《墨子》Vol. 10

This passage comes from the "Canon I" (Jing Shang) chapter of the Mozi, presenting core concepts and logical thought of the Mohist school. Here's the modern interpretation:

The Mohists held that all phenomena arise from causes ("gu"), and their continued existence requires duration ("zhi yi jiu"). Wholes consist of parts ("ti fen yu jian"), while cognitive faculty ("zhi cai") forms the basis for acquiring knowledge. They employed geometric concepts to explain equality ("ping tong gao" - level surfaces share equal height) and length comparison ("tong chang yi fou xiang jin" - equal lengths completely coincide when measured).

In ethics: Benevolence entails mutual care ("ren ti ai"), righteousness must align with benefit ("yi li"), integrity requires verification ("zhi can"), and propriety manifests respect ("li jing"). Circles maintain equal radii from center to edge ("yuan yi zhong tong chang"), while squares possess four right angles ("fang zhu yu si huan").

Regarding cognition: Truth brings honor ("shi rong"), while loyalty and filial piety demand action ("zhong yi wei li er qiang di"). The endpoint constitutes the most fundamental existence ("duan ti zhi wu xu er zui qian zhe"). Speech should correspond to reality ("xin yan he yu yi"), and dreams are illusions during sleep ("meng wo er yi wei ran").

On governance: Rewards and punishments must be clear - commend merit ("shang shang bao xia zhi gong"), punish offenses ("fa shang bao xia zhi zhui"). Laws should follow popular will ("fa suo ruo er ran"), while administration requires unified standards ("jun chen meng tong yue"). Benefit distribution must be equitable ("yu fou quan li"), avoiding harm ("e fou quan hai").

Finally, sensory cognition: Ears serve hearing ("wen er zhi cong"), while knowledge requires practical verification ("zhi jian shuo qin ming shi he wei yan chu ju"). These propositions demonstrate the Mohists' practical orientation and rigorous logical philosophy.

This passage is from Mozi: Canon II, discussing issues of logical reasoning and epistemology. The original text succinctly presents a series of philosophical propositions, which I will explain one by one:

Regarding the discussion of measurement: Sometimes when things develop to their extreme, even a foot's distance cannot contain them (describing the critical state of transformation). One must follow known information to deduce its inherent meaning, which requires mindful contemplation.

Observation of things must be comprehensive, without exception. The sharpness of speech lies in seizing the opportune moment and grasping the key points to speak. By analyzing the intent behind words, one can discern a person's capacity for judgment. Change often has subtle signs, and commitments do not necessarily remain constant.

In practical application, one must discard biases and eliminate the unnecessary. If one becomes attached to flowery language and clever adaptations, it is better to return to the source. Increase convenience and reduce complexity, just as farming must follow the agricultural seasons. When principles are the same, observe their commonality; when principles differ, observe their respective applications. Action sometimes requires compliance, while cessation serves to distinguish different truths.

The text also discusses numerous logical propositions:

• The standard for classification lies in the essential identity of things.
• The mutual overcoming of the Five Phases (Metal, Wood, Water, Fire, Earth) is not fixed in victory or defeat—the key lies in the specific context.
• A single thing can have multiple names (e.g., "team of four horses" and "horse" refer to the same entity).
• Understanding things cannot rely on partial views; comprehensive observation is necessary.
• Knowledge acquisition does not depend solely on sensory perception (the five paths) but also requires long-term accumulation.
• Judging truth and falsehood must be based on facts themselves, not appearances.

It particularly mentions the principle of mirror imaging: When standing before a mirror, the reflection is inverted; a large object can produce a small reflection, depending on the distance and angle between the object and the mirror. This demonstrates the Mohists' scientific observations in optics.

Finally, it uses the example of "dog" and "canine" to illustrate conceptual overlap: Killing a dog is killing a canine because they are essentially the same. This reflects the Mohists' profound thinking on conceptual classification and logical identity.

This passage appears to be a fragment from the Mozi concerning logical debate, though the extant text shows significant disorder. Based on the characteristics of Mohist logic ("Mohist Dialectics"), I will attempt to reconstruct its core ideas:

When discussing epistemology and logic, Mozi proposed that the attributes of things (such as "hardness and whiteness") do not depend on singular sensory perceptions. For example, a stone possesses both hardness (tactile) and whiteness (visual) simultaneously—one cannot deny its hardness simply because only its whiteness is seen.

Regarding change in phenomena, Mozi held that movement ("yu," referring to space) and time ("jiu") are interdependent. He illustrated this with the observation of shadows ("jing"), which helps understand the laws of motion—the lengthening or shortening of a shadow depends on the distance between the object and the light source ("fou," a pottery vessel used here as a measuring tool).

In logical judgment, Mozi emphasized distinguishing between "sameness" and "difference." For instance, while oxen and horses are both animals ("jian"), this does not mean their distinctions can be conflated ("non-ox and permissible sameness"). Correct reasoning ("the intent of inference") must be grounded in empirical evidence, as subjective assumptions ("wild assertions") cannot truly discern the differences between things.

Concerning the nature of debate, Mozi believed truth is not determined by victory in argument ("debate has no inevitable victor") but by correspondence with reality ("explanation lies in actuality"). He used commercial transactions ("trade") as an example: a fair price ("appropriateness") requires both buyer and seller to have clear knowledge of the goods ("both parties understand"). Concealing information leads to injustice.

Finally, the text touches on the limits of knowledge acquisition: human understanding will always have known and unknown aspects ("there is the known and there is the unknown"), yet acknowledging ignorance ("critics" representing the spirit of critique) is precisely the beginning of inquiry. Just as in counting numbers, recognizing that "two" is followed by "three"—this openness is the very foundation of scholarship ("the benefit of learning").

This passage is from the "Canons and Explanations I" chapter of Mozi, primarily discussing logical reasoning and the relationship between names and realities. Mozi (founder of the Mohist school) introduces the logical concepts of "minor cause" (xiao gu) and "major cause" (da gu).

A "minor cause" refers to a partial condition for an event's occurrence—its presence doesn't necessarily lead to the outcome, but its absence definitely prevents the outcome. It's like vision requiring eyes as the "foundational condition" (duan). A "major cause," however, denotes a sufficient and necessary condition where its presence inevitably produces the result, just as seeing requires both eyes and an object to "form perception" (cheng jian).

The text further examines three levels of cognition: First is "knowing faculty" (zhi cai), the basic capacity for perception. Second is "deliberation" (lü), using known information to explore the unknown, though not always reaching conclusions. Third is "inference" (shu), the ability to analyze phenomena and draw definitive conclusions from existing knowledge.

Regarding moral conduct, Mozi proposes: Genuine humaneness (ren) isn't about exploiting others (unlike loving horses for their utility). Righteousness (yi) takes universal benefit as its goal. Ritual propriety (li) demands respect regardless of social status. Loyalty and trustworthiness (zhong xin) reside not in eloquent words but concrete actions. Courage (yong) means daring to do what's right rather than showing off strength. Integrity (lian) involves clear discernment of proper conduct.

Finally, it discusses benefit-harm evaluation: Joy upon obtaining something signifies benefit; aversion indicates harm. Such judgments should be based on objective facts rather than subjective preferences. The entire passage exemplifies the Mohist emphasis on practical logic and objective reasoning.

(Note: While this text comes from Mozi rather than Daoist literature, the translation follows the requested academic style with key philosophical terms rendered consistently. For Daoist-specific passages, the provided glossary would be applied accordingly.)

This passage originates from the Mohist Canons section of the Mozi, primarily discussing philosophical issues concerning the relationship between names and realities, judgments of right and wrong, and spatial concepts. Given the extensive use of interchangeable characters and abbreviated expressions in the original text, we reconstruct its logical framework in modern language:

Regarding the criteria for judging right and wrong: Governance should be based on practical outcomes. When people evaluate matters concerning north and south directions, they must examine actual behaviors. Praise or criticism should be grounded in facts, using language to record distinctions and provide concrete examples. Speech is a tool for collective expression, as clear as drawing lines with a brush. Statements should be as definitive as stones hitting the ground—whether predicting "what will happen" or describing "what has happened," they must be as unshakable as stones.

Rulers administer through distinctions (名分), where merit is not determined by timing, just as wearing clothes isn't season-dependent. The principles of rewards and punishments are: harmless actions outside prohibited areas should not be punished. Reporting merits should follow bottom-up procedures, while verifying offenses also requires bottom-up confirmation. For example, when two people observe the same pillar, the duration of serving a ruler, or spatial orientations like past/present and east/west/north/south—the boundary between "finite" (有穷) and "infinite" (无穷): the finite can be measured, while the infinite transcends measurement.

The relationship between motion and stillness: At the onset of change, it may persist long or vanish instantly. Like a frog transforming into a quail (ancient belief in biological transmutation), this represents a complete qualitative change. Ritual systems function like balances—sometimes reducing parts preserves the whole. The populace resembles flowing goods in a warehouse, or door pivots in perpetual rotation. "Wu jiu bu zhi" (无久不止) asserts "an ox is not a horse," while "you jiu bu zhi" (有久不止) parallels the paradox "a white horse is not a horse" (highlighting conceptual precision).

Discussions on space and logic: Crossing a bridge requires specifying which abutment. Brother relationships may align or conflict—judgments of right/wrong must be unambiguous. Comparing lengths relies on internal standards. Circles are drawn with compasses, squares with rulers. The difference between two feet and one foot lies in their incomparability if one end is removed. The concept of "jia" (夹): a ruler's front lies beyond a region yet not within its boundary. "Ji" (及) isn't simple connection—it's like the void between two planks.

Analysis of material properties: When hardness and whiteness (坚白) combine in stone, each retains its distinct nature—coexisting attributes don't negate each other. Connecting rulers end-to-end doesn't guarantee perfect alignment, just as "hardness/whiteness" can be perceived simultaneously yet remain fundamentally separate. Sequence requires endpoints; even dimensionless planes can conceptualize thickness (abstract spatial dimensions).

Note: The "hardness/whiteness" (坚白) reference invokes Gongsun Long's paradox on whether object properties exist independently. "Dimensionless" (无厚) reflects the School of Names' philosophical concept about spatial dimensionality. These propositions demonstrate the Mohists' sophisticated reasoning in logic and epistemology.

This passage originates from Mozi (the Mozi Jing), primarily discussing the relationship between names and realities (the correspondence between designations and essences) and issues of cognitive judgment. Through everyday examples, the text illustrates that when people hold differing judgments about things, it often stems from failing to accurately grasp the essence of the matter.

For instance, in the debate about an "ox": some say it is an ox, while others claim it is not—such disputes arise from inconsistent criteria for judgment. It is like eating preserved meat without knowing whether it has spoiled; proceeding despite recognizing potential harm constitutes a failure of reason. Rational judgment ought to weigh both benefits and risks comprehensively, not neglecting dangers due to desire.

The text further distinguishes several modes of cognition: knowledge acquired through others' accounts is "heard knowledge" (wenzhi), firsthand observation yields "personal knowledge" (qinzhi), and reasoning based on present circumstances constitutes "embodied knowledge" (tizhi). Names must align with realities ("the coupling of names and realities," ming shi ouhe), just as naming a horse must correspond to the category of equine animals, or calling a dog "hound" (quan) derives from its defining traits.

Finally, it addresses the dialectical relationship between "sameness and difference" (tong yi): identical things may bear different names ("reiterated sameness," zhong tong), distinct things may belong to the same whole ("embodied sameness," ti tong), coexistence in one space is "shared sameness" (he tong), and shared features constitute "categorical sameness" (lei tong). Conversely, different things necessarily have distinctions, and unrelated entities do not belong to the same category. These discussions reflect the Mohist school's rigorous approach to conceptual classification and cognitive methodology in logic.

This passage originates from Mozi·Jingshuo Xia, primarily discussing issues of logical reasoning and the relationship between names and realities. Through numerous comparative examples, it expounds the view that judging things requires examining different aspects.

The text enumerates many examples of unity of opposites: such as fortune and misfortune, existence and non-existence, abundance and scarcity, life and death, length and brevity, black and white, center and periphery, illustrating how things often possess dual aspects. When mentioning the "Five Affirmations" (five judgment criteria), it points out that even sages can make mistakes—the key lies in determining right and wrong through multiple verifications. Just as some people are black-skinned while others are not, one shouldn't assume everyone is black upon seeing black people; some are loved while others aren't, so the standards of love require specific analysis.

The section on logical reasoning emphasizes that one shouldn't assume all similar things are identical just because they share certain characteristics (like four-legged beasts). Examples demonstrate that while "white horses have much whiteness," "viewing horses doesn't mean viewing abundance," highlighting the distinction between names and substance. Finally, when discussing concepts like "hardness and whiteness," it explains that although different attributes (such as hardness and whiteness) coexist in the same object, they can be examined separately in cognition.

Overall, this passage showcases the Mohist school's emphasis on empirical verification and logical analysis. Through numerous everyday examples, it demonstrates that understanding things requires multi-perspective examination to avoid overgeneralization.

This passage from the Mozi primarily discusses the relativity of cognition and phenomena, employing numerous analogies to illustrate how human judgment is often constrained by subjective perspectives. Here is a modern interpretation of its core content:

On the Relativity of Perception:

The functions of ears and eyes differ, just as one cannot determine whether wood or the night is "longer," or whether wisdom or grain is "more important." Among nobility, familial bonds, commerce, and virtue (De), which is most valuable? Is the elk or the crane (Huo) taller? In truth, it depends on the observer's standpoint—when a crane stands in a marsh, it may appear shorter than an elk.

Essence and Illusion of Phenomena:

The metaphor of "naming a dog Huo" demonstrates that labels are merely human constructs. Calling an animal "Huo" doesn't alter its inherent nature. People are often deceived by appearances: lifting a tuft of grass feels light, yet setting it down makes it seem heavy. This isn’t due to any intrinsic change in the object but stems from perceptual differences.

Limitations of Cognition:

The example of "counting oxen and horses" reveals the subjectivity of categorization—viewed as a collective, they are one; counted separately, they become two. Spatial orientation further illustrates the eternality of "Yu" (space): no matter how north and south shift, space itself remains constant. Yao’s governance was exemplary in antiquity, yet applied today, it might prove ineffective.

Philosophical Reflections on Optical Phenomena:

Detailed descriptions of light and shadow relationships explain principles like shadow formation: when feet block light from below, shadows appear above; when heads obstruct light from above, shadows manifest below. The laws of mirror imaging (where closer objects produce larger reflections, and distant ones smaller) extend to a method for discerning truth—only by finding the "centered and upright" (中正) vantage point can one achieve accurate judgment.

These arguments exemplify the Mohist emphasis on empirical logic, stressing the need to distinguish objective reality from subjective perception and advocating multi-perspective observation to approach the essence of things.

(Note: While this text originates from the Mohist tradition, its methodological rigor resonates with Daoist epistemological inquiries, particularly in distinguishing relative perception from absolute truth—a theme echoed in later Daoist works like the Zhuangzi and Huainanzi.)

This passage from the Mozi discusses the principles of levers and mechanical equilibrium, primarily focusing on methods of adjusting the balance of heavy objects through counterweights and rope tension.

When observing distant objects, their images appear smaller; nearby objects appear larger—a principle consistent with modern optics. For levers to maintain proper balance: when the fulcrum is closer to the heavy object, the force arm is shorter but can lift greater weight; when the fulcrum is farther from the heavy object, the force arm lengthens but lifting capacity diminishes.

The text meticulously describes various equilibrium states: When adding weight to one end of a balance beam (heng), counterweights (quan) must be placed on the opposite end to maintain balance. If the beam itself is uneven, the shorter side requires additional weight while the longer side needs reduction. When pulling heavy objects with ropes, tautness indicates equal weight distribution. When lifting, reducing weight at the top causes the bottom to rise, and vice versa.

Illustrative examples include: the principle behind awl penetration, the balance of two-wheeled carts (chuanche), and how pulling a cart axle with ropes resembles drawing a crossbeam from a boat. A notable experiment involves stones and silk threads: place a square stone one foot above the ground, support it with another stone below, and suspend a silk thread above—adjust until the stone barely resists falling. If the thread snaps, equilibrium breaks.

Finally, it employs economic metaphors: when currency (dao) depreciates, grain (di) appears expensive; when currency appreciates, grain seems cheap. Just as during wartime, people sell houses or marry off daughters without haggling over prices, seeking only swift transactions. This mirrors the mechanical principle that "when equilibrium breaks, states inevitably change."

These contents reveal the Mohists' profound understanding of mechanical principles during the pre-Qin period, using everyday tools and natural phenomena to explain the laws of balance and motion.

This passage examines the debate between names and realities (the relationship between concepts and substance) and issues of cognitive judgment. Through a series of metaphors, it illustrates that when people use different names for the same thing (such as calling a dog "quan"), its essence remains unchanged; whereas applying the same name to different things (such as calling an ox "horse") creates confusion.

Regarding cognition, the text points out that genuine debate should distinguish right from wrong, just as a stone possesses both hardness (jian) and whiteness (bai) as attributes while remaining fundamentally the same object. To acknowledge only the attributes one proposes while denying others pointed out by someone else constitutes partial understanding. For example, if asked "Do you know fine horses?" and one answers "no" without even inquiring what kind of horse is meant, such a response is problematic.

The text also mentions the generative and restrictive relationships among the Five Phases (Wuxing: Water, Earth, Fire, Metal, Wood) — how fire can melt metal, yet excessive metal can smother flames; how burning wood turns to charcoal, yet charcoal can also fuel fire. The author advocates objectively recognizing the nature of things without letting personal preferences cloud judgment, as this prevents harm to life or diminishment of longevity. Finally, it references "shao lian" (possibly denoting an attitude of modest simplicity in conduct) as the fundamental method for resolving problems.

This passage explores the standards of human cognition and judgment, using everyday examples to illustrate the inherent limitations in our understanding.

The relationship between love and benefit resembles drinking wine—moderate consumption brings benefits, while excess causes harm. The truly wise approach is to eliminate superfluity and maintain perfect balance. Just as overeating harms the stomach while moderate eating preserves health, proper restraint is essential.

Understanding things cannot rely solely on visual perception. Though fire is inherently hot, the eyes only perceive its brightness without sensing the heat. People often conflate what they know with what they don't—when questioned, they might say "I know this but not that," yet such distinctions are fundamentally flawed.

Several vivid examples demonstrate this: a hair withstands force when evenly distributed but snaps under uneven pressure; people view sage-emperor Yao differently—some focus on reputation, others on actual deeds; just as "dog" and "hound" name the same animal differently. These show how identical things can be perceived diversely.

A final architectural metaphor: five pillars supporting a structure can form twelve distinct combinations—this transcends simple arithmetic. Like finding a stick's midpoint by measuring from either end, we ultimately locate the true center. This reveals that understanding requires grasping essence beyond surface appearances.

This passage examines the relationship between names and actualities (the correspondence between labels and essential nature) and issues of logical classification. Using the examples of oxen and horses, it illustrates that while oxen have teeth and horses have tails, one cannot conclude that an ox is not a horse based solely on these characteristics. Similarly, the fact that oxen have horns while horses don't cannot alone prove they belong to different categories. Such partial judgments are rash.

The author clarifies that an ox is an ox and a horse is a horse, but the combined term "ox-horse" refers to neither. In the process of "rectifying names" (establishing proper correspondence between terms and realities), names should precisely match their referents: the name "ox" applies only to oxen, "horse" only to horses. Confusing names with actualities leads to logical disorder.

The discussion then turns to epistemology: A person with limited knowledge who doesn't study is like someone singing without response; a wise person who doesn't teach others resembles having responders without a lead singer—in both cases, knowledge cannot be transmitted. Other examples follow: forcibly taking someone's clothes constitutes a crime, but offenses have varying degrees of severity; inviting someone to drink demonstrates friendship, yet the depth of feeling remains difficult for outsiders to assess.

Finally, it emphasizes methodological principles: One should use the known to verify the unknown, not employ the unknown to doubt the established. Like using a ruler to measure length, we must apply definite standards to evaluate uncertain matters. The entire passage embodies the Mohist school's characteristic emphasis on logical analysis and empirical verification.

This passage examines the rationality of cognition and discourse, with its core argument being that judgments of right and wrong should not be based on the quantity of statements, but on their conformity with the Dao (the Way).

On the limits of cognition: Human understanding has boundaries and cannot exhaust infinite phenomena. Just as one could traverse the southern regions (symbolizing boundless space) if they were finite, but could never complete the journey if they were infinite, we similarly cannot determine whether humans can fully comprehend all things or whether "perfect love" can be achieved. The crucial insight is this: recognizing the limitations of cognition helps us understand how difficult complete understanding truly is; whereas assuming cognition has no boundaries leads one into predicaments.

On humaneness (ren) and righteousness (yi): Humaneness is internal care, while righteousness concerns external benefit. Loving and being loved, benefiting and being benefited are distinct matters that should not be confused. Equating "love" with "what is benefited" is as absurd as claiming the left eye can see what the right eye perceives. Such erroneous cognition resembles commenting ignorantly on the value of learning while fundamentally misunderstanding it—this essentially perpetuates fallacious notions.

On the validity of criticism: Assessing the correctness of statements doesn't depend on their quantity. Criticism directed at truly flawed arguments remains valid regardless of frequency, while unfounded criticism is wrong even if minimal. Just as one shouldn't determine right and wrong by length, neither should criticism's validity be judged by its volume. The true standard should follow the Daoist principle exemplified by mountains and marshes—though positioned lowly, they align with heavenly patterns. The measure should be goodness itself, not superficial positions of high or low. These writings precisely elucidate this principle.

This passage comes from the tenth chapter of Mozi, discussing the dialectical relationship between "wen" (ritual and music systems) and "bu wen" (non-ritual systems).

The original meaning is: If one does not follow "shi" (proper ritual standards), then it constitutes "bu wen" (non-conformity with ritual). If something is "bu wen," then even if it superficially appears to be "shi" (seemingly correct), it remains fundamentally "bu wen." Nowadays, some promote "bu wen" as if it were "shi," while treating genuine "shi" as mere formal "wen"—thus confusing the distinction between "wen" and "bu wen."

Here, Mozi criticizes the chaotic state of ritual norms in his time: people were promoting practices that violated ritual propriety as if they were proper rites, while reducing authentic ritual standards to superficial formalities. This blurred the line between true ritual substance and improper practices. The Mohist school advocated "universal love" (jian ai) and "elevating unity" (shang tong), opposing hypocritical ritual formalism. This passage exemplifies their critique of the distortion of social ritual systems.

(Note: Since this text is Confucian/legalist rather than Daoist, I've maintained the original philosophical terminology without applying Daoist glossary terms. The translation preserves Mozi's critique of ritual hypocrisy while clarifying the conceptual interplay between "wen," "bu wen," and "shi.")