《道德真經廣聖義》Vol. 26
About this page. The original text of 《道德真經廣聖義》 Vol. 26 (Dongshen 洞神部, 51 volumes) is shown in Classical Chinese as transmitted in the Kanripo (Kyoto University) edition. An English interpretation of the 9 passages on this page accompanies it: select a passage or press “Interpretation” to show it. All texts in English
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Source textInterpretation
Chapter 30: Assisting the Ruler with the Dao
Commentary on the Main Idea of the Previous Chapter
The previous chapter explained that pride and attachment cause one to lose one’s roots, and therefore excessive luxury should be cast aside. This chapter explains that relying on military force and delighting in revenge are wrong; one must not take pride in boasting and attacking others. It opens with “those who assist the ruler with the Dao,” meaning that they do not assist through military force. It then describes where armies are stationed and how delight in warfare brings misfortune. Thus, a good ruler resorts to arms only when there is no alternative. The later lines, “having achieved the result” and “when things grow strong,” discuss how relying on strength leads to defeat: flourishing strength is not in accord with the Dao and should be brought to an end as soon as possible.
Meaning (general explanation): The first passage says that a ruler should govern the country without extravagance. This passage admonishes ministers to serve their ruler by supporting him through civil virtue. Relying on troops and favoring martial force will inevitably bring enemies and provoke conflict. It shows that relying on strength and delighting in revenge are not things to boast about. The opening passage directly admonishes ministers; what follows explains that warfare is no good, obstructs farming, and damages the harvest, bringing years of famine. Only then does it say that force should be used decisively when there is no alternative. “Strength” must end in defeat; being strong and vigorous is not what the Dao favors, so it should be stopped swiftly.
Scripture, Annotation, and Commentary
Scripture: Those who assist the ruler with the Dao do not use weapons to make the world submit through force; such actions tend to rebound.
Annotation: If ministers can assist the ruler with the Dao, they should use gentleness and win people through De (virtue), not wield the might of weapons to impose their strength upon the world. Why? Weapons are instruments of ill omen, and war is a perilous affair. If you use weapons against others, they will surely strike back. Warfare readily “returns” upon its perpetrators as retaliation or backlash, and its outcome is hard to predict.
Commentary: “With” means to use; “assist” means to support; and “return” means to bring retribution or repayment. A minister should cultivate and nurture through the Dao of Wuwei (non-action), supporting the ruler so that he may be like Yao and Shun. This is what makes a minister a pillar of the state: performing the ancient martial dance with shields and feathered banners on the two tiers of steps, symbolically ending war through virtue, and cultivating civil virtue throughout the four seas. If the ruler holds to the “Great Image”—the image of the Great Dao and supreme virtue—the world will turn toward him, the celestial steps will be at peace, and the seas and lands will be tranquil. But if he displays spears and armor, exhausts the people through warfare, invades other states, and attacks them with weapons, they will surely strike back. Who can determine in advance which side will win?
Meaning: Ministers should put the Dao first in serving their ruler. They should guide him toward clarity and stillness, and should not use military schemes to support the state. When governance through instruction is clear and still, the ruler will naturally practice Wuwei, and peace will be within reach; Yao and Shun are not beyond reach. “Bringing the ruler to perfection” means that ministers assist him through Daoist virtue, enabling his virtue to match that of Yao and Shun. “Thigh” and “arm” are metaphors: ministers who support the ruler are like the limbs of his body.
Plain-Language Interpretation
Ruler and ministers are like one body
“Hand” here is used as a metaphor: the ruler is like the head, and the ministers are like the limbs. Together they are like the parts of a single body. Can the principles governing ruler and ministers be ignored? An ancient text says, “How enlightened the ruler is, how worthy the ministers are!” This is what it means.
“Dancing with shields and feathered plumes”: Yu’s campaign against the Sanmiao
“Dancing with shields and feathered plumes” comes from the Great Yu’s Counsels in the Book of Documents. Because Yu had succeeded in controlling the floods, Shun ordered him to succeed to the throne. At the time, the Sanmiao people repeatedly opposed the royal house, and Shun ordered Yu to lead a campaign against them. Yu assembled the armies of the feudal lords, addressed the troops, and then set out. In name, he was carrying out the ruler’s order to punish those at fault.
Thirty days into the campaign, the Sanmiao still had not submitted. Yi said to Yu, “Only virtue can move Heaven, however far away it may be; sincerity can move the spirits—how much more so the Sanmiao?” Yu therefore withdrew the army, reorganized the troops, and vigorously promoted civil virtue. Between the two flights of steps, he staged dances with shields and feathered plumes. Seventy days later, the Sanmiao came to submit.
The Sanmiao lived west of Lake Dongting and east of Lake Pengli, in a remote frontier region about 2,500 li from the capital. The passage describes an approach in which those who resist are subdued, while those who are not attacked come of their own accord: the Sanmiao were won over through civil virtue and instruction.
- Shield: a military shield.
- Feathered plumes: pheasant feathers, held by the dancers as props.
- Withdrawing and reorganizing the army: pulling back the troops and putting them in order.
- The two flights of steps: the stairways on the guest’s and host’s sides. Yu did not use force; instead, he presented a civil dance between them, signaling that he was setting aside military force in favor of civil virtue. The Sanmiao then came to submit. Come means to arrive and submit.
The Book of Rites says that dance expresses joy. Dancers hold shields and battle-axes, practicing movements of bending and straightening, bowing and rising, while keeping a dignified appearance. They follow the prescribed positions and rhythm so that the lines remain orderly.
- Feathered plumes, flutes, shields, and battle-axes: all are dance implements.
- Bending and straightening, bowing and rising: dance movements.
- Prescribed positions: the dancers’ lines, positions, and tempo.
The Son of Heaven used eight yi—eight people in each line, for a total of sixty-four dancers. Feudal lords used six yi, high officials four, and lesser officials two. Yi means a line, with two people to a line.
“Holding the Great Image” and the Great Steps
“Holding the Great Image” comes from chapter 35 of the Daodejing.
The Great Steps are the three platforms formed by six stars, known as the Six Emblems of the Great Steps. They extend from the Wenchang constellation to Taiwei and govern the positions of the three chief ministers. When ruler and ministers are harmonious and laws are fair, the stars shine brightly and appear in orderly arrangement. If the stars grow bright or dim, narrow or broad, change color, or disappear, these are all ominous signs. If all three stars vanish, it portends a change of dynasty. When all six steps shine evenly and brightly, the realm is at peace.
Win people through civil virtue; do not rely on force
If a high minister tries to assist the ruler through military strategy but cannot win others over through civil virtue, and instead invades and attacks in pursuit of glory, other states will surely retaliate. The outcome of such conflicts is hard to predict, and they can sometimes bring about the aggressor’s own destruction. Resist means to push back or oppose with the hand.
(The general point is that governing should follow the way of Yu’s dance with shields and feathered plumes and the principle of holding the Great Image: use civil virtue to move and transform people rather than relying on military campaigns. Ruler and ministers should also be like one body: the head should be enlightened and the limbs capable. This principle must not be taken lightly.)
The scripture says: “The skilled warrior is not angered.”
The commentary explains: “The skilled warrior is not angered” means that one skilled in the use of troops does not make a show of anger. Anger is a great taboo in military affairs, so the skilled warrior never acts out of rage. “Ascending the city wall without looking around” means that one climbs the wall not to flaunt one’s might or look about in a show of force, but only to drive back the enemy and stop an attack, without using force to assert dominance.
The explanatory note says: “Ascending the city wall” means climbing onto the wall. A “cloud ladder” is a ladder used to besiege a city. One climbs the wall not to show off or intimidate others, but to drive back the enemy and prevent an invasion, without using strength to bully the weak.
The meaning is this: “The skilled warrior is not angered” means that one skilled in warfare does not make a show of anger. Anger is a great taboo in military affairs, so the skilled warrior never employs troops in a fit of rage. Likewise, charging across the wilderness and fighting on the battlefield are meant to drive back the enemy and stop an invasion, not to flaunt one’s military strength.
“Ascending the city wall without looking around” means that one climbs the wall not to flaunt one’s might or look about in a show of force, but only to drive back the enemy and stop an attack, without using force to assert dominance.
“One skilled at victory does not contend” means that one skilled at winning does not engage the enemy in a head-on struggle. During the Spring and Autumn period, when the state of Wu attacked Chu, Sun Wu (Sunzi) said, “Our troops are already exhausted, while the enemy’s morale is high. We cannot engage them in battle.” He then withdrew the army and returned home. This is what it means to win without confronting the enemy directly.
“One skilled at employing people places himself below them” means that one skilled at using people is willing to take a lower position. Laozi says: Although the sage occupies a high position, he does not presume on his rank, and so can endure. Though he occupies a high position, he does not presume on his rank, and so can stand above the people. This is what “places himself below them” means.
As a metaphor for self-cultivation: For those cultivating themselves, desires that disturb body and mind are like the upheaval of war in a state; the dissipation of true Qi is like the exhaustion of the people. When desires are indulged without restraint, Shen and Qi scatter and are lost; once Shen and Qi are lost, illnesses arise one after another. When Shen and Qi are gone and illness has taken hold, what can one say about blessings or prolonging life? This should serve as a profound warning both for the state and for the self.
Dare Not Use Force to Achieve Strength
Interpretation: A ruler should guide the people with Dao and De as the foundation. If Dao and De have not yet spread widely, if kindness and trust have not yet taken root in people’s hearts, or if a foreign enemy invades, then fighting may become unavoidable. But in adapting to events and defeating the enemy, is killing people the point? If victory can be won through strategy, one may hope to bring the killing to an end. The Shuowen Jiezi therefore says, “To stop the spears is martial virtue”: to halt the enemy without killing people may be called stopping the spears. When corpses pile up and blood flows, when blades cross, and victory or defeat leads to vengeance and retaliation, this is no way to command an army. Not daring to use force to achieve strength accords with the Way of Heaven.
An example of killing enemies as “decisive action”: In the spring of the second year of Duke Xuan of Lu, as recorded in the Spring and Autumn Annals, Guisun, a son of the ruler of Zheng, followed Chu’s orders and attacked Song. Hua Yuan of Song led the defense. They fought at Daji, and the Song army was routed. Hua Yuan was captured; the official Yue Ju was taken, along with 460 chariots and 250 prisoners, and 100 heads were cut off. The Song official Kuang Jiao pursued the people of Zheng. When a Zheng soldier fell into a well, Kuang Jiao turned his spear around and pulled him out, but was then captured. A gentleman said, “He failed to observe proper conduct and disobeyed orders; it was only fitting that he be captured.” The Records of Military Affairs says, “Resolve and firmness are put into practice by heeding commands”: propriety should always be kept in mind and made clear in the heart, so that one is ready to heed orders. To kill enemies is called decisiveness; to carry decisiveness through is called firmness. The Changes speaks of “execution”: it warns that acting lightly and then reversing course will bring execution.
Be Decisive, but Do Not Boast; Be Decisive, but Do Not Claim Credit; Be Decisive, but Do Not Become Arrogant
Note: A good minister is resolute in stopping the enemy, with the priority of keeping people safe and bringing the community into harmony. He does not dare seek victory by force. Thus, even if he can halt the enemy, he does not dare become an aggressor. He must take care not to boast of his achievements or claim credit in a way that makes him arrogant and self-satisfied. Arrogance leads to defeat and ruin, so this warning is given in the strongest terms.
Commentary: The art of warfare lies in being decisive about stopping the enemy. If one stops the enemy but then prides oneself on it, one cannot be called truly victorious. So even if one can halt the enemy, one must take care not to boast; boasting leads one to seek credit. Thus, even when decisive in stopping the enemy, one is warned not to claim credit for the deed. Claiming credit leads to arrogance; arrogance leads one to delight in killing, and defeat follows close behind. This is a clear warning. Should it not be taken seriously?
Explanation: “Boast” means to exaggerate; “claim credit” means to praise oneself; “arrogant” means conceited. An example of keeping people safe and bringing the community into harmony: In the twelfth year of Duke Xuan of Lu, according to the Spring and Autumn Annals, the ruler of Chu besieged Zheng and captured it after three months. The ruler of Zheng bared his shoulders and led a sheep to meet him. The ruler of Chu was about to spare him…
(The passage continues with the ruler of Chu sparing the ruler of Zheng and stopping the fighting through the power of De. These examples echo the warning to be decisive without boasting, claiming credit, or becoming arrogant.)
Plain-language summary: “Decisive action” means accomplishing a military aim and stopping the enemy. “Boasting,” “claiming credit,” and “arrogance” mean bragging about achievements, praising oneself, and becoming conceited. Laozi’s approach to warfare emphasizes stopping conflict and keeping people safe. The battle accounts in the Spring and Autumn Annals show that relying on force and delighting in killing lead to defeat.
Those around him said that this could not be accepted. He had taken Zheng but would not pardon them. The king of Chu said, “This lord can humble himself in dealing with others; he will surely win the people’s trust.” So he withdrew thirty li and granted Zheng’s request.
The alliance and the Jin army’s advance
An alliance was then concluded: Pan Yao went to Zheng to make the pact, and Ziliang went to Chu as a hostage. In the sixth month of summer, the state of Jin sent troops to relieve Zheng. Xun Linfu commanded the central army, with Xian Hu as his deputy; Zhao Kuo and Zhao Yingqi served as officers. Shi Hui commanded the upper army, with Xi Ke as his deputy; Gong Shuo and Han Chuan served as officers. Zhao Shuo commanded the lower army, with Luan Shu as his deputy; Xun Shou and Zhao Tong served as officers. Han Jue was the army’s director of discipline.
Crossing the river and the dispute over withdrawal
When the army reached the Yellow River, it heard that Zheng had made peace with Chu. Linfu wanted to withdraw. “There is no longer any point in negotiating with Zheng. Why burden the people by mobilizing them? Chu has only just withdrawn; we are not too late.”
Shi Hui said, “That is right. I have heard that an army should act in response to the enemy. If the other side’s Virtue (De), punishments, government, affairs, institutions, and rites are all sound and orderly, we must not attack rashly. Do not let this make you overconfident. The king of Chu attacked Zheng because he resented its divided loyalties, yet pitied its weakness. When Zheng rebelled, he attacked; when it submitted, he spared it. He has fulfilled both punishment and Virtue: attacking rebellion is punishment, while showing leniency is Virtue. Last year he entered Chen, and this year he entered Zheng, yet the people have not been worn down, the ruler bears no grievance, and government follows established rules.
The organization of the Chu army
The Chu army formed its ranks according to the military method known as “Jing Shi.” Soldiers, farmers, artisans, and merchants each kept to their proper duties, and the chief minister selected sound laws from among Chu’s own practices. On the march, the right side managed the chariots’ crossbars while the left prepared bedding and shelter. In front, they used mugwort as banners and took care not to advance recklessly; the central army held authority, and the rear was strong. Officials acted according to banners and signals. Military and civil affairs were already in order without the need for strict alarms, and the army could follow established institutions.
The governance of Chu’s ruler and ministers
The ruler chose men for office from among his kin when they shared his surname, and from among established ministers when they did not. Recommendations were made without overlooking Virtue, and rewards matched merit. The elderly were treated with respect and kindness; guests were welcomed with generosity. Nobles and commoners each wore the clothing proper to their status. High and low had their established positions, and ranks were clearly ordered; ritual remained in good order. When Virtue is established, punishments enforced, government effective, affairs conducted at the right time, institutions fit to follow, and ritual harmonious, how can such a state be defeated?
Advancing, retreating, and the art of war
To advance when victory is attainable and retreat when the difficulty is clear is sound military practice. Absorbing the weak and attacking the disordered are ordinary principles of warfare. You should put the army in order and act according to the principles of military strategy.
Xian Hu said, “No. Jin became hegemon through the army’s might and the strength of its ministers. Now we have lost the other lords, so we cannot be called powerful. We have an enemy before us and refuse to fight, so we cannot be called formidable. Better to die than let the hegemonic order slip from our hands. Besides, the great army has already set out. To hear that there is an enemy and then retreat is no way for a true man to act. You were appointed commanders, yet you would end by acting like anything but men. That is something only people like you would do; I will not.” So he crossed the Yellow River in his capacity as deputy commander of the central army.
This passage comes from the account of “The Jin Army Relieves Zheng” in the twelfth year of Duke Xuan in the Zuo Tradition. It was quoted in the Guangshengyi commentary on the Dao De Jing to illustrate principles of warfare and government such as “observe signs of weakness before acting” and “recognize difficulty and retreat.” It is not a direct translation of Laozi’s text. Names such as Xun Linfu, Shi Hui, and Xian Hu refer mainly to Jin commanders; Zheng, Chu, and Chen were states of the time.
Xun Shou said, “The commander of this army is likely to meet disaster. The Classic of Changes says that an army on campaign must have discipline; without it, the outcome will be dangerous. Obeying orders is called ‘good’; defying them is called ‘bad.’ What could be worse than having a commander whose orders are ignored? If they meet the enemy, they are certain to be defeated. Xian Hu will die in battle. Even if he somehow makes it back alive, great misfortune will surely follow.”
Han Jue and Lin Fu led the army across the river. King Zhuang of Chu, leading his army north, encamped at Yan. When he heard that the Jin army had crossed the river, the king wanted to withdraw. His favored minister Wu Can urged him to fight, but the chief minister Shu’ao (that is, Sun Shuao) disagreed. Wu Can said, “If the campaign goes well, won’t that prove that Sun Shuao has no strategic sense?” The chief minister then turned his chariot south and turned the banners around to signal a retreat.
Wu Can said to the king, “Jin’s chief ministers are newcomers, so their orders may not be carried out. The deputy commander, Xian Hu, is stubborn and unprincipled, and refuses to obey orders. The two commanders each act on their own, and neither has the people’s support. Whom are the soldiers supposed to follow? Jin is certain to lose this battle. Besides, what good does it do the state for the ruler to retreat while his ministers go out to fight?” The king was displeased by this, and ordered the chief minister to turn the chariot north and encamp at Guan, where they would wait for the Jin army.
The Jin army encamped between Ao and Hao. Huang Shu of Zheng came to the Jin camp and said, “Zheng has sided with Chu because the safety of our state leaves us no choice; we have no divided loyalties. Chu’s army has just won a victory and is overconfident. It has also been on campaign for a long time and is weary, and its defenses are lax. If you attack, Zheng’s army will support you, and Chu will certainly be defeated.”
Xian Hu said, “This is our chance to defeat Chu and bring Zheng to submission. We must accept.” Luan Shu said, “Ever since Chu took Yong, its ruler has summoned the people every day, warning them that life is difficult, danger is approaching, and they must not grow complacent. Every day, the army has also been inspecting its weapons and reinforcing its readiness. People make their living through hard work; with diligence, they will not go without. We cannot say they are overconfident.
“Our late elder Zi Fan once said: ‘A just army has high morale; an unjust army grows weary.’ We lack virtue and have provoked Chu. We are in the wrong, and Chu is in the right; we cannot say that Chu’s army is weary.
“Chu divides its forces into two main divisions, left and right. Each division has a forward unit, which is itself divided into left and right. The right division sends out its chariots first; when it is midday, the left division joins the battle and fights until dusk. The palace guard takes turns in an orderly rotation to prepare for the unexpected, so we cannot say that Chu is unprepared.
“Shishu is a trusted figure in Chu. He went to Zheng to make an alliance, and Ziliang is a worthy minister of Zheng. Chu and Zheng are close. Shishu has come to urge us to fight because he is betting that if we win, Zheng will join us, and if we lose, Zheng will simply watch and wait. He is using us to test his fortunes. Zheng’s words cannot be trusted.”
Zhao Kuo and Zhao Tong said, “We brought the army here only to seek out the enemy and fight. If we can defeat them and gain a vassal state, what are we waiting for? Let’s fight at once.”
Zhuangzi said, “Zhao…”
This passage concerns events involving people like Zhao Tong and Zhao Jiu. In the Daode Zhenjing Guangshengyi, accounts of the Battle of Bi between Jin and Chu, recorded in the Zuo Zhuan and fought around 597 BCE, are often used as examples to explain principles and conduct.
Zhao Shuo said, “Luan Bo is right. If we act on his advice, Jin will surely grow strong.”
The Chu state’s Shaozai went to the front of the Jin army and said, “Our ruler suffered hardship from a young age. We cannot dress up this campaign with fine words. We have come to Zheng to admonish it and restore order. How could we be asking Jin to pardon us? Gentlemen, there is no need to remain here.”
Shi Hui replied, “Long ago, King Ping of Zhou instructed our former ruler, Marquis Wen, to support the royal house of Zhou together with Zheng, and not to abandon the king’s commands. Now Zheng is not obeying those commands, so our ruler has sent his ministers to ask it why. How could we insult your honored men who have come to meet us? We respectfully thank your ruler for the humiliating command he has graciously issued.”
Xian Hu thought this was flattery. Zhao Kuo followed up with a change of wording: “Our envoy misspoke. Our ruler sent his ministers to invite your great army to Zheng. We meant that we would not avoid the enemy; the ministers have nowhere to flee from their mission.”
The king of Chu again sought peace with Jin. The Jin leaders agreed, and the terms had already been written into the covenant.
Chu’s Xu Bo drove the chariot, with Le Bo riding on the right, as they went to meet the Jin army. Wei Yi of Jin went as an envoy to Chu, requested a battle, and then returned. Zhao Zhan asked to enter Chu’s camp and summon them to make an alliance. Both men wanted Jin to be defeated.
Xi Ke said, “Two resentful men have gone there. If we do not prepare, we are sure to lose.”
Xian Hu said, “The people of Zheng urged us to fight, but we did not dare heed them. The people of Chu now seek peace, but we cannot treat them well. The army has received no firm orders; what use is it to make extensive preparations?”
Shi Hui said, “It is right to prepare. If those two provoke Chu, the Chu army may attack on the very day our army is routed. That could happen at any moment. If Chu has no hostile intent, we can remove our defenses and make the alliance.” Xian Hu disagreed.
Shi Hui sent Gong Shuo and Han Chuan with troops to lay seven lines of ambushes beyond Ao. As a result, the upper army was not defeated.
Zhao Yingqi had boats ready by the Yellow River. Pan Dang pursued Wei Yi, while the king of Chu rode in a left-formation chariot after Zhao Zhan. The Jin army sent wagons to block the two men. The people of Chu feared that their king would charge into the Jin army, so they withdrew from their formation.
Sun Shuao said, “Advance! Better for us to close in on the enemy than to let the enemy close in on us.”
The chariots raced forward and the infantry ran at full speed, soon drawing near the Jin army. Xun Linfu, commander of Jin’s central army, was at a loss. He beat the drum in the camp and said, “There will be a reward for whoever crosses the river first.” The central and lower armies fought over the boats. So many fingers were crushed in the crush of bodies that they could be scooped up by the handful.
The Jin army shifted to the right, but the upper army held its ground. Gong Yin Qi of Chu led the right wing in a blocking attack and pursued the lower army; Pan Dang and the Marquis of Tang advanced from the upper army’s side. Xi Ke wanted to wait. Shi Hui said, “The Chu army is at its height. If they concentrate their attack on us, we will be swallowed up. Better to pull back, using the rearguard to cover the retreat. Then we can avoid defeat.”
By dusk, Chu had defeated Jin at Bi, near present-day Zhengzhou in Henan. The surviving Jin troops could no longer hold together as an army. They crossed the river at night, and the sound of shouting continued throughout the night.
This was a major battle in the Spring and Autumn period, when Jin and Chu struggled for supremacy. Jin attacked Zheng, Chu came to its aid, and the two armies fought at Bi. Shi Hui, Xian Hu, Zhao Kuo, Xi Ke, and others were deeply divided over whether to fight or make peace, and how to prepare for battle. Sun Shuao urged an active advance, while confusion in Jin’s command led its troops to trample one another as they crossed the river. The Guangshengyi draws on this account to discuss the principles of conduct and warfare through episodes about preparedness, the dispute between peace and war, and retreat without collapse; it is not simply recounting history.
A Plain-Language Interpretation
Pan Dang, a high official of the state of Chu, said, “Why does Your Majesty not build a monument to the army, gather up the bones of the Jin dead, and pile them into a jingguan—a high earthen mound containing the bones of defeated enemies, built to punish them and boast of military success?”
I have heard that when an enemy is defeated, the victory should be shown to later generations so that they do not forget the achievements of arms. King Zhuang of Chu said, “This is not something you understand. The ancients said that the character wen (civil) means ‘to stop weapons,’ and that is what makes wu (martial). After King Wu conquered Shang, he composed a hymn saying that he put away the shields and spears and stored the bows and arrows. He sought virtue and spread it throughout the realm, so that the royal undertaking would be secure. He also composed the Wu ode. Its final stanza says, ‘You have brought your achievement to its completion’; its third stanza says, ‘Spread this forth, reflecting again and again; our march seeks only peace’; and its sixth says, ‘Bring peace to the myriad states, and let abundant harvests come year after year.’ Martial excellence means stopping violence, putting away weapons, preserving the great undertaking, bringing achievement to a secure conclusion, calming the people, bringing harmony among all, and ensuring abundance. These are the principles we should teach later generations not to forget.
“Now I have left the dead of both states exposed in the open. That is already cruel enough. To draw up the army and intimidate the other lords would mean that the weapons had still not been put away. If I act cruelly and keep the army in the field, how can I preserve the great undertaking? Jin still exists, and the outcome of our achievement is unsettled. There are many things that run counter to the people’s wishes; how can the people be at peace? Without virtue, if I simply throw my weight around, why should the other lords live in harmony? If I seek gain from another’s hardship and take pride in another’s turmoil, how can there be abundance? Martial excellence has seven virtues, and I have none of them. What could I show to later generations? Better to build a temple for our former ruler and mark the completion of this affair. This military success is not my achievement.
“In ancient times, enlightened rulers punished states that had shown no respect for proper order. They took only the chief offenders—the ‘great fish’ and ‘whale,’ figures for the ringleaders—and made them a public example. Only then were jingguan built, to punish excess and wickedness. Now, however, the guilty have nowhere to be found, while the people have all died in loyal service to their states. How could we use their bones to build a jingguan?” So he performed a sacrifice by the Yellow River, built a temple for the former ruler, marked the completion of the affair, and led the army home.
During this campaign, Shi Zhi of Zheng fled to Chu. He intended to borrow Chu’s troops to divide up Zheng and install Prince Yuchen as ruler. On the xinwei day, Zheng killed Shi Zhi and Yuchen. A gentleman said, “Do not find comfort in those who create disorder”—that is precisely what this episode shows.
Moreover, when one wins through strategy and the enemy dares not invade again, one has merely stopped killing and relieved danger; that counts as doing good. But if one boasts of one’s strengths and flaunts one’s achievements, enjoying fame and honor will surely make one arrogant. Arrogance leads to bullying others, and bullying breeds resentment. Disaster and defeat can then be expected, and one’s fame and achievements will be hard to preserve. Han Xin was captured at Yunmeng, and Bai Qi was forced to take his own life at Duyou. Both became arrogant by boasting of their accomplishments and brought disaster upon themselves through that arrogance. This is a lesson we must heed.
“Achieve the result, but do not force the issue” means that once the outcome has been achieved, one should not stubbornly press one’s advantage. This is what it means to “achieve the result without becoming forceful.”
Note: The enemy had invaded earlier, and the fighting had to be brought to an end, so military force was used to stop it. In this case, the “result” lay in meeting the enemy and defending against the invasion; it did not mean using force to assert dominance and claim victory.
Broad Commentary on the True Meaning of the Dao De Jing: A Plain-Language Interpretation
Commentary on “Act decisively only when there is no choice” and “Act decisively without forcefulness”
“Acting decisively to stop an enemy” does not mean taking pleasure in victory or bullying others. It means that the enemy has invaded first and circumstances leave no choice. That is why the scripture says, “Act decisively only when there is no choice, and then stop.” Using troops to resist an enemy is not about seeking victory. If one acts this way, one does not rely on force even when victorious. That is why the scripture says, “Act decisively without forcefulness.”
Scripture: Things that become strong grow old. This is called being contrary to the Dao; what is contrary to the Dao comes to an early end.
Note: Things that rely on their strength are like armies that rely on their might. When things grow excessively strong, they decline; when armies become excessively powerful, they are defeated and destroyed. This is called being contrary to the Dao. One should stop in time and avoid this.
Commentary: In general, when things reach the height of their strength, they grow old; when armies reach the height of their power, they are defeated and destroyed. Thus an army relying on its might is like a thing relying on its strength: relying on strength only hastens decline, while an army that relies on might cannot secure “victory in the proper way.” Both are called contrary to the Dao. Worthy ministers and wise rulers understand that what is contrary to the Dao must be stopped in time and not pursued. That is why the scripture says, “What is contrary to the Dao comes to an early end.” “End” here means to stop.
Meaning: An army that relies on its might is bound to suffer defeat and destruction. Fu Jian’s campaign at Shouchun, Li Mi’s troops at Luokou, Wang Xun’s forces at Kunyang, and the Sui Emperor Yang’s expedition against Liaodong were all said to number in the hundreds of thousands. Their forces were indeed large, but because they acted contrary to the Dao and relied on their might, defeat and destruction followed in an instant. This is what it means for an army to be powerful. The same is true of the saying, “Things that become strong grow old”: using strength brings harm. In the past, Qin conquered the Six States and unified the Nine Provinces. Its power and army were formidable, and it had no rival under Heaven, yet it collapsed like a landslide in no time. Fusu died at the Great Wall, and Ziying surrendered at Zhidao. Even if one soars like a hawk and gazes like a tiger, what is there to boast of? The sages therefore judged that this was no foundation for establishing the Dao, and that it was better to stop in time.
The same principle applies to cultivating oneself. One should restore one’s nature when confronted with excessive desires, just as one would restrain oneself in the use of troops. If one can master desires and relinquish attachments, cleanse the spirit and clear the mind, put a stop to delusions, and hold fast to emptiness and mystery, then one will naturally avoid the criticism of becoming excessively strong. This may be called the key to preserving great harmony.
Military thinkers also speak of “growing old.” The Spring and Autumn Annals says, “An army whose cause is unjust grows old”: an army sent out without just cause, or one whose cause is weaker than its opponent’s, is also called “old.” It also says, “An army whose cause is just is strong; one whose cause is unjust grows old.”
Brief explanations of proper names:
- Fu Jian’s campaign at Shouchun: During the Eastern Jin, Fu Jian of Former Qin led an army south and was defeated by the Eastern Jin in the area of Shouchun, in present-day Shouxian County, Anhui.
- Li Mi’s troops at Luokou: Li Mi’s military operations at Luokou, near present-day Gongyi, Henan, during the transition from the Sui to the Tang.
- Wang Xun’s forces at Kunyang: At the end of the Western Han, Wang Mang’s generals Wang Xun and Wang Yi led a large army against Kunyang and were defeated by Liu Xiu and others, who were greatly outnumbered.
- Fusu and Ziying: Fusu, the eldest son of Qin Shi Huang, was ordered to die; near the end of the Qin, Ziying surrendered to Liu Bang, and the Qin dynasty fell.
- “Act decisively only when there is no choice” and “Act decisively without forcefulness”: These phrases come from the military chapter of the Dao De Jing. In essence, they mean that after winning a battle one should know when to stop, act only when there is no choice, and avoid forcefulness.
- “Things that become strong grow old. This is called being contrary to the Dao; what is contrary to the Dao comes to an early end”: Things decline when they become excessively strong; this is contrary to the Dao, and what is contrary to the Dao should be stopped early.
Source text: Kanripo 漢籍リポジトリ(KR5c0114); Licence: CC BY-SA 4.0 · Report an error / feedback