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《墨子》Vol. 11

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Taiqing 太清部 Vol. 11 / 15 5,464 characters

About this page. The original text of 《墨子》 Vol. 11 (Taiqing 太清部, 15 volumes) is shown in Classical Chinese as transmitted in the Kanripo (Kyoto University) edition. An English interpretation of the 11 passages on this page accompanies it: select a passage or press “Interpretation” to show it. All texts in English

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Source textInterpretation

墨子卷之十一沛十    大取第四十四 天之愛人也薄於聖人之愛人也其利人也 厚於聖人之利人也大人之愛小人也薄於 小人之愛大人也其利小人也厚於小人之 利大人也以臧爲其親也而愛之非愛其親 也以臧爲其親也而利之非利其親也以樂 爲利其子而爲其子欲之愛其子也以樂爲 利其子而爲其子求之非利其子也於所體 之中而權輕重之謂權權非爲是也非非爲 非也權正也斷指以存□利之中取大害之 中取小也害之中取小也非取害也取利也 其所取者人之所執也遇盗人而斷指以免 身利也其遇盗人害也斷指與斷腕利於天 下相若無擇也死生利若一無擇也殺一人 以存天下非殺一人以利天下也殺已以存 天下是殺已以利天下於事爲之中而權輕 重之謂求求爲之非也害之中取小求爲義 非爲義也爲暴人語天之爲是也而性爲暴 人歌天之爲非也諸陳執既有所爲而我爲 之陳執執之所爲因吾所爲也若陳執未有 所爲而我爲之陳執陳執因吾所爲也暴人 爲我爲天之以人非爲是也而性不可正而 正之利之中取大非不得已也害之中取小 不得已也所未有而取焉是利之中取大也 於所既有而棄焉是害之中取小也義可厚 厚之義可薄薄之謂倫列德行君上老長親
Interpretation

This passage comes from the "Great Taking" chapter of Mozi, primarily discussing the ethical principle of "weighing benefits and harms."

Heaven's care for humans may not be as profound as that of sages, yet it bestows greater benefits upon people. Those in high positions may not love common people as deeply as common people revere them, yet they provide more substantial advantages. If one loves a servant merely because they attend to one's parents, this love is not truly for the servant themselves; if one rewards a servant solely for serving one's parents, the benefit is not genuinely for the servant. It is like forcing a child to learn music under the pretext that it is beneficial—this is not truly for the child's sake.

Assessing the relative importance in specific matters is called "quan" (weighing). Weighing is not a simple judgment of right or wrong but requires impartial handling. For instance, severing a finger to save a life is choosing the lesser of two harms. Cutting off a finger to survive when confronted by a robber is wise, even though encountering the robber is itself a misfortune. If severing a finger or a wrist equally benefits the world, there is no difference between them; if life and death equally benefit the world, there is no need to choose. Killing one person to save the world does not equate to benefiting the world by killing one; sacrificing oneself to save the world is truly acting for the world's benefit.

Weighing priorities in action is called "qiu" (decision-making). Forcing oneself to do what should not be done or choosing the lesser harm in a dilemma does not constitute true righteousness. Praising a tyrant by claiming it is the will of Heaven is incorrect. When I follow the practices of predecessors, my actions are influenced by them; when I pioneer what predecessors have not done, later generations will emulate me. A tyrant claiming to represent Heaven's will is wrong, for those with unrighteous natures cannot truly embody justice.

Striving for the greatest benefit among advantages is not compulsion; choosing the lesser harm among dangers is necessity. Acquiring benefits one does not yet possess is "taking the greater advantage"; abandoning harms one already has is "avoiding the lesser harm." Righteousness should be emphasized where it ought to be and downplayed where appropriate—this is the order of ethical principles. Virtue (De), rulers, elders, and family should all be treated according to this principle.

戚此皆所厚也爲長厚不爲幼薄親厚厚親 薄薄親至薄不至義厚親不稱行而顧行爲 天下厚禹爲禹也爲天下厚愛禹乃爲禹之 人愛也厚禹之加於天下而厚禹不加於天 下若惡盗之爲加於天下而惡盗不加於天 下愛人不外已已在所愛之中已在所愛愛 加於已倫列之愛已愛人也聖人惡疾病不 惡危難正體不動欲人之利也非惡人之害 也聖人不爲其室臧之故在於臧聖人不得 爲子之事聖人之法死亡親爲天下也厚親 分也以死亡之體渴興利有厚薄而毋倫列 之興利爲已語經語經也非白馬焉執駒焉 說求之舞說非也漁大之舞大非也三物必 具然後足以生臧之愛已非爲愛已之人也 厚不外已愛無厚薄舉已非賢也義利不義 害志功爲辯有有於秦馬有有於馬也智來 者之馬也愛衆衆世與愛寡世相若兼愛之 有相若愛尚世與愛後世一若今之世人也 鬼非人也兄之鬼兄也天下之利驩聖人有 愛而無利視日之言也乃客之言也天下無 人子墨子之言也猶在不得已而欲之非欲 之非欲之也非殺臧也專殺盗非殺盗也凡 學愛人小圜之圜與大圜之圜同方至尺之 不至也與不至鍾之至不異其不至同者遠 近之謂也是璜也是玉也意楹非意木也意 是楹之木也意指之人也非意人也意獲也
Interpretation

This passage from Mozi expounds the core concept of "universal love" (jian'ai). He argues that genuine love should be impartial and undifferentiated—one should love others as one loves oneself.

The text points out that people often show special favor to those close to them while treating distant acquaintances with indifference, a practice Mozi deems incorrect. A true sage (a person of high moral virtue) should treat all people equally, just as Yu the Great tamed the floods for the benefit of all under heaven, not for personal gain.

Mozi illustrates this principle with several analogies: love should not discriminate between kin and strangers, just as a circle remains a circle regardless of size; one should love present and future generations alike; and there should be no distinction between loving many or few. He emphasizes that "universal love" (jian'ai) is the correct path—one should not deny basic compassion even to thieves because of their wrongdoing.

The actions of a sage are not motivated by self-interest but by concern for the welfare of all. Just as parents naturally love their children, so too does a sage's love for humanity arise spontaneously. The text further notes that true love should not calculate gains and losses, just as one should not treat horses differently based on their color (such as favoring white horses).

Finally, Mozi acknowledges that practicing "universal love" is difficult, yet it remains the right path. Just as craftsmen follow standards when making tools, so too must one uphold the fundamental principle of "impartiality" in love. This philosophy transcended the rigid social hierarchies of its time, embodying an early form of humanitarian thought.

乃意禽也志功不可以相從也利人也爲其 人也富人非爲其也人有爲也以富人富人 也治人有爲鬼焉爲賞譽利一人非爲賞譽 利人也亦不至無貴於人智親之一利未爲 孝也亦不至於智不爲已之利於親也智是 之世之有盗也盡愛是世智是室之有盗也 不盡是室也智其一人之盗也不盡是二人 雖其一人之盜苟不智其所在盡惡其弱也 諸聖人所先爲人欲名實名實不必名苟是 石也白敗是石也盡與白同是石也唯大不 與大同是有便謂焉也以形貌命者必智是 之某也焉智某也不可以形貌命者唯不智 是之某也智某可也諸以居運命者苟人於 其中者皆是也去之因非也諸以居運命者 若鄕里齊荆者皆是諸以形貌命者若山丘 室廟者皆是也智與意異重同具同連同同 類之同同名之同丘同鮒同是之同然之同 同根之同有非之異有不然之異有其異也 爲其同也爲其同也異一曰乃是而然二曰 乃是而不然三曰遷四曰强子深其深淺其 淺益其益尊其尊察次山比因至優指復次 察聲端名因請復正夫辭惡者人右以其請 得焉諸所遭執而欲惡生者人不必以其請 得焉聖人之拊𣿦也仁而無利愛利愛生於 慮昔者之慮也非今日之慮也昔者之愛人 也非今之愛人也愛獲之愛人也生於慮獲
Interpretation

This passage from Mozi discusses the dialectical relationship between names and realities (the correspondence between terms and actual things) as well as the interplay between ren'ai (benevolent love) and li (benefit/interest). Mozi observes that human intentions often diverge from the actual effects of their actions. For instance, helping others cannot be judged solely by surface behavior.

The text illustrates this with examples: a wealthy person's assistance may not stem from genuine concern for others, and those who govern the people might have ulterior motives. Rewarding an individual does not necessarily benefit the public at large, and true wisdom does not lie in pursuing gain for oneself or one's kin. Just as knowing thieves exist in the world doesn't negate the world itself, or discovering a thief in one room doesn't invalidate the entire room. When sages act, they prioritize aligning names with realities—yet names cannot fully capture essence. A white stone remains white even when shattered; only its form changes.

Mozi proposes several methods of naming: some based on xingmao (physical features), like "mountain" or "ancestral temple"; others tied to location, such as "Qi" or "Chu." He distinguishes nine types of tong (sameness) and three kinds of yi (difference), emphasizing that things share essential similarities while manifesting distinct expressions. Ultimately, he notes that benevolence may arise from considerations of benefit—past and present acts of ren'ai may differ in motivation, just as loving a person and loving gain (huo, acquiring profit) stem from separate deliberations.

This passage reveals the core tension in Mohist jian'ai (universal love) philosophy: the aspiration to love others beyond utilitarian concerns, while acknowledging the inescapable reality of interest-driven relationships. It reflects Mozi's profound insight into the complexity of moral motivation.

之利非慮臧之利也而愛臧之愛人也乃愛 獲之愛人也去其愛而天下利弗能去也昔 之知墻非今日之知墻也貴爲天子其利人 不厚於正夫二子事親或遇熟或遇凶其親 也相若非彼其行益也非加也外執無能厚 吾利者藉藏也死而天下害吾特養臧也萬 倍吾愛臧也不加厚長人之異短人之同其 貌同者也故同指之人也與首之人也異人 之體非一貌者也故異將劍與挺劍異劍以 形貌命者也其形不一故異楊木之木與桃 木之木也同諸非以舉量數命者敗之盡是 也故一人指非一人也是一人之指乃是一 人也方之一面非方也方木之面方木也以 故生以理長以類行也者立辭而不眀於其 所生忘也今人非道無所行唯有强股肱而 不明於道其困也可立而待也夫辭以類行 者也立辭而不明於其類則必困矣故浸淫 之辭其類在於鼓栗聖人也爲天下也其類 在於追迷或壽或卒其利天下也指若其類 在譽石一日而百萬生愛不加厚其類在惡 害愛二世有厚薄而愛二世相若其類在蛇 文愛之相若擇而殺其一人其類在阬下之 鼠小仁與大仁行厚相若其類在申凡興利 除害也其類在漏雍厚親不稱行而類行其 類在江上井不爲已之可學也其類在獵走 愛人非爲譽也其類在逆旅愛人之親若愛
Interpretation

This passage primarily examines the relationship between "love" and "benefit," as well as the issues of similarity and difference among things. Mozi argues that true benefit does not stem from mere consideration of personal gain, but rather from loving all people as one would love their servants. Even if private affection were removed, the public benefit of the world would not thereby diminish.

The text provides examples to illustrate this: ancient and modern understandings of walls differ; the Son of Heaven's efforts to benefit the people may not necessarily surpass those of ordinary individuals; in serving one's parents, filial devotion should remain unchanged whether in times of abundance or famine. These examples demonstrate that changes in external form do not affect the essence.

Mozi particularly emphasizes the differences among things: human appearances may seem similar but are in fact distinct; the way a sword is held determines its use; though poplar and peach wood are both types of wood, their natures differ. He points out that if one only sees surface similarities without discerning essential differences, they will fall into confusion.

The discussion on "love" is especially profound: the sage governs the world like guiding those who have lost their way; true benevolence makes no distinction between great and small; promoting benefit and eliminating harm is like draining accumulated water; caring for family should not involve calculating gains and losses; loving others should not be done for reputation, just as travelers meeting on the road treat each other with sincerity. Mozi believes that true love should transcend form and achieve equality in essence.

其親其類在官苟兼愛相若一愛相若一愛 相若其類在死也    小取第四十五 夫辯者將以明是非之分審治亂之紀明同 異之處察名實之理處利害決嫌疑焉摹略 萬物之然論求群言之比以名舉實以辭抒 意以說出故以類取以類予有諸已不非諸 人無諸已不求諸人或也者不盡也假者今 不然也效者爲之法也所效者所以爲之法 也故中效則是也不中效則非也此效也辟 也者舉也物而以明之也侔也者比辭而俱 行也援也者曰子然我奚獨不可以然也推 也者以其所不取之同於其所取者予之也 是猶謂也者同也吾豈謂也者異也夫物有 以同而不率遂同辭之侔也有所至而正其 然也有所以然也同其所以然不必同其取 之也有以取之其取之也同其所以取之不 必同是故辟侔援推之辭行而異轉而危遠 而失流而離本則不可不審也不可常用也 故言多方殊類異故則不可偏觀也夫物或 乃是而然或是而不然或一害而一不害或 一是而一不是也不可常用也故言多方殊 類異故則不可偏觀也非也白馬馬也乘白 馬乘馬也驪馬馬也乘驪馬乘馬也獲人也 愛獲愛人也臧人也愛臧愛人也此乃是而 然者也獲之視人也獲事其親非事人也其 弟美人也愛弟非愛美人也車木也乘車非
Interpretation

This passage comes from Mozi·Minor Queries, primarily discussing methods of logical reasoning and the precision of linguistic expression. Mozi (founder of the Mohist school) presents several argumentation techniques here:

First, it introduces the concept of "universal love" (jian ai), meaning one should love both one's own relatives and others equally. If love can be extended impartially to all people, then such love is identical in nature.

It then elaborates on several methods of debate:

1. "Observation of natural states" (mo lüe) involves reasoning by examining the inherent conditions of all things

2. "Comparative analysis" (lun qiu) examines similarities and differences among various statements

3. "Using names to denote reality" (yi ming ju shi) employs terminology to represent actual objects

4. "Expressing ideas through language" (yi ci shu yi) uses words to convey thoughts

5. "Explaining causes through discourse" (yi shuo chu gu) employs arguments to clarify reasons

Five specific argumentation methods are highlighted:

"Analogy" (pi) illustrates principles through concrete examples; "parallel reasoning" (mou) compares similar statements; "counter-questioning" (yuan) cites the opponent's view to rebut ("you say this is permissible, why can't I?"); "deduction" (tui) derives new conclusions from principles the opponent accepts; "this is like saying" (shi you wei) identifies similarities, while "how could I mean" (wu qi wei) points out differences.

The text particularly emphasizes that superficial similarities don't necessarily indicate identical essences—argumentation methods should be flexibly applied but not abused. For example, a white horse is a horse, so riding a white horse means riding a horse; similarly, a black horse is a horse, so riding a black horse means riding a horse. Yet some seemingly similar cases differ substantially: a servant attending their master isn't equivalent to ordinary people attending a master, nor is loving one's younger brother the same as loving a beautiful woman.

Finally, it observes that relationships between things can be complex: they may be "affirming the premise and conclusion" (shi er ran), "affirming the premise but not the conclusion" (shi er bu ran), "partially harmful and partially harmless" (yi hai yi bu hai), or "one correct and one incorrect" (yi shi...).

乘木也船木也人船非人木也盗人人也多 盗非多人也無盗非無人也奚以明之惡多 盗非惡多人也欲無盗非欲無人也世相與 共是之若若是則雖盗人人也愛盗非愛人 也不愛盗非不愛人也殺盗人非殺人也無 難盗無難矣此與彼同類世有彼而不自非 也墨者有此而非之無故也焉所謂内膠外 閉與心毋空乎内膠而不解也此乃是而不 殺者也且夫讀書非好書也且闘雞非雞也 好闘雞好雞也且入井非入井也止且入井 止入井也且出門非出門也止且出門止出 門也若若是且夭非夭也壽夭也有命非命 也非執有命非命也無難矣此與彼同世有 彼而不自非也墨者有此而罪非之無也故 焉所謂内膠外閉與心毋空乎内膠而不解 也此乃是而然者也愛人待周愛人而後爲 愛人不愛人不待周不愛人不失周愛因爲 不愛人矣乘馬待周乘馬然後爲乘馬也有 乘於馬因爲乘馬矣逮至不乘馬待周不乘 馬而後不乘馬而後不乘馬此一周而一不 周者也居於國則爲居國有一宅於國而不 爲有國桃之實桃也棘之實非棘也問人之 病問人也惡人之病非惡人也人之鬼非人 也兄之鬼兄也祭之鬼非祭人也祭兄之鬼 乃祭兄也之馬之目盼則爲之馬盼之馬之 目大而不謂之馬大之牛之毛黄則謂之牛
Interpretation

This passage comes from Mozi·Minor Queries, primarily discussing the relationship between names and actualities (the correspondence between terms and real-world referents) and issues of logical reasoning. Through a series of everyday examples, Mozi reveals common logical fallacies in human language expression.

For instance, the text states: We ride boats because they are made of wood, but the boat itself is not a person. Saying "thieves are people" is correct, but "many thieves" does not equate to "many people." To eliminate thieves does not mean eliminating all people. This resembles how everyone agrees that "killing thieves is not the same as killing people," yet the Mohist school (followers of Mozi) were criticized for this view—a criticism that is unreasonable.

A sequence of metaphors then illustrates problems of conceptual confusion: Enjoying reading doesn't mean enjoying the physical book itself; enjoying cockfighting doesn't mean loving all chickens. Preventing someone from jumping into a well is virtuous, but preventing them from going out isn't necessarily so. Though human lifespan is determined by heaven, saying "fate is fate" is meaningless.

Mozi particularly points out that some people's thinking is rigid (internally glued and externally closed), their minds as if sealed shut by adhesive. For example, "loving people" doesn't require loving everyone to count as loving people, but "not loving people" means failing to treat even one person well. It's like riding horses—having ridden once counts as having ridden a horse, but "not riding horses" requires never having ridden at all.

Finally, several examples clarify name-actuality relations: Living in a state doesn't mean owning the country; peaches are the fruit of peach trees, but thorns aren't fruits. Visiting the sick shows care for the person; hating illness isn't hating the person. Sacrificing to a deceased elder brother honors the brother, not ordinary ghosts. A horse with a squint may be called a "squint-eyed horse," but a horse with large eyes isn't called a "big-eyed horse."

These examples all emphasize: speech must precisely correspond to facts; one cannot arbitrarily expand or conflate concepts. Mozi argues that many disputes stem from such linguistic confusion, advocating rigorous logical thinking to distinguish right from wrong.

黄之牛之毛衆而不謂之牛衆一馬馬也二 馬馬也馬四足者一馬而四足也非兩馬而 四足也一馬馬也馬或自者二馬而或白也 非一馬而或白此乃一是而一非者也    耕柱第四十六 子墨子怒耕柱子耕柱子曰我毋俞於人乎 子墨子曰我將上大行駕驥與羊我將誰歐 耕柱子曰將歐驥也子墨子曰何故歐驥也 耕柱子曰驥足以責子曰我亦以子爲足以 責巫馬子謂子墨子曰鬼神孰與聖人明智 子墨子曰鬼神之明智於聖人猶聰耳明目 之與聾瞽也昔者夏后開使蜚廉折金於山 川而陶鑄之於昆吾是使翁難卜於白苦之 毚曰鼎成三足而方不炊而自烹不舉而自 臧不遷而自行以祭於昆吾之墟上鄕人言 兆之由曰饗矣逢逢白雲一南一北一西一 東九鼎既成遷於三國夏后氏失之殷人 受之殷人失之周人受之夏后殷周之相 受也數百歲矣使聖人聚其良臣與其桀 相而諫豈能智數百歲之後哉而鬼神智 之是故曰鬼神之明智於聖人也猶聰耳 明目之與聾瞽也治徒娛縣子碩問於子 墨子曰爲義孰爲大務子墨子曰譬若築墻 然能築者築能實壤者實壤能欣者欣然後 墻成也爲義猶是也能談辯者談辯能說書 者說書能從事者從事然後義事成也巫馬 子謂子墨子曰子兼愛天下未云利也我不
Interpretation

This passage contains several parables and dialogues from Mozi, which I'll explain section by section:

The "debate on oxen and horses" discusses logical concepts. It states that while an ox has much hair, we don't say there are "many oxen"; when we say "one horse," we mean a complete horse, and "a horse has four legs" refers to one horse having four legs, not two horses sharing four legs. If a horse has white markings, it means one of two horses is white, not that a single horse changes color itself. This distinguishes between whole and part relationships.

When Mozi reprimanded his disciple Geng Zhuzi, he used an analogy: "If I were going to Mount Taihang, I could drive either a fine steed or a goat—which should I whip?" Geng Zhuzi replied that the steed deserved whipping because it was capable of more. Mozi then said, "I too consider you worth whipping" (meaning he believed the disciple could do better).

Wu Mazi asked Mozi: "Who is wiser—spirits and deities or sages?" Mozi answered that spirits surpass sages in wisdom just as the sharp-eared and keen-eyed surpass the deaf and blind. He cited the example of Emperor Qi of Xia (Xia Hou Qi) who sent Fei Lian to mine copper at Kunwu to cast tripods. The completed tripods had three legs—they could cook without fire and move without being carried, used for sacrifices at Kunwu. These Nine Tripods were passed down for centuries from Xia to Shang and then to Zhou. Mozi asked: "Even if sages gathered all worthy ministers to deliberate, how could they foresee events centuries later? Yet spirits and deities know such things."

Zhi Tu Yu and Xianzi Shuo asked Mozi: "What's most important in practicing righteousness (yi)?" Mozi used wall-building as analogy: "Let those who can lay bricks do so, those who can fill earth fill, those who can measure measure—only by each contributing their skills can a wall be built. Practicing righteousness is the same: let those who can debate debate, those who can teach teach, those who can act act—only thus can righteousness be achieved."

Finally, Wu Mazi challenged Mozi's doctrine of "universal love" (jian ai), saying loving all people brought no visible benefit. Mozi responded: "Suppose there's a fire—if one person fetches water but fails to extinguish it, would you say the water was useless?" (Meaning we shouldn't reject universal love just because immediate results aren't apparent.)

愛天下未云賊也功皆未至子何獨自是而 非我哉子墨子曰今有燎者此於一人奉水 將灌之一人摻火將益之功皆未至子何貴 於二人巫馬子曰我是彼奉水者之意而非 夫摻火者之意子曰吾亦是吾意而非子之 意也子墨子游荆耕柱子於楚二三子過之 食之三升客之不厚二二子復於子墨子曰 耕柱子處楚無益矣二三子過之食之三升 客之不厚子墨子曰未可智也毋幾何而遺 十金於子墨子曰後生不敢死有十金於此 願夫子之用也子墨子曰果未可智也巫馬 子謂子墨子之爲義也人不見而耶鬼不見 而富而子爲之有狂疾子墨子曰今使子有 二臣於此其一人者見子從事不見子則不 從事其一人者見子亦從事不見子亦從事 子誰貴於此二人巫馬子曰我貴其見我亦 從事不見我亦從事者子墨子曰然則是子 亦貴有狂疾也子夏之徒問於子墨子曰君 子有闘乎子墨子曰君子無闘子夏之徒曰 狗狶猶有闘惡有士而無闘矣子墨子曰傷 矣哉言則稱於湯文行則譬於狗狶傷矣哉 巫馬子謂子墨子曰舍今之人而譽大王是 譽槁骨也譬若匠人然智槁木也而不智生 木子墨子曰天下之所以生者以大王之道 教也今譽大王是譽天下之所以生也可譽 而不譽仁也子墨子曰和氏之璧隋侯之珠
Interpretation

This passage records several dialogues between Mozi (founder of Mohism) and figures like Wumazi, vividly illustrating the Mohist core principles of "universal love" (jian'ai) and "valuing righteousness" (guiyi).

On love and utility: Mozi uses a firefighting analogy to demonstrate that actions should be judged by their intentions rather than outcomes. Just as someone carrying water to extinguish a fire differs fundamentally from someone adding fuel to the flames—even if neither has yet affected the fire's intensity—the water-carrier's motivation deserves praise. Mozi thus teaches that we must examine the fundamental motivations behind actions.

On interpersonal conduct: Mozi's disciple Gengzhuzi provided fellow students in Chu with only three sheng of grain, appearing stingy, yet later voluntarily gave Mozi ten jin (an ancient monetary unit). This shows we shouldn't judge others by superficial appearances. Through this incident, Mozi instructs disciples to evaluate people by their essential character rather than temporary behavior.

On motivations for righteousness: Wumazi challenges Mozi, suggesting his good deeds resemble madness since they bring no worldly reward. Mozi responds with a servant analogy: one who works only when watched versus one consistently diligent. True virtue, he explains, must stem from inner sincerity without expectation of reward—this being the truly admirable quality.

On gentlemanly cultivation: When a disciple of Zixia asks whether gentlemen contend with others, Mozi firmly denies it. As the interlocutor counters that even pigs and dogs fight, Mozi responds with anguish, declaring it profoundly mistaken to compare gentlemanly conduct to beasts, thus emphasizing humanity's pursuit of higher moral standards.

On historical evaluation: Wumazi claims praising ancient sage-kings resembles praising dry bones. Mozi refutes this, arguing that following the sage-kings' governance principles sustains all life under heaven. To praise them is to affirm the fundamental principles upholding the world—this being the duty of humane people.

The concluding references to the He Shi Jade (legendary precious stone) and Marquis Sui's Pearl (mythical treasure) imply Mozi's belief that true value lies not in such treasures, but in practicing the moral principles of "universal love" and "valuing righteousness." These dialogues vividly demonstrate Mohism's characteristic emphasis on practical action, motivational purity, and pursuit of all-embracing love.

三棘六異此諸侯之所謂良寳也可以富國 家衆人民治刑政安社稷乎曰不可所爲貴 良寳者爲其可以利也而和氏之璧隋侯之 珠三棘六異不可以利人是非天下之良寳 也今用義爲政於國家人民必衆刑政必治 社稷必安所爲貴良寳者可以利民也而義 可以利人故曰義天下之良寳也葉公子高 問政於仲尼曰善爲政者若之何仲尼對曰 善爲政者遠者近之而舊者新之子墨子聞 之曰葉公子高未得其問也仲尼亦未得其 所以對也葉公子高豈不知善爲政者之遠 者近也而舊者新是哉問所以爲之若之何 也不以人之所不智告人所以智告之故葉 公子高未得其問也仲尼亦未得其所以對 也子墨子謂魯陽文君曰大國之攻小國譬 猶童子之爲馬也童子之爲馬足用而勞今 大國之攻小國也攻者農夫不得耕婦人不 得織以守爲事攻人者亦農夫不得耕婦人 不得織以攻爲事故大國之攻小國也譬猶 童子之爲馬也子墨子曰言足以復行者常 之足以舉行者勿常不足以舉行而常之是 蕩口也子墨子使管黔𣷫游高石子於衛衛 君致禄甚厚設之於鄕高石子三朝必盡言 而言無行者去而之齊見子墨子曰衛君以 夫子之故致禄甚厚設我於鄉石三朝必盡 言而言無行是以去之也衛君無乃以石爲
Interpretation

This passage conveys two main layers of meaning.

The first layer discusses what constitutes true "treasure." It states that feudal lords consider precious jade ritual vessels as treasures, yet these cannot truly enrich a state or bring prosperity to its people. The real treasure should be "righteousness" (Daoist virtue), for only through practicing righteousness can a state achieve stability and benefit its citizens.

The second layer illustrates principles of governance through several dialogues. When Duke Ye Zigao consulted Confucius about statecraft, Confucius replied, "A skilled ruler attracts distant peoples to submit while renewing existing traditions." Mozi found this answer too abstract, believing one should provide concrete guidance. Mozi then told Lord Wenyang of Lu that large states attacking small ones resembles children playing at riding horses—not only exhausting resources but also disrupting agriculture. Finally, when Mozi sent his disciple Gao Shizi to serve in Wei, Gao resigned after his advice went unheeded, embodying the Mohist principle of "unity of speech and action."

These contents reflect core Mohist philosophy: opposing warfare, advocating pragmatism, valuing concrete actions over empty talk, and recognizing that true worth lies in policies benefiting the common people.

狂乎子墨子曰去之苟道受狂何傷古者周 公旦非關叔辭三公東處於商盖人皆謂之 狂後世稱其德揚其名至今不息且翟聞之 爲義非避毁譽就去之道苟受狂何傷高石 子曰石去之焉敢不道也昔者夫子有言曰 天下無道仁士不處厚焉今衛君無道而貪 其禄爵則是我爲苟陷人長也子墨子說而 召子禽子曰姑聽此乎夫倍義而鄕禄者我 常聞之矣倍禄而鄕義者於高石子焉見之 也子墨子曰世俗之君子貧而謂之富則怒 無義而謂之有義則喜豈不悖哉公孟子曰 先人有則三而已矣子墨子曰孰先人而曰 有則三而已矣子未智人之先有後生有反 子墨子而反者我豈有罪哉吾反後子墨子 曰是猶三軍北失後之人求賞也公孟子曰 君子不作術而已子墨子曰不然人之其不 君子者古之善者不誅今也善者不作其次 不君子者古之善者不遂已有善則作之欲 善之自已出也今誅而不作是無所異於不 好遂而作者矣吾以爲古之善者則誅之今 之善者則作之欲善之益多也巫馬子謂子 墨子曰我與子異我不能兼愛我愛鄒人於 越人愛魯人於鄒人愛我鄉人於魯人愛我 家人於鄉人愛我親於我家人愛我身於吾 親以爲近我也擊我則疾擊彼則不疾於我 我何故疾者之不拂而疾不者之拂故有我
Interpretation

Mozi's disciple Gao Shizi was offered an official position in the state of Wei, but upon discovering the ruler's incompetence and unprincipled governance, he resolutely resigned. While others criticized him for being arrogant, Mozi praised his decision as correct.

Mozi illustrated his point with a historical example: When the Duke of Zhou (a founding minister of the Zhou dynasty) relinquished his high-ranking position as one of the Three Dukes to govern the eastern Shang territories, people also called him arrogant. Yet later generations praised his virtue (De). This demonstrates that upholding moral principles shouldn't be swayed by others' criticism—even if one is labeled arrogant.

Mozi criticized conventional attitudes: "When people call someone poor, they take offense, yet if called unprincipled, they might actually feel pleased—isn't this utterly absurd?" He emphasized that true gentlemen should emulate the virtuous conduct of ancient sages while innovating benevolent practices according to contemporary circumstances, thereby continuously expanding virtuous deeds.

Another scholar, Wu Mazi, once told Mozi: "My view differs from yours—I cannot love all people equally. I love the people of Zou more than those of Yue, the people of Lu more than those of Zou, my fellow villagers more than other Lu citizens, my family more than fellow villagers, my parents more than other family members, and myself most of all. The closer people are to me, the more I love them. For instance, if someone hits me, I feel pain; if they hit others, I don't. Therefore, I only prevent what causes me pain."

有殺彼以我無殺我以利子墨子曰子之義 將匿耶意將以告人乎巫馬子曰我何故匿 我義吾將以告人子墨子曰然則一人說子 一人欲殺子以利已十人說子十人欲殺子 以利已天下說子天下欲殺子以利已一人 不說子一人欲殺子以子爲施不祥言者也 十人不說子十人欲殺子以子爲施不祥言 者也天下不說子天下欲殺子以子爲施不 祥言者也說子亦欲殺子不說子亦欲殺子 是所謂經者口也殺常之身者也子墨子曰 子之言惡利也若無所利而不言是蕩口也 子墨子謂魯陽文君曰今有一人於此羊牛 㹖㹖維人但割而和之食之勝食也見人之 生餅則還然竊之曰舍余食不知日月安不 足乎其有竊疾乎魯陽文君曰有竊疾也子 墨子曰楚三意之田曠蕪而不可勝辟𧦝靈 數千不可勝見宋鄭之間邑則還然竊之此 與彼異乎魯陽文君曰是猶彼也實有竊疾 也子墨子曰季孫紹與孟伯常治魯國之政 不能相信而祝於禁社曰苟使我和是猶弇 其目而視於禁社也苟使我皆視豈不繆哉 子墨子謂駱滑氂曰我聞子好勇駱滑氂曰 然我聞其鄕有勇士焉吾必從而殺之子墨 子曰天下莫不欲與其所好度其所惡今子 聞其鄉有勇士焉必從而殺之是非好勇也 是惡勇也 墨子卷之
Interpretation

This dialogue showcases the debate between Mozi (founder of Mohism) and his disciples Wu Mazi and others regarding "righteousness" (yi) and "benefit" (li). Wu Mazi claims he would never conceal the principles of righteousness and is willing to teach them to everyone. Mozi counters: If one person agrees with your view, he would want to kill you for his own benefit; if ten people agree, ten would want to kill you; if the whole world agrees, the entire world would want to kill you. Conversely, those who disagree would also want to kill you for spreading ominous words. Whether people agree or disagree, you invite mortal danger—this illustrates the principle that "speech is the gateway to calamity" (jing zhe kou ye).

Mozi then tells Duke Wen of Lu Yang an analogy: Suppose a man refuses to eat his own livestock but insists on stealing others' provisions—clearly, he suffers from a thieving sickness. Similarly, though Chu possesses vast uncultivated lands, it covets the small cities of Song and Zheng—this too is thievery. Duke Wen of Lu Yang admits this indeed constitutes a thieving sickness.

In another exchange, Mozi criticizes two Lu statesmen, Ji Sunshao and Meng Bochang: Though they distrust each other, they pray to the gods for harmony—as absurd as blindfolded men begging the gods for light.

Finally, in a dialogue with Luo Huamao, who boasts of "loving courage" (hao yong) by claiming he kills any local warrior he hears of, Mozi points out: True courage means cherishing warriors, whereas you seek to murder them—this is actually "hating courage" (wu yong). These conversations reflect Mohist opposition to warfare and advocacy for universal love (jian ai) and non-aggression (fei gong).

十一

Source text: Kanripo 漢籍リポジトリ(KR5f0010); Licence: CC BY-SA 4.0 · Report an error / feedback

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