical records, using praise and blame to show right and wrong—something done only because there was no other way. Later commentaries did not always grasp the sage’s intent, so some of its meaning was never made plain. Zhuangzi uses this to explain his own purpose in writing.

“Great Dao is not named” means the Dao cannot be put into words; “supreme great courage does not harm” means true courage does not injure others. “Round and almost turned square” means the way of roundness nearly approaches squareness; here “round” suggests removing sharp edges and making things whole, while “almost turned square” means nearing the Dao. All five phrases express the Dao. If you fix a name on the Dao, the Dao is split apart. To know how to stop at what one does not know is to have nothing that must be forced into a name—and that is the utmost of the Dao.

“Word that is not spoken” is still words; one who “speaks with words” is not the true Dao. “Dao that is not spoken of” still becomes a dao; one who “daos with a dao” is not the true Dao either. Whoever sees this keeps the mind empty and still, and so is called the “Celestial Storehouse”—the source from which the ten thousand things emerge.

“Pour in and it is not filled; ladle out and it is not exhausted” means it is like a spring: pour in and it never fills; scoop out and it never runs dry. It has no traceable end, and no one knows whence it comes—even knowing it should be set aside. “Preserving the light” means gathering radiance inward and not displaying one’s wisdom.

鬳斋口义云有封即彼我有常有所主也至道至言本无彼此因人心之私有个是字生出许多畛域入德只是物我对立之意才彼此对立理事便各有所主分辩无已故六合之外存而不论释氏所谓四维上下不可思量六合之内有许多道理圣人何尝不但不详议以强天下之知见于史册者皆先王经世之意圣事便各有所主分辩无已故六合之外存而不论释氏所谓四维上下不可思量六合之内有许多道理圣人何尝不但不详议以强天下之知见于史册者皆先王经世之意圣人岂容不议然亦何尝争竞是非凡天下之理忘言为至才到分辩则是胸中无见故有不分有不辩也大道不称谓无对立者大辩不言乃至言也大仁不仁无仁之迹猴藏食处曰嗛满也以廉为廉则意自满不得为大廉矣不忮者不见其用勇之迹园圆也已上五者皆是圆物本自混成若稍有迹则近于方物有圭角也真知无知便可以见天理之所会矣故欲益不能欲损不可而物本自混成若稍有迹则近于方物有圭角也真知无知便可以见天理之所会矣故欲益不能欲损不可而不知其所由来藏其光而不露是曰葆光宗脍胥敖事不经见亦寓言耳蓬艾之间喻物欲障蔽谓彼三子物欲自蔽不能向化我才有不悦之心则物我对立矣日于万物无所不照况德进于日而不能容此三子乎物我是非圣人所以置之不辩者照之于天也十日之即莫若以明之喻
Interpretation

Commentary on the Youzhai Oral Explication says: “having boundaries” means drawing divisions in the mind and fixing some view as primary. The utmost Dao and the utmost words originally know no split between “this” and “that”; because the human heart is partial, the character for “right” (shi) arises, and from it many lines are drawn.

To cultivate De (virtue/power), one must first let go of the opposition between things and self. Once “this side” and “that side” are separated to reason and argue, each side holds its ground and dispute has no end. Therefore, concerning matters beyond the four directions of heaven and earth, the sage keeps them in mind without debating them. What Buddhism calls the four dimensions above and below—beyond reckoning—means the same thing. Within the six directions there are many principles; the sage does not refuse to speak of them, but does not argue them in detail or force the world to accept such talk. What the histories record are the former kings’ intentions in governing the age; the sage certainly discusses state affairs too, yet never strives to win arguments or cling to right and wrong. Principles under heaven reach their height when words can be forgotten; once one falls into disputation, it often shows the heart has no real grasp. So some matters need neither sorting out nor quarreling over.

“Great Dao is not labeled” means the Dao has no opposing pole; “great disputation does not speak” means the finest argument does not rely on words; “great benevolence is not benevolent” means true great benevolence shows no trace of deliberate kindness. Where monkeys hide food is called qian—meaning “full.” If one treats integrity as something to boast of, the heart is already full and cannot be called truly great integrity. “Bu zhi” means not showing off boldness. Yuan suggests roundness and completeness. These five attainments are like round things, originally whole and undivided; the moment a fixed shape appears, it is like a square thing with corners—fallen into discrimination.

True wisdom does not cling to “knowing,” and only then can one touch the place where heavenly principle gathers. It does not wish to add anything, nor need to subtract anything, yet one cannot say where this state comes from. Gathering in radiance and not flashing edges is called baoguang (preserving inner light).

The story of Zong Kuai and Xu Ao has no solid basis in received texts and is probably pure allegory. Between mugwort and wormwood is a metaphor for being blocked by desire for things. Those three men were blinded by desire and could not turn toward the Dao; if I then felt displeased because of them, I would again fall into the split between things and self. The sun shines on all things without omission; if De is vaster than the sun, how could it not make room for those three? So the sage sets aside the oppositions of things-and-self and right-and-wrong and does not argue, because he views all things through heavenly Dao. The “ten days” image likewise serves to show that one does better to follow the principle that illumines the myriad things.

尧欲伐宗脍胥敖一节似与上文不贯然句首加故昔者则是因上文而引证无疑苐此事不见他经无所考订三国之名义亦难分诸解缺而不论独音义载崔氏云宗一脍二胥敖三也陈碧虚音义亦引崔一云宗脍丛支胥敖三国人间世篇亦有尧攻丛支胥敖之语然观者又当究其立言之意不可以事迹拘也偶得管见附于篇后以俟博识窃详经旨自上文有封有常篇亦有尧攻丛支胥敖之语然观者又当究其立言之意不可以事迹拘也偶得管见附于篇后以俟博识窃详经旨自上文有封有常有畛而来意三国者备喻前六合内外先王之志曰论曰议曰辩三条皆欲攻而去之所以离言辩之是非复道德之默而尧犹未能自胜以问于舜舜答以三子者犹存蓬艾之间谓皆已存而不论莫若听其自处于无人之境则在我不以介怀在彼无所碍累何不释然之有复证云昔者十日并出群阴皆退有目有趾待是成功况今帝德又过乎日则彼三者不待攻而自去理固然也盖以寓言夫议论辩不生则是非自息此齐物之大防也 南华真经义海纂防卷三 钦定四库全书 南华真经义海纂者不待攻而自去理固然也盖以寓言夫议论辩不生则是非自息此齐物之大防也 南华真经义海纂防卷三 钦定四库全书 南华真经义海纂防卷四 宋 禇伯秀 撰 齐物论第三
Interpretation

Yao wished to subdue the three states of Zong, Kuai, and Xu Ao. On the surface this passage seems unrelated to what precedes it, yet the opening “therefore in antiquity” shows that it continues the earlier discussion and offers an illustration. The episode itself is not attested in other received texts, so it is hard to verify; the names and meaning of the three states are also difficult to pin down, so the various explanations may be left aside for now. Only the Yin Yi records that Master Cui held that “Zong,” “Kuai,” and “Xu Ao” were the names of three states. Chen Bixu’s Yin Yi likewise cites Master Cui and notes that the “Renjian shi” chapter mentions Yao’s campaigns against “Congzhi” and “Xu Ao.” Readers should nevertheless ask what the author is arguing for here, rather than getting stuck in the factual details of the story.

I append my own tentative reading at the end of the chapter for those better versed in the tradition to judge. As I read the line of thought in the text: the previous section speaks of demarcations, fixed norms, and territorial limits; the three states stand for the “inside and outside of the six directions.” The “discussion, deliberation, and disputation” in the “intent of the ancient kings” are all things to be broken through and discarded, so as to escape the snarl of right and wrong in words and return to the abstruse stillness of the Way and its virtue. Yao still could not master himself and went to Shun for guidance. Shun replied that those three still lingered among tangled weeds and brush—that is, they were already there, and there was no need to pick a fight over them; it was better to let them rest undisturbed where no one goes. Then the mind would not be burdened and the other would not be obstructed—what could not be set at ease?

The text then gives an example: once ten suns rose together and all yin withdrew; each had its eyes and feet and awaited the completion of its task. How much more so now, when Yao’s virtue outshines the sun—the three need not be attacked and will disappear of themselves, for that is the way things naturally are. This is likely an allegory: once disputation and debate no longer arise, right and wrong quiet down on their own. That is the gist of the “Qi wu lun.”

啮缺问乎王倪曰子知物之所同是乎曰吾恶乎知之子知子之所不知邪曰吾恶乎知之然则物无知邪曰吾恶乎知之虽然尝试言之庸讵知吾所谓知之非不知邪庸讵知吾所谓不知之非知邪且吾尝试问乎汝民湿寝则腰疾偏死防然乎哉木处则惴栗恂惧猨猴然乎哉三者孰知正处民食刍豢麋鹿食荐蝍蛆甘带吾所谓知之非不知邪庸讵知吾所谓不知之非知邪且吾尝试问乎汝民湿寝则腰疾偏死防然乎哉木处则惴栗恂惧猨猴然乎哉三者孰知正处民食刍豢麋鹿食荐蝍蛆甘带鸱鸦嗜鼠四者孰知正味猿猵狙以为雌麋与鹿交防与鱼游毛嫱丽姬人之所美也鱼见之深入鸟见之高飞麋鹿见之决骤四者孰知天下之正色哉自我观之仁义之端是非之涂樊然殽乱吾乌能知其辩啮缺曰子不知利害则至人固不知利害乎王倪曰至人神矣大泽焚而不能河汉冱而不能寒疾雷破山风振海而不能惊若然者乘云气日月而游乎四海之外死生无变于已而况利害之端乎 郭象注所同未必是所异不独非彼我莫能相正故无所用其知若自知不知即为有知而不能任群才之气日月而游乎四海之外死生无变于已而况利害之端乎
Interpretation

Nie Que asked Wang Ni, “Do you know what all things collectively take to be right?” Wang Ni replied, “How would I know?” Nie Que asked again, “Do you know what it is that you do not know?” Wang Ni said, “How would I know?” Nie Que pressed on, “Then are all things devoid of awareness?” Wang Ni answered, “How would I know? Still, let me try to put it this way: how do I know that what I call ‘knowing’ is not in fact not knowing? And how do I know that what I call ‘not knowing’ is not in fact knowing?”

“I ask you further: when people sleep in damp places, their waists ache and they may even become half paralyzed—does the loach do the same? When people stay in trees, they tremble with fear—do monkeys do the same? Among human beings, loaches, and monkeys, who truly knows the most suitable place to live? People eat meat; elk eat grass; centipedes delight in eating snakes; owls and kites delight in eating mice. Among these creatures, who knows the finest flavor? Monkeys and gibbons seek mates among their own kind; elk mate with deer; loaches swim with fish. Mao Qiang and Lady Li were regarded as beauties. When fish saw them, they dove to the bottom; when birds saw them, they flew high; when elk saw them, they fled at once. Among these living beings, who knows what true beauty in the world is?”

“As I see it, the boundaries of benevolence and righteousness and the paths of right and wrong are interwoven in confusion—how could I clearly sort them out?”

Nie Que asked, “If you do not know benefit and harm, does the perfected person not know benefit and harm either?” Wang Ni replied, “The perfected person is spirit-like and unfathomable. A great marsh ablaze cannot make him feel heat; rivers frozen solid cannot make him feel cold; thunder splitting mountains and gales churning the sea cannot frighten him. A person like this rides the clouds and mist, mounts the sun and moon, and roams beyond the four seas. Even life and death cannot alter him—how much less so benefit and harm?”

Guo Xiang commented: What all things collectively affirm is not necessarily correct, and what differs among them is not necessarily wrong; none can adjudicate for another, so there is no need to cling to one’s own judgments. If one thinks one knows what one does not know, one has already turned it into “knowing,” and can no longer let each innate endowment unfold on its own. The perfected person rides cloud and mist, mounts sun and moon, and roams beyond the four seas; life and death cannot move his heart—still less benefit and harm.

郭象注所同未必是所异不独非彼我莫能相正故无所用其知若自知不知即为有知而不能任群才之自当故啮缺三问而王倪答以三不知也汝岂知吾所谓知之非不知不知之非知邪鱼泳于水水物所同咸谓之知自鸟观之则向所谓知者复为不知矣故举民防猿三者以明万物之异便次举民鹿蛆鸦四者以明美恶之无主又举猿猵麋鹿防鱼毛丽以明天下所好之不同不同者而非之则无以知所同之必是唯莫之辩荡然俱得啮缺未能妙其不知犹疑至人当知之斯悬之未解也至人神矣言体与物防虽渉至变而未始非我也
Interpretation

Guo Xiang held that when people confront things, they often know only that they differ from one another, yet fail to see that each thing has its own principle; one cannot judge right and wrong by one’s own understanding alone, so there is no need to pride oneself on being clever. If one thinks one knows what “not knowing” is, one is still clinging to something and cannot let each kind of capacity play out freely and find its proper place.

Nieque (the questioner) asked three times; Wang Ni (the one who answered) each time replied, “I do not know.” Nieque then pressed him: “Do you mean that what I call ‘knowing’ is not really not-knowing, and what I call ‘not knowing’ is not really knowing?” Fish swim in water, and creatures of the water all take that as fitting; from a bird’s point of view, what birds find fitting need not suit fish. The text goes on to list humans, deer, monkeys, and other living things, and their different judgments of beauty and ugliness and what they prefer—showing that each kind of being has what suits it, and that under Heaven there is no single standard of good and bad that everyone accepts.

Since different things each have their own way of seeing, if one uses only one standard to reject other views, one cannot recognize what they share. Only by not clinging to distinctions and dispute can every kind of thing find its proper place. Nieque had not yet grasped the subtlety of “not knowing”; he still assumed that the Perfect Person (one who has reached the deepest level of attainment) must know everything, so his doubt remained unresolved. The Perfect Person is spiritually penetrating: able to discern how self and the myriad things meet and connect; even through ten thousand transformations, the authentic self is never lost.

Lü Huiqing’s commentary says that when knowing stops at “not knowing,” one no longer gets stuck in sorting out sameness and difference among things, nor settles right and wrong by a private view—then each thing can find its place. Nieque had not yet understood this subtlety of “not knowing”; he still thought the Perfect Person should know all things without exception, so his doubt was not cleared. The phrase “the Perfect Person is divine in spirit” means that the Perfect Person can connect with the myriad things; through every sort of change, the self is not lost.

吕惠卿注知止乎不知物之所同是莫之辩荡然俱得啮缺未能妙其不知犹疑至人当知之斯悬之未解也至人神矣言体与物防虽渉至变而未始非我也 吕惠卿注知止乎不知物之所同是也知物所同是则非不知也唯道不可知知之所以不知不知所以知之则道之为体可见矣今夫民以体知安佚为正处口知刍豢为正味目知好色为正色至于防猿之所安蛆鸦之所甘鱼鸟麋鹿之相与为偶者如彼是各以其知为知之正则民与万物之所知岂有正处正味正色哉诚不得正处正味正色而知之则其所知者非正可知矣故自我观之仁义是非樊然殽乱吾安能知其辩所以四问四不知也至人神矣神则妙万物而为言万物莫非者非正可知矣故自我观之仁义是非樊然殽乱吾安能知其辩所以四问四不知也至人神矣神则妙万物而为言万物莫非我而我则无矣孰能寒而惊惧之哉 林疑独注民人之与鸟兽各随所好交相憎爱孰知天下之正处正味正色哉天下之正处无处是也天下之正味无味是也天下之正色无色是也虽然以无为是者见无而已故但言有处有味有色之殊而不言无之为正自我观之是非仁义樊然殽乱孰从而正之故不知其辩乃所以辩也 陈祥道注道以不知为内知之为外故知乃不知不知乃知而知其不知亦不免于有故不定云知与不知又不言无处味色之为正凡以遣其为言之累而已夫其辩乃所以辩也
Interpretation

Commentary by Lü Huiqing

To know how to rest in “not knowing” is to understand that the ten thousand things each have what they share in common. Recognizing that things share something in common does not mean knowing everything. Only the Dao cannot be grasped by ordinary knowledge: to think one knows is precisely to show one does not yet know; to understand that one cannot know it in the usual way—that alone counts as knowing this much. From this one can see the substance of the Dao.

People rely on bodily feeling and take ease and comfort as the right place to dwell, meat and fine flavors as good taste, and beauty as true color. Yet what monkeys prefer to live in, what maggots and crows find delicious, and how fish, birds, and deer keep company—all differ from human likes. Since each takes its own knowledge as the correct measure, how could there be an absolute standard for dwelling, taste, and color as humans and the myriad things define them? If one admits that dwelling, taste, and color have no fixed correct standard, then what each party takes as standard may not be truly correct.

From my perspective, benevolence, righteousness, right, and wrong tangle and blur together—how could I fix their distinctions? Hence, faced with four questions, the answer each time is “I do not know.” The perfected person (zhi ren) is unfathomably subtle and can let the ten thousand things each display their own excellence. Nothing is otherwise; and “I” too am among the ten thousand things. When “I” no longer cling to self, who could make me tremble at cold or heat?

Commentary by Lin Yidu

Humans, birds, and beasts each follow their own preferences, loving and hating one another. Who can say what the truly correct dwelling, taste, and color in the world are? The world’s true dwelling is dwelling without a fixed dwelling; true taste is taste without a fixed taste; true color is color without a fixed color. Yet to treat “nothing” (wu) as correct is still only to have seen a “nothing.” Therefore the commentary speaks only of how visible kinds of dwelling, taste, and color differ, and does not treat “nothing” as the sole correct standard.

From my perspective, right and wrong, benevolence and righteousness, are jumbled and mixed—on what basis could one judge which is correct? Saying “I do not know their distinctions” is precisely another way of showing that distinctions have no fixed standard.

Commentary by Chen Xiangdao

The Dao takes “not clinging to knowing” as its inner root and concrete knowledge as its outer expression. Thus to cling to knowing is really not knowing; to understand that one does not know is really knowing. But if one then clings to “knowing that one does not know,” one still falls into a state of having something attained. Hence one does not fix which side is “knowing” and which is “not knowing,” nor treat formless dwelling, taste, and color as the only correct standard. These formulations are all meant to remove the bonds imposed by words and concepts. The very fact that the ten thousand things can be distinguished is also the reason they can be distinguished at all.

陈祥道注道以不知为内知之为外故知乃不知不知乃知而知其不知亦不免于有故不定云知与不知又不言无处味色之为正凡以遣其为言之累而已夫泽焚不河冱不寒疾雷不惊者其天守全其神无郄故也乘云气日月则不疾而不行而至者也
Interpretation

Chen Xiangdao explains that the Dao takes not-knowing as its inner foundation and knowing as its outer manifestation. Thus true knowing includes awareness of what one does not know; to think one knows everything is still a kind of not-knowing. Yet if one clings to the idea of knowing that one does not know, one still falls into deliberate contrivance. So the text neither fixes on calling something knowing or not-knowing, nor posits some third place beyond both. When Zhuangzi speaks of flavor and color, it is likewise only to loosen the grip of attachment to words and concepts.

When marshes burn they do not feel the heat; when rivers freeze they do not feel the cold; when thunder rolls they are not startled—because they fully preserve their innate nature and their spirit (Shen) is not diminished. “Riding cloud-qi and steering sun and moon” means aligning with the movement of heaven-and-earth qi: one can arrive swiftly without hurrying and reach a destination without walking.

陈碧虚注以同为是则无非以同为非则无是凡物形不同各不相知虽都忘其知而物各存焉且吾所知者庸言不知彼不知此也吾所不知者庸言知之物各不相知也吾所谓知者万物之理所不知者万物之性故濠梁之上知鲦鱼之也吾所不知者庸言知之物各不相知也吾所谓知者万物之理所不知者万物之性故濠梁之上知鲦鱼之乐庸讵信之哉蝉饮而不食食而不饮自不知其所以然凡物之形不同色味亦尔性情所禀岂可强齐则仁义是非宜圣人所不辩也至人神变不测故造化莫移方寸之地虚矣身非我有云气可乘也视听不用日月可也所在皆适四海可游也生死莫变利害何有哉赵虚斋注吾所谓知未必知所谓不知未必不知子曰吾有知乎哉无知也言必至于无知斯为真知居处味色人与鸟兽各适所欲不能皆同孟子谓犬之性犹牛之性牛之性犹人之性正此言欲识居处色味之正必离居处色味而后有真识欲知仁义是非之正必离仁义是非而后有真知啮缺复以至人为问王倪遂以姑射神人之告之二子皆寓言也鬳斋口义云啮缺同是之问王倪不知之对即是知止其所不知知之非不知不知之非知盖谓不知即真知啮缺复以至人为问王倪遂以姑射神人之告之二子皆寓言也鬳斋口义云啮缺同是之问王倪不知之对即是知止其所不知知之非不知不知之非知盖谓不知即真知也次论正处正味正色皆是非物我之喻结以仁义是非纷然殽乱亦犹处味色之不同又安可得而辩哉王倪即至人神矣妙万物而无迹不不寒不惊即游心于无物之始也死生且不为之动心况利害是非乎
Interpretation

Chen Bixu’s commentary states: If you treat what is alike as right, you will treat what differs as wrong; if you treat what is alike as wrong, you will treat what differs as right. The forms and kinds of the ten thousand things are not the same, and they cannot fully understand one another; even if all forgot their own knowing, each thing would still exist on its own. How can what I know show that I also know what others do not know? How can what I do not know show that others know? The ten thousand things by nature cannot fully know one another.

What I call “knowing” is grasping the principles of the ten thousand things; what I call “not knowing” is failing to grasp each thing’s own nature. Thus when Zhuangzi on the bridge over the Hao River knew the minnow’s joy, how could one be sure he truly knew? Cicadas drink dew and do not eat; silkworms eat mulberry leaves and do not drink water—they do not know why they are so. The ten thousand things differ in form; color and flavor differ as well; innate endowment and disposition differ, so how can one force them to be the same? Therefore questions of benevolence, righteousness, and right and wrong probably should not be argued over insistently by the sage.

The perfected person (zhiren, one who has reached the deepest level) transforms in spirit in ways that cannot be measured, so creation and transformation cannot alter him. His mind is empty and bright; he does not take the body as “mine.” He can ride cloud-qi without relying on eyes and ears to see and hear, as if he could command sun and moon. Wherever he is, he is at ease; the four seas are all open to him. Birth and death cannot move his heart—what need is there to care about benefit and harm?

Zhao Xuzhai’s commentary states: What we take ourselves to know may not be real knowing; what we take ourselves not to know may not be real not-knowing. Confucius said: “Do I have knowledge? I have no knowledge.” Only when one reaches the “not-knowing” of non-attachment is there true knowing. Dwelling, flavor, and color—each person has preferences; humans and birds and beasts differ in preference too, and complete sameness is impossible. Mencius’s saying that “the nature of a dog is like the nature of an ox, and the nature of an ox is like the nature of a human” means exactly this. To know the right principle of dwelling, flavor, and color, one must transcend attachment to dwelling, flavor, and color; only then can there be genuine understanding. To know the right principle of benevolence, righteousness, and right and wrong, one must likewise transcend attachment to benevolence, righteousness, and right and wrong; only then can there be genuine cognition.

When Queque again asked Wang Ni about the perfected person, Wang Ni told the story of the spirit person of Mount Guye—both are figures in allegory. Yizhai’s oral exegesis says that Queque asked what “same affirmation” means, and Wang Ni answered that he “does not know”—which exactly embodies knowing where to stop (zhizhi): to know what one does not know is true knowing; to call not-knowing knowing, or knowing not-knowing, is not true knowing. Not-knowing itself is precisely true knowing.

What follows, on proper dwelling, flavor, and color, all uses the gap between things and self as metaphor; it ends with benevolence, righteousness, and right and wrong tangled together. Since dwelling, flavor, and color are not the same, how can one forcibly argue out one standard everyone accepts? Wang Ni is the wondrous perfected person: he attunes to the ten thousand things yet leaves no trace, feels no heat, feels no cold, and is not shaken; his spirit roams in the undifferentiated origin of things. Even birth and death cannot move his heart—how much less benefit, harm, and right and wrong?

诸解于啮缺首问物之所同是一句似欠发明窃考经意盖谓人物之所同者性所异者情性流为情物各自是彼此偏见指马相非论殊而嫌隙生辩极而忿争起以至肝胆楚越父子路人者有之其患实始于知之一字妄生分别故王倪三答吾恶乎知之欲啮缺反求其所不知得其同然之性而防夫大通之理则近道矣又恐未能心防以尝试言之引喻人妄生分别故王倪三答吾恶乎知之欲啮缺反求其所不知得其同然之性而防夫大通之理则近道矣又恐未能心防以尝试言之引喻人鸟兽之异宜以证处味色之非正然则所谓知者岂其真知所谓不知岂真不知哉 太上云知者不言言者不知今既有言矣如知何曰舍其多知而求其所不知因其有言而究其所不言则孰知不知之非真知有言之非无言
Interpretation

Commentators from various schools do not seem to have fully explained the line in which Nie Que first asks what all things have in common. On my own reading of the text: what humans and things share is xing (nature); what sets them apart is qing (emotion and disposition). When nature expresses itself as emotion, each thing takes its own view as right, bias arises between them, and they reject one another like disputants arguing whether a name fits its object (zhi ma xiang fei). When opinions diverge, rifts appear; when argument reaches an extreme, anger and conflict follow. Even those as close as liver and gall can turn against each other, or father and son become strangers. These disasters all stem in the end from one word—zhi (knowing): people impose arbitrary distinctions and cling to their own judgments.

Therefore Wang Ni three times answered, “How would I know?”—to lead Nie Que to turn back and seek what he did not yet know, to grasp the nature that all things share, and thereby to apprehend the datong (great universal penetration) that runs through all things, thus drawing near to the Dao. Fearing that Nie Que might still fail to grasp the deeper point, he offered a parable: people impose false distinctions just as humans, birds, and beasts each have what suits them—by which one may show that there is no absolute standard for taste or color. Then is what we call “knowing” truly knowing? Is what we call “not knowing” truly not knowing?

Taishang says: “Those who know do not speak; those who speak do not know.” Yet words have now been spoken—how are we to understand this? One may put it thus: set aside excessive knowledge and seek what one does not yet know; follow what has been said and pursue what was left unsaid. Then who can insist that “not knowing” is not genuine knowing, or that “having spoken” means one has not truly spoken?

瞿鹊子问乎长梧子曰吾闻诸夫子圣人不从事于务不就利不违害不喜求不缘道无谓有谓有谓无谓而游乎尘垢之外夫子以为孟浪之言而我以为妙道之行也吾子以为奚若长梧子曰是黄帝之所听莹也而丘也何足以知之且汝亦大早计见而求时夜见弹而求鸮炙予尝为汝妄言之汝以妄听之奚旁日月挟宇宙为其吻合置其滑涽以相尊众人役役圣时夜见弹而求鸮炙予尝为汝妄言之汝以妄听之奚旁日月挟宇宙为其吻合置其滑涽以相尊众人役役圣人愚芚参万岁而一成纯万物尽然而以是相蕴予恶乎知悦生之非惑邪予恶乎知恶死之非弱防而不知归者邪丽之姬艾封人之子也晋国之始得之也涕泣沾及其至于王所与王同匡床食刍豢而后悔其泣也予恶乎知夫死者不悔其始之蕲生乎梦饮酒者旦而哭泣梦哭泣者旦而田猎方其梦也不知其梦也梦之中又占其梦焉觉而后知其梦也且有大觉而后知此其大梦也而愚者自以为觉窃窃然知之君乎牧乎固哉丘也与汝皆梦也予谓汝梦亦梦也是其言也其名为吊诡万世而愚者自以为觉窃窃然知之君乎牧乎固哉丘也与汝皆梦也予谓汝梦亦梦也是其言也其名为吊诡万世之后而一遇大圣知其解者是旦暮遇之也郭象注务来理自应非从而事之任而直前无所避就斯独至者也无彼有谓有此无谓是以言之者孟浪闻之者听莹付当于尘垢之外合乎视听之表今瞿鹊方闻孟浪之言便以为妙道之行无异见而责司晨之功见弹而求鸮炙之实予试妄言之子试妄听之以死生为昼夜旁日月之谓也以万物为一体挟宇宙之谓也以有所贱故尊卑生滑涽纷乱莫之能正各自是于一方不若委之自尔吻合自然也故众人驰骛役役圣人芚然无知举万世而参其变尊卑生滑涽纷乱莫之能正各自是于一方不若委之自尔吻合自然也故众人驰骛役役圣人芚然无知举万世而参其变可谓杂矣而与化为一常游于独积是于万岁万岁一是也积然于万物万物一然也恶知悦生恶死之非惑耶如丽姬者一生之内情变若此况死生之异恶能相知哉观寤寐之间事变情异则死生之愿不得同矣死生虽异而各得所愿以方梦而不知其梦则方死亦不知其死必有大觉而后知其大梦愚者梦中自以为寤窃窃然以所好为君上所恶为牧圉可谓固陋况复梦中占梦哉此非常之谈吊当诡异万世一遇犹旦暮然言同生死者至希也吕惠卿注圣人不知利害故无就违无不足此非常之谈吊当诡异万世一遇犹旦暮然言同生死者至希也吕惠卿注圣人不知利害故无就违无不足故不喜求无非道故不缘道有谓乃所以无谓无谓乃所以有谓唯无心者足以与此瞿鹊子尝闻夫子言之以为孟浪而已则以为妙道然二者皆非夫道非言默所载故黄帝之所听莹夫子何足以知之时夜生于卵而卵非时夜鸮炙得于弹而弹非鸮炙妙道因于所闻而所闻非妙道也今之闻道者自以为悟而不知日损以至于无为皆瞿鹊之徒也道不可以言传耳听予言之而汝听之皆妄而已欲其忘言而以心契之也知日月之所损以至于无为皆瞿鹊之徒也道不可以言传耳听予言之而汝听之皆妄而已欲其忘言而以心契之也知日月之所以为日月而与之合其明则可旁矣知宇宙之所以为宇宙而其机在乎手则可挟矣为其吻合此以为妙道之行非特闻之而已滑涽而以相尊者固置而不取矣众人役役不见成功圣人则愚而无知芚而不散虽万岁之久参而一之则成纯矣万物尽然而以是相蕴我体备万物万物即吾体之谓也参万岁而一成纯则殇子可以寿于彭祖矣万物尽然以是相蕴则秋毫大于太山矣以丽姬观之则安知死者不悔其向之蕲生又何生之可悦死之可恶乎
Interpretation

Qu Quezi asked Chang Wuzi: “I heard my teacher say that the sage does not busily engage in worldly affairs, does not chase profit, and does not flee from harm; does not deliberately seek anything, and does not cling rigidly to the Dao. They do not call what is ‘is’ nor call what is not ‘is not’; they wander at ease beyond the dust of the world. My teacher finds such talk wild and reckless, but I take it as the practice of wondrous Dao. What do you think?”

Chang Wuzi said: “Even the Yellow Emperor would have been baffled by such words—how could Kong Qiu [Confucius] be equal to understanding them? And you are too hasty: you see a quail and want it to crow at dawn; you see a crossbow and want roast owl to eat. The cock that announces morning and the roast meat do not come straight from what is before your eyes. I will speak at random—listen at random: why not treat sun and moon as things at your side, and take the whole cosmos into your embrace, so that the ten thousand things mutually accord? Set aside those tangled, one-sided notions that lift some things up and push others down. The masses bustle busily, while the sage is blank and undivided, simple and unfragmented. Let the changes of ten thousand ages gather into one and achieve a wholly unified state; when nothing fails to be so, they can contain one another. How do I know that clinging to life is not delusion? How do I know that loathing death is not like losing the way in childhood and never knowing the road home until now?

“Li Ji was the daughter of a border guard of Ai. When she was first taken to marry in Jin, she wept until her tears soaked her collar; once she reached the king’s dwelling, sharing his great bed and eating rich food, she regretted having wept. How do I know that the dead do not regret having clung to life?

“One who drinks and revels in a dream may weep upon waking; one who weeps in a dream may go hunting when awake. While dreaming, one does not know one is dreaming, and may even divinate the dream within the dream; only after waking does one know one was dreaming. One must wait for the great awakening to know that all of this has been a great dream. The foolish think themselves awake, privately sure they understand everything, and dispute who is ruler and who is herdsman. Kong Qiu is truly stubborn! You and I are both in a dream; when I say you are dreaming, that saying is still dream-talk. Such discourse may be called strange and uncanny. If after ten thousand ages a great sage appears who grasps its meaning, meeting him will be like meeting morning or evening.”

Guo Xiang’s commentary explains: Affairs come of themselves, principle shows itself—the sage does not deliberately pursue, but only accords with things and goes forward calmly, neither fleeing nor grasping; that is what is unique here. “Not calling what is ‘is’ nor what is not ‘is not’” means that what speech says and what the heart hears should not be fixed; only by going beyond worldly notions and aligning with the subtle realm beyond sight and hearing can one act. Qu Quezi, having just heard words that seemed wild, thought he was already practicing wondrous Dao—like seeing a quail and demanding it crow at dawn, or seeing a crossbow and asking for roast owl.

Chang Wuzi’s “I will speak at random—listen at random” means treating life and death as the alternation of day and night, and the ten thousand things as one body taken into the cosmos. If one belittles something to exalt something else, rank and low arise; ideas tangle and each side holds to one corner, each sure of being right. Better to let things be natural so the ten thousand things mutually accord. Hence the masses run and toil while the sage seems dull and unknowing, yet is simple and unforced; they take the changes of ten thousand ages into their view—one might say they embrace multiplicity yet fuse with change, abiding constantly in self-sufficiency. Gathering the changes of ten thousand ages, the ten thousand ages return to one; gathering the conditions of the ten thousand things, the ten thousand things return to one.

Since the ten thousand things are all thus and mutually contain one another, how can I be sure that craving life or loathing death is not delusion? In one lifetime Li Ji’s mood changed so greatly—how much more do life and death differ, and how can one know in advance? Between waking and dreaming, feeling and circumstance shift; wishes toward life and death need not stay the same. Though life and death differ, each may suit the person’s wish at the time. As in a dream one does not know one is dreaming, so at death one may not know one is dying; only the great awakening reveals that great dream. The foolish in their dream think themselves awake, privately calling what they like “ruler” and what they dislike “herdsman and servant”—stubborn and shallow, and still divinating the dream within the dream. Such extraordinary speech is strange and hard to resolve; in ten thousand ages, to meet once one who understands it is like meeting morning or evening. One who can speak wondrous Dao and return life and death to one body is exceedingly rare.

Lu Huiqing’s commentary explains: The sage does not fix on benefit and harm, so does not deliberately seek profit or avoid harm; nothing is lacking, so nothing is deliberately grasped. All affairs are nothing but Dao, so one does not cling to Dao either. “Being” is the path to “non-being,” and “non-being” is the path to “being”—only the person without fixed mind can grasp this. Qu Quezi heard Kong Qiu’s words and found them wild; Chang Wuzi took them as wondrous Dao. Yet neither view has truly held Dao, for Dao is not something speech or silence can carry.

The quail hatches from an egg, but the egg is not the cock that crows at dawn; roast owl comes from a bird taken by crossbow, but the crossbow is not the roast meat. Wondrous Dao may be stirred by hearing, but what is heard is not Dao itself. Hearers of Dao today think they have awakened, not knowing they must daily diminish until wuwei (non-action)—such people resemble Qu Quezi. Dao cannot be transmitted by words: I speak, you listen with the ear—both are provisional; in the end one must forget words and grasp with the heart.

If one understands how sun and moon are sun and moon and joins their light, one may say sun and moon are at one’s side; if one understands how the cosmos is the cosmos and holds the key to its turning, one may say the cosmos is in one’s embrace. Making the ten thousand things mutually accord is practicing wondrous Dao—not stopping at hearing alone. Tangled notions that cling to one side and mutually exalt or demean should be released, not grasped. The masses are busy yet see no achievement; the sage seems foolish and unknowing, yet is simple and un scattered. Through ten thousand ages one can still gather change into one—that is achieving the state of unity.

“Nothing fails to be so, and they mutually contain one another” means my body holds the ten thousand things, and the ten thousand things are all within my body. If the changes of ten thousand ages return to one, a child who dies young may live as long as Peng Zu; if the ten thousand things mutually contain one another, an autumn hair may be greater than Mount Tai. Judging from Li Ji’s experience, how do we know the dead do not regret having clung to life? Then how can we be sure life is worth craving or death worth loathing?

林疑独注圣人应之于不得已何尝从事于务哉无拣择故无就违心至足故无求缘乃能默时时默而游乎尘垢之外也听主乎聪莹主乎明谓黄死之可恶乎 林疑独注圣人应之于不得已何尝从事于务哉无拣择故无就违心至足故无求缘乃能默时时默而游乎尘垢之外也听主乎聪莹主乎明谓黄帝之聪明乃能不惑不蔽而丘也何足以知之如吻之合者谓之滑乱而涽者置之使各尽其极臣于君仆于臣自然之势也任其不齐而不废吾心之平等故愚芚不别参万岁之变而一成纯粹也夫人莫不悦生而生不能延莫不恶死而死不能免在生安生丽姬之在艾封也在死安死丽姬之在王所也恶知死者不悔其始之蕲生乎 陈祥道注圣人不以已绝物未尝忘务而不应不以物累已未尝役务而从事利之不吾益故不就害之不吾损故不违供始之蕲生乎
Interpretation

Lin Yidu said that when the sage responds to external things, it is because response cannot be avoided—not because he busies himself with affairs on purpose. He does not make deliberate choices of acceptance and rejection, so he does not intentionally draw near and does not intentionally keep away. When the inner mind is full and sufficient, there is nothing further to pursue. Only then can one be silent when silence is called for and speak when speech is called for, standing apart from the turmoil of the mundane world.

Hearing should chiefly be clear and sharp; sight should chiefly be discerning. The Yellow Emperor, though endowed with intelligence, could still avoid being misled and deceived—so on what grounds could Kong Qiu (Confucius) be sure that he himself truly knew these things?

When things fit one another, people call that smooth going; when things are chaotic and obscure, one lets each go its own way until it reaches its limit. The subject belongs to the ruler, the servant to the subject—such is the situation that forms of itself. Allow things each to differ without harming the principle of inner equality; then even if one is dull and ignorant, there is no need to discriminate on purpose. Let the myriad things unfold through the changes of long ages until they return to purity.

All people love life, yet life cannot be lengthened; all people hate death, yet death cannot be escaped. While alive, live in peace; when Liji was brought to the border of Ai, she grieved over it. When dead, accept it in peace; now Liji dwells in the royal palace. Who knows whether the dead might regret it—regret that they once clung so hard to staying alive?

Chen Xiangdao said that the sage does not shut himself off from external things, nor does he forget affairs and refuse to respond; yet he is not burdened by things and is not enslaved by affairs. Gain cannot add anything to me, so I do not deliberately draw near; harm cannot subtract anything from me, so I do not deliberately turn away.

陈祥道注圣人不以已绝物未尝忘务而不应不以物累已未尝役务而从事利之不吾益故不就害之不吾损故不违供物之求故不喜求与道为一故不缘道终日不言而未尝无言终日言而未尝有言也孟浪则不中平听莹者听而明也夫子以为孟浪则不及瞿鹊以为妙道则过矣故曰太早计居日月之下而旁日月生宇宙之中而挟宇宙非役阴阳官天地者不足以与此吻合则为之为其所可为也滑涽则置之不为所不可为也虽相与为君臣适然耳役役愚芚老子所谓众人皆有以我独顽且鄙是也参万岁则此吻合则为之为其所可为也滑涽则置之不为所不可为也虽相与为君臣适然耳役役愚芚老子所谓众人皆有以我独顽且鄙是也参万岁则古犹今一成纯则众由一也人皆知生之乐不知生之苦皆知死之恶不知死之息是以生生死死不知悦恶之为妄况知生死乎古者谓死人为归人则生人为行人矣弱防不知归人以为迷生而不知死非迷邪生死徃反犹觉梦然知梦之悲乐不足为是则觉之悲乐岂诚然哉
Interpretation

Chen Xiangdao’s commentary explains: the sage does not, because he has transcended worldly affairs, forget human business or refuse to respond; nor does he let external things drag him along so that he is driven by tasks. He holds that what seems to benefit oneself cannot truly add to oneself, so he does not chase after it; what seems to harm oneself cannot truly injure oneself, so he does not flee from it. When external things need a response, he responds without rejoicing over it; his heart is one with the Dao, so he is not pulled by outward things. The sage may go all day without speaking, yet that is not because he has no words; he may talk all day, yet that is not because he clings to speech.

“Manglang” means rash and impractical; “ting ying” means to hear and then understand clearly. Confucius took these sayings to be rash to the point of excess, while Qu Quezi took them to express subtle truth—so each side went too far in its own way. What is meant by “planning too early” is judging and scheming before the time is ripe. To stand beneath sun and moon yet not be bound by sun and moon; to live within the cosmos yet not be confined by the cosmos—only one who can master Yin-Yang and encompass heaven and earth can align with this. When aligned with the Dao, one does what lies within one’s power; when the mind is confused and dim, one sets aside what cannot be done. Even when ruler and subject relate to each other, it is only because circumstances happen to be so. The sage is busy with affairs yet takes no credit for it, appearing dull and slow—just as Laozi said: “All others seem capable; only I am stubborn and lowly.”

To treat ten thousand years as a single instant is to erase the distinction between past and present; to return to pure oneness is to unify the ten thousand things from that ground. People all know that living brings joy, yet do not know that living also brings pain; they all know that death is hateful, yet do not know that death is also a kind of rest. Thus they cling to birth and death without seeing that the mind that loves life and hates death is already biased—how much less do they truly understand birth and death? The ancients called the dead “those who return home”; then the living are “travelers.” The young and ignorant do not know that the dead have returned, and so think the dead are lost; yet they know life and not death—is that not also being lost? Birth and death turn in cycles like waking and dreaming. If sorrow and joy in a dream need not be taken as real, how can sorrow and joy while awake be wholly real?

陈碧虚注孟浪不精要貌莹玉色辩玉当以视而云听岂非惑哉黄帝道之宗师视听不以耳目若未忘言是犹听莹也夫司晨在鸡造炙湏鸮契道由心此有其本也今见末而喜者早计轻侻之徒耳旁日月者常照也挟宇宙者总揽也在鸡造炙湏鸮契道由心此有其本也今见末而喜者早计轻侻之徒耳旁日月者常照也挟宇宙者总揽也为其吻合从事无迹也置其滑涽忘其违就也以相尊世俗役役也圣人愚芚灰心槁形也参万岁而一成纯者通古今如旦暮合万变为混成也夫安生乐死未出阴阳之域恶得体防夫道故丽戎之女失艾封之乐得晋国之欢舍彼从此本为无着一生之内悲喜莫知生死之际安可轻议夫梦饮酒梦哭泣者情变之所致非至人所有以万世为一旦此大觉者也以死生为一条岂复有梦哉愚者于梦中自以为觉尊巳为君视人如牧斯固陋之甚也至人以生死为大觉众人以魂交为梦形开为觉颠倒诡异岂复有梦哉愚者于梦中自以为觉尊巳为君视人如牧斯固陋之甚也至人以生死为大觉众人以魂交为梦形开为觉颠倒诡异惑于生死是故达人发此觉梦之至言以吊趣死之诡异夫生死之系虽无防约而不可解若乃经历万世一遇大圣释此生死之防者是犹旦暮之遇也
Interpretation

Chen Bixu’s commentary: “Menglang” means coarse and imprecise; “ying” means the luster of jade. Discerning jade ought to rely on the eyes—yet to say one must rely on the ears to hear is surely deluded? The Yellow Emperor was a master who embodied the Great Dao; in grasping the Dao he did not cling to hearing or seeing. If one has not yet forgotten words, one still seems to be “hearing ying”—bewitched by language and unable truly to comprehend.

Waiting for the owl to appear before the cock crows at dawn or before roasting meat—these phenomena each have their root; only by following the principle in the heart can one understand. Today some rejoice at surface appearances alone—they are short-sighted and rash. With sun and moon beside one, one can constantly receive their light; embracing heaven and earth within the breast, one can encompass the ten thousand things. The sage acts in accord with the Dao, leaving no trace; setting aside turmoil and confusion, one also forgets opposition and compliance among things. Worldly people enslave one another and vie for rank above and below; the sage is plain and without contrivance, as if dull, inwardly still, the body not deliberately adorned.

Taking ten thousand years as a single moment, one can penetrate past and present, as when viewing morning and evening; embracing myriad changes, one can merge with the Dao as undifferentiated whole. If one merely rests content in life and delights in death, one has not yet stepped beyond the sphere of yin-yang and birth-and-death—how then can one count as truly embodying the Great Dao? The woman of Lirong lost the joy of Aifeng yet gained the delight of Jin; abandoning one side and turning to the other—originally there was no fixed gain or loss. In a lifetime, joy and sorrow cannot be foretold; at the threshold of life and death, how can one lightly pass judgment?

Drinking or weeping in a dream arises from shifts of emotion—not the state of the zhenren ( perfected person who embodies the Dao and reaches a lofty realm). Taking ten thousand generations as a single dawn is precisely the realm of one fully awakened; taking life and death as one path—where then would dreams remain? The foolish, though in a dream, think themselves awake; they honor themselves as rulers and treat others as herded folk—truly shallow in the extreme. The zhenren take birth and death as the great awakening itself; the multitude take psychic interplay and bodily activity as dream and waking. They invert right and wrong, treat the strange as real, and are deluded by notions of life and death. Those who penetrate therefore speak profound doctrine on dream and awakening, lamenting how perversely the world chases death.

The bonds of life and death have no rope or hook, yet are hard to release. If only after ten thousand generations one meets a great sage and can undo those bonds, such a meeting is as rare as encountering one another between morning and evening—yet as precious as that instant when day and night meet.

王雱注儒者之所以知孔子不出乎形器之间故于道未全然所谓不知乃真知也凡有言有听不足以尽其真故皆曰妄旁日月挟宇宙此盖识者所了不可为众人道如吻之合者为之置世之滑涽使各尽其极而不以萦懐若臣于君仆于臣自然之势本无高下众人役于滑涽圣人防于无物万岁之间万物之化殽杂多矣参合其变俱为纯粹此可以心了不可以言受也次论悦生恶死证以丽姬之喻义甚切当盖谓齐物论者始于齐彼是终于一死生死生既一物安有不齐者乎夫大觉者本自无觉对未悟而言强立觉名即是不觉之觉觉与不觉俱不可着愚者之窃窃然自以为觉亦梦也直为其有是者乎夫大觉者本自无觉对未悟而言强立觉名即是不觉之觉觉与不觉俱不可着愚者之窃窃然自以为觉亦梦也直为其有是梦故吾不得不为之言梦然大觉者知觉与梦本无异也古之人不得已而有言盖为发明此处吊当于至理而诡异于众人也
Interpretation

Wang Bi’s commentary states: The reason Confucians hold that Confucius never stepped outside the realm of form and concrete things is that they have not yet fully grasped the Dao. What is called “not knowing” is sometimes precisely true knowing. Whatever is put into words and received through hearing cannot exhaust the real principle; all of it may be called “delusion.”

“Side by side with sun and moon, embracing the universe” describes a state only one who knows the great Dao can enter; it cannot be explained to ordinary people. When a person merges with the Dao, it is like two things fitting together without a gap. When the world is turbulent and slippery, one should let each thing reach its utmost and not hang them on the mind. The distinction between subject and ruler, servant and minister was originally a relation formed by nature itself; in themselves they have no rank of high and low. Ordinary people are driven by affairs; the sage can release attachment to things. Over a thousand years, the changes of the ten thousand things are intricate and interwoven; when these changes are viewed together, they all return to purity. This can only be grasped in the heart; it cannot be passed on in words.

What follows speaks of loving life and hating death, and uses the story of Lady Li as a simile in a very apt way. The argument of Discourse on Evening Up Things begins with evening up self and other and ultimately settles on treating life and death as one body. Once life and death are the same, what among the ten thousand things cannot be evened up?

What is called “great awakening” has no fixed “awakening” that can be stated; only relative to those who have not yet awakened is the name “awakening” provisionally set up. Such “awakening” is still awakening that is not awakening; neither awakening nor non-awakening should be clung to. Fools take themselves to be clear-headed, yet they too are still within a dream. Precisely because people cling to this dream, I have no choice but to call it a “dream” in speaking; yet one who is truly greatly awakened knows that awakening and dream originally have no distinction.

The ancients spoke only when they had no alternative, in order to clarify the principle here. Their words accord with the highest principle, yet they appear at odds with ordinary views.

赵虚斋注圣人不从事至尘垢之外乃长梧平时告瞿鹊者瞿鹊以为妙道而长梧以为孟浪瞿鹊未免有疑长梧又语之曰此语乃黄帝之所闻见非我所知且语未造此而遽以为妙无乃太早计乎世之养生家不知大道之所存以乾坤为门户坎离为毂轴求合吾身之造化其不可晓者置之不言而以百骸九窍六藏递为君臣是何足以相治所谓以相尊而不知有真君者存众人役役颠防于利害圣人愚芚则知而不言万物各具此理而出机入机安知死之不乐于生邪列子载周之众人役役颠防于利害圣人愚芚则知而不言万物各具此理而出机入机安知死之不乐于生邪列子载周之尹氏大治产夜则梦为人仆其役夫夜则梦为国君梦中为君为牧若固有之也今吾与子问答已是梦语告子此语是梦亦是梦其名为吊诡言举世为梦幻惑而不自觉是可吊悯也万世之后一遇大圣言举世未有知之者能知其解是旦暮遇之言悟此理在顷刻间耳鬳斋口义云孟浪不着实听莹听而能明也太早计谓汝之所言方如此而早以为妙逍之行见少而自多之意旁附日月挟懐宇宙吻合至理混而为一世人滑涽以相尊者皆置之而不言臣仆皆也而自以为尊卑众人汝之所言方如此而早以为妙逍之行见少而自多之意旁附日月挟懐宇宙吻合至理混而为一世人滑涽以相尊者皆置之而不言臣仆皆也而自以为尊卑众人役役圣人则浑然无知合万岁而观止此一理更无间杂丽姬悔泣以破悦生恶死之大惑饮酒哭泣觉梦之间变幻若此梦中占梦之皆曲尽人情则知卫玠之问乐广之答未为深达大觉即大悟君牧贵贱之分吊诡至怪也我为此言可谓至怪而中存妙理万世之后有大圣人出知此等见解与我犹旦暮之遇也此亦后世有扬子云必知我之意
Interpretation

Zhao Xuzhai explained that phrases such as “the sage does not busy himself with affairs and does not busy himself with debate,” and “beyond dust and filth,” were what Changwu ordinarily said to Quehezi. Quehezi took this talk to describe the subtle Dao; Changwu thought it empty and vague. Quehezi still had doubts, so Changwu told him: “These words belong to a realm that the Yellow Emperor heard and saw—I cannot know it myself. You have not yet truly reached that realm, yet you hurry to treat it as the subtle Dao; you are concluding too soon, are you not?”

Some people who teach nourishing life do not understand where the Great Dao actually lies. They take Qian and Kun as gate and pivot, Kan and Li as axle, and try to match the transformations of heaven and earth’s movement to the human body. Where things are hard to explain, they set them aside and speak only of arranging the hundred bones, nine openings, and six viscera into a scheme of ruler and subject. How can that be enough to harmonize the parts of the body with one another? What is meant by “taking servants as the standard of honor” is speaking only of the high and low of the body’s parts, without knowing that there is a true master within.

Ordinary people bustle about, turned upside down and confused by gain and loss; the sage seems utterly unknowing, yet understands in the heart and does not expose it. Each thing in its own way possesses this principle; vitality goes out and returns in cycles—how can one insist that death is less joyful than life?

The Liezi records that in the region of Zhou there was a man named Yin whose household and business were very large. At night he dreamed he had become someone else’s servant; his servant at night dreamed he had become a lord. Whether lord or servant in the dream, each felt it was real. The question-and-answer between you and me now is originally like talk in a dream; what I tell you is a dream, and when you repeat it, it is still a dream. This way of speaking is called “diao gui”—words that are strange and contrary. Everyone is sunk in dreamlike confusion without noticing—a thing truly to be regretted. If, ten thousand generations later, a great sage should appear who understands my meaning, meeting him would be as close as morning and evening; to grasp this principle may take only an instant.

Yuzhai kouyi explains: “Menglang” means impractical and groundless; “ting ying” means hearing and then being able to understand. “Too early a reckoning” means that the doctrine you have heard is still only at this stage, yet you prematurely take it for the subtle Dao—there is a sense of shallow knowledge that fancies itself deep understanding. Talk of matching sun and moon, embracing the cosmos, and merging with the Dao sounds muddled to worldly ears; as for taking subject and servant as an order of honor and lowliness, that too can be set aside and need not be discussed much. Servants are by nature subordinate, yet people imagine there is high and low among them.

Ordinary people rush to and fro; the sage looks on all things with undivided unity. Gather ten thousand years into one view—in the end there is only this one principle, nothing else mixed in. Lady Li once wept in regret after waking—this too shows that attachment to loving life and hating death can be broken. The shifts between drinking and weeping, waking and dreaming are so inconstant that the saying “interpreting dreams within a dream” portrays human feeling very thoroughly. Seen this way, Wei Jie’s question and Yue Guang’s answer had not yet reached full awakening.

The distinction between ruler and subject, noble and base, is strange and hard to unravel from the start. When I speak this way, it can be called very odd, yet subtle principle is contained within. If ten thousand generations later a great sage appears who understands such a view, meeting me will seem separated by no more than morning from evening. If later ages produce a Yang Ziyun, he too will surely grasp my meaning.

圣人无为任物自为故利害莫得而及非有心于避就也不喜求则方寸内虚不缘道则虚亦忘矣不言而令行无谓有谓也言而无滞迹有谓无谓也若是则何尘垢之能染哉此瞿鹊平日闻于夫子以为孟浪之言而自以为妙道之行举以求证于长梧长梧谓此言诚妙唯黄帝听之始能明了恐夫子亦未尽知之况汝践履未充徒叹羡其美是为日闻于夫子以为孟浪之言而自以为妙道之行举以求证于长梧长梧谓此言诚妙唯黄帝听之始能明了恐夫子亦未尽知之况汝践履未充徒叹羡其美是为太早计犹见卵而求时夜也予试妄言汝试妄听以为何如旁日月挟宇宙此神人之事非与日月参光天地为常未易语此傥能行前所论圣人之事则可进乎是要在审其吻合自然者为之滑涽于俗者置之从徼至妙由阶而升亦如以相尊士大夫大夫公卿等而上之圣而入于神矣众人昧此役于知见不能暂息圣人如愚不分故虽万岁之久事变之杂合而一之混然纯备无今古而忘死生也圣人不独入于神矣众人昧此役于知见不能暂息圣人如愚不分故虽万岁之久事变之杂合而一之混然纯备无今古而忘死生也圣人不独善而已又使万物同证此道相蕴而熟成之故能与天地并生万物为一也凡人所以不能造此者悦生恶死惑其心喜怒哀乐戕其性遂于后文申言以破其惑观丽姬之先泣后悔则安知死者不悔其向之蕲生乎饮酒哭泣之无据觉梦变幻之多端梦中占梦以喻世人迷之尤者必有大觉而后知此大梦也而愚者于梦中自以为觉以君牧贵贱于其间何蔽固不通之甚举世皆梦又何分乎彼我哉是以此言达者喜其吊当迷者惊其诡异万世一遇知其解者若旦暮然重叹世人明此道者至希也窃详本章指归开人耳目正在大觉二字观者梦又何分乎彼我哉是以此言达者喜其吊当迷者惊其诡异万世一遇知其解者若旦暮然重叹世人明此道者至希也窃详本章指归开人耳目正在大觉二字观者宜究心焉瞿鹊长梧制名以问答夫子指孔子亦是寓言
Interpretation

The sage accords with the ten thousand things, acts without forced contrivance, and lets all things run their natural course. Thus benefit and harm cannot sway them. This is not because they set out to shun one thing and cling to another, but because they do not grasp or cling; their mind is empty and clear. They are not pulled by outer things, and they do not even cling to that “empty clarity” itself.

They do not speak, yet affairs still get done—not because they must turn “wordlessness” into a kind of deliberate doing. When they do speak, they leave no trace of rigidity, and they need not split “having words” and “having no words” into opposites. Reaching such a state, how could dust and grime stain them?

Qu Que had heard Confucius speak in this vein and took it for absurd talk; yet he also treated these same words as the subtle Way and practiced them, then went to ask Chang Wu. Chang Wu said: “These words are indeed subtle—only the Yellow Emperor, hearing them, could truly grasp them. Confucius himself may not have fully understood; how much less you, whose practice is still shallow, while you only praise how fine it all sounds. It is like seeing an egg and already expecting the cock’s crow—far too soon.”

Chang Wu went on: “Let me speak loosely, and you listen loosely—what do you think? Surpassing the light of sun and moon, embracing the whole cosmos—that is the realm of the spirit person. To shine with sun and moon and endure with heaven and earth is not something one can discuss lightly. Only if you can reach the sage’s level described earlier can one go on to speak of this.”

The key is careful discernment: what fits nature, follow it; what in the world slides into confusion, let go. From shallower levels one enters finer ones, like ranks rising step by step—from scholar to grand officer to minister and duke, upward layer by layer, until from sage one enters the divine.

Ordinary people are driven by what they see, hear, and discriminate; they cannot rest for an instant. The sage seems dull and does not make such splits. So even through ten thousand years and myriad changes, they can merge all into one, stay utterly pure and whole, unbound by past and present, forgetful of life and death. The sage not only reaches this state themselves but also helps the ten thousand things taste and nourish this Way, and so can endure with heaven and earth and become one with all things.

Most people fail to reach this because they crave life and hate death, clouding the original mind; joy, anger, sorrow, and delight further harm innate nature. What follows goes deeper to dispel this confusion. Lady Li wept when she was first taken away, yet later she regretted that grief—how can we be sure the dead do not regret having clung so hard to life?

Drinking and laughing or weeping in grief have no fixed grounds; waking and dreaming shift endlessly and are even harder to pin down. To dream within a dream that one is interpreting a dream is a metaphor for people lost in sleep yet unaware. Only after “great awakening” does one know that before was all a great dream. The foolish, still inside the dream, think themselves awake and argue over ruler and subject, noble and base—how deep that blindness runs! If the whole world is dreaming, why insist on “you” versus “me”?

So the penetrating person, hearing this, finds it fitting; the confused person is shocked and calls it absurd. One who can understand is rare in ten thousand ages—as if only between dawn and dusk might such a person appear. The author laments how few in the world truly see this Way. The chapter’s aim is to open understanding with the words “great awakening”; the reader should ponder them carefully. Qu Que and Chang Wu are fictional figures for question and answer; “the Master” in the text means Confucius, again in an allegorical setup.

既使我与若辩矣若胜我我不若胜若果是也我果非也邪我胜若若不吾胜我果是也而果非也邪其或是也其或非也邪其俱是也其俱非也邪我与若不能相知也则人固受其黮暗吾谁使正之使同乎若者正之既与若同矣恶能正之使同乎我者正之既同乎我矣恶能正之使异乎我与若固受其黮暗吾谁使正之使同乎若者正之既与若同矣恶能正之使同乎我者正之既同乎我矣恶能正之使异乎我与若者正之既异乎我与若矣恶能正之使同乎我与若者正之既同乎我与若矣恶能正之然则我与若与人俱不能相知也而待彼也邪何谓和之以天倪曰是不是然不然是若果是也则是之异乎不是也亦无辩然若果然也则然之异乎不然也亦无辩化声之相待若其不相待和之以天倪因之以曼衍所以穷年也忘年忘义振于无竟故寓诸无竟郭象注不知而后推不见而后辩辩之而不足以自信以其与物对也辩对终日黮暗莫能正当付之自正耳同故是之异故非之皆未足信是若果是则不复有非之者非若果非则无复有是之者故是非生乎好辩而休乎天均付之两行而息乎自正待彼不足以正此则天下莫能相正任其自正而已是非然否彼我无辩故和之以自然之分不待彼以正之也是非之辩为化声化声之相待俱不足以而息乎自正待彼不足以正此则天下莫能相正任其自正而已是非然否彼我无辩故和之以自然之分不待彼以正之也是非之辩为化声化声之相待俱不足以相正故若不相待和以自然之分任其无极之化则是非之境自泯性命之致自穷忘年故同死生忘义故弥贯是非荡而为一斯至理也至理畅于无极故寄之者不得有穷也
Interpretation

Even if you and I debate, and you defeat me, does that prove you are right and I am wrong? Or if I defeat you, does that prove I am right and you are wrong? Perhaps each of us is partly right and partly wrong, or perhaps we are both entirely right or both entirely wrong. Neither you nor I can know for certain who is right and who is wrong, so any third party is bound to be confused as well. Whom should we ask to decide?

If we invite someone who agrees with you, since he already sides with you, how can he judge whether you are correct? If we invite someone who agrees with me, the same problem arises. If we invite someone who disagrees with both of us, since he does not share our views, how can he determine who is right? If we invite someone who agrees with both of us, his judgment would still be shaped by our shared outlook. In this light, you, I, and any bystander cannot mutually establish who is correct; must we then wait for yet another person to settle the matter?

How can such disputes be harmonized? One must follow the natural dividing line (tian ni)—the boundaries and measure that arise from nature itself—and allow “this” and “that,” “so” and “not so,” each to stand on its own footing. If your view is genuinely correct, the difference between it and an incorrect view is already clear and needs no further debate. If a situation is genuinely so, the difference between “so” and “not so” is equally clear and needs no further debate. The various positions are like shifting, flowing voices responding to one another; once we stop treating them as opposites that must prove and overpower each other, we can follow the natural dividing line and let change extend without end—thus one may live out a whole lifetime. Forget counting years of life; forget clinging to distinctions of right and wrong in principle; unfold body and mind in the boundless, and entrust yourself to what has no limit.

Guo Xiang’s commentary states: Precisely because there is what one does not know, people press on in inquiry; precisely because things are not seen clearly, people argue. After arguing, one still cannot be sure, because people always set themselves over against external things. Arguing all day long, one sinks into dim confusion, and no one can decide; better to leave it to things themselves and let them become clear on their own.

When views align, one assumes the other is correct; when they differ, one assumes the other is wrong—neither is enough for genuine certainty. If a view is truly correct, there will be no opposing view; if it is truly wrong, there will be no contrary judgment. Thus disputes over right and wrong stem from fondness for debate; only when contention rests in the natural balance can each position find its place and show itself clearly. Treat both sides as each having its own ground, and there is no need to wait for someone else to prove you. When right and wrong, permissible and impermissible, and mutual opposition no longer require argument, one can follow the natural dividing line.

The positions in dispute are voices in constant change; these voices depend on one another and cannot judge each other. Once one no longer fixates on such opposition, one can follow the natural dividing line and let boundless change unfold. Then the bounds of right and wrong dissolve naturally, and the aim of life and innate nature can fully appear. Forget length of years, and one can connect with the mystery of birth and death; forget distinctions of principle, and one can penetrate right and wrong. Let everything return to oneness, and one approaches the utmost principle. The utmost principle extends through the boundless, so one who dwells within it is not confined by finite limits.

吕惠卿注天下之所谓是非者不过我是若非若是我非或是或非俱是俱非四者皆出于我与若而我与若俱不能相知则所谓是非者卒不明人固受其黮暗谁与正之必正于人也而人者非同乎已则同乎若非异乎已则异乎若非同乎我与若必异乎我与若亦不过四者而皆不能正之则是我与若与人俱不能与正之必正于人也而人者非同乎已则同乎若非异乎已则异乎若非同乎我与若必异乎我与若亦不过四者而皆不能正之则是我与若与人俱不能相知也其待彼也邪言不相待也唯圣人知其然故虽化声之相待若其不相待则彼是莫得其耦而休乎天均矣何则言之是非非有实也声之出于化而已我之与人相待与不相待又出于识心之妄计也我则和之以天倪而不为之分辩因之以曼衍触而长之则万物不累乎心矣穷年则参万岁而一成纯之谓也是不是然不然之无辩者知其同体而物物皆然也穷年则忘年无是非则忘义始起于无竟故终亦寓于无竟也
Interpretation

Lu Huiqing held that what people call right and wrong comes down to “I say yes and you say no,” or “I say no and you say yes”; or both may say yes, or both may say no. These four patterns all arise from each side’s own view. If I and the other person cannot understand each other, right and wrong cannot be settled, and people remain stuck in confusion. To decide right and wrong, we have to rely on someone else; yet if that person does not agree with me, they may agree with the other; if they do not agree with the other, they may agree with me. Either way, we stay within these same kinds of opinion, and no one can truly judge. Seen this way, I, the other, and bystanders cannot understand one another, so none can deliver a final verdict on right and wrong. These views depend on one another and also fight one another—which shows that right and wrong have no fixed standard.

The sage understands this. Even when they hear many voices arguing, they know those voices have no unshakable ground. Then the opposed “that” and “this” no longer tangle with each other, and the heart rests in natural equilibrium (“tian jun”—following nature without clinging to one side). Why? Right and wrong in speech have no fixed substance; they are only sounds arising in change. Whether I and others depend on each other is likewise a vain calculation made by discriminating mind. The sage harmonizes these distinctions with the measure of nature, does not force judgments, but extends along the thread of how things change, so that the myriad things no longer burden the inner life. Living to the end of one’s years, one can join and merge with ten thousand years—this is called purity.

We stop arguing “yes and no,” “so and not-so,” because we see that the myriad things share one root and each thing has its own “is.” Living to the end of one’s years, one forgets the passage of years; without disputes over right and wrong, one forgets human-made standards. The beginning of the myriad things starts from what has no end, and in the end they also lodge in what has no end.

Lin Yidu thought Zhuangzi probably wanted people to forget words, which is why he raised this discussion. He said: even if you and I debate, if I am truly skilled in debate, I should also know that the myriad things share one root and each has its reason. Living to the end of one’s years, one forgets the passage of years; without disputes over right and wrong, one forgets human-made standards. The myriad things begin from what has no end and in the end lodge in what has no end.

林疑独注庄子盖欲忘言故立是论使我与若辩至我果辩者知其同体而物物皆然也穷年则忘年无是非则忘义始起于无竟故终亦寓于无竟也 林疑独注庄子盖欲忘言故立是论使我与若辩至我果非也邪设乱以遣之也我胜若若不吾胜吾谁使正之又遣其所遣也使同乎若者正之至同乎我与若矣恶能正之此遣之又遣而至于无所复遣斯其至矣凡言是未必是言然未必然故其异同亦皆无辩然之与是复自相对又均于辩也有化者有化化者有声者有声声者化者之化非声则不显声者之声非化则不彰化者声之体声者化之用此化声之相待也然而声出乎化非化之所能知化统乎声非声之所能识此又若其不相待也夫相待生于两物若合万化为一则相待之迹无由而生夫声者常声不待物而后声闻者自因物而生听耳化者常化不待声而后化见者自因声而生听耳此其所以相待而若不相待也若夫化化者非化之所能化声声者非声之所能声又何相待不相待之有和之以性命之本因之以变化之余则声而后化见者自因声而生听耳此其所以相待而若不相待也若夫化化者非化之所能化声声者非声之所能声又何相待不相待之有和之以性命之本因之以变化之余则古今之年有时而穷而所以为我者不古不今而无极也 陈祥道注天倪者性命之端曼衍者无穷之变和以天倪因以曼衍则物我不蔽于是非而各尽其性命之分此其所以穷年也忘年则死生为一条忘义则可不可为一贯死生可不可固无竟矣而知忘之者岂以为有物邪特寓之而已
Interpretation

Lin Yidu’s commentary holds that Zhuangzi offers this discussion so that people may release themselves from words and disputation. Suppose you and I argue: is it I who am wrong, or you? If we ask someone who shares your view to judge, he will side with you; if we ask someone who shares my view, he will side with me. If we ask someone who agrees with neither you nor me, how can he decide? None of these judgments can settle the dispute, so we must set them aside one after another until there is nothing left to set aside—only then have we reached the utmost.

To call something “right” (shi) is not necessarily to be right; to call something “so” (ran) is not necessarily to be so. Right and wrong, sameness and difference, have no absolute verdict. “So” and “right” also oppose each other and remain trapped in dispute.

There is change, and there is the root that makes change occur; there is sound, and there is the root that makes sound occur. Change without sound cannot show itself; sound without change has no way to manifest. Change is the root of sound, and sound is the expression of change—the two depend on each other. Yet sound arises from change, while change itself is not something sound can know; change encompasses sound, yet sound cannot know change in its entirety, so they also seem not to depend on each other.

This mutual dependence arises only when two things stand over against each other. If the changes of the myriad things are gathered into one, the relation of mutual facing has nowhere to appear. Sound can emit by itself; it need not wait on something else to exist. The one who hears sound, however, depends on sound for the arising of hearing. Change occurs ceaselessly by itself; it need not wait on sound to exist. The one who sees change, however, depends on sound for the corresponding arising of hearing. Thus the two both depend on each other and also seem not to depend on each other.

As for the root that makes change occur, it is not something change itself can alter; as for the root that makes sound occur, it is not something sound itself can voice. Viewed this way, how can we still speak of dependence or non-dependence? Harmonizing the myriad things through the root of nature and life (xingming), and going along with the various phenomena that change brings, then the years of past and present will in the end have a limit, while what truly constitutes “me” at the root is not bound by past and present and has no end.

Chen Xiangdao’s commentary says that Tianni (the heavenly beginning) is the opening thread of the original root of nature and life (xingming), and manyan (endless proliferation) is change without limit. Using Tianni to harmonize the myriad things and going along with boundless change, one is not obscured by self and things or by right and wrong; each can fulfill the allotment that nature and life (xingming) bestow, and thus complete one’s allotted years. Forgetting the count of years, one treats life and death as one continuous vein; forgetting distinctions of right principle, one treats what is permissible and what is not as mutually penetrating. Life and death, the permissible and the impermissible, originally have no end; the saying “to know the Dao (the Way) is to forget these distinctions” does not take them as concrete objects—it is only a provisional way of speaking.

陈碧虚注悟则不辩辩则不悟对辩不已黮暗莫明彼我不自信故也夫水清则可以鉴妍丑心虚则可以齐同异若中无主则待于外是逐物而迁者也从箕子视比干则愚注悟则不辩辩则不悟对辩不已黮暗莫明彼我不自信故也夫水清则可以鉴妍丑心虚则可以齐同异若中无主则待于外是逐物而迁者也从箕子视比干则愚以比干视箕子则卑矣从管晏视夷齐则戆以夷齐视管晏则贪矣趋舍相非嗜欲相反将使谁正之若将飞者栖巢走者宿穴各安所安孰曰不齐哉夫彼我之情相待者也非是之辩化声者也情不相待恶有彼我辩无是非恶有化声是以虚心以和崖分妙用以释留滞所以穷天年而无是非也穷天年则忘年无是非则忘义故能振举于无竟以无尽之物无极之理寄诸无尽无极而已矣赵虚斋注自得之学难为人言言之则辩论蜂起谁能正之孔也穷天年则忘年无是非则忘义故能振举于无竟以无尽之物无极之理寄诸无尽无极而已矣赵虚斋注自得之学难为人言言之则辩论蜂起谁能正之孔子曰莫我知也夫又曰知我者其天乎亦此意声相待啐化啄同时也和以天倪因以曼衍和其光同其尘也是不是然不然皆不可得而辩则是举世不相知与人言无解者是化声之不相待也如此则但当和光同尘以乐其天年何必强聒哉忘年忘义言此生此理皆付之于忘言造物者无穷吾亦与之无穷而已
Interpretation

Chen Bixu’s commentary: Those who truly understand do not cling to disputation; once one enters into debate, one is often far from understanding. When argument never stops, matters grow obscure and unclear—because neither side trusts the other’s judgment. When water is clear, it can reflect beauty and ugliness; when the mind is empty and luminous, it can view differing opinions on equal terms. If the inner mind lacks its own standpoint and everything depends on what is outside, the heart will shift with every external thing.

From Jizi’s standpoint, Bigan seems foolishly upright; from Bigan’s standpoint, Jizi seems timid and lowly. In the eyes of Guan Zhong and Yan Ying, Boyi and Shuqi seem pedantic and stiff; from Boyi and Shuqi’s standpoint, Guan Zhong and Yan Ying seem grasping and covetous. People’s choices clash with one another, and likes and desires differ—who is to decide? Birds that fly roost in nests; beasts that run dwell in burrows—each rests where it belongs; who can say they are not alike?

Mutual distinction arises from relative relations; disputes over “right” and “wrong” are also nothing but shifting words. If feelings no longer oppose one another, where would “that” and “this” be? If disputation no longer clings to right and wrong, where would there be tangled, changing words? Therefore one should make the mind empty, quiet, broad, and harmonious, and comply with the boundaries between self and other; employ refined wisdom to dissolve inner obstruction. Only then can one fully enjoy one’s natural span of years and not be trapped by right and wrong. To fully enjoy one’s natural years is to forget counting the length of life; not clinging to right and wrong is to forget the worldly standards of duty and righteousness. Then one can expand freely in a boundless realm and entrust endless things and limitless principle within the infinitely endless.

Zhao Xuzhai’s commentary: Principle grasped through personal experience is hard to explain to others in words. Once spoken, disputes arise in swarms—who can adjudicate? Confucius said, “No one understands me,” and also, “Those who understand me, perhaps only Heaven”—this is the same idea. Sounds answer one another, like the inner and outer pecking at an eggshell—life is generated in the same instant. “Harmonizing with the Heavenly pivot” means complying with nature’s dividing lines; “following along to spread and unfold” means extending in step with change; “blending one’s light and mixing with the dust” means reining in one’s sharp edge and merging with the mundane world. Right and wrong, correct and incorrect—no final verdict can be fought out. Seen this way, people in the world cannot know one another; even when they speak, they can hardly be understood. This is precisely the situation where words change yet cannot truly respond to one another. So it is enough to rein in one’s light and go along with the world, peacefully enjoying one’s full years—why insist on endless chatter? What is meant by forgetting years and forgetting righteousness is entrusting this life and the principle within it to wordless creation (zaohua). Creation is inexhaustible, and I go on with it into the same inexhaustibility.

鬳斋口义云胜负不足为是非则我与若所辩者彼此不能相知也黮暗言所见者我与若皆不明将使谁正之议论与彼同既不可议论与我同又不可皆与我与彼不同亦不可皆与我与彼相同亦不可则是三者皆不能相知必湏待彼也此彼字指造化即所谓天倪天倪者自然之分所以和者因是而已是不是然不然皆两存之若定不同亦不可皆与我与彼相同亦不可则是三者皆不能相知必湏待彼也此彼字指造化即所谓天倪天倪者自然之分所以和者因是而已是不是然不然皆两存之若定其然是则有不然不是便有是非之争化声者以言语相化服相待对敌也若以是非言语相对敌以求化服何似因其所是而不相敌故曰若其不相待不相敌而尚同则是和之以天倪游衍以穷尽岁月如此则并与岁月义理俱忘之振动鼔舞于无物之境此振字亦逍遥之意信能如是则终身寓于无物之境矣 是非胜负各执一偏不能相正则我与若与人俱不能相知也而待彼也邪言必付之造化耳此一节诸解备悉独化声之义奥难明相待不相待之境矣
Interpretation

Yizhai Kouyi says: Victory and defeat cannot serve as grounds for judging right and wrong, because when you and I argue, neither of us can truly know the other. When what both sides see is unclear, who can decide?

If the discussion agrees with the other party, it cannot be used to judge; if it agrees with me, it still cannot judge; if it differs from both me and the other, it still cannot judge; if it agrees with both me and the other, likewise it cannot judge. Seen this way, all three of us cannot know one another, and we can only wait for “that” to decide. Here “that” refers to zaohua (creation, the transforming process)—what is called “tian ni” (the natural boundary or dividing line).

Tian ni means harmonizing one another by following the natural boundary. Whether something is “is” or “is not,” “right” or “wrong,” let both positions stand side by side first; if you insist on ruling one side correct, the other side’s incorrectness is dragged in, and you fall back into dispute over right and wrong.

“Hua sheng” (transforming through words) means using speech to persuade the other so they submit; “xiang dai” (mutual facing/opposition) means standing opposed and arguing with each other. If you always use words of right and wrong to fight each other and try to talk the other into agreement, it is better to follow each person’s own acknowledged principle and no longer treat each other as enemies. Hence it is said: “If without opposing each other for victory you can still meet and connect, that is harmonizing by tian ni.”

When you wander and unfold in this way in accord with nature, until years are exhausted, even years and principle are forgotten together, and you move freely in a state of non-attachment. “Zhen” also carries the sense of carefree roaming. If you can truly do this, you can spend your whole life resting in non-attachment.

Right and wrong, victory and defeat each cling to one side; neither can correct the other, so I, you, and others cannot truly know one another. Then leave judgment to zaohua. Commentators on this section have already explained it in great detail; only the meaning of “hua sheng” is somewhat obscure—the crux is understanding the difference between the state of mutual opposition and the state of no longer opposing.

是非胜负各执一偏不能相正则我与若与人俱不能相知也而待彼也邪言必付之造化耳此一节诸解备悉独化声之义奥难明相待不相待之机亦未易以言尽唯穷神通化者以心烛之至理自见诸解中疑独立论最高自成一家之言与经文相表里非训诂之学所能及鬳斋论化声独异于众而无竟立尤长若以简要论之死生觉梦之分出于化者也彼我是非之辩出于声者也觉梦依乎形是非生乎情有若相待也然而化者自化不知其所以化声者自声不知其所以声又若不相待也要夫物理之至极莫逃造化之自然此万化之所出入万物之所以齐也详此化声之相待与形景之相待义同前后互发明耳吕氏注后附云化声之相待也要夫物理之至极莫逃造化之自然此万化之所出入万物之所以齐也详此化声之相待与形景之相待义同前后互发明耳吕氏注后附云化声之相待至所穷年也合在何谓和之以天倪之上简编脱略因误次于此观文意可知 罔两问景曰曩子行今子止曩子坐今子起何其无特操与景曰吾有待而然者邪吾所待又有待而然者邪吾待蛇蚹蜩翼邪恶识所以然恶识所以不然昔者庄周梦为蝴蝶栩栩然蝴蝶也自喻适志与不知周也俄然觉则蘧蘧然周也不知周之梦为蝴蝶与蝴蝶之梦为周与周与蝴蝶则必有分矣此之谓物化
Interpretation

Right and wrong, victory and defeat—each side clings to its own position, and neither can truly set the other straight. Then you and I, I and others, likewise cannot genuinely know one another; we can only leave things to Zao (the transforming work of nature). The various commentators on this section have already explained it at length; only the meanings of duhua (unique/spontaneous transformation) and sheng (voice/sound) remain subtle and hard to grasp, and the logic of mutual dependence versus non-dependence is not easily exhausted in words. Only those who exhaustively investigate spirit and penetrate transformation can attend with the heart and grasp the principle.

Among the commentaries, the discussion of “yi du” (relying on the One / the solitary One) is the most penetrating—it forms its own school and mutually illuminates the original Zhuangzi text, going beyond ordinary philological glossing. Yizhai’s treatment of “hua sheng” (transformation and voice) is distinctive; especially the point that one need not exhaust the beginning and end of the myriad things is insightful. In brief: the distinction between death and life, waking and dreaming, arises from transformation; disputes over “this versus that” and right versus wrong arise from voice. Waking and dreaming depend on bodily form; right and wrong spring from intention and feeling—they seem mutually dependent. Yet transformation occurs on its own, and people do not know why it happens; voice arises on its own, and people do not know why it is uttered—they then seem not mutually dependent. In the end, the principle of the myriad things never departs from the spontaneity of Zao; this is precisely the root through which all transformations enter and exit, and through which the myriad things are equalized. Here, the mutual dependence of “transformation and voice” matches the mutual dependence of “form and shadow” earlier in the text—the two passages explain each other.

The note appended after Lü’s commentary observes that the passage about “transformation and voice being mutually dependent yet ultimately not departing from the spontaneity of Zao” originally belonged before “What is meant by harmonizing through tianni (heaven’s angle / natural balance)”; because of a lacuna in the arrangement of the fascicles, it was misplaced here. The sense of the text makes this clear.

Wangliang (the faint penumbra at the edge of a shadow) asked the shadow: “A moment ago you walked, now you stop; a moment ago you sat, now you stand again—why do you have no fixed constancy at all?”

The shadow replied: “Do I do this because I have something I depend on? And does what I depend on also depend on something else? Do I depend on things like the scales on a snake’s body or the wings of a cicada? How would I know what makes me thus, or what makes me not thus?”

Long ago Zhuang Zhou dreamed he had become a butterfly—light and free, taking himself to be the butterfly, perfectly content, unaware that he was Zhuang Zhou. Suddenly he woke and knew clearly that he was Zhuang Zhou. He did not know whether Zhuang Zhou had dreamed he was a butterfly, or a butterfly was dreaming it was Zhuang Zhou. Zhuang Zhou and the butterfly must differ; this is called wuhua (transformation of things—the mutual turning of beings in change).

郭象注罔两景外防阴天机自尔坐起无待无待而独得者孰知其故责其所待寻其所由卒于无待而独化之理明矣若待蛇蚹与蜩翼则无特操之所由未为难识今所以不识正由不待斯而独阴天机自尔坐起无待无待而独得者孰知其故责其所待寻其所由卒于无待而独化之理明矣若待蛇蚹与蜩翼则无特操之所由未为难识今所以不识正由不待斯而独化耳或谓罔两待景景待形形待造物者请问造物有邪无邪无则胡能造物有则不足以物众形明众形之自物自造无所待焉此造物之正也今罔两之因景犹云俱生而非待也故罔两非景之所致景非形之所使形非无之所化则化不化然不然从人之与由已吾恶识其所以哉方其梦为蝶而不知周俄然觉则蘧蘧然周也自周而言故称觉耳未必非梦也今之不知蝴蝶无异梦之不知周而各适一时之志则无以明蝴蝶之不梦为周矣世有假寐而梦经百年者则无以明今之百年非假寐梦也今之不知蝴蝶无异梦之不知周而各适一时之志则无以明蝴蝶之不梦为周矣世有假寐而梦经百年者则无以明今之百年非假寐之梦也觉梦之分无异于死生之辩今所以自喻适志由其分定非由无分也夫时不暂停今不遂存昨日之梦于今化矣死生之变岂异于此而劳心于其间哉
Interpretation

Wangliang—the faint shadow beside a shadow—stands up and sits down not because it depends on the shadow for its movements; all of this is the spontaneous operation of tianji (the natural pattern of generation and transformation). When a snake sheds its skin or a cicada leaves its shell, something is relied upon, and the reason is still easy to grasp. What is hard to grasp is precisely that things do not depend on such conditions yet each changes on its own. If you pursue what they rely on and seek the root of their change, you will finally see that things originally have no external support but transform by themselves—this is the right principle of creation.

Some say Wangliang depends on shadow, shadow on form, and form on the Creator. Then I ask: does the Creator exist or not? If not, how could all things be created? If yes, who created the Creator? From this we know that the myriad things each arise and each change without needing something else as support—this is the correct doctrine of creation. Wangliang and shadow arise together; it is not that shadow produces Wangliang. Shadow is not dispatched by form, nor is form produced by change from “nothing.” Change and non-change, being thus and not thus—whether caused by outer things or by oneself—I cannot know the reason.

When Zhuang Zhou dreamed he was a butterfly, he did not know he was Zhuang Zhou; suddenly he woke and clearly knew he was Zhuang Zhou. From Zhuang Zhou’s standpoint this is called waking, yet one cannot say he is not still in a dream. Now Zhuang Zhou not knowing he is a butterfly is no different from the dream-butterfly not knowing it is Zhuang Zhou; each conforms to the mind of the moment, so one cannot prove the butterfly’s dream might not be Zhuang Zhou’s. Some people doze and in a dream live a hundred years—then we also cannot prove that the hundred years we now experience are not one long dream.

The distinction between waking and dreaming is no different from that between life and death. We feel we follow our hearts and are at ease because the boundary of each state is already fixed—not because no boundary exists. Time does not stand still; this present moment before us will not endure forever; yesterday’s dream has already changed and gone by today. Is the change of life and death any different? Why trouble the mind over it?

吕惠卿注罔两之于景同也而不知景之无待于形犹我与若与人亦同也而不知其无待于彼盖景之行止坐起唯形是随则无特操者也然本无情岂知有待若谓景待于形形又何待而然邪景之待形非若蛇之待蚹而行蜩之待翼而飞也恶识所以然不然哉人能通乎物之无知则蛇蚹蜩翼亦无待而已故方其为蝶也栩栩然不知有周及其为周也蘧蘧然不知有蝶一身之变犹不自知则物之化而异形其能相知乎物物不相知则各归其根物物不相待则莫得其偶其有不齐方其为蝶也栩栩然不知有周及其为周也蘧蘧然不知有蝶一身之变犹不自知则物之化而异形其能相知乎物物不相知则各归其根物物不相待则莫得其偶其有不齐者邪 林疑独注景由形生似乎相待而实不相待也而罔两者不知形景皆属造物遂以为行止坐起在乎形然非日火之光则虽有形景何由生哉此所谓不相待也景曰吾所待又有待而然者景之所待者形而形亦未能无待言待于造化耳夫景之待形则亦防小而形在造化中益又小矣故曰吾待蛇蚹蜩翼言物之至防薄者也外篇虫臂鼠肝亦此义庄子寓意于蝶以明梦觉无复分知庄子梦蝶之理则死生之尽矣梦而为蝶不知有周觉而为周不知有蝶其势不能合并必有时而分矣万物之化亦如此陈祥道注罔两待景而后有景待形而后
Interpretation

Lü Huiqing said: Wangliang (the faint edge at the margin of a shadow) and shadow belong to the same kind, yet they do not know that shadow does not depend on physical form to exist on its own; this is like you and me, or one person and another—we belong to the same kind, yet we do not know that each does not depend on others to exist. The shadow’s moving, staying, sitting, lying, and rising all follow changes in the physical form, so it has no independent conduct. But shadow originally has no consciousness—how could it know that it depends on something? If we say shadow depends on form, then on what does form depend for this to be so? Shadow’s dependence on form is not like a snake needing feet to crawl or a cicada needing wings to fly. How do we know the reason is not like this? When Zhuang Zhou dreamed he had become a butterfly, he was light and at ease and did not know there was a Zhuang Zhou; when he woke as Zhuang Zhou, he was clear and self-possessed and did not know there was a butterfly. A single person’s transformation is something even he cannot notice—how much less can things with different forms and changes know one another? When the myriad things cannot know one another, each returns to itself; when they do not depend on one another, there is no fixed correspondence between them. Is there really inequality among them?

Lin Yidu said: Shadow arises from physical form and appears mutually dependent, but in fact it is not so. Wangliang does not know that both form and shadow come from zaohua (the transforming work of heaven and earth), and therefore thinks every movement of the shadow is wholly determined by the form. Yet without the light of sun or fire, even with a form, from where would shadow arise? This is what is meant by “not depending on each other.” When shadow says “I have something I depend on,” what it depends on also has something it depends on: shadow depends on form, and form too cannot be without support—here both depend on zaohua. Shadow’s dependence on form is already a very subtle relation; form’s situation within zaohua is even more negligible. Therefore speaking of shadow as depending on snake’s feet or cicada’s wings is using extremely fine things to clarify the principle. What the Outer Chapters of the Zhuangzi say about insect arms and rat livers is the same idea.

Zhuangzi used the butterfly dream to show that there is no fixed distinction between dreaming and waking. Once one grasps the principle of the butterfly dream, what is said about life and death can also be understood: in the dream one becomes a butterfly and does not know oneself as Zhuang Zhou; on waking one is Zhuang Zhou and does not know oneself was a butterfly. The two states cannot exist at once—there must be a moment of separation. The transformation of the myriad things is the same.

见形

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