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《抱朴子外篇》Vol. 15

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Taiqing 太清部 Vol. 15 / 51 3,369 characters

About this page. The original text of 《抱朴子外篇》 Vol. 15 (Taiqing 太清部, 51 volumes) is shown in Classical Chinese as transmitted in the Kanripo (Kyoto University) edition. An English interpretation of the 7 passages on this page accompanies it: select a passage or press “Interpretation” to show it. All texts in English

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Source textInterpretation

抱朴子外篇卷之十五    審舉 抱朴子曰華霍所以能崇極天之峻者由乎 其下之厚也唐虞所以能臻巍巍之功者實 賴股肱之良也雖有孫陽之手而無騏驥之 足則不得致千里矣雖有稽古之才而無宣 力之佐則莫縁凝庶績矣人君雖明並日月 神鑒未兆然萬機不可以獨統曲碎不可以 親總必假目以遐覽借耳以廣聽誠須有司 是康是贊故聖莫不根心招賢以舉才爲首 務施玉帛於丘園馳翹車於巖藪勞於求人 逸於用能上自槐棘降逮皂隸論道經國莫 不任職恭己無爲而治平刑措而化洽無外 萬邦咸寧設官分職其猶構室一物不堪則 崩橈之由也然未貢舉之士格以四科三事 九列是之自出必簡摽穎拔萃之俊而漢之 末葉桓靈之世柄去帝室政在姦臣綱漏防 潰風頽教沮抑清德而揚諂媚退履道而進 多財力競成俗苟得無恥或輸自售之寳要 人之書或父兄貴顯望門而辟命低眉膝以 積習而見私夫銓衡不平則輕重錯謬斗斛 不正則少多混亂繩墨不陳曲直不分準格 傾側則滓雜實繁以之治人則虐暴而豺貪 受取聚歛以補買官之費立之朝廷則亂劇 於棼絲引用駑庸以爲黨援而望風向草偃 庶事之康何異懸瓦礫而責夜光絃不調而 索清音哉何可不澄濁飛沈沙汰臧否嚴試
Interpretation

In the fifteenth chapter of Baopuzi's Outer Chapters, the importance of selecting capable individuals is discussed. Ge Hong (Baopuzi) uses vivid analogies to illustrate his point: The towering heights of Mount Hua and Mount Huo reach the clouds because they rest upon massive foundations; the great achievements of Emperors Yao and Shun were possible solely through the assistance of virtuous ministers. Just as the legendary horse expert Bole (Sun Yang) could not travel far without a thousand-mile steed, even the most discerning ruler cannot handle all state affairs alone—they must rely on officials to assist in governance and decision-making.

A truly wise ruler prioritizes the recruitment of talented individuals, personally seeking them out among the common people with gifts and honors. Though the selection process may be rigorous, the employment of such individuals should be smooth and unhindered. Only then can the state be well-governed, with punishments rendered unnecessary and moral teachings spreading widely, bringing peace to the realm. Establishing official positions is like building a house—if even one component is defective, the entire structure may collapse.

During the late Han Dynasty under Emperors Huan and Ling, imperial authority declined, corrupt ministers seized power, and social morality deteriorated. Upright individuals were suppressed while sycophants rose to prominence. People resorted to bribery to secure official posts, and family connections determined appointments. The standards for selecting officials became as unreliable as faulty scales and inaccurate measures, leading to widespread tyranny. When the court employed mediocrities who formed cliques for personal gain, yet still expected orderly governance, it was akin to hanging roof tiles as if they were luminous pearls or expecting beautiful music from an untuned zither. Therefore, rigorous evaluation is essential—eliminating the incompetent and promoting the truly capable.

對之法峻貪夫之防哉殄瘁攸階可勿畏乎 古者諸侯貢士適者謂之有功有功者增班 進爵貢士不適謂之有過有過者黜位削地 猶復不能令詩人謐大車素餐之刺山林無 伐檀罝兔之賢况舉之無非才之罪受之無 負乘之患衡量一失其格多少安可復損乎 夫孤立之翹秀藏器以待賈瑣碌之輕薄人 事以邀速夫唯待價故頓淪於窮瘁矣夫唯 邀速故佻竊而騰躍矣蓋梟鴟屯飛則鴛鳳 幽集豺狼當路則麒麟遐遁舉善而教則不 仁者遠矣姦僞榮顯則英傑潜逝高概恥與 闒茸爲伍清節羞入饕餮之貫舉任並謬則 群賢括囊群賢括囊則凶邪相引凶邪相引 則小人道長小人道長則檮杌比肩頌聲所 以不作怨嗟所以嗷嗷也高幹長材恃能勝 己屈伸默語聽天任命窮通得失委之自然 亦焉得不墮多黨者之後而居有力者之下 乎逸倫之士非禮不動山峙淵渟知之者希 馳逐之徒蔽而毁之故思賢之君終不知竒 才之所在懷道之人願效力而莫從雖抱稷 契之器資邈世之量遂沈滯詣死不得登叙 也而有黨有力者紛然鱗萃人乏官曠致者 又美亦安得不拾掇而用之乎靈獻之世閹 官用事群姦秉權危害忠良臺閣失選用於 上州郡輕貢舉於下夫選用失於上則牧守 非其人矣貢舉輕於下則秀孝不得賢矣故
Interpretation

In ancient times, when feudal lords recommended talents (gongshi) to the imperial court, proper recommendations were considered meritorious and rewarded with promotions and fiefdoms, while improper ones were deemed faults punishable by demotion or reduced territories. Yet even then, poets still satirized those in high positions who failed to fulfill their duties—as seen in the Book of Songs, where "Cutting Sandalwood" criticizes idle beneficiaries while "Rabbit Nets" praises the worthy. How much worse is it today, when recommenders face no consequences for poor selections and appointees never worry about "virtue (De) mismatching position"? Once standards are skewed, how easily can the damage be undone?

True talents are like precious gems awaiting fair valuation, while mediocrities climb swiftly through opportunism. It is precisely because the worthy adhere to principles that they struggle in obscurity, while the petty thrive by cunning. When owls gather, phoenixes hide; where jackals rule, qilins retreat. If virtuous leaders educate the people, the corrupt will naturally flee; if villains dominate, heroes will withdraw—the noble disdain mingling with the vulgar, the upright feel ashamed alongside the greedy. When appointments go awry, the worthy fall silent while the wicked recommend one another. With malevolent officials in power and petty men triumphant—like the monstrous Taowu roaming unchecked—society inevitably seethes with discontent.

The truly capable often maintain integrity and follow nature’s course, yet end up lagging behind schemers and bowing to the powerful. Those of extraordinary character stand firm like mountains and depths, unmoved and profound, understood by few while slandered by the fame-seeking mob. Thus, rulers who thirst for talent never find the truly worthy, while those with grand aspirations possess governance skills but no path to serve. Like ancient sages Ji and Xie, even with unparalleled abilities, they may fade into obscurity. Meanwhile, factions cluster like fish scales, and when offices lie vacant, how can the court avoid appointing such people hastily?

During the reigns of Emperors Ling and Xian of Han, eunuchs monopolized power, treacherous ministers ruled, and loyalists suffered. The central selection system decayed, while local recommendations grew reckless. Faulty appointments at the top led to incompetent local officials; perfunctory recommendations below produced "cultivated talents" and "filial exemplars" in name only.

時人語曰舉秀才不知書察孝廉父别居寒 素清白濁如泥高第良將怯如雞又云古人 欲達勤誦經今世圖官免治生蓋疾之甚也 于時懸爵而賣之猶列肆也爭津者買之猶 市人也有直者無分而徑進空拳者望途而 收迹其貨多者其官貴其財少者其職卑故 東園積賣官之錢崔烈有銅臭之嗤上爲下 傚君行臣甚故阿佞幸獨談親容桑梓議主 中正吏部並爲魁儈各責其估清貧之士何 理有望哉是既然矣又邪正不同譬猶冰炭 惡直之人憎於非黨刀尺顛倒者則恐人之 議己也達不由道者則患言論之不美也乃 共構合虚誣中傷清德瑕累横生莫敢救拔 於是曾閔獲商臣之謗孔墨蒙盜砳之垢懷 正居貞者填笮乎泥濘之中而狡猾巧僞者 軒翥乎虹霓之際矣而凡夫淺識不辯邪正 謂守道者爲陸沈以履徑者爲知變俗之隨 風而動逐波而流者安能復身於德行苦思 於學問哉是莫不弃檢括之勞而赴用賂之 速矣斯誠有漢之所以傾來代之所宜深鑒 也或曰吾子論漢末貢舉之事誠得其病也 今必欲戒既往之失避傾車之路改有代之 絃調防法翫之或變令濮上巴人反安樂之 正音腠理之疾無退走之滯患者豈有方乎 士有風姿豐偉雅望有餘而懷空抱虛幹植 不足以貌取之則不必得賢徐徐先試則不
Interpretation

There was a popular saying at the time: "The 'cultivated talents' selected don't study, and the 'filial and incorrupt' nominees live apart from their fathers. Those claiming purity are filthy as mud, while generals praised for virtue cower like chickens." Others observed: "Ancient men sought distinction through diligent study of classics, but modern men pursue office to escape honest labor." Such phenomena were truly lamentable.

Official ranks were openly traded like merchandise, displayed like goods in market stalls. Office-seekers competed to purchase them like customers in a bazaar. The wealthy obtained positions without merit, while the poor could only watch helplessly. Higher bids secured superior offices, smaller payments brought humbler posts. Thus the court accumulated wealth from selling offices, and officials like Cui Lie were mocked for reeking of copper coins. When superiors behaved thus, inferiors followed suit—a ruler's actions directly shaped his ministers' conduct.

Thus sycophants alone gained favor, while fellow villagers and relatives monopolized nominations. Recruitment offices became marketplaces where each position had its price tag. How could impoverished scholars ever rise? Evil and integrity cannot coexist, just as ice and hot coals share no vessel. Those who hated the upright feared public censure; those who climbed by crooked means dreaded ill repute. They conspired to slander virtuous men, burdening the principled with false accusations while none dared speak in their defense.

Consequently, sages like Zeng Shen and Min Ziqian were vilified, while Confucius and Mozi bore thieves' stigma. The principled languished in obscurity, while the cunning soared. Common folk, shortsighted and confused, mistook steadfastness for pedantry and deviousness for adaptability. As society drifted with the tide, who would devote themselves to moral cultivation or rigorous study? All abandoned earnest effort, competing instead to purchase office through bribery.

This was the root of the Han dynasty's collapse—a warning for posterity. Some argue: "Your critique of late Han selection practices hits the mark. But rectifying past errors to avoid repetition is like altering longstanding melodies, preventing legal distortions, restoring vulgar music to classical elegance, or curing deep-seated maladies—easier said than done." Many appear refined and reputable yet lack substance. Selecting by appearance guarantees no true talent; thorough evaluation risks missing timely appointments.

可倉卒將如之何抱朴子答曰知人則哲上 聖所難今使牧守皆能審良才於未用保性 履之始終誠未易也但共遣其私情竭其聰 明不爲利慾動不爲屬託屈所欲舉者必澄 思以察之博訪以詳之脩其名而考其行校 同異以備虛飾令親族稱其孝友邦閭歸其 信義嘗小仕者有忠清之效治事之幹則寸 錦足以知巧刺鼠足以觀勇也又秀孝皆宜 如舊試經答策防其罪對之姦當令必絶其 不中者勿署吏加罰禁錮其所舉書不中者 刺史太守免官不中左遷中者多不中者少 後轉不得過故若受賕(巨流/切)而舉所不當發 覺有驗者除名禁錮終身不以赦令原所舉 舉者與同罪今試用此法治一二歲之間秀 孝必多不行者亦足以知天下貢舉不精之 久矣過此則必多修德而勤學者矣又諸居 職其犯公坐者以法律從事其以貪濁臟汙 爲罪不足至死者刑竟及遇赦皆宜禁錮終 身輕者二十年如此不廉之吏必將化爲夷 齊矣若乃臨官受取金錢山積發覺則自恤 得了免退則旬日復用者曾史亦將變爲盜 跖矣如此則雖貢士皆中不辭於官長之不 良或曰能言不必能行今試經對策雖過豈 必有政事之才乎抱朴子答曰古者猶以射 擇人况經術乎如其舍旃則末見餘法之賢 乎此也夫豐草不秀塉土巨魚不生小水格
Interpretation

This dialogue discusses the selection of virtuous and capable officials. Baopuzi (Ge Hong's Daoist name) acknowledges the difficulty in truly assessing a person's moral character and abilities, yet proposes systematic methods for evaluation.

He offers concrete suggestions: When local officials select candidates, they must first eliminate personal biases and conflicts of interest. The evaluation process should be comprehensive and meticulous, including observing daily conduct for filial piety and fraternal love (孝友), verifying neighborhood recognition of their integrity (信义), and examining their record of incorruptibility and administrative competence in minor official posts. Just as examining a small piece of brocade reveals the weaver's skill, or observing the "porcupine test" (a traditional courage assessment) demonstrates bravery, major virtues can be discerned from minor details.

Regarding traditional selection methods like the Xiucai and Xiaolian examinations (秀孝), he recommends maintaining the testing system while strictly preventing fraud. Recommending officials should face penalties—even dismissal—for unqualified candidates; if most recommendations prove unsatisfactory, the official should be demoted. Those who recommend candidates in exchange for bribes should be permanently barred from office, with both parties receiving equal punishment. Implementing these measures for one or two years would improve selection quality and encourage scholars to cultivate moral character.

For corrupt officials, Baopuzi advocates severe punishment: Those guilty of corruption not warranting capital punishment should be permanently barred from office after serving their sentence or receiving amnesty, with lighter cases receiving twenty-year bans. He argues this would compel dishonest officials to become as upright as the ancient paragons Boyi and Shuqi. Conversely, if corrupt officials can quickly resume office after being caught, even virtuous men like Zeng Shen and Shi Yu might degenerate into bandits like the infamous Robber Zhi.

When challenged that examination excellence doesn't guarantee practical governance skills, Baopuzi counters: Ancient times used archery tests for selection—modern classical examinations are already reasonable. Just as fertile soil yields good crops and large fish require deep waters, fundamental qualities form the basis of achievement. If candidates cannot master classical learning, how can they be expected to possess other talents?

言不吐庸人之口高文不墮頑夫之筆故披 洪範而知箕子有經世之器覽九術而見范 生懷治國之略省夷吾之書而明其有撥亂 之幹視不害之文而見其精霸王之道也今 孝廉必試經無脫謬而秀才必對策無失指 則亦不得闇蔽也良將高第取其膽武猶復 試之以策况文士乎假令不能必盡得賢能 要必愈於了不試也今且令天下諸當在貢 舉之流者莫敢不勤學但此一條其爲長益風 教亦不細矣若使海内畏妄舉之失凡人息 僥倖之求背競逐之末歸學問之本儒道將 大興而私貨必漸絶竒才可得而役庶官可 以不曠矣或曰先生欲急貢舉之法但禁錮 之罪苛而且重懼者甚衆夫急轡繁策伯樂 所不爲密防峻法德政之所恥抱朴子曰夫 骨填肉補之藥長於養體益壽而不可以救 暍溺之急也務寬含垢之政可以蒞敦御朴 而不中以拯衰弊之變也虎狼見逼不揮戈 奮劍而彈琴詠詩吾未見其身可保也燎火 及室不奔走灌注而揖讓盤旋吾未見其焚 之自息也今與知欲賣策者論此是與跖議 捕盜也 抱朴子曰今普天一統九垓同風王制政令 誠宜齊一夫衡量小器猶不可使往往而有 異况人士之格而可參差而無檢乎江表雖 遠密邇海隅然染道化率禮教亦既千餘載 矣往雖暫隔不盈百年而儒學之事亦不偏
Interpretation

This passage primarily discusses the importance of talent selection and moral cultivation. The text observes that truly capable individuals (such as Jizi, Fansheng, and Guan Zhong) demonstrate their statecraft abilities through their writings. The author advocates for a rigorous selection system: candidates recommended for filial piety and integrity must master the classics, while outstanding scholars must excel in policy responses (answering governance questions), ensuring no talent goes unrecognized. Just as selecting skilled generals requires evaluating both courage and strategic thinking, literary scholars should also undergo stringent assessments.

The author argues that a rigorous tribute and recommendation system would motivate scholars nationwide to study diligently and improve social customs. If people abandon opportunism and return to scholarly fundamentals, Confucian orthodoxy would flourish, exceptional talents would be employed, and official positions would no longer remain vacant. Addressing concerns that such strict standards might be overly harsh, the author counters with analogies: one cannot play the lute or recite poetry when facing tigers and wolves, nor perform ceremonial bows when a house is ablaze—a decaying era demands severe measures. Debating systems with those seeking to cheat is as absurd as discussing thief-catching with burglars.

The conclusion emphasizes the need for unified governance in a consolidated empire. Just as weights and measures require standardization, talent selection cannot tolerate inconsistency. Though the Jiangnan region may be remote, it has been steeped in Confucian rites for over a millennium. Even if briefly isolated for less than a century, its scholarly traditions remain unbroken. The author advocates implementing uniform selection criteria nationwide.

廢也惟以其土宇褊於中州故人士之數不 得鈞其多少耳及其德行才學之高者子游 仲任之徒亦未謝上國也昔吴土初附其貢 士見偃以不試今太平已近四十年矣猶復 不試所以使東南儒業衰於在昔也此乃見 同於左衽之類非所以别之也且夫君子猶 愛人以禮况爲其愷悌之父母邪法有招患 令有損化其此之謂也今貢士無復試者則 必皆修飾馳逐以競虛名誰肯復開卷受書 哉所謂饒之適足以敗之者也自有天性好 古心悅藝文學不爲禄味道忘貧若法高𡖖 周生烈者學精而不仕徇乎榮利者萬之一 耳至於甯越倪寬黄霸之徒所以强自篤厲 於典籍者非天性也皆由患苦困瘁欲以經 術自拔耳向使非漢武之世則朱買臣嚴助 之屬亦未必讀書也今若取富貴之道幸有 易於學者而復素無自然之好豈肯復空自 勤苦執灑掃爲諸生遠行尋師問道者乎兵 興之世武貴文寢俗人視儒士如僕虜見經 誥如芥壤者何哉由於聲名背乎此也夫不 用譬猶售章甫於夷越徇髯蛇於華夏矣今 若遐邇一例明考課試則必多負笈千里以 尋師友轉其禮賂之費以買記籍者不俟終 日矣 抱朴子曰才學之士堪秀孝者已不可多得 矣就令其人若如桓靈之世舉吏不先以財 貨便安臺閣主者則雖諸經兼本解於問無
Interpretation

This passage examines how talent selection systems shape scholarly trends. Ge Hong (Baopuzi) observes that the prolonged absence of imperial examinations in southeastern regions led to the decline of Confucian education there. He likens the examination system to selling ceremonial hats to barbarians or trading snake skins in the Central Plains—though seemingly incongruous, examinations remain crucial for motivating students to study.

The text notes that contemporary selection processes no longer emphasize actual examinations, causing people to chase empty reputations rather than engage in serious study. While exceptional scholars like Fa Gaoqing and Zhou Shenglie pursued learning out of innate passion, most study merely for official advancement. Historical figures such as Ning Yue, Ni Kuan, and Huang Ba devoted themselves to the classics solely to alter their destinies through scholarly achievement. Were it not for Emperor Wu of Han's promotion of Confucianism, even renowned ministers like Zhu Maichen and Yan Zhu might never have pursued learning.

Ge Hong laments that during wartime, warriors gain prominence while scholars are marginalized—commoners treat Confucians as servants and classical texts as trash. He contends that standardized national examinations with clear evaluation criteria would immediately transform academic culture, making people travel great distances with book-filled trunks and spend gift money on texts instead.

The passage concludes with poignant criticism: even candidates capable of passing the "Xiucai" (Outstanding Scholar) or "Xiaolian" (Filial and Incorrupt) examinations have become rare. Were we to encounter another era like Emperor Huan or Ling of Eastern Han who sold official posts, yet conducted fair examinations without demanding bribes, few would demonstrate mastery of the classics.

不對猶見誣枉使不得過矣常追恨于時執 事不熏爲之防余意謂新年當試貢舉者令 年便可使儒官才士豫作諸策計足周用集 上禁其留草殿中封閉之臨試之時亟賦之 人事因縁於是絶當答策者皆可會著一處 高選臺省之官親監察之又嚴禁其交關出 入畢事乃遺違犯有罪無赦如此屬託之冀 窒矣夫明君恃己之不可欺不恃人之不欺 己也亦何恥於峻爲斯制乎若試經法立則 天下可以不立學官而人自勤樂矣案四科 亦有明解法令之狀今在職之人官無大小 悉不知法令或有微言難曉而小吏多頑而 使之决獄無以死生委之以輕百姓之命付 無知之人也作官長不知法爲下吏所欺而 不知又决其口筆者憤憤不能知食法與不 食不問不以付主者或以意斷事蹉跌不愼 法令亦可令廉良之吏皆取明律令者試之 如試經高者隨才品叙用如此天下必少弄 法之吏失理之獄矣 抱朴子外篇卷之
Interpretation

This passage presents Ge Hong (Baopuzi)'s critique of the imperial examination system and official selection procedures during his time, along with his proposed reforms. He identified serious flaws in the current system and advocated for stricter evaluation mechanisms.

Regarding civil examinations, he proposed that candidates should be given ample preparation time for policy essay topics, with the actual question being assigned on-site during the test. All examinees should be gathered in one location under direct supervision by high-ranking officials, with strict prohibitions against private communication and severe penalties for violators. Only through such measures could backdoor appointments be eliminated. A wise ruler, he argued, should rely on rigorous systems to prevent corruption rather than expecting voluntary compliance with rules.

Concerning official appointments, Ge Hong observed that many officials at all levels lacked legal knowledge, resulting in chaotic judicial proceedings. Some petty clerks—stubborn and uneducated—wielded life-and-death power over commoners. Some magistrates ignorant of law were deceived by subordinates, while others rendered verdicts based on personal whims, leading to numerous wrongful convictions.

His recommendation was to establish legal examinations modeled after the Classics examinations (Shijing), selecting only those proficient in jurisprudence for official posts. All virtuous and capable officials should pass legal examinations before appointment, with positions assigned according to examination results. This approach would reduce corrupt officials and miscarriages of justice.

(Note: "Classics examinations" [Shijing] refers to the major testing category for talent selection at that time, primarily assessing Confucian classics; the "Four Categories" [Sike] were the four examination subjects used in Han Dynasty recruitment; "Central Ministries" [Taisheng] denotes high-level central government offices.)

十五

Source text: Kanripo 漢籍リポジトリ(KR5f0021); Licence: CC BY-SA 4.0 · Report an error / feedback

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