《韓非子》Vol. 10

In Chapter 31 of "Six Subtle Dangers" from Han Feizi Volume 10's "Inner Storehouse of Sayings (Part 2)," the text primarily discusses six subtle dangers rulers must guard against. These six perils are: having authority borrowed by ministers, having interests exploited by external forces, private agendas disguised through similar events, reversals of benefit-harm relationships, internal factions fighting among themselves, and enemy states interfering with domestic official appointments. These constitute critical issues a ruler must discern with clarity.

Regarding "authority must not be lent": Once a ruler's power is borrowed by ministers, the loss of even a fraction of authority allows subordinates to expand their influence a hundredfold. When ministers borrow power, they strengthen their own forces, mobilizing both internal and external factions to their advantage—leaving the ruler blinded. This principle mirrors Laozi's saying, "The fish must not leave the deep"—just as a fish perishes out of water, so too does a ruler who loses authority. Historical examples include Duke Li of Jin, whose prolonged favoritism toward close ministers led to his authority being sidelined, and the tyranny of Lord Zhou in Chu, which provoked Yan citizens to retaliate by washing with excrement—both demonstrating the dire consequences of lending power.

Concerning "divergent interests between ruler and ministers": The fundamental divergence in their interests makes genuine loyalty from ministers rare. Ministers pursuing personal gain inevitably harm the ruler's interests, with treacherous ones even inviting enemy troops to eliminate rivals or using diplomatic affairs to confuse the ruler. Like the couple from Wei who each prayed selfishly without regard for the other, historical cases such as Dai Xie's advice to enfeoff relatives leading to the Three Huan clans attacking Duke Zhao of Lu, or Gongshu Cuo inviting Qi troops while Zhai Huang summoned Han forces, all show how personal gain overrides national security.

On "exploiting similar-seeming events": Ministers often deceive rulers by manipulating superficially analogous incidents for private ends. Examples include the gatekeeper splashing water to frame Yi She, Lord Jiyang forging orders while scapegoating two others; Sima Xi killing Yuan Qian to pin blame on Ji Xin, and Zheng Xiu lying that "the new concubine smells foul" to make the King of Chu cut off her nose. These cases reveal how similar events often serve as setups—like burning a fodder store to blame Zhongshan, or killing an old Confucian while rewarding Lord Jiyang—absurd yet effective ploys.

Regarding "reversed benefit-harm dynamics": Every incident has beneficiaries; thus, when harm occurs, one must investigate inversely. A wise ruler's method is: if the state suffers, determine who gains; if a minister is harmed, examine who opposed them. For instance, when Chu troops massed at the border, Chen Xu was promoted to chancellor instead; when grain prices spiked, the granary officials were investigated—both classic cases cracked through reverse reasoning. Like Zhao Xihu capturing the straw peddler, or Marquis Zhao of Han interrogating secondary culprits, these demonstrate the power of counterintuitive scrutiny.

This passage from Han Feizi primarily discusses the ruler's strategies for preventing ministers from gaining excessive power and maintaining their own rule. Here is a modern vernacular interpretation in sections:

On "Mutual Suspicion and Power Struggles":

Situations where power is mutually checked often become sources of chaos. A wise ruler is extremely cautious about this. Historical examples include Li Ji of Jin causing the death of Crown Prince Shen Sheng, the poisoning by the Lady of Zheng, and Zhou Yu of Wei assassinating Duke Huan. Similarly, Gongzi Gen gained excessive favor in Eastern Zhou, leading to Shang Chen's rebellion. In Han, the power struggle between Yan Sui and Han Kui resulted in the assassination of Marquis Ai. In Qi, Tian Chang and Kan Zhi vied for power, while in Song, Dai Huan and Huang Xi's rivalry led to the murder of Duke Jian. These cases all confirm the dangers of "dual favoritism" as warned by Hu Tu and Zheng Zhao's principle of "preventing problems before they arise."

On "The Art of Appointments and Dismissals":

Political opponents often employ deception and false appearances. If the ruler lacks discernment, they will be manipulated in personnel decisions. King Wen of Zhou exploited Fei Zhong, the King of Qin worried about Chu's envoys, Confucius was sidelined by Li Ju, and Gan Mao was controlled by Zi Xiang. Wu Zixu spread rumors to elevate Zi Chang, the beauty trap led to the fall of Yu and Guo, forged letters caused the death of Chang Hong, and sacrificial rituals with chickens and pigs resulted in the loss of capable ministers in Kuai.

On "Court Intrigues":

A wise ruler internally prevents power struggles but can externally employ such tactics. Supporting frivolous individuals or aiding weaker factions constitutes so-called "temple strategies." One must examine internal realities while observing external movements to see through an enemy's disguises. Examples include the dwarf of Qin informing Lord Huiwen, Xiang Ci predicting the attack on Ye, and Duke Si of Wei rewarding the mat-keeper.

On the Importance of "Authority":

A ruler's authority is like a deep pool, while ministers are the fish within it. Once fish leave the pool, they cannot be recaptured; once a ruler loses control over ministers, it is hard to regain. The ancients, unable to speak directly, used fish as a metaphor. Rewards and punishments are crucial tools—rulers use them to control ministers, but ministers may also exploit them to coerce the ruler. If a ruler prematurely reveals their intentions regarding rewards and punishments, ministers will seize the opportunity to buy loyalty and build their own prestige. Thus, the key instruments of governance must not be carelessly disclosed.

Supplementary Examples:

When Lord Jing Guo served as Qi's chancellor, merely conversing more with old friends made them wealthy, and showing extra care to close aides increased their influence. If such minor favors could enrich others, how much more could official positions and power achieve? During Duke Li of Jin's reign, the six ministers grew overly powerful. Xu Tong and Chang Yu Jiao warned: "When ministers become too influential, they rival the ruler. Externally, they form factions for personal gain; internally, they undermine state laws—ultimately threatening the ruler."

This passage recounts several stories about power struggles and mutual suspicion among people.

The first story describes how Duke Li of Jin executed three high ministers. Ministers Xu Tong and Changyu Jiao warned that executing only some of the equally guilty parties would leave survivors harboring resentment. The duke couldn't bring himself to kill them all, and three months later, the remaining ministers united to kill Duke Li and divided his territory.

The second story uses the experience of Li Ji from Yan as a metaphor. When Li Ji's wife was committing adultery and he suddenly returned home, the adulterer was still inside. The wife and household women conspired to have the man rush out naked and disheveled, pretending not to see him. When Li Ji asked who it was, everyone claimed not to have seen anything, making him think he'd seen a ghost. The women suggested using the excrement (or urine) of five domestic animals to exorcise the evil, which Li Ji did.

The third story tells of a couple from Wei praying together. The wife prayed to receive one hundred bolts of cloth, to which the husband complained it was too little. She replied: "If it were more, you'd just use it to buy concubines."

The fourth narrative concerns the King of Chu wanting to send his princes to serve in neighboring states. Dai Xie dissuaded him, arguing this would make those states value these princes, who might then collude with foreign powers—essentially teaching them to commit treason.

Finally, the passage recounts how the three powerful clans of Lu (Mengsun, Shusun, and Jisun) jointly seized power by kidnapping Duke Zhao. When the duke attacked the Jisun clan, Shusun's retainer said: "We're just household servants who don't understand state affairs—having or not having Jisun makes no difference to us," implying they wouldn't come to Jisun's rescue.

These stories collectively illustrate: political enemies must be dealt with thoroughly to avoid future trouble; people are easily deceived by those close to them; and in power struggles, one must guard against collusion between internal and external forces.

This passage recounts the intricate power struggles and ruler-minister dynamics among various states during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods:

When asked "Which option benefits me more?", all agreed that without the Ji Sun clan, the Shu Sun clan couldn't survive, thus they should come to their aid. They attacked from the northwest corner, and when the Meng Sun clan saw Shu Sun's banners entering, they too sent reinforcements. The Three Huan families (Ji Sun, Shu Sun, and Meng Sun of Lu State) united, leaving Duke Zhao of Lu unable to prevail—he was eventually exiled and died at Ganhou.

Gongshu, having rendered meritorious service as chancellor of Han, found himself rivaled by Gongzhong of Qi who enjoyed King Han's favor. Fearing replacement, Gongshu secretly orchestrated an alliance between Qi and Han to attack Wei. He deliberately stationed Qi troops near Zheng territory to pressure the Han ruler into securing his position while forging the bilateral pact.

Wei minister Zhai Huang, maintaining close ties with Han, summoned Han troops to attack Wei, then posed as peacemaker to elevate his standing at court. When the Yue king attacked Wu, King Wu surrendered with apologies. Fan Li and minister Wen Zhong advised against acceptance, declaring: "When Heaven offered Yue to Wu before, Wu refused. Now celestial mandate has reversed—Fuchai's calamity shows Heaven giving Wu to Yue."

Grand Vizor Bo Pi wrote to Wen Zhong: "When cunning hares die, hunting dogs get stewed; when rival states perish, strategists face execution. Why not spare Wu as your escape route?" Reading this, Wen Zhong sighed: "My death would make Yue share Wu's fate."

Dacheng Niu traveled from Zhao to Han to tell Shen Buhai: "Have Han value me through Zhao's regard, and I'll have Zhao value you through Han's regard—thus we both gain standing in both states." Sima Xi, a Zhongshan minister favoring Zhao, routinely leaked state secrets to the Zhao king. Lü Cang, a Wei official aligned with Qin, secretly urged Qin to attack Wei, then mediated to enhance his position.

Generals Song Shi of Wei and Jing Ke of Wei exchanged letters during hostilities: "When armies face off, engagement brings mutual destruction—this concerns our rulers alone. Privately we bear no enmity; wisdom dictates mutual avoidance."

Wei chancellor Bai Gui told Han chancellor Bao Qian: "Use Han's might to secure my power in Wei, and I'll use Wei's to secure yours in Han—thus we both endure in office." In Qi, a mid-rank officer named Yi She once attended the king while drunk.

This passage records several stories of ancient political stratagems, revealing the ruthlessness of power struggles.

The first tale recounts how Yi She offended a gatekeeper who had suffered the punishment of foot amputation (a penal mutilation in ancient times). The gatekeeper deliberately poured water by the gate to create the illusion of someone urinating there. When the ruler saw this the next day and flew into a rage, the gatekeeper hinted it was Yi She's doing, leading to Yi She's execution.

The second story tells of Ji Yangjun, a high minister of Wei who was at odds with two colleagues. He forged a royal order to frame them. When the ruler inquired, Ji Yangjun feigned ignorance, merely mentioning their poor relations. The ruler believed the slander and executed the two ministers.

In the third account, Sima Xi of Zhongshan State harbored enmity toward Ji Xin. He secretly had Ji Xin's enemy Yuan Qian killed, making the ruler believe Ji Xin was responsible—a classic case of killing with a borrowed knife.

The fourth narrative reveals the machinations of Zheng Xiu, a favorite concubine of the King of Chu. When the king acquired a new beauty, Zheng Xiu pretended friendship while secretly plotting her downfall.

The fifth episode describes Duke Huan of Zheng's stratagem before attacking the Kuai State: he first bribed Kuai's capable men, feigning an alliance by setting up sacrificial altars outside the city. The Kuai ruler mistakenly thought they were plotting rebellion and executed them all, allowing Zheng to conquer Kuai effortlessly.

The sixth tale tells how Xiang Ci, magistrate of Wei's Ye district, secretly befriended close associates of the King of Zhao. Every time Zhao planned to raid Ye, he obtained advance knowledge and reported to the Wei ruler, foiling Zhao's attempts repeatedly.

In the seventh story, a Qin dwarf gained great favor with the King of Chu while secretly cultivating Chu ministers, passing all of Chu's state secrets to King Huiwen of Qin.

The final account describes how Lord Si of Wei sent his county magistrate a new mat, simply because he had secretly learned the magistrate's old one was torn. The magistrate, believing the ruler possessed divine insight, dared practice no more deception. These stories collectively illustrate the treacherous stratagems and counter-stratagems characteristic of ancient political struggles.