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《南華真經義海纂微》Vol. 3

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Dongshen 洞神部 Vol. 3 / 104 11,757 characters

About this page. The original text of 《南華真經義海纂微》 Vol. 3 (Dongshen 洞神部, 104 volumes) is shown in Classical Chinese as transmitted in the Kanripo (Kyoto University) edition. An English interpretation of the 23 passages on this page accompanies it: select a passage or press “Interpretation” to show it. All texts in English

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南華眞經義海纂微卷之四建四     武林道士褚伯秀學    齊物論第三 齧缺問乎王倪曰子知物之所同是乎曰吾 惡乎知之子知子之所不知邪曰吾惡乎知 之然則物無知邪曰吾惡乎知之雖然嘗試 言之庸詎知吾所謂知之非不知邪庸詎知 吾所謂不知之非知邪且吾嘗試問乎汝民 溼寢則腰疾偏死鰌然乎哉木處則惴慄恂 懼猨猴然乎哉三者孰知正處民食芻豢麋 鹿食薦蝍蛆甘帶鴟鴉嗜鼠四者孰知正味 猿猵狙以爲雌麋與鹿交鰌與魚游毛嬙麗 姬人之所美也魚見之深入鳥見之高飛麋 鹿見之决驟四者孰知天下之正色哉自我 觀之仁義之端是非之塗樊然殽亂吾惡能 知其辯齧缺曰子不知利害則至人固不知 利害乎王倪曰至人神矣大澤焚而不能熱 河漢沍而不能寒疾雷破山風振海而不能 驚若然者乗雲氣騎日月而遊乎四海之外 死生無變於己而況利害之端乎  郭象註所同未必是所異不獨非彼我莫  能相正故無所用其知若自知不知即爲  有知而不能任羣才之自當故齧缺三問  而王倪答以三不知也汝豈知吾所謂知  之非不知不知之非知邪魚泳於水水物  所同咸謂之知自鳥觀之則向所謂知者  復爲不知矣故舉民鰌猿三者以明萬物  之異便次舉民鹿蛆鴉四者以明美惡之
Interpretation

Collected Subtle Meanings of the Profound Sea of the Nanzhen Jing, Volume 4

Composed by Daoist Chu Boxiu of Wulin

Chapter 3: Discussion on Making All Things Equal (Qi Wu Lun)

Nie Que asked Wang Ni: “Do you know what all things regard as right?”

Wang Ni said: “How would I know?”

Nie Que asked again: “Do you know what you do not know?”

Wang Ni said: “How would I know?”

Nie Que asked: “Then, do all things lack awareness?”

Wang Ni said: “How would I know? Even so, let me try to say something: How can you be sure that what I call ‘knowing’ is not really not knowing? And how can you be sure that what I call ‘not knowing’ is not really knowing?

“Let me try asking you: When people sleep in damp places, their backs ache and they may even become half-paralyzed—would mudfish be like that? When people climb trees, they tremble with fear—would monkeys be like that? Among humans, mudfish, and monkeys, who knows what dwelling is truly suitable?

“Humans eat the flesh of livestock; elk eat grass; centipedes delight in eating snakes; owls and crows delight in eating mice. Among humans, elk, centipedes, and owls, who knows what taste is truly right?

“Monkeys take the bianju (a kind of ape) as mates; elk pair with deer; mudfish roam the water with fish. Mao Qiang and Li Ji are women people consider beautiful—yet when fish see them they dive to the bottom, when birds see them they fly high, and when elk see them they flee swiftly. Among these creatures, who knows what true beauty in the world is?

“In my view, the beginnings of benevolence and righteousness and the boundaries of right and wrong are tangled and confused—how could I sort them out?”

Nie Que said: “If you do not know benefit and harm, does the perfected person (zhi ren) also not know benefit and harm?”

Wang Ni said: “The perfected person is unfathomable in spirit. A great marsh ablaze cannot make him feel heat; the Yellow River and Han River frozen solid cannot make him feel cold; thunder splitting mountains and wind churning the sea cannot make him afraid. One such as this rides on cloud-qi, mounts sun and moon, and wanders beyond the four seas; the transformations of life and death cannot shake him—how much less the distinction between benefit and harm?”

Guo Xiang’s commentary:

What all things jointly take to be the case is not necessarily correct; views that differ from one another are not necessarily wrong on anyone’s side. When none can judge the other, there is no need to apply one’s own understanding as a standard to cut and decide. If one can know for oneself that one “does not know,” that already counts as a kind of “knowing”—yet one still cannot let each capacity play out on its own in a fitting, natural way. Therefore Nie Que asked three times, and Wang Ni answered three times with “How would I know?”

How can you be sure that what I call “knowing” is not “not knowing,” and that what I call “not knowing” is not “knowing”? Fish swim in water; for creatures of the water, water is the shared environment in which they live, and they all feel that this is suitable—yet from the bird’s perspective, what was called “suitable” before becomes “unsuitable.” Thus Zhuangzi cites humans, mudfish, and monkeys to show that what each finds suitable differs; then he cites humans, elk, centipedes, and crows to show that judgments of delicious and foul differ as well.

 無主又舉猿猵麋鹿鰌魚毛麗以明天下  所好之不同不同者而非之則無以知所  同之必是唯莫之辯蕩然俱得齧缺未能  妙其不知猶疑至人當知之斯懸之未解  也至人神矣言體與物㝠雖涉至變而未  始非我也  吕惠卿註知止乎不知物之所同是也知  物所同是則非不知也唯道不可知知之  所以不知不知所以知之則道之爲體可  見矣今夫民以體知安佚爲正處口知芻  豢爲正味目知好色爲正色至於鰌猿之  所安蛆鴉之所甘魚鳥麋鹿之相與爲偶  者如彼是各以其知爲知之正則民與萬  物之所知豈有正處正味正色哉誠不得  正處正味正色而知之則其所知者非正  可知矣故自我觀之仁義是非樊然殽亂  吾安能知其辯所以四問四不知也至人  神矣神則妙萬物而爲言萬物莫非我而  我則無矣敦能寒熱而驚懼之哉  林疑獨註民人之與鳥獸各隨所好交相  憎愛敦知天下之正處正味正色哉天下  之正處無處是也天下之正味無味是也  天下之正色無色是也雖然以無爲是者  見無而已故但言有處有味有色之殊而  不言無之爲正自我觀之是非仁義樊然  殽亂敦從而正之故不知其辯乃所以辯  也  陳詳道註道以不知爲内知之爲外故知  乃不知不知乃知然不知而知其不知亦
Interpretation

Apes, otters, elk, deer, mudfish, and fish; Maoqiang (a legendary beauty)—each delights in what is not the same. People under heaven do not all love the same things. If you reject others merely because they differ from you, how can you know what they might share? If you insist that only your own likes are right, you cannot tell one difference from another. Each thing finds its place; that is how it has always been. Nieque (a figure in ancient parables) had not yet grasped this subtlety; though he knew that he did not know, doubt still lingered in his mind. The perfected person (Zhiren, in Daoist usage) should understand: such unresolved doubt exists precisely because the mind of discrimination has not been cleared away. The spiritual realm of the perfected person cannot be measured. Body and mind are one with outer things; even through the greatest changes, he never feels that the myriad things are separate from himself.

Commentary by Lü Huiqing: Human understanding reaches its limit when one admits not knowing—then one can see that each thing has its place and takes that as what suits it. Knowing what things share is not the same as knowing nothing; it is only that the Dao itself cannot be grasped by ordinary knowing. The limit of knowing is precisely to acknowledge not knowing; from “not knowing” one apprehends “knowing,” and thus perceives the substance of the Dao.

People take bodily ease as the right dwelling, savory meat as authentic flavor, and pleasing colors as authentic beauty. Yet mudfish, apes, maggots, and crows prefer dwellings and foods that differ; fish, birds, and elk each keep their own company. If humans and all things alike treat their own judgment as the standard, then where in the world are fixed right dwellings, authentic flavors, or standard beauty? Since these standards are not fixed, what people affirm cannot count as absolutely correct. Thus from the human standpoint, benevolence, righteousness, right and wrong tangle in confusion—how can I judge their distinctions? To answer again and again “I do not know” is exactly because no one’s judgment can be fixed as the absolute standard. The spiritual realm of the perfected person cannot be measured; he blends with the myriad things without clinging to “self”—how could he be stirred by cold, heat, shock, or fear?

Commentary by Lin Yidu: Humans and birds and beasts follow their inclinations; likes and dislikes differ between them—who can decree what the true standard dwelling, flavor, and beauty under heaven are? The true dwelling under heaven is dwelling without a fixed dwelling; true flavor is flavor without a fixed taste; true color does not cling to any one hue. Still, taking “non-being” as the standard only sees “non-being”; so here the discussion is of how visible dwellings, flavors, and colors differ from one another—it does not erect “non-being” as the sole standard. From the human view, right and wrong, benevolence and righteousness cross and tangle—who can set a single standard for them? Therefore to say “I do not know how to distinguish” shows precisely that discrimination itself cannot be fixed.

Commentary by Chen Xiangdao: The Dao takes “not knowing” as its inner root and “knowing” as its outer expression, so true knowing includes not knowing, and not knowing can also lead to knowing. Yet if one admits not knowing on one hand and on the other treats “not knowing” itself as a settled piece of knowledge, one still…

 不免於有故不定云知與不知又不言無  處味色之爲正凡以遣其爲言之累而已  夫澤焚不熱河沍不寒疾雷不驚者其天  守全其神無卻故也乗雲氣騎日月則不  疾而速不行而至者也  陳碧虚註以同爲是則無非以非爲同則  無是凡物形類不同各不相知雖都忘其  知而物各存焉且吾所知者庸言不知彼  不知此也吾所不知者庸言知之物各不  相知也吾所謂知者萬物之理所不知者  萬物之性故濠梁之上知鯈魚之樂庸詎  信之哉蟬飲而不食蠶食而不飲自不知  其所以然凡物之形類不同色味亦爾性  情所禀豈可强齊則仁義是非宜聖人所  不辯也至人神變不測故造化莫移方寸  之地虚矣身非我有雲氣可乗也視聽不  用日月可騎也所在皆適四海可遊也生  死莫變利害何有哉  趙虚齋註吾所謂知未必知所謂不知未  必不知子曰吾有知乎哉無知也言必至  於無知斯爲眞知居處味色人與鳥獸各  適所欲不能皆同孟子謂犬之性猶牛之  性牛之性猶人之性正類此言欲識居處  色味之正必離居處色味而後有眞識欲  知仁義是非之正必離仁義是非而後有  眞知齧缺復以至人爲問王倪遂以姑射  神人之說告之二子皆寓言也  慮齋口義云齧缺同是之問王倪不知之  對即是知止其所不知知之非不知不知
Interpretation

One cannot help but know something, so one cannot definitively declare whether one truly “knows” or “does not know,” nor is there any need to insist that one “knows nothing at all.” Facing such matters as dwelling places, flavors, and colors, each person takes something to be fitting—and such judgments have always differed. These examples are raised not to lay down one uniform standard for them, but to dispel the trouble that comes from clinging to words and disputes.

When marshland burns, they do not feel the heat; when the Yellow River freezes, they do not feel the cold; when thunder crashes fiercely, they are not frightened—because their innate nature and spiritual integrity remain whole and have not slipped away. Riding cloud-qi and steering the sun and moon, they can arrive swiftly without walking and reach distant places without moving the body.

Chen Bixu annotates: Treat the different as the same, and there is no “wrong”; treat the same as different, and there is no “right.” The forms and kinds of the myriad things differ; they cannot understand one another. Even if all forgot their own knowing, each thing would still exist on its own. As for what I know, I can usually know only what I myself know—I cannot on that basis decide that others do not know what I know. As for what I do not know, I likewise cannot decide that others know it. The myriad things do not know one another.

What is called “knowing” refers to the principles of the myriad things; what is called “not knowing” refers to each thing’s own nature. Hence when Huizi, on the bridge over the Hao River, said he knew the minnow’s joy, how could Zhuangzi have believed him? The cicada sips dew and eats nothing else; the silkworm eats mulberry leaves and does not drink water—each likewise does not know why it is so. Kinds differ; the colors and flavors they experience differ; the dispositions each receives—how can these be forced into sameness? Standards of benevolence, righteousness, and of right and wrong are not something the sage should stubbornly argue over.

The Perfected Person—one of the highest cultivation in the Daoist sense, who transcends ordinary human constraints—transforms with spirit so subtly that it cannot be measured; even creation and transformation cannot alter him. His mind is empty and clear; he does not treat the body as something wholly at his own command. Therefore he can ride cloud-qi and steer the sun and moon; without relying on the senses of ear and eye, he can still move freely everywhere. Wherever the body is, it is at ease—as if all within the four seas could be traveled; death and life cannot change him, so what is there to fear from benefit or harm?

Zhao Xuzhai annotates: To say of oneself “I know” is not necessarily to know; to say “I do not know” is not necessarily not to know. Confucius said, “Do I have knowledge? I have no knowledge”—meaning that knowing truly begins when one no longer clings to the thought that one knows. Humans, birds, and beasts each have preferences suited to them in dwelling, flavor, and color; one cannot demand that all be the same. When Mencius said that “the nature of a dog is the same as that of an ox, and the nature of an ox is the same as that of a human,” he was speaking of just this sort of issue. To recognize what is fitting in dwelling, color, and flavor, one must first not be bound by those particular preferences—only then can one truly recognize. To recognize what is fitting in benevolence, righteousness, and right and wrong, one must likewise first not be trapped by fixed views of benevolence, righteousness, and right and wrong—only then can one truly recognize. When Nie Que asked Wang Ni what the Perfected Person is, Wang Ni told the story of the divine person of Mount Guye; both sides of that dialogue use allegory to convey the point.

The Luzhai kouyi says: When Nie Que asked what “sameness” is and Wang Ni answered “I do not know,” that was knowing where to stop. To understand the boundary of what one does not know is not ignorance.

 之非知盖謂不知即眞知也次論正處正  味正色皆是非物我之喻結以仁義是非  紛然殽亂亦猶處味色之不同又安可得  而辯哉王倪即至人神矣妙萬物而無迹  不熱不寒不驚即遊心於無物之始也死  生且不爲之動心況利害是非乎   諸解於齧缺首問物之所同是一句似   欠發明竊考經意盖謂人物之所同者   性所異者情性流爲情物各自是彼此   偏見指馬相非論殊而嫌隙生辯極而   忿爭起以至肝膽楚越父子路人者有   之其患實始於知之一字妄生分别故   王倪三答吾惡乎知之欲齧缺反求其   所不知得其同然之性而㝠夫大通之   理則近道矣又恐未能心會繼以嘗試   言之引喻人鳥獸之異宜以證處味色   之非正然則所謂知者豈其眞知所謂   不知豈眞不知哉   太上云知者不言言者不知今既有言   矣如知何曰舍其多知而求其所不知   因其有言而究其所言則敦知不知之   非眞知有言之非無言邪 瞿鵲子問乎長梧子曰吾聞諸夫子聖人不 從事於務不就利不違害不喜求不縁道無 謂有謂有謂無謂而遊乎塵垢之外夫子以 爲孟浪之言而我以爲妙道之行也吾子以 爲奚若長梧子曰是黄帝之所聽瑩也而丘 也何足以知之且汝亦大早計見卵而求時 夜見彈而求鴞炙予嘗爲汝妄言之汝以妄
Interpretation

What is called “not-knowing” is roughly this: not thinking that one already knows is what counts as genuine knowing. Next comes “correctness”: flavors differ as sweet and sour, colors differ as red and white—these are images for how things and the self each have their differences. Benevolence, righteousness, right and wrong tangle and confuse one another, much as people’s feelings about flavor and color differ; how could debate settle on one absolute standard?

Wang Ni was a perfected person who had reached a marvelous realm. He could let each thing display its wonder without leaving traces of contrivance; he felt neither heat nor cold, and was not shaken by alarm—this is the state in which spirit roams in thetime before things had arisen. Even life and death could not move his heart; how much less could benefit, harm, right, and wrong?

Commentators on the Discussion on Making All Things Equal who explain Nie Que’s opening question—“In what way are all things the same?”—seem not to have fully clarified it. My own reading is that the text means: what humans share with all things is nature (xing); what sets them apart is conscious disposition (qing). When nature turns into disposition, each thing fixes on itself as right. People cling to partial views and argue over who is right and wrong; when views split, rifts open; when argument reaches an extreme, anger and conflict follow. Even those who would lay down their lives for one another can turn as hostile as Chu and Yue, and father and son can grow as distant as strangers. Calamity begins with the thought of “knowing”: people impose false distinctions, and strife arises.

Therefore Wang Ni answered three times, “How would I know?”—to turn Nie Que back toward what he does not yet know, to taste the nature shared by all things, and to align with the great Dao that runs through them; that is what draws one near to the Way. Fearing Nie Que might not yet grasp this inwardly, he went on: “Let me try to say something,” and gave examples of how humans, birds, and beasts each have different preferences, showing that feelings about flavor and color likewise vary and admit no absolute standard. Seen this way, is what we call “knowing” really true knowing? Is what we call “not knowing” really ignorance?

The Daodejing says: “Those who know do not speak; those who speak do not know.” Yet words have already been spoken—what then? Set aside piled-up knowledge and seek what one does not know; follow what has been said and pursue the meaning the words were meant to convey. Then can one not see that taking oneself to know is not necessarily true knowing, and that having spoken is not necessarily failing to grasp the wordless Way?

Qu Quezi asked Changwuzi: “I heard from my teacher that the sage does not busy himself with worldly affairs, does not chase profit, and does not deliberately flee disaster; he is not glad because he gains something, and does not cling to one fixed doctrine. He wanders at ease beyond the dust of the world. My teacher called this talk wild, but I take it to be the practice of the profound Dao. What do you think, sir?”

Changwuzi said: “Even the Yellow Emperor would be perplexed by this—how could Kong Qiu understand it? Besides, you are too impatient: you see an egg and already expect a crowing cock; you see a sling and already expect roasted owl. Let me try to speak to you in loose, far-reaching words, and you…”

聽之奚旁日月挾宇宙爲其脗合置其滑涽 以隸相尊衆人役役聖人愚芚參萬歲而一 成純萬物盡然而以是相藴予惡乎知悅生 之非惑邪予惡乎知惡死之非弱喪而不知 歸者邪麗之姬艾封人之子也晋國之始得 之也涕泣沾襟及其至於王所與王同匡牀 食芻豢而後悔其泣也予惡乎知夫死者不 悔其始之蘄生乎夢飲酒者旦而哭泣夢哭 泣者旦而田獵方其夢也不知其夢也夢之 中又占其夢焉覺而後知其夢也且有大覺 而後知此其大夢也而愚者自以爲覺竊竊 然知之君乎牧乎固哉丘也與汝皆夢也予 謂汝夢亦夢也是其言也其名爲吊詭萬世 之後而一遇大聖知其解者是旦暮遇之也  郭象註務來理自應非從而事之任而直  前無所避就斯獨至者也無彼有謂有此  無謂是以言之者孟浪聞之者聽瑩付當  於塵垢之外玄合乎視聽之表今瞿鵲方  聞孟浪之言便以爲妙道之行無異見卵  而責司晨之功見彈而求鴞炙之實予試  妄言之子試妄聽之以死生爲晝夜旁日  月之謂也以萬物爲一體挾宇宙之謂也  以有所賤故尊卑生滑涽紛亂莫之能正  不若委之自爾脗合自然也故衆人馳騖  役役聖人芚然無知舉萬世而參其變可  謂雜矣而與化爲一常遊於獨積是於萬  歲萬歲一是也積然於萬物萬物一然也
Interpretation

To treat life and death as the alternation of day and night is to “lean on sun and moon”; to treat all things as one body and to take the whole cosmos into oneself is to “embrace the universe.” In that way one aligns with nature and no longer lets turmoil disturb the mind.

Because people look down on certain others, distinctions of high and low arise; the multitude therefore bustle and toil. The sage, by contrast, seems plain and unlearned. He takes the transformations of ten thousand ages into his view and becomes one with change. The ten thousand ages may be tangled, yet they return to oneness; the myriad things differ, yet in this they are the same.

Since all things mutually contain one another, how can I know that clinging to life is not a delusion? And how can I know that loathing death is not like someone who left home as a child and later forgot where to return?

Li Ji was the daughter of the border officer of Ai. When Jin first took her, she wept until her tears soaked her collar. Once she was at the Jin ruler’s side, sharing his great couch and eating rich food, she regretted having wept. How can I know that the dead do not regret having once been desperate to live?

One who drinks wine in a dream may weep when morning comes; one who weeps in a dream may go hunting when morning comes. While dreaming, a person does not know he is dreaming; he may even divine his dream within the dream. Only after waking does he know it was a dream. It takes a “great awakening” to realize that everything now is itself a great dream. The foolish think they are awake and smugly believe they understand everything—who is ruler, who is herdsman. How stubborn their judgment is! Confucius and you are both dreaming. When I say you are dreaming, that saying too is spoken in a dream. Such talk is called “hanging paradox”—words that sound strange and seem to contradict each other. Ten thousand ages from now, if a great sage appears who grasps this truth, it will be as if you met him between morning and evening.

Guo Xiang comments: Follow how things naturally unfold and let them show themselves; accept reality and go straight ahead, neither deliberately avoiding nor courting anything—only then can one penetrate alone. What is meant here is discourse without a fixed standpoint: if the listener takes it as mysterious doctrine beyond the mundane world, he will hear it as obscure and unclear.

Now, as soon as Qüquezi heard reckless, unconstrained talk, he thought he had already mastered the practice of the subtle Way. That is like seeing a bird’s egg and demanding that it crow at once, or seeing a sling and expecting roast owl meat immediately. I will speak loosely for now, and you may listen loosely: to treat life and death as day and night is to “lean on sun and moon”; to treat all things as one and to take the cosmos into oneself is to “embrace the universe.” Because something is held cheap, high and low arise; turmoil swirls and no one can set it right. Better to let things be as they are, so that all things may fit together. The crowd hurries and labors; the sage remains plain and unknowing. He surveys the changes of ten thousand ages together—though they may be called tangled, he can merge with change and constantly roam in a realm that depends on nothing else. What the ten thousand ages accumulate returns to the same; what the myriad things accumulate is likewise so.

 惡知悦生惡死之非惑邪如麗姬者一生  之内情變若此況死生之異惡能相知哉  觀寤寐之間事變情異則死生之願不得  同矣死生雖異而各得所願以方夢而不  知其夢則方死亦不知其死必有大覺而  後知其大夢愚者夢中自以爲寤竊竊然  以所好爲君上所惡爲牧圉可謂固陋況  復夢中占夢哉此非常之談吊當詭異萬  世一遇猶旦暮然言玄同生死者至希也  吕惠卿註聖人不知利害故無就違無不  足故不喜求無非道故不縁道有謂乃所  以無謂無謂乃所以有謂唯無心者足以  與此瞿鵲子嘗聞夫子言之以爲孟浪而  已則以爲妙道然二者皆非夫道非言默  所載故黄帝之所聽瑩夫子何足以知之  時夜生於卵而卵非時夜鴞炙得於彈而  彈非鴞炙妙道因於所聞而所聞非妙道  也今之聞道者自以爲悟而不知日損以  至於無爲皆瞿鵲之徒也道不可以言傳  耳聽予言之而汝聽之皆妄而巳欲其忘  言而以心契之也知日月之所以爲日月  而與之合其明則可旁矣知宇宙之所以  爲宇宙而其機在乎手則可挾矣爲其脗  合此所以爲妙道之行非特聞之而已滑  涽而以隸相尊者固置而不取矣衆人役  役不見成功聖人則愚而無知芚而不散  雖萬歲之乆參而一之則成純矣萬物盡  然而以是相藴我體備萬物萬物即吾體
Interpretation

How can we know that loving life and hating death is not itself a kind of delusion? Someone like Lady Li, over the course of a single lifetime, undergoes so many shifts in feeling—how much more so the gap between life and death; how could we ever fully grasp one another across that divide?

Judging from the alternation of sleep and waking and from the variety of our emotions, what we wish for in life and in death is not the same. Yet though life and death differ, each state can obtain what it seeks in its own way. When we dream, we do not know we are dreaming; when we die, we may likewise not know we are dead. Only after a great awakening do we realize that our whole life has been nothing but a vast dream. The foolish, still inside the dream, fancy themselves awake: they secretly decide that what they like must mean being a ruler, and what they dislike must mean being a slave. That is already stubborn and shallow—and all the more so when, still dreaming, they try to divine the meaning of the dream.

Such talk is out of the ordinary and sounds strange when you first hear it; it may come once in a thousand years, yet feel as if it could appear any morning or evening. Those who truly speak of the sameness of life and death and the hidden unity of all things are exceedingly few.

Commentary by Lu Huiqing: The sage does not reckon in terms of benefit and harm, and so has no mind to draw near or turn away; he feels no lack, and therefore does not crave pursuit; he does not go against the Dao, and so does not cling to anything in particular. The Dao has what we “call” it only because it was never something to be put into words; and because it is beyond words, there is what we call it. Only one who is without deliberate intent is fit to touch this depth.

Qu Quezi once heard the Master speak in this vein and took it for mere wild talk; yet to treat it as nothing but “the mysterious Dao” would also miss the mark. The Dao is not something speech or silence can carry. When the Yellow Emperor heard the Dao he was still left in doubt—how then could the Master lightly claim to know?

The nightjar hatches from an egg, but the egg is not the nightjar; roast owl comes from the hunt with a pellet bow, but the pellet bow is not the roast owl. The mysterious Dao may show itself when one hears of it, but what is heard is not the mysterious Dao. People today who have “heard of the Dao” imagine they have already understood, not knowing they must day by day pare away until they reach the ground of Wuwei (non-action)—they are all of them like Qu Quezi.

The Dao cannot be handed on through words. When I speak to you and you listen to me, it is all empty talk; what matters is to forget the words and take it in with the heart. Understand why sun and moon can be sun and moon, and merge with their light—then you may reach it from the side; understand why the cosmos can be the cosmos, and grasp the pivot of its turning—then you may hold it. To be wholly in accord with the Dao in this way is to practice the mysterious Dao, not merely to have heard a few sayings.

To honor and serve those who are confused as if they were worthies is a practice that should be cast off, not taken up. The crowd bustles about yet sees no real outcome; the sage seems dull and unknowing, undivided within and not scattered without. Even after ten thousand years he can still gather all things into one, and so achieve pure oneness. All things are like this, each holding the others within itself; my body contains the ten thousand things, and the ten thousand things are my body.

 之謂也參萬歲而一成純則殤子可以壽  於彭祖矣萬物盡然以是相藴則秋毫可  以大於太山矣以麗姬觀之則安知死者  不悔其向之蘄生又何生之可悦死之可  惡乎  林疑獨註聖人應之於不得已何嘗從事  於務哉無揀擇故無就違心至足故無求  縁乃能默時說說時默而遊乎塵垢之外  也聽主乎聰瑩主乎明謂黄帝之聰明乃  能不惑不蔽而丘也何足以知之如脗之  合者爲之滑亂而涽者置之使各盡其極  臣隸於君僕隸於臣自然之勢也任其不  齊而不廢吾心之平等故愚芚不别参萬  歲之變而一成純粹也夫人莫不悦生而  生不能延莫不惡死而死不能免在生安  生麗姬之在艾封也在死安死麗姬之在  王所也惡知死者不悔其始之蘄生乎  陳詳道註聖人不以己絶物未嘗忘務而  不應不以物累己未嘗役務而從事利之  不吾益故不就害之不吾損故不違供物  之求故不喜求與道爲一故不縁道終日  不言而未嘗無言終日言而未嘗有言也  孟浪則不中平聽瑩者聽而明也夫子以  爲孟浪則不及瞿鵲以爲妙道則過矣故  曰太早計居日月之下而旁日月生宇宙  之中而挾宇宙非役陰陽官天地者不足  以與此脗合則爲之爲其所可爲也滑涽  則置之不爲所不可爲也雖相與爲君臣
Interpretation

This is what is meant: when one regards ten thousand years as a single whole, one can form a complete and pure understanding; seen in this light, a child who dies young may be said to outlive Pengzu. The same holds for all things: if one looks from the angle of mutual inclusion and interconnection, a single autumn hair may be greater than Mount Tai. Consider Lady Li’s experience—how can we know that the dead do not regret having once clung so hard to life? Given that, what grounds have we to insist that birth is necessarily welcome and death necessarily hateful?

Lin Yidu’s commentary: The sage responds to external things only when he cannot avoid doing so—how could he be someone who sets out deliberately to do this or that? He has no partiality in grasping or rejecting, so he neither forces himself to draw near nor deliberately turns away; his inner life is full and sufficient, so he does not seek outwardly. Because he is not pulled by things, he can be silent when silence is fitting and speak when speech is fitting, dwelling at ease beyond the dust and turmoil of the world.

Hearing values keenness, sight values clarity. The Yellow Emperor’s “intelligence” means that he could remain unconfused and unclouded; as for Kong Qiu (Confucius), how could he have understood this level? Where things accord with one another, he lets them merge in their course; where things are chaotic and obscure and hard to sort out, he sets them aside and lets each run its course to the end.

The subject serves the ruler, the servant serves the subject—such is the situation nature has shaped. The sage lets all things keep their differences yet does not thereby break the inner equality of his heart, so even the dull and ignorant are not treated as beneath regard. Across ten thousand years things change without cease, yet the whole still returns to purity.

Everyone delights in life, yet life cannot be extended; everyone loathes death, yet death cannot be escaped. While alive, one rests in being alive—Lady Li, before she was taken to Jin, lived thus in Ai. When dead, one rests in being dead—after Lady Li came to the Jin king’s side and her life settled, it was thus too. How do we know that the dead do not regret having once clung so hard to life?

Chen Xiangdao’s commentary: The sage does not, because he is inwardly still, cut himself off from the myriad things; affairs that call for response he never forgets. Nor does he let external things burden him—he is not enslaved by tasks. Gain cannot add to him, so he does not insist on drawing near; harm cannot diminish him, so he does not deliberately resist. He supplies what the myriad things need without rejoicing over it; he is one with the Dao and is not dragged about by things.

The Dao can go a whole day without speaking, yet that is not to say it never speaks; it can speak all day long, yet that is not to be fixated on speech. Confucius held that “recklessness” (manglang—lightness and lack of steady measure) was unsuitable; Qu Quezi took it for “wondrous Dao” and went too far in the other direction—hence the remark: “You are thinking too soon.” To stand beneath sun and moon yet view sun and moon from beyond them; to be born within the cosmos yet stand transcendent beyond the cosmos—not one who is not enslaved by Yin-Yang and can master Heaven and Earth could do this.

What is called “accord” is doing what one can along with the situation; what is called “chaotic obscurity” is setting aside what one cannot do and not forcing it. Even when ruler and subject relate to one another as such…

 時適然耳役役愚芚老子所謂衆人皆有  以我獨頑且鄙是也參萬歲則古猶今一  成純則衆由一也人皆知生之樂不知生  之苦皆知死之惡不知死之息是以生生  死死不知悦惡之爲妄況知生死乎古者  謂死人爲歸人則生人爲行人矣弱喪不  知歸人以爲迷生而不知死非迷邪生死  往反猶覺夢然知夢之悲樂不足爲是則  覺之悲樂豈誠然哉  陳碧虚註孟浪不精要貌瑩玉色辯玉當  以視而云聽豈非惑哉黄帝道之宗師視  聽不以耳目若未忘言是猶聽瑩也夫司  晨在雞造炙須鴞契道由心此有其本也  今見末而喜者早計輕侻(音/脫)之徒耳旁日  月者常照也挾宇宙者總攬也爲其脗合  從事無迹也置其滑涽忘其違就也以隸  相尊世俗役役也聖人愚芚灰心槁形也  參萬歲而一成純者通古今如旦暮合萬  變爲混成也夫安生樂死未出陰陽之域  惡得體㝠乎道故麗戎之女失艾封之樂  得晋國之歡舍彼從此木爲無着一生之  内悲喜莫知生死之際安可輕議夫夢飲  酒夢哭泣者情變之所致非至人所有以  萬世爲一旦此大覺者也以死生爲一條  豈復有夢哉愚者於夢中自以爲覺尊己  爲君視人如牧斯固陋之甚也至人以生  死爲大夢超生死爲大覺衆人以魂交爲  夢形開爲覺顚倒詭異惑於生死是故達
Interpretation

This is merely how circumstances happen to fall. People bustle about in ignorance and folly, just as Laozi said: “All others seem clear; only I am dull and shallow.” If you take ten thousand years as a single instant, past and present have no separation; all things return to pure unity, and the many all arise from the one.

People all know the joy of living, yet do not know that living also brings suffering; they all know death is fearful, yet do not know that death may be rest. Therefore they only cling to life and dread death, unaware that such likes and dislikes are empty from the start—how much less can they truly see through birth and death? The ancients called the dead “those who return”; then those alive are “travelers.” Like a child who leaves home young and, grown, forgets the road back, they take going home for losing the way. Not knowing where death leads while alive—is that not the same kind of being lost? Birth and death cycle like waking and dreaming. Since one knows joy and sorrow in dreams are not to be taken as real, how can joy and sorrow while awake be certainly real?

Chen Bixu’s commentary: When people debate in confusion, they often miss the point. Some judge jade only by its outward luster and call what should be seen with the eyes something heard with the ears—is that not muddled? The Yellow Emperor (Huangdi) was a master of the Dao; observing and listening did not cling to ear and eye. To still fixate on words is like only “listening to clarity”—hearing the teaching without truly understanding. The rooster announces dawn, the owl seizes roasted food—each has its capacity; grasping the Dao requires the mind—that is the root. Today some rejoice at surface appearance alone; they are merely people who rush for results and are rash and restless.

“Walking beside sun and moon” means keeping pace with sun and moon, always shining upon things; “embracing heaven and earth” means holding the cosmos in one’s grasp. The sage accords with all things, making self and things join, acting without leaving traces; setting aside turmoil, forgetting the distinction between opposing and agreeing. Worldly people attach to others and mutually honor one another, busy all day; the sage seems plain and unknowing, inwardly clear and still, the body also untroubled by externals. To take ten thousand years as one glance is to penetrate past and present, as morning and evening meet; to fuse myriad changes into one is the realm of undifferentiated completion.

Clinging to life and taking ease in death still does not step outside the scope of yin-yang transformation—how then can one taste the realm of merging with the Dao? Li Rong (a famed beauty of old), happy to leave Aifeng, joyful to gain Jin, abandoned the one side and chose the other; but whatever one chooses, in the end there is no true support. Joy and sorrow alternate through a lifetime, yet one does not understand the juncture of birth and death—how can one speak of it lightly?

To drink or weep in a dream is stirred by shifting emotion, not a state the perfected person (zhiren) clings to. To see ten thousand generations as a single dawn is the great awakened one; to take birth and death as one road—where would dreams remain? The foolish are in a dream yet think themselves awake; they honor themselves as rulers and treat others as herdsmen—how shallow. The perfected person takes birth and death as one great dream; to transcend birth and death is great awakening. The multitude call the crossing and blurring of hun and po, the wavering of spirit, “dreaming,” and call the body’s waking “clarity”—upside down, deluded by birth and death. Therefore the person who has attained…

 人發此覺夢之至言以吊趣死之詭異夫  生死之係雖無繩約而不可解若乃經歷  萬世一遇大聖釋此生死之縛者是猶旦  暮之遇也  王雱註儒者之所以知孔子不出乎形器  之間故於道未全然所謂不知乃眞知也  凡有言有聽不足以盡其眞故皆曰妄旁  日月挾宇宙此盖識者所了不可爲衆人  道如脗之合者爲之置世之滑涽使各盡  其極而不以縈懷若臣隸於君僕隸於臣  自然之勢本無高下衆人役於滑涽聖人  㝠於無物萬歲之間萬物之化殽雜多矣  參合其變俱爲純粹此可以心了不可以  言受也次論悦生惡死證以麗姬之喻義  甚切當盖謂齊物論者始於齊彼是終於  一死生死生既一物安有不齊者乎夫大  覺者本自無覺對未悟而言强立覺名即  是不覺之覺覺與不覺俱不可着愚者之  竊竊然自以爲覺亦夢也直爲其有是夢  故吾不得不爲之言夢然大覺者知覺與  夢本無異也古之人不得已而有言盖爲  發明此處吊當於至理而詭異於衆人也  趙虚齋註聖人不從事至塵垢之外乃長  梧平時告瞿鵲者瞿鵲以爲妙道而長梧  以爲孟浪瞿鵲未免有疑長梧又語之曰  此數語乃黄帝之所聞見非我所知且汝  未造此而遽以爲妙無乃太早計乎世之  養生家不知大道之所存以乾坤爲門户
Interpretation

People comfort those who chase strange realms beyond death by saying, “They have discovered the words of truth in a dream.” Life and death are bound together. Though no ropes tie them, the bond is hard to undo. To live through ten thousand generations before meeting a great sage who can free one from life and death’s hold would be as rare as a chance encounter that lasts only from morning to evening.

Wang Pang’s Commentary: Confucians believe that Confucius never went beyond the realm of physical things, and so did not fully grasp the Great Dao. To “not know” is true knowledge. Whatever comes through speaking and hearing cannot exhaust what is real, and is therefore merely illusory. The sun and moon, and the cosmos, depend on one another. Only those who understand can grasp these principles; they cannot be explained to ordinary people. Those whose understanding fits together like matching tallies can go along with the world’s confusion and darkness, letting each thing fulfill its own potential without keeping these changes in mind.

Ministers and servants belong to the ruler, just as attendants belong to ministers. This is simply how things take shape naturally; there is no absolute hierarchy. Ordinary people are driven by the confusion of worldly affairs, while sages merge in spirit with the myriad things and cling to nothing. Over ten thousand years, the changes among things are intricate and intertwined. If one can draw on these changes and bring them together, all can merge into a single, undivided whole. This can only be understood in the heart; it cannot be passed on through words.

The text then turns to loving life and loathing death, using the story of Li Ji as a fitting illustration. The argument in “Discussion on Making All Things Equal” begins by dissolving distinctions between right and wrong, and ultimately arrives at the unity of life and death. Once life and death are one, what among the myriad things cannot be made equal?

A true great awakener has no fixed “awakening” to speak of. It is only in relation to those who have not realized the Dao that one is reluctantly called “awakened.” Such awakening is still named in relation to “unawakened.” Neither awakening nor lack of awakening should be clung to. Fools think themselves awake, but in truth they are still dreaming. Because they are trapped in such a dream, I have no choice but to tell them they are dreaming. Those who are truly awakened know that awakening and dreaming are originally no different.

The ancients spoke of these things only because they had no choice, seeking to make this ultimate principle clear. Their words accord with the ultimate principle, yet seem strange to ordinary people.

Zhao Xuzhai’s Commentary: Sages do not deliberately seek a realm beyond worldly dust and defilement. This is what Master Changwu used to tell Master Quque. Quque thought it was the subtle Great Dao, but Changwu considered the claim too hasty. Quque still had doubts, so Changwu told him again: “These few words are what the Yellow Emperor heard and saw; they are not something I could know for myself. You have not yet reached this state through personal experience, so to call it the wondrous Dao so quickly is surely to reach a conclusion too soon.” People in the world who cultivate life do not understand where the Great Dao exists; they regard only Heaven and Earth as its gateway.

 坎離爲轂軸求合吾身之造化其不可曉  者置之不言而以百骸九竅六藏遞爲君  臣是何足以相治所謂以隸相尊而不知  有眞君者存衆人役役顚㝠於利害聖人  愚芚則知而不言萬物各具此理而出機  入機安知死之不樂於生邪列子載周之  尹氏大治産夜則夢爲人僕其役夫夜則  夢爲國君夢中爲君爲牧若固有之也今  吾與子問答已是夢語告子此語是夢亦  是夢說其名爲吊詭言舉世爲夢幻眩惑  而不自覺是可吊憫也萬世之後一遇大  聖言舉世未有知之者能知其解是旦暮  遇之言悟此理在頃刻間耳  慮齋口義云孟浪不着實聽瑩聽而能明  也太早計謂汝之所言方如此而早以爲  妙道之行見少而自多之意旁附日月挾  懷宇宙脗合至理混而爲一世人滑涽以  隸相尊者皆置之而不言臣僕皆隸也而  自爲尊卑衆人役役聖人則渾然無知合  萬歲而觀止此一理更無間雜麗姬悔泣  以破悦生惡死之惑飲酒哭泣覺夢之間  變幻若此夢中占夢之說皆曲盡人情則  知衛玠之問樂廣之答未爲深達大覺即  大悟君牧貴賤之分吊詭至怪也我爲此  言可謂至怪而中存妙理萬世之後有大  聖人出知此等見解與我猶旦暮之遇也  此亦後世有揚子雲必知我之意   聖人無爲任物自爲故利害莫得而及
Interpretation

Kan and Li (Water and Fire in the Bagua) are said to be the pivot of the body’s creation and transformation; as for how to align them with oneself, if that is truly hard to grasp, set the topic aside for now. If one takes the body’s hundred bones, nine openings, and six viscera in turn as lord and subject, how could they truly govern one another? It is like servants honoring one another in rank while not knowing that a real master exists at all.

The crowd hurries about, dazzled by benefit and harm; the sage seems dull and unknowing, yet understands the principle and does not expose it. Each thing in its own way embodies this same principle—now showing from here, now hiding from there—so who can say that death is surely less joyful than life?

The Liezi records that Lord Yin of Zhou amassed great wealth yet dreamed at night that he was another man’s servant; his servant dreamed at night that he was a king. Those who are kings or herd the people in dreams all feel that things simply ought to be that way. Now you and I question and answer—we are already speaking in a dream; telling you this is also speaking in a dream. Such talk is called “diaogui” (strange speech that overturns ordinary sense). The whole world dwells in dream and delusion without knowing it—a thing truly pitiable. Ten thousand generations hence, should a great sage appear who understands these views, it would be like meeting at dawn and dusk; grasping this truth may also take no more than a turning of the eyes.

Luzhai Kouyi explains: “Menglang” means words that float wide of reality; “tingying” means hearing yet understanding. “Taozaoqi” means that your words have only reached this point and you already firmly believe you have entered the subtle Way—that is, little seen yet much self-assured knowing. As for taking sun, moon, and cosmos into the breast, merging with utmost principle and becoming one, as well as talk of the world’s confusion and servants honoring one another, all that may be left aside for the moment.

Servants are servants by nature, yet imagine there is high and low; the crowd bustles while the sage is blankly unknowing—viewed across ten thousand years, it is one and the same principle, without the slightest split. Lady Li’s regret and tears break the delusion that clings to life and flees death. The shifts between drinking and weeping, life and death, dream and waking are so tangled; to discuss dream within dream already paints human feeling to the full. Seen thus, Wei Jie’s question and Le Guang’s answer are not truly deep and penetrating; only one of great awakening is thoroughly clear. The distinction between lord and herdsman, noble and base, was strange and absurd from the start. That I speak this way can indeed be called utterly odd—and yet within it there is a subtle principle. Ten thousand generations hence, should a great sage appear who grasps these views, it would be like meeting at dawn and dusk. A later age, if it had a Yang Ziyun (Yang Xiong, Western Han scholar), would surely understand my meaning.

The sage practices wuwei (non-action), letting each thing transform of itself; therefore benefit and harm cannot move him.

  非有心於避就也不喜求則方寸内虚   不縁道則虚亦忘矣不言而令行無謂   有謂也言而無滯迹有謂無謂也若是   則何塵垢之能染哉此瞿鵲平日聞於   夫子以爲孟浪之言而自以爲妙道之   行舉以求證於長梧長梧謂此言誠妙   唯黄帝聽之始能明了恐夫子亦未盡   知之況汝踐履未充徒歎羡其美是爲   太早計猶見卵而求時夜也予試妄言   汝試妄聽以爲何如旁日月挾宇宙此   神人之事非與日月參光天地爲常未   易語此儻能行前所論聖人之事則可   進乎是要在審其脗合自然者爲之滑   涽於俗者置之從徼至妙由階而升亦   如以隸相尊士隸大夫大夫隸公卿等   而上之聖而入於神矣衆人昧此役於   知見不能暫息聖人如愚不分故雖萬   歲之乆事變之雜合而一之混然純備   無今古而忘生死也聖人不獨善而已   又使萬物同證此道相藴而熟成之故   能與天地並生萬物爲一也凡人所以   不能造此者悦生惡死惑其心喜怒哀   樂戕其性遂於後文申言以破其迷觀   麗姬之先泣後悔則安知死者不悔其   向之蘄生乎飲酒哭泣之無據覺夢變   幻之多端夢中占夢以喻世人迷之尤   者必有大覺而後知此大夢也而愚者   於夢中自以爲覺以君牧貴賤於其間   何固蔽不通之甚舉世皆夢又何分手
Interpretation

It is not that one deliberately shuns or clings to anything; one simply does not like to grasp and seize, and so the heart stays empty and clear. If one were not drawn by the Dao (the Way), even this clarity would be forgotten. Though one does not speak, one can still move others to follow; though one seems to do nothing, in fact one acts; and though one acts, one leaves no lingering trace. When one can be “youwei” (having purposeful action) yet leave no mark, as in wuwei (non-action), how can dust and grime cling to one?

This was what Qu Quezi had often heard from the Master. He took it for reckless talk, yet treated it as refined Daoist practice and went to Changwuzi to test it. Changwuzi said: “These words are indeed subtle; only the Yellow Emperor could truly grasp them. I fear the Master did not fully understand them either—and as for you, your cultivation is still insufficient; you merely admire and praise their beauty in vain. You are getting ahead of yourself, like seeing an egg and already expecting it to crow at dawn.”

Let me speak loosely, and you listen loosely—how does that sound? To stand level with sun and moon and hold the cosmos in one’s embrace is the realm of the spirit person (shenren); it is not merely to shine alongside sun and moon or to treat heaven and earth as something fixed and unchanging—such states are hard to put into words. If you can actually practice the sage’s way described earlier, you might advance to this level. The crux is this: carefully distinguish what accords with nature and do it; what drags one into worldly confusion and dullness, set aside.

Moving from the ordinary toward the subtle is also like rising step by step through the ranks: the petty officer serves the shi, the shi serves the grandee, the grandee serves the minister and lord, and on upward until one passes from sage into the realm of the spirit person. Ordinary people do not see this; they are driven by their own knowledge and opinions and cannot rest for an instant. The sage seems foolish because he does not make distinctions; thus through a thousand years and countless changes he can merge them into one, whole and undivided, without past or present, and forgetful of birth and death. The sage does not perfect this path only for himself; he lets all things share in the Dao, so that they nourish one another and gradually ripen—hence he lives together with heaven and earth and is one with the ten thousand things.

Ordinary people cannot reach this because they crave life and loathe death, and their spirit is thereby confused; joy, anger, grief, and delight also injure their original nature. What follows explains this further, to break through worldly delusion.

Consider the story of Lady Li: at first she wept; later she regretted having wept. Who can be sure that the dead do not regret having once clung so hard to life? Laughing when drunk and grieving when weeping—these moods have no solid ground; dream and waking keep shifting, and true and false are hard to tell. To dream that one is divining a dream is a metaphor for how far people can be lost. Only after a true great awakening does one know one has been living inside a great dream. The fool, still inside the dream, thinks himself awake; he even distinguishes ruler and subject, noble and base—how cramped and closed off! The whole world is dreaming; why must we keep drawing lines among ourselves?

  彼我哉是以此言達者喜其吊當迷者   驚其詭異萬世一遇知其解者若旦暮   然重歎世人明此道者至希也竊詳本   章指歸開人耳目正在大覺二字觀者   宜究心焉瞿鵲長梧製名以問答夫子   指孔子亦是寓言 既使我與若辯矣若勝我我不若勝若果是 也我果非也邪我勝若若不吾勝我果是也 而果非也邪其或是也其或非也邪其俱是 也其俱非也邪我與若不能相知也則人固 受其黮闇吾誰使正之使同乎若者正之既 與若同矣惡能正之使同乎我者正之既同 乎我矣惡能正之使異乎我與若者正之既 異乎我與若矣惡能正之使同乎我與若者 正之既同乎我與若矣惡能正之然則我與 若與人俱不能相知也而待彼也邪何謂和 之以天倪曰是不是然不然是若果是也則 是之異乎不是也亦無辯然若果然也則然 之異乎不然也亦無辯化聲之相待若其不 相待和之以天倪因之以曼衍所以窮年也 忘年忘義振於無竟故寓諸無竟  郭象註不知而後推不見而後辯辯之而  不足以自信以其與物對也辯對終日黮  闇莫能正當付之自正耳同故是之異故  非之皆未足信是若果是則不復有非之  者非若果非則無復有是之者故是非生  乎好辯而休乎天均付之兩行而息乎自  正待彼不足以正此則天下莫能相正任
Interpretation

What is meant by “self and other” and “right and wrong” is precisely that such language shows how the perspicacious delight in this kind of discourse, while the confused are startled because it seems strange. Such reasoning is rarely encountered across the ages, and those who grasp its meaning are as few as morning and evening are brief. The author therefore laments that people in the world who truly understand this principle are far too few. The point of this chapter is to open human understanding, and the key lies in the two words “great awakening” (da jue); the reader should reflect on them with care.

Qu Quezi and Chang Wuzi are fictional names set up for question and answer; the “Master” (fu zi) in the text refers to Confucius, and all of this is allegory. Suppose you and I dispute: you defeat me and I do not defeat you—are you then genuinely right and I genuinely wrong? Or the reverse—I defeat you and you do not defeat me—am I then genuinely right and you genuinely wrong? Or is one of us right and one wrong, or are we both right, or both wrong? You and I cannot understand each other, so others are bound to remain in obscurity—whom should I ask to decide?

If we ask someone who agrees with you to decide, since he already sides with you, how can he judge fairly? If we ask someone who agrees with me, since he already sides with me, how can he judge fairly? If we ask someone who disagrees with both of us, since he differs from us, how can he tell who is right and who is wrong? If we ask someone who agrees with both of us, since he agrees with us, how can he render a judgment? Seen this way, you, I, and others cannot understand one another—so whom can we wait for to decide?

What does it mean to harmonize right and wrong by following the natural boundary? It is to acknowledge that “is” and “is not,” “so” and “not so,” each have their way of being spoken. If something is indeed so, it differs from the way of calling it “not so,” and there is no need to argue further; if something is indeed “is,” it differs from “is not,” and again there is no need to argue. When various voices face each other and dispute, one can harmonize by following the natural boundary and unfold with change as it goes, and thus live out one’s years. Forget the span of life, forget worldly propriety, and let the mind expand in the boundless—this is settling the heart in the infinite.

Guo Xiang’s commentary says: people first do not know, and then they seek; first they do not see clearly, and then they debate. Yet after debating they still cannot trust themselves, because they always stand over against things. Disputing right and wrong all day long only deepens obscurity, and no one can truly decide—better to let things return to what is fitting in themselves. What matches oneself is called “is,” what differs is called “is not,” but such judgments are not enough to rely on. If something is truly “is,” there will no longer be a side of “is not”; if something is truly “is not,” there will no longer be a side of “is.” Thus right and wrong arise from love of disputation and cease in “Heaven’s Equal” (tian jun)—the natural equilibrium. Let various sayings run in parallel without contending, so that things each return to the right. Relying on others is not enough to judge oneself, so under Heaven no one can finally decide for anyone else.

 其自正而已是非然否彼我無辯故和之  以自然之分不待彼以正之也是非之辯  爲化聲化聲之相待俱不足以相正故若  不相待和以自然之分任其無極之化則  是非之境自泯性命之致自窮忘年故玄  同死生忘義故彌貫是非蕩而爲一斯至  理也至理暢於無極故寄之者不得有窮  也  吕惠卿註天下之所謂是非者不過我是  若非若是我非或是或非俱是俱非四者  皆出於我與若而我與若俱不能相知則  所謂是非者卒不明人固受其黮闇誰與  正之必正於人也而人者非同乎己則同  乎若非異乎己則異乎若非同乎我與若  必異乎我與若亦不過四者而皆不能正  之則是我與若與人俱不能相知也其待  彼也邪言不相待也唯聖人知其然故雖  化聲之相待若其不相待則彼是莫得其  耦而休乎天均矣何則言之是非非有實  也聲之出於化而巳我之與人相待與不  相待又出於識心之妄計也我則和之以  天倪而不爲之分辯因之以曼衍觸類而  長之則萬物不累乎心矣窮年則參萬歲  而一成純之謂也是不是然不然之無辯  者知其同體而物物皆然也窮年則忘年  無是非則忘義始起於無竟故終亦寓於  無竟也  林疑獨註莊子盖欲忘言故立是論使我  與若辯至我果非也邪設辭以遣之也我
Interpretation

For each thing to align with its own nature is enough; there is no need to sort out right and wrong, this and that, self and other. Go by the natural differences among things, without using one party to judge another. Debate over right and wrong is only sound amid change, arising in mutual opposition; since neither side can truly decide the other, it is better not to depend on each other, to follow the natural boundaries (tianni), and let endless transformation unfold. Then the line between right and wrong dissolves on its own, and the way of life and nature (xingming) can show itself fully. Forget the count of years, and you can merge life and death in the subtle; forget distinctions of right and principle, and you can see through the quarrel over right and wrong. Level the turmoil and return to oneness—this is ultimate principle. Ultimate principle runs through the boundless, so those who dwell in it never reach an end.

Lü Huiqing’s commentary: What the world calls right and wrong is always “I say thus, the other says so”: I say right, the other says wrong; I say wrong, the other says right; or both hold themselves right and the other wrong. These four patterns all rest on “I” and “the other.” Yet I and the other cannot truly know each other, so right and wrong can never be settled. People are already veiled in obscurity—who could judge? If someone else were to judge, and that person does not side with me, they side with the other; if they do not side with the other, they side with me. Whichever they side with, they remain within the split between me and the other and cannot truly decide right and wrong. Seen this way, I, the other, and any third person cannot fully know one another.

Therefore Zhuangzi asks whether one should rely on the other to judge—he is really saying that mutual reliance is unnecessary. Only the sage sees this, so even when shifting opinions clash in debate, they can be treated as not necessarily standing in opposition. Then “that” and “this” find no fixed counterpart, and one abides in natural equilibrium (tianjun)—a state of following nature without leaning to either side.

Why? Right and wrong in speech have no fixed substance; they are only sounds born of change. Whether I and others rely on each other or not is something the mind adds by calculation. I harmonize the various sayings by the natural boundary (tianni), without ranking them; then I follow how things connect and spread (manyan), and nothing becomes a burden on the mind. Living out one’s natural span, one can be with all things as if ten thousand years were one—this is called “purity” (chun). No longer sorting yes from no, right from wrong, is because one sees that all things issue from one body, each with its own natural principle. Living out one’s natural span, one forgets the years; without the split of right and wrong, one also forgets the bonds of moral principle. All things begin in the boundless and their end too is entrusted to the boundless.

Lin Yidu’s commentary: Zhuangzi likely wanted people to forget contentious speech, hence this teaching. Suppose you and I argue: “Am I really wrong?”—this uses hypothesis to dissolve dispute…

 勝若若不吾勝吾誰使正之又遣其所遣  也使同乎若者正之至同乎我與若矣惡  能正之此遣之又遣而至於無所復遣斯  其至矣凡言是未必是言然未必然故其  異同亦皆無辯然之與是復自相對又均  於辯也有化者有化化者有聲者有聲聲  者化者之化非聲則不顯聲者之聲非化  則不彰化者聲之體聲者化之用此化聲  之相待也然而聲出乎化非化之所能知  化統乎聲非聲之所能識此又若其不相  待也夫相待生於兩物若合萬化爲一則  相待之迹無由而生夫聲者常聲不待物  而後聲聞者自因物而生聽耳化者常化  不待聲而後化見者自因聲而生識耳此  其所以相待而若不相待也若夫化化者  非化之所能化聲聲者非聲之所能聲又  何相待不相待之有和之以性命之本因  之以變化之餘則古今之年有時而窮而  所以爲我者不古不今而無極也  陳詳道註天倪者性命之端曼衍者無窮  之變和以天倪因以曼衍則物我不蔽於  是非而各盡其性命之分此其所以窮年  也忘年則死生爲一條忘義則可不可爲  一貫死生可不可固無竟矣而知忘之者  豈以爲有物邪特寓之而已  陳碧虚註悟則不辯辯則不悟對辯不已  黮闇莫明彼我不自信故也夫水清則可  以鑒妍醜心虚則可以齊同異若中無主
Interpretation

If you prevail over the other party yet still cannot make them accept your judgment, who else can settle right and wrong? So the entrusted arbiter is handed over to yet another arbiter. But if someone who shares your and my view is chosen to judge, in the end they will be just like you and me—how can they truly adjudicate? Layer upon layer of delegated judgment continues until no one remains to delegate to; only then has the limit been reached.

Whatever is called “this is right” is not necessarily really right; whatever is called “this is so” is not necessarily really so. Thus among various doctrines of difference and sameness, there is no absolute standard. Saying “yes” and saying “it is so” oppose each other and likewise fall into dispute.

There is “transformation” (the changing of all things) and “hua-hua” (the root power that brings transformation about); there is “sound” and “sheng-sheng” (the root power that produces sound). If transformation had no sound, it could not appear; if sound had no transformation, it could not be made clear. Transformation is the substance of sound; sound is the function of transformation—this is the side on which transformation and sound depend on each other.

Yet sound arises from transformation, while transformation itself is not something sound can know; transformation encompasses sound, while sound cannot know transformation. This again is as if the two did not depend on each other. Relations of mutual dependence arise between two things that stand apart; if the transformations of all things were merged into one, no trace of mutual dependence could arise.

Sound by nature can sound; it need not wait for an external thing before there is sound—only the hearer needs an external thing to produce hearing. Transformation by nature goes on occurring; it need not wait for sound before there is transformation—only the observer needs sound to have cognition. This is why they seem mutually dependent yet also seem not to depend on each other.

As for “hua-hua,” ordinary transformation cannot transform it; as for “sheng-sheng,” ordinary sound cannot sound it. In that case, how can one still speak of dependence or non-dependence? Harmonizing all things by the root of nature and life (xingming), and going along with the inexhaustible momentum of endless change—then although the years of human life have an end, the root that constitutes “me” is not bound by past and present and has no limit.

Chen Xiangdao’s commentary: “Tian Ni” means the natural thread of nature and life; “manyan” means endless, inexhaustible change. Harmonizing all things by Tian Ni and following infinite change, person and things are not obscured by distinctions of right and wrong; each can fulfill what nature and life assign—this is what makes it possible to complete one’s natural span. Forget the count of years and birth and death become one; forget distinctions of right and wrong and “may” and “may not” run through as one. Birth and death and may/may-not originally have no fixed verdict. Those who know how to forget these distinctions—do they take them as things that really exist? They are only temporarily lodged in them for the moment.

Chen Bixu’s commentary: Where there is insight, there is no dispute; once there is dispute, insight is not yet complete. Disputing without end leads to obscurity—because each side clings to the other’s view and cannot trust itself. When water is clear, it can reflect beauty and ugliness; when the mind is empty and still, it can level different opinions. If there is no settled view in the heart…

 則待於外是逐物而遷者也從箕子視比  干則愚以比干視箕子則卑矣從管晏視  夷齊則戆以夷齊視管晏則貪矣趨舍相  非嗜欲相反將使誰正之若乃飛者棲巢  走者宿穴各安所安孰曰不齊哉夫彼我  之情相待者也是非之辯化聲者也情不  相待惡有彼我辯無是非惡有化聲是以  虚心以和崖分妙用以釋留滯所以窮天  年而無是非也窮天年則忘年無是非則  忘義故能振舉於無竟以無盡之物無極  之理寄諸無盡無極而已矣  趙虚齋註自得之學難爲人言言之則辯  論鋒起誰能正之孔子曰莫我知也夫又  曰知我者其天乎亦此意化聲相待啐啄  同時也和以天倪因以曼衍和其光同其  塵也是不是然不然皆不可得而辯則是  舉世不相知與人言無解者是化聲之不  相待也如此則但當和光同塵以樂其天  年何必强聒哉忘年忘義言此生此理皆  付之於忘言造物者無窮吾亦與之無窮  而已  鬳齋口義云勝負不足爲是非則我與若  辯者彼此不能相知也黮闇言所見不明  我與若皆不明將使誰正之議論與彼同  既不可議論與我同又不可皆與我與彼  不同亦不可皆與我與彼相同亦不可則  是三者皆不能相知必須待彼也此彼字  指造化即所謂天倪天倪者自然之分所  以和者因是而已是不是然不然皆兩存
Interpretation

If one must rely on external things to judge everything, one changes oneself along with those external things. Seen through Jizi (a worthy minister at the end of the Shang), Bigan (a loyal minister at the end of the Shang) seems blunt and obstinate; seen through Bigan, Jizi seems servile and cringing. Seen through Guan Zhong and Yan Ying, Boyi and Shuqi seem rigid and constrained; seen through Boyi and Shuqi, Guan Zhong and Yan Ying seem grasping and covetous. People’s choices differ, likes and dislikes oppose one another—then who is to decide who is right and who is wrong?

Birds roost in nests and beasts dwell in burrows; each rests content in its own place—who can say they are not alike? My feelings and those of others take shape only in mutual contrast; disputes over right and wrong also shift with changing words. If feelings did not depend on such comparison, where would “I” and “other” be? If argument had no fixed right and wrong, where would there be words that keep changing? Therefore one must empty the mind and embrace each other’s boundaries, using flexible responsiveness to dissolve fixation and obstruction, so as to fully live out one’s natural years without falling into quarrels over right and wrong. To fully live out one’s years is to forget the length of life; to be free of disputes over right and wrong is to forget worldly distinctions of duty and principle. Thus one can rouse oneself and go forward in boundlessness, entrusting oneself to inexhaustible things and to principle without limit.

Zhao Xuzhai’s commentary: Knowledge grasped on one’s own is hard to make clear to others; once one speaks, debate arises in succession—who can judge right and wrong? Confucius said, “No one understands me!” and also, “Those who understand me are perhaps only Heaven!” He meant the same thing. Words depend on one another and answer each other, like nestlings and the parent bird pecking the shell at the same time. One should follow the natural dividing line (tian ni), letting it unfold as it will; harmonize one’s own light and dwell amid the dust of the world. What is “so” and what is “not so,” what is “right” and what is “wrong,” cannot be settled by argument. If people in the world cannot understand one another, and speech cannot connect, that shows words have no shared ground. Since that is so, one need only rein in sharpness and go along with the world, enjoying one’s natural years—why insist on arguing? Forgetting the length of life and forgetting worldly duty and principle means handing this life and its patterns over to the realm where nothing is said. Creation is inexhaustible; I simply go along with it into that same inexhaustibility.

Yizhai’s oral exegesis: Victory and defeat are not enough to decide right and wrong, so when you and I argue, we still cannot understand each other. “Obscure darkness” means insight is unclear; if neither you nor I can see clearly, who is to arbitrate? If a view matches the other’s, that cannot settle the matter; if it matches mine, that cannot settle it either; if both differ, it still cannot be settled; if both agree, it still cannot be settled. Seen this way, none of these cases lets us truly understand each other—we can only wait for “that other” to decide. Here “that other” means Creation (zao hua), what is called tian ni. Tian ni is the dividing line formed by nature; what is called harmonizing is precisely moving along with it. “So” and “not so,” “right” and “not right,” should both be held together.

 之若定其然是則有不然不是便有是非  之爭化聲者以言語相化服相待對敵也  若以是非言語相對敵以求化服何似因  其所是而不相敵故曰若其不相待不相  敵而尚同則是和之以天倪游衍以窮盡  歲月如此則併與歲月義理俱忘之振動  鼓舞於無物之境此振字亦逍遥之意信  能如是則終身寓於無物之境矣   是非勝負各執一偏不能相正則我與   若與人俱不能相知也而待彼也邪言   必付之造化耳此一節諸解備悉獨化   聲之義隱奥難明相待不相待之機亦   未易以言盡唯窮神通化者以心燭之   至理自見諸解中疑獨立論最高自成   一家之言與經文相表裏非訓詁之學   所能及鬳齋論化聲獨異於衆而無竟   立說尤長若以簡要論之死生覺夢之   分出於化者也彼我是非之辯出於聲   者也覺夢依乎形是非生乎情有若相   待也然而化者自化不知其所以化聲   者自聲不知其所以聲又若不相待也   要夫物理之至極莫逃造化之自然此   萬化之所出入萬物之所以齊也詳此   化聲之相待與形景之相待義同前後   互發明耳吕氏註後附說云化聲之相   待至所以窮年也合在何謂和之以天   倪之上簡編脫略誤次於此觀文意可   知 罔兩問景曰曩子行今子止曩子坐今子起
Interpretation

If you designate one side as “right,” another side will be judged “wrong”; once there is “right,” there is also “wrong.” The two sides then argue, using words to persuade and refute each other, and opposition takes shape.

Since both sides dispute over right and wrong with words and try to make the other submit, why not follow what the other takes as “right” and understand it that way, instead of clashing head-on? Not opposing each other yet still recognizing each other—this is harmonizing through the natural boundary (tian ni), moving freely within it until the years run out. Then even the years and the principles within them are forgotten together, vibrating and dancing in the realm where nothing is fixed. Here “vibrate” also carries the sense of carefree roaming. If one can truly do this, one can spend a whole life dwelling in that realm where nothing is fixed.

When right and wrong and victory and defeat each cling to one pole and cannot correct each other, then you and I, and you and others, cannot understand one another—how can we expect the other to yield? When all is said and done, it can only be entrusted to creation-and-transformation (zaohua).

On this passage, commentaries from various schools are already thorough. Still, the meaning of “transforming voices” (huasheng) is obscure, and the crux between “mutual dependence” and “non-dependence” cannot be exhausted in a few sentences. Only someone who penetrates change and grasps its principle can take it to heart and eventually see the point for themselves. Among the commentaries, discussions of “doubtful singularity” (yi du) are the most refined—an independent line of thought that illuminates the classic in return, not something mere philology can reach. “Yan Zhai” on “transforming voices” differs from common views and does not cling to one fixed formula; it is especially insightful.

In brief: the distinctions among life and death, waking and dreaming come from change; disputes over “this and that” and right and wrong come from vocal expression. Waking and dreaming depend on the body; right and wrong arise from emotion—they seem to depend on each other. Yet change happens on its own, and people do not know why; voices arise on their own, and people do not know why. Seen this way, they also seem not to depend on each other. In the end, the utmost of all things never leaves the natural operation of creation-and-transformation: all transformations enter and exit through it, and all things can thereby be seen as equal. Look closely—“transforming voices in mutual dependence” means the same as “form and shadow in mutual dependence” earlier; the two passages explain each other.

After Lü’s commentary there is a note: the section on “transforming voices in mutual dependence,” from “therefore to the end of the years” through “……,” should be placed before “What does it mean to harmonize them with the natural boundary?” Because slips were scattered and lost, the order was wrongly placed here; the sense of the text makes this clear.

何其無特操與景曰吾有待而然者邪吾所 待又有待而然者邪吾待蛇蚹蜩翼邪惡識 所以然惡識所以不然昔者莊周夢爲胡蝶 栩栩然胡蝶也自喻適志與不知周也俄然 覺則蘧蘧然周也不知周之夢爲胡蝶與胡 蝶之夢爲周與周與胡蝶則必有分矣此之 謂物化  郭象註罔兩景外微陰天機自爾坐起無  待無待而獨得者孰知其故責其所待尋  其所由卒於無待而獨化之理明矣若待  蛇蚹蜩翼則無特操之所由未爲難識今  所以不識正由不待斯類而獨化耳或謂  罔兩待景景待形形待造物者請問造物  有邪無邪無則胡能造物有則不足以物  衆形明衆形之自物自造無所待焉此造  物之正也今罔兩之因景猶云俱生而非  待也故罔兩非景之所制景非形之所使  形非無之所化則化不化然不然從人之  與由己吾惡識其所以哉方其夢爲蝶而  不知周俄然覺則蘧蘧然周也自周而言  故稱覺耳未必非夢也今之不知胡蝶無  異夢之不知周而各適一時之志則無以  明胡蝶之不夢爲周矣世有假寐而夢經  百年者則無以明今之百年非假寐之夢  也覺夢之分無異死生之辯今所以自喻  適志由其分定非由無分也夫時不暫停  今不遂存昨日之夢於今化矣死生之變  豈異於此而勞心於其間哉
Interpretation

“Why does it have no independent, unchanging constancy?” Jing (the shadow) said, “I am like this only because I depend on something. Yet what I depend on also depends on something else to be like this. Am I depending on the scales along a snake’s belly or on a cicada’s wings? How could I know why things change in this way—and how could I know why they do not change in this way?

“Long ago, Zhuang Zhou dreamed he had become a butterfly: light and free, truly a butterfly. He felt entirely content and had no idea he was Zhuang Zhou. Suddenly he awoke and was startled to find he was Zhuang Zhou. He did not know whether Zhuang Zhou had dreamed he was a butterfly, or a butterfly was dreaming it was Zhuang Zhou. Between Zhuang Zhou and the butterfly there must be a distinction. This is what is called wuhua (the mutual transformation of things).”

Guo Xiang’s commentary: Wangliang (the faint shadow beside the shadow) appears by depending on the shadow; the shadow appears by depending on the physical form—and all these changes are simply how nature is. Whether they ultimately depend on something or stand alone in this way, who can say what the reason is? If you trace what they depend on and where they come from, you will find in the end that precisely because there is no fixed thing they depend on, things each transform on their own—and then this principle becomes clear.

If one says they depend on a snake’s belly scales or a cicada’s wings, it is not hard to explain why they lack independent constancy. The reason we cannot now give a clear account is that they are not like those cases in having something to depend on; they change on their own. Some say: “Wangliang depends on the shadow, the shadow on form, form on the Creator.” Then ask: does the Creator exist or not? If it does not exist, how could it create the myriad things? If it exists, it still cannot account for why each thing arises as itself. Clearly the myriad things each generate themselves and each complete themselves; there is no common thing they all depend on. That is the real situation of what we call creation.

Wangliang appears because of the shadow; one can also say they arise together, not that one depends on the other. So Wangliang is not ruled by the shadow, the shadow is not driven by the body, and the body is not produced by transforming out of nothingness. As for changing or not changing, being thus or not thus, whether caused by outer things or so of themselves—we how can we know the reasons?

When Zhuang Zhou dreamed he was a butterfly, he did not know he was Zhuang Zhou; suddenly waking, he was startled to find he was Zhuang Zhou. Here we only take Zhuang Zhou’s standpoint and call waking “awakening,” but that need not mean it is not another dream. Now Zhuang Zhou not knowing he is a butterfly is no different from the butterfly in the dream not knowing it is Zhuang Zhou; both simply follow the mind of that moment. So we cannot prove that the butterfly’s dream was not a dream of being Zhuang Zhou.

Some people dream in a light sleep and live a hundred years in the dream; then we also cannot prove that the hundred years we live now are not a dream in a brief light sleep. The distinction between waking and dreaming is no different from that between life and death. We feel content now only because our respective distinctions are temporarily fixed—not because there were never distinctions. Time does not pause for an instant; the present cannot stay forever. Yesterday’s dream, come to today, has already changed and gone. How is the shift of life and death any different? Why trouble the mind over it?

 吕惠卿註罔兩之於景同類也而不知景  之無待於形猶我與若與人亦同類也而  不知其無待於彼盖景之行止坐起唯形  是隨則無特操者也然本無情豈知有待  若謂景待於形形又何待而然邪景之待  形非若蛇之待蚹而行蜩之待翼而飛也  惡識所以然不然哉人能通乎物之無知  則蛇蚹蜩翼亦無待而已故方其爲蝶也  栩栩然不知有周及其爲周也蘧蘧然不  知有蝶一身之變猶不自知則物之化而  異形其能相知乎物物不相知則各歸其  根物物不相待則莫得其偶其有不齊者  邪  林疑獨註景由形生似乎相待而實不相  待也而罔兩者不知形景皆屬造物遂以  爲行止坐起在乎形然非日火之光則雖  有形景何由生哉此所謂不相待也景曰  吾所待又有待而然者景之所待者形而  形亦未能無待言待於造化耳夫景之待  形則亦微小而形在造化中益又小矣故  曰吾待蛇蚹蜩翼言物之至微薄者也外  篇蟲臂鼠肝亦此義莊子寓意於蝶以明  夢覺無復分知莊子夢蝶之理則死生之  說盡矣夢而爲蝶不知有周覺而爲周不  知有蝶有勢不能合并必有時而分矣萬  物之化亦如此  陳詳道註罔兩待景而後有景待形而後  見形待造物然後生形之於造物已幻矣  況景乎景之於形已外矣況罔兩乎凡此
Interpretation

Lü Huiqing’s commentary: The dim shadow beside a shadow and the shadow itself belong to the same kind, yet the dim shadow does not know that the shadow exists independently of the body. In the same way, you and I, and you and other people, belong to the same kind, yet we do not know that we exist independently of others. Whether the shadow walks, stops, sits, or rises, it merely follows the body and has no conduct of its own. But since the shadow has no feelings or awareness to begin with, how could it know that it depends on something? If the shadow depends on the body, what, in turn, does the body depend on to be as it is?

The shadow’s dependence on the body is not like a snake’s dependence on its feet or a cicada’s on its wings, which it uses to move or fly. Who can know for certain how this works? Is it so, or is it not? If people can understand that the myriad things have no awareness of their own, then the snake’s feet and the cicada’s wings, too, are things on which they need not necessarily depend.

Thus, when Zhuang Zhou dreamed he had become a butterfly, he was lighthearted and content, unaware that there was a Zhuang Zhou. When he awoke as Zhuang Zhou, he was startled and unsettled, unaware that there had been a butterfly. If someone cannot even know the changes within himself, how could the myriad things, changing and taking different forms, know one another? Since the myriad things do not know one another, each returns to its own source. Since they do not depend on one another, none has a fixed mate or counterpart. In this way, what among the myriad things is not equal?

Lin Yidu’s commentary: The shadow is produced by the body, so they seem to depend on each other, but in fact they do not. The dim shadow does not know that both body and shadow come from Creation—the natural force that brings the myriad things into being—and so it assumes that the shadow’s movements and stillness, sitting and rising, are all determined by the body. Yet without sunlight or firelight, how could a shadow appear, even if there were a body? This is what is meant by saying that they do not depend on one another.

The shadow says, “I depend on something,” while the body itself must also depend on something to be as it is. The shadow depends on the body, which is already much larger than the shadow; yet within Creation, the body appears still smaller. So the phrase “I depend on the snake’s feet and the cicada’s wings” refers to things that are exceedingly minute. The phrase “an insect’s arm and a mouse’s liver” in the Outer Chapters of the Zhuangzi—comparing parts of the human body to an insect’s arm and a mouse’s liver—expresses the same idea.

Zhuangzi uses the butterfly to convey the point that there is no clear dividing line between the self in dreams and the self while awake. Once we understand the meaning of Zhuang Zhou’s dream of the butterfly, the discussion of life and death is complete. In the dream, he became a butterfly and did not know there was a Zhuang Zhou; when he awoke as Zhuang Zhou, he did not know there had been a butterfly. Since the two cannot be united as one at the same time, there must be a time when they are separate. The transformations of the myriad things are the same.

Chen Xiangdao’s commentary: The dim shadow depends on the shadow to appear, the shadow depends on the body to be seen, and the body depends on Creation to come into being. Compared with Creation, the body is already illusory; how much more so the shadow? Compared with the body, the shadow is already on the outermost layer; how much more so the dim shadow? All these…

 皆非眞實故不足辯況認其非眞實者以  爲有而即其不足辯者以爲問此莊子所  以託景之答以袪其惑夫天下之物自迹  觀之未嘗不相待自理觀之未始有待今  景之爲物以爲待形邪非日火則無見以  爲待日火邪非形則無有然則形也景也  日火也果有待邪無待邪惡識所以然不  然哉蛇蚹蜩翼言其用之小者耳悟而爲  道者摭實而不摭華迷而通物者摭華而  不摭實蝶之爲物摭華者也而周夢爲之  是爲道而不免通物之想摭實而不免摭  華之夢也及其覺也然後不以想累神不  以夢易眞而周與胡蝶固有分矣唯大通  物化之情者斯可與於此  陳碧虚註景不待形形不待陰陽豈比蛇  蛻蜩殻有物者邪夫物之相因無如形景  今尚言其不相待明外物不可必萬類皆  自爾唯因待都忘卓然獨化方可論超生  死而反混㝠是謂帝之縣解也周蝶之性  妙有之一氣也昔爲胡蝶乃周之夢今復  爲周豈非蝶之夢哉周蝶之分雖異妙有  之氣一也夫造化之機精微莫測儻能知  此則造化在已而不遷於物是謂生物者  不生化物者不化既已爲物惡有不化者  哉死生之革形類所遷漆園之夢其理盡  矣  趙虚齋註景之行止坐起皆依於形而所  以行止坐起必有形形者存乎其中蛇籍  蚹以行蜩藉翼以飛而所以行飛者非蚹
Interpretation

The appearance, movement, and stillness of a shadow all seem to depend on the physical form; yet the form can be seen only because of light. If we say the shadow depends on the form, without sunlight it cannot be seen; if we say it depends on sunlight, without a form there would be no shadow. So are form, shadow, and sunlight mutually dependent, or each independent? Who can say exactly how they come about?

The snake moves by the scales on its belly, the cicada flies by its wings—these describe their concrete functions. Those who grasp the Dao look to the true root of things and do not cling to surface appearances; those lost in the outward show of things see only outer form and not the root. The butterfly is a case that easily leads people to cling to appearances: Zhuang Zhou dreamed he had become a butterfly—that can mean someone who has grasped the Dao still dreams of the myriad things, or that someone who looks to the root still cannot avoid dreams of appearance. Only after waking does one not let imagination burden the spirit, nor take the dream for reality. Zhuang Zhou and the butterfly are ultimately distinct. Only those who truly penetrate the principle of change in all things can understand this.

Chen Bixu comments: The shadow cannot be apart from the form, and the form cannot be apart from Yin-Yang transformation—unlike the shed skin of a snake or the cast shell of a cicada, which are merely tangible leftovers. The relation of form and shadow is the clearest example of mutual dependence among things; since even that is hard to fix as dependence, we cannot grasp that outer things must be so. Each thing is simply as it is; only by forgetting reliance and dependence and recognizing that the myriad things transform of themselves can we speak of transcending life and death and returning to undifferentiated obscurity. This is what is called “the Emperor’s hanging release”—a metaphor for loosening the bonds of birth and death.

The nature of Zhuang Zhou and the butterfly alike arises from Miaoyou, the primordial vital breath. Zhuang Zhou once dreamed he had become a butterfly; now he is Zhuang Zhou again—can we not also say the butterfly dreamed it had become Zhuang Zhou? Though their forms differ, both issue from the same Miaoyou qi. The mystery of zaohua—the generating and transforming of heaven, earth, and the myriad things—is exceedingly subtle and hard to fathom. Whoever understands this will not be led about by outer things. The root that creates things is not itself ruled by birth and death and change; the root that gives birth to things does not shift with the myriad things. Once something has become a concrete thing, how could it not undergo change? The alternation of death and life is the shifting of bodily kinds as change proceeds; the dream of Zhuang Zhou, the clerk of Lacquer Garden, has already said all there is to say on the matter.

Zhao Xuzhai comments: The shadow’s moving, stopping, sitting, and lying all attach to the form; and for those movements to occur at all, a form must already be there—the form is present within them. The snake crawls by the scales on its belly, the cicada flies by its wings; but what enables crawling and flying is not merely the scales or wings themselves.

 翼也人物之一動一靜皆有待而然景待  形而形之所待者非形也形且不知其所  以然何責於景哉是以莊周胡蝶物我俱  化栩栩蘧蘧覺夢如一也  鬳齋口義云景言吾之運動待形而形又  待造物形之爲形猶蛇蚹蜩翼而巳蛇蜩  既蛻而蚹翼猶存豈能自動邪我既待形  形又有待惡知所以然不然此即是非待  彼之喻周昔夢蝶不知周也及覺爲周得  非蝶之夢乎然此覺夢須有箇分别到此  似結不結却不說破正要人於此參究此  之謂物化言萬物變化之理不過如是   蛇蚹蜩翼或謂蛻甲者不若齟齬翅翼   之說爲優盖蛇藉以行蜩籍以飛喻人   身中所以運動者有若相待而終於無   待則獨化之理明矣故翻覆辯論卒歸   無待而止人之一身耳聽目視手執足   行有待而然也而所以用形者若待造   物而實無待也天下之物生於有有生   於無有之以爲利無之以爲用然則有   無利用未嘗不相生也人能反究至無   之妙遊乎物初則知所以生有所以用   形者矣今有形以運動有心以思慮尚   不自知其主宰之者則自形以生景又   豈罔兩所可知宜其惑而有問也寓言   篇有衆罔兩問景章喻世之迷者益多   故不一言之有云子蜩甲也蛇蛻也與   此蚹翼義同本經嘗言古之眞人其寢   不夢而南華自謂夢爲胡蝶何邪盖借
Interpretation

The human body and its shadow (jing) each have movement and stillness, and both depend on something else. The shadow depends on the body to appear; yet what the body depends on in order to be a body is not another tangible thing. The body itself does not even know why it is as it is—how then could it question the shadow? Thus when Zhuang Zhou dreamed he had become a butterfly, thing and self transformed together: the butterfly in the dream fluttered at ease, and Zhuang Zhou upon waking was clear and aware, as if waking and dreaming were one and the same.

Yanzhai’s Kouyi says: every move of the shadow depends on my body; and the body in turn depends on zaohua (the creative transformation of nature). That the body is a body is like the ventral scales beneath a snake or the wings of a cicada. After snake and cicada shed their old shells, the scales and wings remain—can they move by themselves? I depend on the body, and the body again depends on something—how can we know why it is so? Otherwise, this is precisely the parable of “this depending on that.”

Zhuang Zhou once dreamed he had become a butterfly and did not know he was Zhuang Zhou; when he awoke as Zhuang Zhou, was that not also a dream of the butterfly? Yet waking and dreaming must in the end be distinguished. The text seems about to conclude yet does not say everything, and does not spell the doctrine out plainly—it is meant for careful reflection. This is called “the transformation of things” (wuhua), meaning the principle of change in the myriad things, and broadly it is no more than this.

Some hold that “snake’s ventral scales, cicada’s wings” (she fu die yi) is more apt than other phrasings, because the snake walks by the scales under its belly and the cicada flies by its wings. The parable means that the human body’s movements seem to have something they depend on; yet when pursued to the end there is nothing to depend on, and the doctrine of duhua (each thing generating and transforming on its own, without relying on externals) becomes clear. Hence the text argues back and forth and finally settles on wu dai (non-reliance)—that is, not depending on anything outside.

The human body—hearing, seeing, grasping with the hands, walking with the feet—all has dependencies; yet what drives the body to act seems to depend on zaohua while in truth depending on nothing. All things under heaven are born from you (being); you is born from wu (non-being). You brings benefit, and wu too has its function. Thus you and wu give birth to each other. If a person can turn inward and inquire, grasp the subtlety of wu, and return to where things first arise, they can understand how the myriad things come to be and how the body exercises its powers. Today people have a body that acts and a mind that thinks, yet still do not know what rules them; then how could the shadow, born from the body, be something the shadow itself could understand? That it is perplexed and asks questions is hardly strange.

In the “Fables” (Yuyan) chapter there is the passage “Wang Liang questions Jing,” which shows that many in the world are deluded, so the theme is developed again here. Some say “cicada’s wing, snake’s slough” (zi tiao jia ye, she tui ye) has the same sense as “ventral scales and wings” (fu yi) here. The classic once said that the ancient perfected persons (zhenren) did not dream in sleep, yet the Perfected Man of Nanhua, Zhuang Zhou, said he dreamed he became a butterfly—why is that? Presumably it is by way of ….

  覺夢以立言明死生之一致生不知死   亦猶死不知生二者雖不相知而理本   齊一請以覺夢觀之槩可見矣何爲當   生而憂死當死而羡生乎蝶之爲物無   巢穴之營無飢渴之患翩翩栩栩遊放   乎天地間人見之者亦欣其自適而莫   加害焉其所由生非關種類往往他蟲   所化或朽麥所爲至樂篇載鳥足之根   爲蠐螬其葉爲胡蝶則亦出於草化莫   究其始而終亦不知所歸盖翾飛中之   得道者故眞人或夢爲之夫人之與物   形分多類咸禀自然自然者至道之妙   本萬化所由立也故莊蝶夢覺各不相   知終歸於化則未嘗有異是知動植萬   形生死萬變有情無情卒齊於化化者   形數之始終萬類之出入由於造物之   推排勇有力者莫能拒物受雕琢形歸   鼓鑄不知所以然而然是以達人委而   順之故覺夢混融生死爲一也周與胡   蝶則必有分分即物之天物雖各有天   固同一天也或讀分如字則分别無已   天下物論何由而齊學者又當究夫性   命之精微以通物理之一致與物同化   而有不化者存以死生爲覺夢視古今   如朝昏將無物之可齊容有論乎然則   莊與蝶與夢與覺與既有論之者矣必   有知之者矣   孟子曰物之不齊物之情也而莊子名   篇以齊物論或疑其與儒家悖重增不   齊之情殊不思孟子特爲許子言之耳
Interpretation

Zhuangzi uses “waking and dreaming” to show that life and death are essentially the same: while awake one does not know one is dreaming, just as while alive one does not know what death is like. Though the living and the dead cannot know each other, from the standpoint of fundamental principle they are one. Seen this way, why should the living fret over death, or why cling to life at the moment of dying?

The butterfly has none of the toil of building a nest or the worry of hunger and thirst; it drifts lightly through heaven and earth. People who see it flying freely feel it is at ease and do not harm it. Where the butterfly comes from cannot necessarily be explained by ordinary lines of descent: sometimes it changes from another kind of insect, and it is said that at times it arises from rotting wheat. The chapter “Perfect Joy” records that the root of a bird’s foot turns into a grub (the larva of a cicada), and a leaf turns into a butterfly. Such accounts treat the butterfly as something that may change out of plants; where it first appears is hard to trace, and where it finally goes cannot be known. The butterfly may be a kind of flying creature that has attained the Dao, which is why an authentic person (one who has realized the Great Dao) sometimes dreams of becoming a butterfly.

Humans and the myriad things differ in form and abound in kinds, yet all receive their being from spontaneity (ziran). Here “spontaneity” means the subtle working of the Dao—the root from which the myriad things are generated and transformed. Thus Zhuang Zhou and the butterfly, not knowing each other between dream and waking, ultimately both return to transformation; in that sense they are not different. From this we can see that animals, plants, and every shape, all the changes of birth and death, whether sentient or not, in the end all return to transformation.

“Transformation” is the beginning and end of form and fate, and the process by which the myriad things are born, die, emerge, and withdraw; all of this is propelled and arranged by the Creator (the power that generates and transforms things). Even the brave and strong cannot resist it. Things accept shaping, forms return to casting-like change, yet do not know the reason—they are simply so of themselves. Therefore the person who has attained the Way listens to transformation and goes along with it. Seen thus, waking and dreaming can merge into one, and life and death can be treated as a single whole.

Zhuang Zhou and the butterfly are after all distinct; that distinction belongs to the nature each thing has received. Though the myriad things each have their own nature, they share one root. If “distinction” is read as separation, then separations are endless—how could discourse on the things of the world ever arrive at equality (qi)? Students should still probe the subtlety of nature-and-life (xingming), so as to penetrate that the principles of the myriad things are fundamentally one. To transform together with the myriad things, while also possessing a root that does not vanish amid change; to treat life and death as waking and dreaming, and past and present as dawn and dusk—then what thing cannot be brought into equality? What remains to dispute? Yet since people already discuss the relations among Zhuang Zhou, the butterfly, dream, and waking, there must also be those who can understand the point.

Mencius said, “Things are not equal—that is their nature.” Zhuangzi, however, titles a chapter “Discourse on Equalizing Things” (Qi Wu Lun), so some suspect this conflicts with Confucian teaching and think it stresses inequality instead. In fact Mencius’s remark was aimed only at Xu Xing’s position.

  況孟之所言者情莊之所言者理理一   分殊則情之不齊也宜矣故南華原本   究極主一理以齊天下之物論篇首設   二子問答詳論人籟地籟之不齊明天   籟之自然非惟理不待齊亦非齊之所   及故於其間旁證側引而不指言天籟   欲人心契而自得之夫生物糺紛榮謝   萬變自形自色自消自息卒歸天籟而   止天籟者無形無聲而形聲之所自出   神化之所發見也儻能究夫人籟地籟   之所由作則天籟可知故郭註云豈復   别有物哉即衆竅比竹接乎有生之類   會而共成一天耳至論知言覺夢成心   言吹可否是非方生方死無異乎萬竅   怒號及乎得其環中以應無窮則虚以   待物物亦無礙此忘而彼自化風濟竅   虚之謂也天地一指萬物一馬則以不   齊齊之恢恑憰怪道通爲一有不待齊   而自齊矣若夫狙公賦茅喜怒所由生   昭文鼓琴成虧所以著言有心有爲不   足以化物何望於齊哉至於天地與我   並生萬物與我爲一可以言齊矣又慮   或者以一與言爲二二與一爲三此又   散而不齊之兆也唯造乎未始有物注   酌無窮以大覺而知大夢參萬歲而一   成純所以槩天下之物而齊之之道也   罔兩問景不知即異而同南華夢蝶孰   究非同非異盖極論物我生死覺夢之   不齊而終歸於物化南華之所謂化即
Interpretation

This passage explores Zhuangzi's (the Nanhua True Man) profound insights on the concept of "heavenly resonance" (tianlai), the authentic state of natural spontaneity. While Mencius spoke of human emotions, Zhuangzi contemplated heavenly principle. Though the heavenly principle is unified, its manifestations are infinitely varied—hence the natural diversity of all things' expressions.

The opening of Zhuangzi's "Discussion on Making All Things Equal" employs a dialogue between Ziqi and Ziyou to meticulously distinguish between "human-made sounds" (renlai) and "earthly sounds" (dilai), ultimately revealing that "heavenly resonance" transcends artificial intervention. This heavenly principle neither requires human-imposed uniformity nor can it be forcibly achieved. Zhuangzi deliberately avoids direct definition, instead using abundant metaphors to guide readers toward personal realization.

All phenomena in their endless transformations—growth and decay, myriad forms—ultimately return to heavenly resonance. Though formless and soundless itself, heavenly resonance is the source of all forms and sounds, the manifestation of numinous transformation. Understanding the origins of human and earthly sounds leads to comprehension of heavenly resonance. As Guo Xiang's commentary notes: heavenly resonance isn't some separate entity, but the harmonious totality formed by all apertures and instruments together.

When addressing cognition, speech, dreams, and preconceptions, the complexity resembles countless apertures sounding simultaneously. Yet by grasping the Dao's central pivot (huanzhong) and responding to phenomena with empty stillness, all oppositions dissolve. Like wind blowing through hollows producing spontaneous sounds, true equality is achieved through apparent "unevenness." Though heaven-earth and the myriad things appear different, they're fundamentally united in the Dao.

The monkey-keeper distributing acorns (provoking joy and anger), or Zhaowen displaying his musical skill—these deliberate actions create distinctions, preventing true unity. Claims like "heaven-earth and I coexist, all things and I are one" may seem unifying, yet fixation on distinctions between "one" and "verbal expression" creates new divisions.

Only by reaching the state "before anything existed"—maintaining awareness amidst infinite transformation while perceiving ten thousand years as a single moment—can one truly encompass all things in perfect equality. The fable of the shadow questioning its shadow, or Zhuangzi dreaming he's a butterfly, all explore apparent divisions between self/other, life/death, waking/dreaming, ultimately pointing to the truth of universal transformation. What Zhuangzi calls "transformation" (hua) is precisely this transcendence of duality and return to the primordial source.

  大易所謂神潜於恍惚見於日用而不   可以知知識識由是悟萬物一形也萬   形一化也萬化一神也神而明之變而   通之孰爲物熟爲我夫是之謂大齊 南
Interpretation

The “Shen” (spirit) spoken of in the Book of Changes lies concealed in what is vague and hard to pin down, yet it shows itself in the conduct of daily life—only people cannot recognize it directly. From this one may understand: all things share one body; the myriad forms all belong to a single transformation, and the myriad transformations in turn return to one marvelous Dao. If one can enter into this marvel and let the mind penetrate and follow change, then what is to be counted as outer things, and what as the self? This is called “Great Equalizing” (da qi)—the state in which the split between thing and self is dissolved and all things are seen as equal.

華眞經義海纂微卷之四

Source text: Kanripo 漢籍リポジトリ(KR5c0127); Licence: CC BY-SA 4.0 · Report an error / feedback

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