《韓非子》Vol. 13

In "The Outer Congery of Sayings: Upper Right" chapter, Han Feizi primarily expounds three methods for rulers to control their ministers. He first points out that when a ruler's authority is insufficient to influence ministers, decisive elimination becomes necessary. This parallels the anecdote of Master Kuang (renowned musician of the Spring and Autumn period) responding to Duke Jing of Qi and Minister Yan Ying's remonstrance - while following trends appears easy, truly implementing the Dao of governance proves difficult, like racing against wild beasts in futility.

Han Feizi cites Zixia's interpretation of the Spring and Autumn Annals, arguing that rulers skilled in wielding authority must eradicate treacherous tendencies at their inception. Just as the Ji Sun clan (powerful Lu minister) reprimanded Confucius for challenging his authority, how much more should rulers act thus toward ministers? Therefore, Jiang Taigong's execution of the defiant hermit Kuang Yu resembles preventing slaves from riding thoroughbreds; Duke Si of Wei understood this principle, hence using deer to pull his carriage; Lord Xue (Qi minister) grasped this truth, thus engaging in strategic games with the two Luan ministers. These all demonstrate comprehension of the ruler-minister power dynamic.

The second principle compares the ruler to an axle and ministers to spokes. When a ruler's preferences become too apparent, ministers exploit loopholes, blinding the ruler; when speech flows too freely, remonstrance becomes difficult, diminishing the ruler's mystical authority. Han Feizi cites Shen Buhai's (Legalist scholar) "Six Cautions" and Tang Yi's archery analogy, showing how disasters often stem from figures like the fictional Guo Nian's petitions or Duke Xuan of Qi's sighs. He recommends wisdom like Lord Jingguo presenting ten pairs of earrings or caution resembling the secret talks between generals Xishou and Gan Mao through a wall crevice.

The third principle states that statecraft fails when "guard dogs" remain uneliminated. Nations harbor such "vicious dogs," with rulers' confidants resembling temple rats. Without Emperor Yao's discernment or King Zhuang of Chu's wisdom in handling crown princes, rulers become like old women Granny Bo and matchmaker Cai making decisions. Examples include Wu Qi divorcing his beloved wife or Duke Wen of Jin executing his favorite minister Dian Jie - actions violating norms yet establishing authority. Like one who endures pain to lance another's boil.

Han Feizi concludes: When rewards fail to motivate, praise to encourage, punishments to intimidate, or slander to instill fear - if all four methods prove ineffective, only elimination remains. He cites Duke Jing of Qi's three inquiries about governance during a banquet with Duke Ping of Jin, where Master Kuang consistently answered "The ruler must benefit the people," illustrating governance's fundamental principle.

Master Kuang (a renowned musician of the Spring and Autumn period) advised Duke Jing of Qi: "This humble master has but one lesson for Your Highness: you must bestow kindness upon the people." When the duke departed his residence, Master Kuang escorted him and again inquired about governance, reiterating: "A ruler must treat his people with benevolence."

Returning to his palace, Duke Jing pondered deeply and finally grasped Master Kuang's profound meaning. At that time, the duke's two younger brothers—Princes Wei and Xia—enjoyed immense popularity. Their wealthy families were beloved by the people, and their influence nearly rivaled the sovereign's. The duke realized: "This threatens my position! By urging me to benefit the people, is Master Kuang advising me to compete with my brothers for popular support?"

Thereupon, Duke Jing opened state granaries to relieve the poor, distributed treasury resources to widows and orphans, emptied stored grain reserves, depleted surplus wealth, released unprivileged palace maidens to marry, and provided rice stipends for all elders over seventy. After two years of such virtuous governance, his brothers lost public favor—Prince Xia fled to Chu, while Prince Wei escaped to Jin.

Later, while touring the Bohai Sea (called Shaohai in antiquity) with Minister Yanzi, Duke Jing ascended the Boqin Terrace overlooking his capital and sighed: "How magnificent this city is! Who shall possess it in future generations?" Yanzi replied: "Likely Tian Chengzi [the powerful Qi minister Tian Chang]." Puzzled, the duke protested: "This is my state—why speak of Tian Chengzi?"

Yanzi explained: "Tian Chengzi has won Qi's hearts. For nobles, he secures titles and emoluments; for commoners, he lends grain by large measures yet collects by small ones [secretly dispensing favors]. When slaughtering oxen, he keeps but one portion of meat, distributing the rest to scholars; annually, he retains only two sets of garments, giving others to scholars. Thus, market timber costs no more than mountain wood, while seafood prices match coastal rates. Meanwhile, Your Highness imposes heavy taxes, yet Tian Chengzi showers generosity upon the people. During Qi's great famine, starved corpses lined roads—but all who sought Tian Chengzi survived. Folk songs now chant: 'Return home—seek Tian Chengzi!' As the Book of Odes says: Though lacking great virtue, the people sing and dance for him. With such popular support, the masses naturally follow Tian Chengzi."

Tears streaming down his face, Duke Jing lamented: "How tragic! Though I possess the state, true power lies with Tian Chengzi. What now?" Yanzi offered no direct answer, yet through this contrast revealed the eternal principle: "He who wins the people's hearts, wins the empire."

This passage from Han Feizi primarily discusses how rulers should employ authority to govern the state and prevent treacherous ministers from causing chaos.

Someone advised Duke Jing of Qi, saying: "Why should you worry? If you wish to reclaim power, you should draw close to virtuous ministers and distance yourself from petty men, rectify the disorder in the court, reduce harsh punishments, relieve the poor and the orphaned, and extend kindness to the people. In this way, the hearts of the people will naturally turn to you. Even if there were ten Tian Chengzi (a powerful minister of Qi) plotting against you, what could they do?"

However, Han Feizi criticized this, arguing: "Duke Jing did not understand how to wield authority, and even Master Kuang (a court musician) and Yanzi (a famed Qi statesman) failed to grasp how to eliminate threats. It is like a hunter who could rely on a stable chariot and six swift horses, driven by Wang Liang (a legendary charioteer), to effortlessly pursue his prey. Yet if he abandons this advantage and instead runs on foot, even Lou Ji (a legendary runner) could not catch anything. The state is like the ruler’s chariot, and authority is his horse. If a ruler does not use his authority to restrain overreaching ministers but instead seeks to win the people’s hearts through benevolence, it is as if he has discarded his chariot and horses to chase prey on foot. Thus, Duke Jing was a ruler who did not understand authority, and Master Kuang and Yanzi were ministers who did not understand how to eliminate dangers."

Zixia (a disciple of Confucius) remarked: "The Spring and Autumn Annals record dozens of cases of ministers assassinating rulers and sons murdering fathers. None of these occurred suddenly—they were the result of gradual accumulation. Treacherous men persist in evil deeds until their power grows strong enough to commit atrocities. Therefore, a wise ruler must root out threats early. Tian Chang’s rebellion had clear warning signs, yet the ruler did not execute him, nor did Yanzi urge the ruler to suppress his overreach. Instead, he encouraged the ruler to practice benevolence, which ultimately led to Duke Jian of Qi’s downfall. Thus, those skilled in wielding authority must nip treachery in the bud."

The passage concludes with a story: When the Ji Sun clan held power in Lu, Zilu served as magistrate of Houyi. In the fifth month, the state of Lu conscripted laborers to dig a long canal. Zilu used his own salary to prepare porridge and fed the workers at Wufu Crossroads. When Confucius heard of this, he sent Zigong to overturn the food and smash the utensils, saying: "These laborers belong to the ruler of Lu—by what right do you feed them?" Zilu angrily confronted Confucius: "Did you not teach us to practice benevolence and righteousness? Benevolence means sharing all things with the world." Confucius explained: "By overstepping your authority to bestow favors, you invite disaster." Sure enough, not long after, the Ji Sun clan sent someone to reprimand Confucius.

This passage recounts two stories illustrating the principles of ritual propriety and political order.

The first story concerns Confucius' experience in the State of Lu. When Confucius' disciple Zilu distributed grain to commoners without authorization, Confucius admonished him: "The Son of Heaven cares for all under heaven, feudal lords care for their domains, ministers care for their official duties, and scholars care for their clans. To extend benevolence beyond one's proper sphere constitutes overreach. These are the people of Lu's ruler, yet you presume to bestow favors—this is your transgression." Before he finished speaking, an envoy from the Ji Sun clan (powerful ministers of Lu) arrived to rebuke Confucius, accusing him of attempting to steal their subjects. Confucius had no choice but to depart Lu by carriage. This shows how even a sage like Confucius proved powerless against ministers usurping sovereign authority. Had Duke Jing of Qi similarly restrained Tian Chang's encroachments, he might have avoided his eventual assassination.

The second story recounts Jiang Taigong's (Grand Duke Wang) actions in Qi. Two reclusive brothers named Kuang Yu and Hua Shi lived by the Eastern Sea, proclaiming: "We will not submit to the Son of Heaven, nor associate with feudal lords. We till our own fields for food, dig our own wells for water, ask nothing of others, and desire neither office nor salary." Upon arriving in Yingqiu, Jiang Taigong immediately had them executed as "primary targets of elimination." When the Duke of Zhou heard this, he urgently sent messengers demanding why virtuous scholars had been killed. Jiang Taigong explained: "These men refused submission to the Son of Heaven—thus I could not command them. They rejected association with lords—thus I could not employ them. Self-sufficient and needing nothing, my rewards and punishments held no sway over them. Without desire for rank or stipend, their talents could never serve me. Those who hold no office will not govern; those who bear no responsibility cannot be loyal. The methods by which former kings ruled their subjects relied precisely on ranks, emoluments, and penal sanctions."

Both stories emphasize the importance of political order, demonstrating how "benevolence" exceeding one's station undermines hierarchy, while complete withdrawal from the system threatens governance foundations. Through these cases, the author articulates Legalist principles concerning centralized authority and institutional constraints.

This passage illustrates the core principle that "talents must serve the state" through several allegorical stories.

The first story compares an inferior horse that resembles a prized steed but refuses to move no matter how it is driven—so useless that even the lowliest servant would disdain riding it. Similarly, those who boast of their virtue yet refuse to serve the state are like this worthless horse, unworthy of a ruler's trust. The text cites the example of Grand Duke Wang executing Kuang Yu. Though Kuang Yu was widely recognized as a worthy man, he neither submitted to the Son of Heaven nor associated with feudal lords. Grand Duke Wang deemed such individuals disruptive to law and moral instruction, hence his execution.

The second story recounts how Duke Si of Wei refused to appoint Ru Er as his chancellor. Just as a horse worth a thousand pieces of gold gains its value through utility, while even the most beautiful deer remains worthless if it serves no purpose, Ru Er—despite his talents—had no loyalty to Wei, leading the duke to reject him.

The third story describes how Xue Gong, chancellor to Marquis Zhao of Wei, discovered that figures like Yang Hu and Pan Qi enjoyed the ruler's favor yet refused to serve him personally. Xue Gong then devised a gambling scheme to sow discord between them and their brothers.

These stories collectively convey the same lesson: the measure of talent lies not in reputation or appearance, but in willingness to serve the ruler. "Worthy men" who withhold loyalty are as valueless to the state as useless horses and deer—a reflection of the Legalist pragmatism in evaluating human potential.

This passage from Han Feizi recounts several stories about statecraft and the relationship between rulers and ministers.

The first story tells of a man named Zhang Ji who was falsely rumored to be disloyal to Lord Xue. Enraged, Lord Xue planned to execute him. Upon discovering that Zhang Ji had actually been secretly serving him all along, Lord Xue immediately reversed his stance—not only sparing Zhang Ji but lavishing him with generous rewards of grain, money, fine horses, and beautiful women. When other retainers witnessed this, they competed fiercely to serve Lord Xue. Han Feizi uses this example to illustrate that a ruler should manage ministers like training birds, making them dependent on the ruler's rewards and titles.

The second story quotes Shen Buhai, emphasizing that a ruler must conceal true intentions. If a ruler appears astute, ministers become guarded; if feigning ignorance, ministers grow confused; if displaying desires, ministers will pander. Thus, the best approach is maintaining "wuwei" (non-action), keeping ministers unable to discern the ruler's mind.

The third story features a dialogue between Tian Zifang and Tang Yiju about bird hunting. Tang remarked: "The bird watches you with hundreds of eyes (its feathers), while you only have two eyes fixed on it—thus extreme caution is needed." Tian Zifang realized this principle applied equally to governance. When Zheng Zhangzi heard this, he recognized Tian sought to "conceal" intentions but hadn't mastered the method.

Han Feizi concludes that true "emptiness" means having nothing to hide, thereby perceiving everything clearly. This embodies the Daoist governing philosophy of "wuwei"—urging rulers to conceal preferences so ministers cannot manipulate them, thus maintaining control. The stories collectively demonstrate how strategic opacity and controlled rewards create ministerial dependence while preserving sovereign authority.

King Xuan of Qi sought advice from Tang Yizi on the essentials of archery. Tang Yizi replied that the key lay in "prudent vigilance." When the king asked what this meant, Tang explained: A bird watches a person with dozens of eyes, while the person observes the bird with only two—how could one not maintain utmost caution? Extending this to governance, Tang noted that while a ruler monitors the realm with two eyes, the millions of subjects watch the ruler with countless eyes—how then should the ruler remain vigilant? Quoting an elder from Zheng, Tang Yizi advised: "Maintain the Daoist state of serene Wuwei (non-action), concealing your intentions—this is the highest form of vigilance."

Minister Guo Yang of Zheng, fearing his ruler's displeasure, proactively sought pardon during a banquet: "Should I err, may Your Majesty inform me so I may correct myself and avoid death." This exemplifies a subject's wisdom in preemptively dispelling suspicion.

When King Xuan of Han praised a guest's counsel, an attendant reminded him to first attribute the advice to the king's magnanimity, thereby securing loyalty.

Lord Jingguo (the Duke of Xue), serving as Qi's chancellor, faced the delicate task of selecting a new queen after the previous queen's death. He crafted ten pairs of jade earrings, one pair exceptionally fine, and had King Wei of Qi distribute them to his ten favored consorts. The next day, observing who wore the finest pair, he recommended her as queen—a subtle method of discerning the ruler's preference through material objects.

As chancellor to King Hui of Qin, Gan Mao learned through a spy hidden in a wall cavity that the king privately intended to appoint Gongsun Yan (Xishou) as his successor. Gan Mao promptly congratulated the king on acquiring a "worthy chancellor." When pressed to name the candidate, Gan Mao revealed it was Xishou, leading the king—embarrassed by the leak—to exile Gongsun Yan. Alternate accounts suggest Xishou was already a renowned general. This episode illustrates the perilous intrigue of political information warfare.

When Xi Shou (Gongsun Yan), a high minister of Liang State, was in Qin, the Qin ruler wished to employ him to govern the realm. Xi Shou replied: "As your servant, I dare not abandon my own sovereign." After completing one year's service in Liang, Xi Shou fled to Qin due to some offense, where the Qin ruler treated him generously. The Qin general Chuli Ji, fearing Xi Shou might supplant him, dug a tunnel beneath the chamber where the ruler held private consultations to eavesdrop.

Soon afterward, the Qin ruler indeed consulted Xi Shou: "I intend to attack Han—what do you think?" Xi Shou answered: "Autumn would be suitable." The ruler said: "I shall entrust you with state affairs—take care not to divulge this." Xi Shou withdrew respectfully. Chuli Ji, having overheard through the tunnel, immediately informed the palace guards, and soon the entire state knew of the planned attack on Han. When the ruler interrogated Chuli Ji about the leak, the general falsely accused: "Xi Shou, being newly arrived in Qin and unsettled in mind, deliberately spread the news." By the time the ruler summoned Xi Shou again, he had already fled to another state.

Tangxi Gong, a strategist of Han, admonished Marquis Zhao of Han through parable: He asked, "Can a jade cup worth a thousand gold pieces hold water if it lacks a bottom?" The Marquis said no. He then asked, "Can a common earthen jar without leaks hold wine?" The Marquis agreed it could. Tangxi Gong pointed out: "Though crude, the earthen vessel is functional; though precious, the jade cup is useless. If a ruler leaks his ministers' confidential discussions, he becomes like that bottomless jade cup—no amount of wisdom can accomplish anything." Thereafter, the Marquis would sleep alone when deliberating major affairs, fearing sleep-talk might betray secrets. In another version, Tangxi Gong asked: "When thirsty, would you use a bottomless jade cup or an intact earthen cup?" The Marquis chose the earthen cup, whereupon Tangxi Gong illustrated how a ruler's leaks undermine governance.

(Notes: 1. "Xi Shou" was the title of Gongsun Yan, a renowned strategist of the Warring States period; 2. Chuli Ji was a Qin general of royal lineage; 3. Tangxi Gong's admonition reflects Legalist "statecraft" philosophy, emphasizing the ruler's absolute secrecy.)

This passage employs two vivid analogies to reveal how rulers become blinded and nations fall into decline.

The first story tells of a Song Dynasty wine merchant whose fine wine was fairly priced, service was attentive, and signage prominent—yet his wine remained unsold until it turned sour. Only after consulting elder Yang Qian did he understand: his ferocious dog frightened customers away. The author extends this metaphor—a nation too has such "vicious dogs." Powerful ministers act like these beasts, blocking worthy talents from approaching the ruler, leaving abilities buried.

The second analogy uses temple rats (sacrificial rodents in earth-god shrines). Guan Zhong advised Duke Huan of Qi that governing a state most fears these creatures—they nest in sacred wooden altars where smoke cannot purge them without burning the shrine, nor water drown them without damaging the structure. Similarly, court insiders bully outsiders through imperial connections while forming internal cliques, constantly probing the ruler's intentions. Leaving them unpunished disrupts laws, yet removing them unsettles the sovereign. These courtiers are the state's "temple rats."

Revisiting the wine merchant's tale, the text emphasizes: when ministers bite worthy scholars like vicious dogs while courtiers spy like temple rats, how can a ruler's blindness not lead to national stagnation? An alternate version adds: a servant sent to buy good wine purchases inferior liquor elsewhere, fearing the merchant's dog.

These metaphors vividly illustrate how rulers surrounded by treacherous officials become like fine wine guarded by vicious dogs—even the most capable governance talents cannot serve, inevitably causing state collapse.

The passage illustrates principles of statecraft through several classic anecdotes. The first story tells of the Zhuang family's tavern where wine turned sour because they failed to eliminate the guard dog (symbolizing powerful ministers who block worthy talents). When Duke Huan of Qi asked Guan Zhong what most troubled governance, Guan Zhong replied "temple rats" (representing treacherous courtiers close to rulers) — rodents nesting in the temple beams where smoke would burn the structure and water would erode the walls. Such ministers externally bully the people and internally deceive the ruler through factionalism; failing to remove them undermines laws while removing them risks harming the sovereign.

The second anecdote describes Emperor Yao wishing to abdicate to Shun. Ministers Gun and Gonggong objected, saying "How can you pass the throne to a commoner?" Yao not only ignored them but executed them militarily. Confucius remarked that recognizing Shun's virtue was easy for Yao, but the true challenge lay in having the resolve to eliminate opposition to uphold his decision.

The third episode recounts King Zhuang of Chu establishing the "Thatched Gate Law": any minister whose carriage splashed water from the palace eaves would have his driver executed. When the crown prince violated this law and begged the king to kill the enforcing officer instead, the king declared: "Officials who uphold laws honor the state. Killing them for the prince's offense would invert the ruler-subject hierarchy and destroy the kingdom." The prince then confessed, spending three nights outdoors to await punishment. These stories collectively emphasize that governance requires strict legal impartiality regardless of status, and rulers must demonstrate decisive leadership to overcome interference when making correct judgments.

The State of Chu had a law prohibiting horse-drawn carriages from entering the palace gate (Maomen). One day during heavy rain, the courtyard flooded, and the crown prince urgently needed to enter the palace. He drove his carriage up to the Maomen. The law enforcement officer (Tingli) stopped him, saying, "Carriages are forbidden at the Maomen—this is against the law." The prince argued, "The king summoned me urgently; I couldn't wait for the floodwaters to recede." He forced his way through, but the Tingli immediately struck the prince's horse with a spear (Shu), damaging the carriage.

The prince tearfully complained to the king of Chu: "The courtyard was flooded, so I drove to the Maomen. The Tingli not only called it illegal but also wrecked my carriage. Please punish him severely." To his surprise, the king replied, "This official showed no favoritism even during the reign of my predecessor, and now he refuses to compromise even with the future ruler. This is a truly law-abiding minister!" Instead of punishing him, the king promoted the Tingli by two ranks and ordered the rear palace gate opened for the prince to bypass the flooded area, warning him not to violate the law again.

On another occasion, Lord Weisi of the State of Wei said to his minister Bo Yi, "Do you think our Wei is too small for your talents? I can appoint you as High Minister and grant you ten thousand acres of fertile land." Bo Yi replied, "My mother has great faith in my abilities, believing I could assist a major state. But at home, there's a shamaness called Granny Cai whom my mother consults on every matter. Even when I propose governance strategies, my mother first seeks Granny Cai's opinion."

Bo Yi continued, "In terms of talent, I am fit to be prime minister of a great state; in terms of familial bonds, my mother and I are deeply attached. Yet she still defers to Granny Cai. Now that I serve Your Lordship—without such closeness as between mother and son—and with favored courtiers around you akin to Granny Cai, these favorites often bend the law for personal gain, while my proposals strictly adhere to legal principles. Personal favoritism and state law are like sworn enemies, fundamentally incompatible."

In another instance, Lord Wei planned to visit the State of Jin and invited Bo Yi to accompany him. Bo Yi said, "I must consult my mother first." The lord went directly to ask the elderly lady, who replied, "My son is your subject; it is proper for you to take him on your journey." Later, Bo Yi asked his mother, "Does Lord Wei trust me as much as you do?" She answered bluntly, "No." He pressed further, "And how does Lord Wei's wisdom compare?" His mother gave the same reply: "He doesn't understand you as I do."

This passage recounts several historical anecdotes about governance and personal conduct, explained in modern terms:

There was a capable son whose mother had already discussed family matters with him, yet she went to consult the diviner Cai Po (an ancient fortune-teller) for another decision. This resembles the ruler of Wei who, though heeding his wise minister's advice, would repeatedly consult other diviners to overturn decisions afterward. In this way, virtuous ministers couldn't remain in service long.

When teaching someone to sing, first let them attempt—only those who can accurately reach the Qingzhi note should be taught. If the instructor sets rigid standards beforehand: fast singing must match the Gong mode, slow singing must match the Zhi mode, and the student fails to meet these, then the teacher cannot be considered competent.

Wu Qi (a renowned general of the Warring States period) was from Zuoshi in Wei. He asked his wife to weave cloth, but the width didn't meet the standard. He had her redo it, yet the result still didn’t comply. Enraged, Wu Qi divorced her. When her brother pleaded for her, he said: "Wu Qi establishes laws—he aims to achieve great deeds for major states and must first implement them in his own household. It’s hard for you to return." Later, her younger brother sought the Wei ruler’s intervention, but Wu Qi refused and eventually left Wei for Chu.

Another version states: Wu Qi showed his wife a sample cloth, saying, "Weave it like this," but she wove it even better. When asked why, she explained she used the same materials but with greater care. Wu Qi replied, "This isn’t what I asked for," and sent her back to her family. Her father pleaded, but Wu Qi said, "In my household, we don’t deal in empty words."

Duke Wen of Jin asked his advisor Hu Yan: "I lavish delicacies and wine on my court, distribute an ox to the whole state, and spend a year’s income rewarding soldiers—will this make the people fight for me?" Hu Yan said it wasn’t enough. The duke then asked, "What if I reduce tariffs and punishments?" Again, Hu Yan said no. The duke pressed further: "If I personally console mourners, pardon criminals, and aid the poor?" Still, Hu Yan insisted it wasn’t enough.

These stories illustrate key principles: governance must avoid capricious changes, teaching should adapt to individual abilities, law enforcement must be impartial, and winning民心 (people's hearts) requires more fundamental virtuous governance. Wu Qi’s story particularly emphasizes that rule-makers must lead by example, enforcing standards even in personal affairs without favoritism.

This dialogue recounts a discussion between Duke Wen of Jin and his minister Hu Yan on how to motivate the common people to fight for the state. Hu Yan argued that the key lay in strict enforcement of laws, ensuring clear rewards and punishments. When Duke Wen asked about the highest standard of punishment, Hu Yan replied that it should apply equally regardless of status—even the ruler’s own favorites must be punished if they broke the law.

The next day, during a hunting expedition, Duke Wen’s favored courtier Dian Jie arrived late. The officials asked how to handle the matter. Though the duke wept in sorrow, he upheld military law and executed Dian Jie, displaying the body publicly to demonstrate the severity of justice. When the people saw that even the ruler’s favorite was punished for wrongdoing, they grew fearful, realizing that ordinary citizens had no chance of escaping punishment. Seeing that the people could now be governed effectively, Duke Wen launched a campaign eastward and won successive victories. These successes stemmed from his adoption of Hu Yan’s advice—using the execution of Dian Jie to establish the authority of the law.

The passage then employs a metaphor: treating a festering abscess is unbearably painful unless the needle reaches the bone marrow. Governing a state is the same—without enduring hardship, true order cannot be achieved. If a ruler wishes to govern well, he must heed the counsel of wise men and execute treacherous ministers. Yet these treacherous ministers are often the ruler’s most trusted favorites. A ruler’s faith in his favorites is as unshakable as the "Hard and White" debate (a philosophical concept from the School of Names, arguing that a stone’s hardness and whiteness are inseparable). For an ordinary person to try driving a wedge between ruler and favorite would be like persuading someone to trade their left leg for their right—not only futile but potentially fatal.

Through historical narrative and analogy, this text illustrates the Legalist principle that "punishment must not spare high ministers, nor rewards exclude commoners." It emphasizes strict, impartial law enforcement—applying the same standards to the privileged as to the lowly—as the foundation of a strong and orderly state. Only by upholding justice without favoritism can the authority of law be established and the nation prosper.