《弘道錄》Vol. 32

Zhuge Liang was a native of Langya who lived in Longzhong, in Xiangyang, where he farmed the land himself and enjoyed chanting the "Liangfu Yin." He often compared himself to Guan Zhong and Yue Yi, yet no one at the time acknowledged him. Sima Hui was refined and unworldly, and skilled at judging people. Pang Degong, a respected elder from the same commandery, called Zhuge Liang the "Sleeping Dragon" and called Sima Decao the "Mirror of Ice," meaning one who judges people with clear discernment. Later, when Liu Bei was seeking talented men in Jingzhou, he asked Sima Hui about them. Sima Hui replied, "How could ordinary scholars understand the state of affairs? Only outstanding men understand it. Here are the Hidden Dragon and the Young Phoenix." Liu Bei asked who they were, and Sima Hui answered, "Zhuge Kongming."

The Hongdao Lu says: When I look at Zhuge Kongming, I come to understand that the talent cultivated in the Eastern Capital (Luoyang of the Eastern Han) could not be easily obtained. People see only that the partisans were killed and humiliated, and they assume this was a calamity for men of virtue and talent. They do not realize that figures such as Gu Chujun, a well-known partisan of the Eastern Han, in fact allowed the custom of upright conduct and integrity to be transmitted for a long time.

Kongming understood how to cultivate himself through stillness and how to nourish virtue (de) through frugality. He said, "Without tranquility of mind, one cannot clarify one's aims; without calm, one cannot reach far-reaching goals." Is this not a man of the dragon's virtue who lives in seclusion? He also said, "Learning requires focus and calm, and ability must be gained through study. Without study, one cannot grow in talent; without calm, one cannot complete one's studies." Is this not a man who remains diligent without cease? He further said, "Idleness and complacency prevent one from probing deeply; haste and rashness prevent one from untangling affairs. Years slip away with the passing of time, and the will is worn down by the passing of the years." Is this not someone who is always alert, as though walking on thin ice? That his contemporaries called him the "Sleeping Dragon" was indeed fitting.

Liu Bei's sincerity in visiting him three times revived a spirit of purpose that had long been suppressed. Kongming's ability to read the state of affairs also surpassed that of men who chased fame and sought reputation through showy deeds.

When Liu Bei visited Zhuge Liang, he dismissed those around him and said, "The Han house is in decline, treacherous ministers have seized power, and the emperor has been left homeless. I, not measuring my own strength, wished to uphold righteousness throughout the realm, yet because my wisdom was shallow and my strategy insufficient, I have suffered repeated defeats up to this day. Still, my resolve has not changed. What course of action do you think I should take?"

Zhuge Liang replied, "Ever since Dong Zhuo caused turmoil, heroes have risen in great numbers, and those who occupy commanderies and prefectures are too many to count. When Cao Cao was compared with Yuan Shao, at first his power was weaker and his troops fewer, yet in the end he defeated Yuan Shao and grew from weak to strong. This was not only because of the timing of Heaven, but also because of human planning. Now Cao Cao already commands a million troops and holds the Son of Heaven under his control..."

Ordering the feudal lords in the name of the Son of Heaven is an advantage no one can contest. Sun Quan has held Jiangdong for three generations. The terrain there is strategically strong, the people have submitted to him, and capable men serve him. We may form an alliance with him, but we should not seek to take his territory.

Jingzhou is bordered on the north by the Han and Mian Rivers, reaches the South China Sea to the south, connects with Wu and Kuaiji to the east, and leads to Ba and Shu to the west. It is a place every military strategist would contest, yet its master cannot hold it. Perhaps this is Heaven's opportunity handed to you, General. Do you intend to take it?

Yizhou has treacherous terrain and thousands of li of fertile plains, a rich and abundant land. Emperor Gaozu of Han relied on it to accomplish his imperial enterprise. Liu Zhang is incompetent and weak, and Zhang Lu lies to the north. The people there are prosperous, yet the state does not know how to comfort them. Worthy men all hope to meet an enlightened lord.

As General, you are a kinsman of the Han house, and your reputation and good faith are known throughout the realm. You welcome heroes and thirst for worthy men. If you can seize Jingzhou and Yizhou and hold their strategic passes, make peace with the tribes to the west, pacify the Yi and Yue peoples to the south, form ties with Sun Quan externally, and put the administration in order internally, then, should the realm undergo upheaval, you can dispatch a great general to lead the Jingzhou army against Wancheng and Luoyang, while you personally lead the Yizhou army out to the Qin plain. At that time, who would not come out with baskets of rice and jugs of wine to welcome the General? If this can truly be achieved, your hegemony can be accomplished and the House of Han can be restored.

Liu Bei (courtesy name Xuande) said, "Good."

The Hongdao Lu comments: I observe that when Zhuge Liang (courtesy name Kongming) laid out his strategy for Liu Bei, including his plan to take Ba and Shu and pacify the Three Qin, he held that the realm could be won, and the two views are alike. Yet Liu Bei ultimately failed to restore the imperial enterprise. Why was this?

Emperor Gaozu of Han, Liu Bang, had three outstanding counselors to assist him. The conquest of Wei, the seizure of Dai, the subjugation of Zhao and Yan, the eastward advance against Qi, and the southward campaign that destroyed Chu were all the achievements of Han Xin. Han Xin once boasted that the more troops he commanded, the better. This shows that his abilities differed greatly from those of Guan Yu, the man who slew Yan Liang and executed Wen Chou. As for issuing commands and pointing out directions, these are certainly the work of counselors like Zhang Liang. Pursuing hares and foxes and charging into battle also require men like Fan Kuai. How could one person in the world handle all of these tasks and succeed at each?

Moreover, Cao Cao's use of troops had much of the style of Sun Wu and Wu Qi. Shu Han, with its weak and isolated forces, ultimately perished in the turmoil, and who could have provided it with strong support? Although Zhuge Liang was able to repel Sima Yi, perhaps it was already too late. This is why Emperor Gaozu admired Zhuge Liang yet said he "knew only one thing, not two."

Sun Quan said to Lü Meng, "You now hold an important post, and you cannot avoid study." Lü Meng declined, citing the many demands of military affairs. Sun Quan replied, "Do I want you to study the classics and become an erudite scholar? You need only read broadly and understand the events of history. You say your affairs are many, but how do they compare with mine?"

Note: The original text ends at the phrase "shu ruo gu" (how do they compare with me), and the translation follows the surviving text. "The one who slew Yan Liang and executed Wen Chou" refers to Guan Yu. "Directing the chase" and "hunting hares and attacking foxes" are the commentator's metaphors for planning and command versus actual combat.

I once studied, and thought I had gained a great deal. Later, Lü Meng (Lü Meng) began to study in earnest. When Lu Su passed through Xunyang and discussed affairs with Lü Meng, he was greatly astonished and said, "Your talent and strategy are no longer those of the Ah Meng of Wu from before!" Lü Meng replied, "Scholars should look at one another with new eyes after only a few days apart. Elder brother (a respectful term for an older man), how is it that you have come to know things so late?"

The Hongdao Lu comments: Why did the ancients study? Because fine natural endowments are easy to obtain, but the highest Way is hard to hear of; study was for the sake of sincerity and trustworthiness. Why do people today study? They seek success in their affairs and achievement in their undertakings; study has instead become a means of deception and pretense. Therefore, before Sun Quan urged Lü Meng to study, his conscience had not yet been clouded, and Heavenly principle still remained. After Lü Meng studied, he began to use cunning, to employ stratagems, to display his merit and show off his abilities, and he was no longer the Ah Meng of Wu from before. Seen in this light, was it not Yunchang (Guan Yu) who suffered the loss, rather than Ziming (Lü Meng, his courtesy name), who benefited?

Sun Quan once spoke with Lu Xun about Zhou Yu, Lu Su, and Lü Meng, saying, "Gongjin (Zhou Yu, courtesy name Gongjin) was brave and fierce, and his judgment and strategy surpassed those of ordinary men. For this reason he defeated Mengde (Cao Cao, courtesy name Mengde) and opened up Jingzhou, and few could compare with him by far. Zijing (Lu Su, courtesy name Zijing) was recommended to me by Gongjin, and so we came to know each other. When he came to speak with me, he at once touched upon the great enterprise of rulers. This was the first delightful thing.

"Later, Mengde took advantage of Liu Cong's surrender and boasted that he commanded several hundred thousand troops advancing by land and water together. I summoned my generals and asked how we should respond, but no one spoke first. Only when Zhang Zibu (Zhang Zhao, courtesy name Zibu) said we should send an envoy to receive Cao Cao did Zijing urge me to quickly summon Gongjin and place the army in his hands, so that he might meet and repel Cao Cao. This was the second delightful thing.

"Later, although Zijing urged me to lend land to Xuande (Liu Bei, courtesy name Xuande), this was a weakness of his, but it was not enough to harm his talent; only that his vision was shallow and narrow, and so he could not see this clearly.

"In the campaigns to pacify Wu, the one who planned, made decisions, and directed the movements was him; the other generals were merely able to capture game. In his ordinary life he did not ride horses himself, nor did he shoot arrows through armor; this was not because he was proud, noble, or fond of ease, but because he was broadly learned, devoted himself to studying the classics, and had attained deep accomplishment. Therefore, when he did good, he did not boast; when he had merit, he did not display it. As for the saying 'In times of peace, do not forget danger,' it is enough to surpass the insight of the multitude. Not only were Wang Jun and Wang Hun unequal to him, but even Hua (Hua Xin) and Gui (a name or appellation, as in the original text) could not reach him. How could it be said that he ultimately damaged the foundations of establishing achievements and words? Alas, he is truly worthy of emulation."

The Tang Shu records that Emperor Taizong of Tang said to Xiao Yu, "When I was young I loved bows and arrows, and I once obtained a fine bow……"

I had long assumed that my own judgment could not be improved upon. Recently I showed a bow to a bowmaker, and he said, "These are not good pieces of wood." When I asked why, the craftsman replied, "If the wood's central grain is not straight, the lines within it will slant. Even if the bow is made very powerful, the arrows will not fly true." Only then did I realize that I had not been careful enough in judging bow materials before.

I have used the bow and arrow to pacify the four quarters, and even so I know that I cannot see through everything. How much less, then, can I judge the affairs of the realm on the strength of my own opinion alone? I therefore ordered the capital officials of the fifth rank and above to take turns keeping watch overnight in the Secretariat (Zhongshu Sheng) and the Inner Court (Neisheng). I often summoned them and asked about the hardships of the common people and the gains and losses in government.

The Record comments: The ancients said that craftsmen could use their skill to advise the ruler. Surely this is what they meant. The bowmaker and Lun Pian, the wheelwright, are still praised today, because their words accord with principle and reflect a thorough knowledge of practical conditions, and so they deserve careful study. Thus, when the grain at the center of the wood is crooked, the lines will slant; when the ruler's heart and mind are not upright, the way of governance will also become careless and expedient. Was the bowmaker's insight really inferior to that of Wang Gui and Wei Zheng?

Taizong heard these words but did not grasp their true meaning. Although he often summoned people to ask about popular suffering and the gains and losses of government, he did not take care over his words and conduct in private with his wife and brothers. This falls short of truly loving to hear advice and of holding fast to the Mean.

The emperor asked Wei Zheng, "How can a ruler become discerning, and how does he become benighted?" Wei Zheng replied, "Listening to all sides makes a ruler discerning; favoring one side makes him benighted. Yao asked widely among the common people, and therefore he understood the situation." (Here the text appears to be missing material; the original goes on to discuss Sun Quan and Lu Xun.) Sun Quan said, "When Lu Xun was young, I thought he was only willing to take on any task regardless of difficulty, and that he was merely bold and daring. But as he matured, his learning grew steadily and his strategy became truly outstanding, enough to rival Zhou Yu. And his plan to seize Guan Yu surpassed that of Lu Su."

The Record comments: When I read Sun Quan's words, I find them truly unreasonable. Zhou Yu's achievements were accomplished because the rulers and ministers of Shu-Han had at one time offered encouragement. Sun Quan did not remember this, and instead used it as a target for ridicule. If that is so, how could he have let Liu Zong go without attacking him? Liu Zong came to surrender yet Sun Quan did not take Jingzhou, but instead handed the opportunity to others. If the one who gave away the opportunity was wrong, how should we judge the one who received it?

Sun Quan's rebellion against the Han dynasty was extreme indeed. His later clever use of trickery to attack Guan Yu was no different from stealing while others were unprepared, yet he presented it as a strategy surpassing that of Lu Su. Since he regarded thievery and similar conduct as commendable, it is no wonder that he later proclaimed the Mandate of Heaven and ingratiated himself with Cao Cao.

In the Book of Jin, Du Yu states that even when the realm is at peace, one who forgets military preparedness will ultimately fall into danger. He diligently drilled the martial arts and built the Panggong (the ancient school of learning), so that the people of the Jiang-Han region were transformed by virtue, and his teachings reached ten thousand li. He subdued the mountain tribes and established garrison camps at strategic points, stationing troops separately to consolidate the defenses. He also repaired the irrigation works left by Shao Xinchen, channeling the Zhi and Yu Rivers to irrigate over ten thousand qing of fields. He demarcated boundaries and carved stone markers, so that land ownership was clear and both the government and the people benefited. The people depended on him and called these waterworks the "Old Waters of Father Du."

Previously, the only waterway to Jiangling ran along the Mian and Han Rivers, stretching over a thousand li, with no navigable channel to the north. Lake Baqiu, where the Yuan and Xiang Rivers converge, was surrounded by treacherous mountains and rivers on all sides, serving as the barrier on which the Jing barbarians relied for defense. Thereupon Du Yu excavated Yangkou and opened the Xia waterway, reaching directly to Baling over a thousand li. Inwardly, it could drain the surplus waters of the Yangtze, and outwardly, it connected the grain transport routes to Lingling and Guiyang. The people of the south sang: "That later generations have known no rebellion is due to the merit of the venerable Du. Who could fully know his wisdom, his renown, and his martial achievements?"

The Hongdao Lu comments: Who does not admire a reputation for wisdom and martial accomplishment, and who would not wish to understand them? The Book of Documents says: "One who boasts of his own good deeds loses that merit; one who displays his fame loses his achievements." If a ruler listens only to one person, he may be deceived and unable to understand the conditions of the people. Emperor Shun was able to hear widely, so Gong Gong, Gun, Huan Dou, and others could not conceal the truth. Later, the ruler who favored Zhao Gao brought on the disaster at the Wangyi Palace; Emperor Wu of Liang, who favored Zhu Yi, ultimately suffered the humiliation at Taicheng; and Emperor Yang of Sui, who favored Yu Shiji, brought about the incident at the Pengcheng Pavilion. Therefore, if a ruler hears all sides and widely adopts counsel, powerful ministers will find it difficult to obstruct the flow of speech, and the true conditions of the common people will be able to reach the throne.

The Emperor said, "Good."

The Hongdao Lu further says: The Li hexagram of the Book of Changes is Li above and Li below, symbolizing continuous light, and therefore represents civilization. The Ming Yi hexagram symbolizes light sinking underground, and therefore represents darkness. This precisely illustrates that hearing all sides and favoring one side lead to different outcomes. Even with these lessons, there were still those who favored Yang Guozhong, bringing about the Tianbao Rebellion; favored Lu Qi, sparking the Jianzhong Turmoil; and favored Li Xun and Zheng Zhu, resulting in the Ganlu Incident.

The Emperor asked Fang Xuanling and Xiao Yu, "What kind of ruler was Emperor Wen of Sui?" They replied: "Emperor Wen was diligent in governing the state, often holding audience to handle affairs until the sun had moved west. Officials of fifth rank and above were invited to sit and deliberate, and guards passed food for all to eat. Though his temperament was not especially benevolent, he was a diligent, energetic ruler devoted to governing the realm."

The Emperor said, "You have only described one side and have not seen the other. Emperor Wen, however……"

If a ruler considers himself perceptive yet likes to examine every matter personally, he will in fact have blind spots and fail to grasp things clearly; the more he scrutinizes, the more he comes to suspect everything. When all affairs of the realm are decided by the ruler alone, without being entrusted to the ministers, and the realm is vast with its business numerous, then even if he toils day and night until body and mind are exhausted, how could he handle every matter in a reasonable way? Once the ministers have grasped the ruler's intentions, they will only follow his thinking and carry out his decisions once made. Even when they notice errors, they dare not remonstrate or argue. This is why the dynasty perished within two generations.

I do not act in this way. I select worthy talents from throughout the realm and appoint them to the hundred offices, letting them deliberate on the affairs of the realm. Matters are first handled with careful consideration by the chief minister, and only once deemed appropriate are they reported to me. Those who achieve merit are rewarded, and those who commit offenses are punished. Who would then dare not exhaust their strength and perform their duties well? And why should I worry that the realm will not be well governed? I therefore issued an order to all departments: from now on, once an edict has been issued, if there is anything inappropriate about it, each must firmly hold to their views and memorialize to explain them, and must not flatter and comply, going against what they truly think.

The Record of Propagating the Dao comments: Might these words of the emperor be taken as a standard and a model for a ruler in governing the state? To fail to see clearly yet to insist on examining every matter is a chronic failing of rulers in later ages. Right and wrong cannot be settled by one person monopolizing the judgment; if one relies only on one's own judgment, right and wrong will become confused. Good and evil cannot be decided by one person acting alone; if one lets personal likes and dislikes prevail, good and evil will be reversed. Merit and fault cannot be adjudicated by one person; if rewards and punishments are determined by private interest, merit and fault will be muddled.

Therefore, admitting that one lacks perfect discernment and entrusting affairs to others to be responsible for is defensible; but taking all trivial and petty matters upon oneself and quickly suspecting others is not defensible. The realm is extremely vast, while the range that one person's thought can measure is very small; the common people are without end, while the reach of one person's eyes and ears is also limited. Thus, when the ruler himself considers a matter inappropriate, having each department present its reasoned case allows one to avoid the biases of personal judgment; when someone is still not informed of the situation, being able to select worthy talents and employ capable people means there is no need to worry that anyone will be overlooked or that affairs will go unattended. Seen in this light, the Zhenguan Reign (the period of good governance under Emperor Taizong of Tang during the Zhenguan era) can be said to be nearly worthy of praise. Rulers of later generations should reflect on this carefully.

Fang Xuanling was thoroughly familiar with state affairs and possessed literary cultivation. He devoted himself day and night, fearing only that one matter might be mishandled, causing some thing to lose its proper use. He administered the law with leniency and fairness, and upon hearing that someone else had a virtue, he rejoiced as though he himself possessed it. He did not demand perfection from others, nor did he use his own strengths to criticize them. Together with Du Ruhui (a prominent minister in the early Tang), he promoted talented people, often fearing that there would not be enough time. The institutional frameworks and regulations of the court's departments were mostly drawn up by these two men. Each time Emperor Taizong discussed state affairs with Fang Xuanling, he would say: "Without Ruhui, I could not reach decisions." As for Du Ruhui……

In the end, Taizong adopted Fang Xuanling's strategy. Fang Xuanling excelled at planning, and Du Ruhui was skilled at making decisions. The two worked in accord and served the state with one heart, so whenever people named worthy chief ministers, they always put forward Fang Xuanling and Du Ruhui.

The Hongdao Lu comments: I observe that Fang Xuanling and Du Ruhui of the Tang, unlike Zhang Liang and Chen Ping of the Han, show no trace of following or depending on others, yet the histories describe them as skilled at planning. Why is this?

Someone answered that it was because they were good at concealing their own talents. Compared with Emperor Gaozu of the Han, Taizong's bearing of magnanimity was quite different. Taizong had an outstanding presence and abundant talent, enough to make everyone under heaven sigh that they could not match him. Had Fang Xuanling offered a plan, Taizong would have treated it as his own strength; had Du Ruhui devised a matter, Taizong would have credited the achievement to himself. If Zhang Liang and Chen Ping had displayed their abilities in this way, how could they have kept their careers intact to the end? When Taizong discussed affairs with Fang Xuanling, he often said, "Unless Du Ruhui decides this matter, it cannot be carried out." Yet when Du Ruhui arrived, Taizong ultimately adopted Fang Xuanling's plan. That ruler and minister, and those friends, could cooperate in this way; is this not precisely the sign of men who were skilled at hiding their own talents?

Taizong said to Zhangsun Wuji and the others, "What people most fear is not knowing their own faults. You may tell me plainly what errors I have." They replied, "Your Majesty possesses both martial prowess and civil virtue. We are busy submitting to and assisting you; how could we presume to name any fault?" Taizong said, "I am asking about my own faults, yet you only keep flattering me. I wish to point out to each of you, face to face, your strengths and weaknesses, so that we may admonish one another and correct ourselves. How about it?" Everyone bowed in thanks.

Taizong continued, "Zhangsun Wuji is good at avoiding suspicion, quick in handling affairs, and decisive in judgment, but leading troops in battle is not his strength. Gao Shilian has read widely across past and present, and his insight is rather profound; facing danger he does not change his integrity, and in office he has never engaged in forming factions for private gain. His shortcoming is that he lacks the bold spirit of direct remonstrance. Tang Jian is quick in speech and good at mediating disputes between people, yet in the thirty years he has followed me, he has never offered advice to urge goodness or correct errors. Yang Shidao is pure in conduct and gentle in temperament and originally has no particular fault, but his heart is timid and weak, and in moments of crisis he is hard to rely on. Cen Wenben is sincere and generous in character, and his writing is elegant and substantial. When he discusses matters, he always grounds himself in profound classical principles, and I think he will not disappoint others. Liu Ji has the steadiest and most upright character and can be of benefit, but he values his promises too highly and shows partiality toward friends. Ma Zhou perceives matters keenly and swiftly, his character is very upright, and he speaks without reservation when evaluating people; recently, when I entrusted him with tasks, most of them have satisfied me. Chu Suiliang's learning..." The original text breaks off here.

He grew steadily in stature and in firmness and uprightness of character. He often poured out his loyalty to me and drew close to me, like a bird nestling against a person, so that one could not help but cherish him.

The Hongdao Lu comments: At first Emperor Taizong of Tang wanted to hear others point out his faults, and he also listened to the opinions of his ministers. Later, however, he often passed judgment on his ministers and forgot to examine his own faults. When he later evaluated Emperor Wu of Wei (Cao Cao), he said: "In mortal peril he could turn the tide, skillful at reading the enemy's situation and winning by surprise. This shows that the general had ample wisdom but lacked the ability to govern a state of ten thousand chariots." Taken together, these remarks reveal both the strengths and the weaknesses of Taizong. Why should one flatter him with evasive words?

Emperor Dezong of Tang issued an edict recalling Guo Ziyi to the capital and appointing Li Guangbi to replace him. The soldiers wept and blocked the eunuch envoy, begging that Guo Ziyi be allowed to stay. Guo Ziyi deceived them, saying, "I was merely showing contempt for the envoy; the order has not yet been transmitted." He then leapt onto his horse and rode away.

Li Guangbi led five hundred cavalry toward the Eastern Capital, Luoyang, and entered the city at night. Zhang Yongji, a junior military officer (bingma shi, a low-ranking post), discussed with several of his generals a plan to lead elite troops into the Eastern Capital, drive out Li Guangbi, and then recall Guo Ziyi. He ordered his men to don armor and mount their horses in preparation for action. Kang Yuanbao dissuaded him, saying, "If you lead troops to bring back Lord Guo, the court will certainly suspect him. If Lord Guo secretly directed you to do this, it would bring ruin upon his entire household. What wrong have the hundred members of the Guo family done to you that you would do such a thing?" Zhang Yongji then abandoned the plan.

The Hongdao Lu comments: When Yue Fei of the Song dynasty received an imperial order to withdraw his army, his departure was in spirit no different from that of Lord Guo leaping onto his horse. Yet some old Confucian scholars blamed Yue Fei, arguing that a general in the field may at times decline the sovereign's orders, and should submit to the court's arrangements only after the Central Plains have been recovered. Is this view correct? And how does Zhang Yongji's scheme differ from such a position?

According to the Song History, Emperor Taizu of Song, Zhao Kuangyin, did not devote himself to his studies in youth and came to love reading only in his later years. He was broad-minded by nature and disliked affectation. After the new palace in the capital was completed, he sat in the main hall and had all of its gates opened. The doors faced one another, giving an unobstructed view. He said to those around him, "This is just like my heart: if it strays even slightly, everyone can see it."

He once said to the chief minister Xue Juzheng and others, "Few rulers of antiquity have been able to rectify their inner minds and reach a state free of error. I am constantly on guard from dawn to dusk, fearing that I might do wrong, restraining my desires, and hoping to practice the principle of transforming people through virtue. Emperor Taizong of Tang accepted memorials of remonstrance, and his ministers criticized his faults to his face, yet he felt no shame. Is it not better to avoid faults at the root, so that ministers have no criticism to offer at all?"

The Hongdao Lu comments: Does the phrase "the human mind is precarious" (ren xin wei wei) in the Yu Shu chapter of the Book of Documents mean that the human mind is dangerous whenever it harbors desire? The Doctrine of the Mean ...

Not seeing and not hearing describes a state in which the mind of cautious self-restraint has reached an extremely deep level. Taizong was broad-minded and discerning, and while he dwelt in such a state, what was there to criticize? Tang Taizong could accept blunt remonstrance, yet he still felt ashamed to be criticized. How much more so would those who conceal their faults and gloss over their errors? I doubt that any later ruler could match him.

Tang Taizong was diligent in his studies. After each audience he would read, repeatedly reflecting on and probing the principles in the text before setting the scroll down. He ordered the Historiography Bureau to compile the Taiping Yulan (Imperial Readings of the Taiping Era), a large encyclopedia of one thousand juan, and to present three juan to him each day. Song Qi and others worried that he would overexert himself and remonstrated with him. Taizong replied, "Opening a book always yields something, so I do not feel weary. I intend to finish this work in one year."

The Hongdao Lu comments: The purpose of a ruler's reading differs from that of a scholar studying the classics. I believe that scholars, too, should observe human feeling and original nature and seek out principles and their meaning. As for boasting of how much one has read or competing in ornate diction, that only wastes effort and brings no benefit. Taizong's ancestor, Emperor Taizu, not only understood the principles he studied but also put them into practice, and later rulers should have taken him as their model. However, the Taiping Yulan that was compiled later is fragmented and trivial, and it offers no help in actually governing the realm. Even if one read three juan a day, what would be gained? Tian Xi's objection to this practice was well founded.

Tian Xi was upright and unyielding, did not know how to flatter others, was resourceful, and also valued ritual and law. He once memorialized that the old Yulan merely arranged things by category and was of no help in enlightening the ruler's mind. He requested that a new Yulan be compiled, selecting essential sayings from the classics and histories to form the Yu Pingfeng (Imperial Screen), which would be placed beside the throne so that the ruler could always see the lessons of order, disorder, rise, and fall.

In his Preface to the Imperial Readings, Tian Xi wrote: The way of the sages is recorded in books. The words and intentions of the Six Classics are lofty, and without instruction, investigation, and discussion, their deeper meaning is difficult to discover. The histories record the deeds of many different figures, and without comparing and contrasting their similarities and differences, it is difficult to retain their complex details. The doctrines of the various philosophers often contain one-sided views, and the words in literary collections often lack the guiding principles of the Confucian classics. Only by searching out the essential principles as models and warnings, extracting the key points to grasp the unifying principles, and then compiling them into a book to be read daily, to advance the virtue of renewal each day, would this be meaningful. Even if one reads until one's hair turns white, one may still not exhaust these principles.

In his Preface to the Imperial Screen, Tian Xi wrote: In ancient times, rulers inscribed admonitions on their basins and bowls and engraved maxims on their tables and staffs, so that these warnings would always be before their eyes and never forgotten, morning or evening. I have often selected important sayings from the classics, histories, philosophers, and literary collections to present to the ruler. If the ruler views and reflects on them morning and evening, his virtue will advance day by day until it matches that of Tang of Shang and King Wu of Zhou.

The Hongdao Lu further comments: I observe that the founding rulers of the Han and Song dynasties did not study deliberately, yet they were able not...

Tang Taizong and Song Taizong both studied diligently and read widely, yet they could not escape criticism from later generations. Why was this? Was it not because they pursued broad learning and retentive memory without applying their efforts to investigating things and deepening their understanding? As a result, their achievements were limited to literary elegance and calligraphy, and did not extend to rectifying the mind and cultivating the inner self. Song Zhenzong could only sigh in admiration of Tian Xi, lamenting that Heaven had taken him too early, so that he could not fully present memorials and accomplish the work of forthright remonstrance. Moreover, what would one make of merely placing a folding screen? Even if it is said that it was made for separate imperial viewing, it would still be the same.

Zhao Pu, when young, was familiar with the affairs of government offices but lacked learning. After Song Taizu urged him to read, he never let a book out of his hands. Each time he returned home, he would close the door, open his chest of books, take out volumes, and read aloud all day. The next day, when handling state affairs, his decisions were remarkably swift. After Zhao Pu died, his family opened the chest and found only twenty chapters of the Analects. He often said to the emperor: "I have one copy of the Analects. With half of it I assisted Taizu in pacifying the realm, and with the other half I assist Your Majesty in bringing about great peace."

Li Hang was once reading the Analects, and someone asked him why he read this book. Li Hang replied: "As chief minister, I have not yet managed to live up to the principles in the Analects about economizing on expenses, cherishing the people, and employing the people only at the proper seasons. The words of the sages are worth reciting for a lifetime."

The Hongdao Lu comments: Zhao Zhongxian (Zhao Pu's posthumous title) reading the Analects may be called self-assured and rather self-satisfied. Yet he did not understand that when tigers and rhinoceroses escape from their cages and jade is destroyed in its box, whose fault is that? This is precisely pushing responsibility away, saying "I did not mean to do this," and yet insisting on finding excuses for oneself.

Li Wenjing (Li Hang's posthumous title) reading the Analects may be called humble and self-reproachful. But he truly was able to keep to his duties without slackening and faithfully put into practice what he learned. Therefore, others did not speak lightly in ordinary times, and when he did speak, his words often struck at the heart of the matter.

Alas, a man like Li Hang: that he could foresee problems in advance may be called wisdom; that he did not deceive himself may be called benevolence; that he recited the words of the sages for a lifetime may be called courage. Judging from his attitude toward the teachings of the sages, was he not a man whose heart was free of worry, doubt, and fear?

Later, when Li Hang became chief minister, Wang Dan began to take part in government affairs. When the army was campaigning in the northwest, Wang Dan sometimes was so busy that he did not have time to eat until night, and he sighed: "How can one simply wait for the realm to be at peace, and be at ease and unhurried with nothing to do?" Li Hang said: "Some worry and diligence for the moment is just the right thing to serve as a warning and a safeguard. When the four quarters are tranquil and the court is at peace in the future, there may still be matters to attend to." Wang Dan did not agree. Li Hang also reported to the throne every day on floods, droughts, bandits, and the like in various regions. Wang Dan considered these minor matters not worth troubling the emperor to hear. Li Hang said: "The ruler……"

Young people should be made to understand the hardships of life throughout the realm. Otherwise, when they are at the height of their vigor and indulge excessively in the pleasures of sound and sex (song and dance, women, horseback riding and hunting), projects such as building palaces, refitting the armies, and offering prayers and sacrifices will surely follow. I am already old, and I fear I will not live to see these things. This is what I came to worry about after serving as Assistant Councillor of Government (Canzheng, an official title).

After Li Hang died, Emperor Zhenzong, having already concluded peace with the Khitan and secured the submission of the Western Xia, performed the Fengshan (imperial rites of sacrifice to Heaven and Earth). He sacrificed at Fenyin and undertook large-scale construction of palaces and Daoist temples (gongguan). He also sought out and studied long-abandoned institutions and rituals, leaving almost no time for rest. Zhenzong watched Wang Qinruo, Ding Wei, and others at their work. He wanted to remonstrate with them but was already implicated in their affairs. He wanted to withdraw, but the emperor treated him generously. He then recalled that Li Hang had foreseen these developments long before, and could not help but sigh, "Li Wenjing was truly a sage!" From that time on, people called Li Hang the "Sage Chancellor."

The Hongdao Lu records: Since the phrase "earnestly seek out a sage of outstanding talent" first appeared in the "Shang Documents" of the Book of Documents, who else has been called a "Sage Chancellor"? Li Hang's foresight was as clear as an omen revealed by divination, and throughout the Song dynasty, he alone was like this.

When Li Hang received guests, they often spoke very little, and outsiders mocked them as the "gourd without a mouth" (one that does not open its mouth). Li Hang's younger brother, Li Wei, once took advantage of a free moment to urge Li Hang to speak on the matter. Li Hang replied, "I am not unable to speak. Today, officials throughout the court may offer advice and submit memorials to the emperor without obstruction. After a memorial is sent down to the responsible office, everyone is able to see it. As for the other young men who entered office through hereditary privilege, they grow flustered even when sitting, rising, bowing, or offering greetings. Once they sit down, they are sure to boast of their merits and encourage themselves, hoping to win favor and rewards. What insight do they have that is worth my conversing with them? If I were to speak empty falsehoods just to accommodate them, that would be what people call longdian, 'enveloping and ensnaring' (placating and manipulating others with empty words). I cannot bring myself to do such a thing."

The Hongdao Lu comments: I find that everything Li Hang said accurately portrays the dispositions of young men. What Li Hang called longdian refers to speaking in hollow, polite formulas while harboring no sincerity within, and this captures worldly behavior with great precision. From this we can see that the wisdom of the "Sage Chancellor" knew no limits. How could anyone, in order to win the delight of the petty folk of the marketplace, willingly be despised by those of discernment?

Chen Shu held a long-term post in charge of the Three Finance Commissions (sansi, the agency overseeing state finances). When Zhenzong first ascended the throne, he ordered Chen Shu to compile a detailed account of the grain and money held by the court and the provinces and to report it to the emperor. Chen Shu delayed the report for a long time, and the emperor issued several edicts urging him. Chen Shu replied, "Your Majesty is still young. If you were to learn that the storehouses are full, I fear you would develop a taste for extravagance, so I dare not report it." The emperor praised him.

The Hongdao Lu comments: Chen Shu held office on the strength of skill in accounting, and there was nothing in this matter that deserved special mention. However, the emperor's extravagance...

Someone has long since seen through this matter. Even if they were pardoned and the affair were recorded in the heavenly register, they would surely refuse to act, and it would not be worth hoping that they would. Make a note of this.

After Cao Bin conquered Jiangnan and returned to the capital, his belongings were simple and plain, consisting only of books, clothing, and bedding. The gatekeeping official presented the report: "Having been dispatched to Jiangnan on official business, I have now returned." People at the time praised Cao Bin for not boasting of merit.

When Cao Bin first set out to attack the Southern Tang, Emperor Taizu told him, "Once Li Yu is captured, I will appoint you as shixiang (a titular chancellor)." Pan Mei congratulated him in advance, but Cao Bin replied, "That is not so. In this campaign we have relied on the majesty of the Son of Heaven and followed the court's plans. What merit is there in that? Besides, the rank of shixiang is already the highest office." Pan Mei asked, "What do you mean by that?" Cao Bin answered, "Taiyuan has not yet been pacified."

When Cao Bin returned and presented the captives, Taizu said, "I had meant to grant you the rank of shixiang, but since Liu Jiyuan (as in the original; possibly Liu Jiyuan) has not yet been subdued, let us wait for now." Pan Mei glanced at Cao Bin and smiled slightly. Noticing this, Taizu asked Pan Mei, who answered truthfully, and Taizu burst into laughter. He then bestowed five hundred thousand cash on Cao Bin. After Cao Bin withdrew, he remarked, "Why must a man insist on becoming a shixiang? A good official is merely one who can earn more money." Cao Bin was later appointed Shumi Shi (Privy Councilor, the office in charge of military affairs).

The Hongdao Lu comments: Can Cao Bin's wisdom and insight be treated lightly? Ma Yuan was slandered by Liang Song, and Wang Jun received an impeachment memorial from Zhou Jun. When a meritorious minister holds such a position, he must not fail to be cautious. Yet even if someone drew a sword to hack at a pillar or rolled up their sleeves to throw punches, they still could not shake Cao Bin, and a mere title of shixiang was far too small to move his heart. The Book of Poetry says, "Without envy and without greed, what could go wrong?" Between Cao Bin and Pan Mei, one may say they got along very well.

When Zhang Yong served as Prefect of Yizhou, the common people spread a rumor that a white-haired old man would eat people in the afternoon, and the whole city was thrown into panic. Zhang Yong went into the marketplace to make inquiries and learned that a treacherous person had started the rumor. He had that person seized and punished, and the rumor subsided that very day. He told the people: "When strange omens arise, it is because baleful qi has entered through an empty opening. Omens take on physical form, while rumors spread through voice. To quell a rumor, one relies on clear discernment and decisive action, not on offering clever schemes to show off."

On another occasion, the region had just suffered warfare, and the people were uneasy. One day the troops were assembled for review, and just as the procession was setting out, someone suddenly shouted "Long live!" three times in succession. Zhang Yong dismounted as well, faced east, and shouted "Long live!" himself, then remounted and continued on. The crowd dared not make a commotion. When someone reported this to Han Qi, Han Qi said, "In that situation, I too could not have thought of a solution." Zhang Yong's wisdom and strategy were mostly of this kind. He often said to Li Tian, "Whether the matter is great or small, one must employ wisdom. Wisdom is like water..."

Water keeps clean as it flows. If people never make a habit of thinking carefully about anything, where will wisdom suddenly come from when a great crisis arrives?

Even with wisdom, there are three difficult things. First, one must be able to see the situation clearly. Second, once it is clear, one must be able to act on that understanding. Third, when the time comes to act, one must be resolute and decisive.

The Hongdao Lu comments: Since Mencius spoke of “forcing an interpretation,” these words of Kou Zhun, whose posthumous title was Zhongding, have truly struck at the heart of the matter. Wisdom cannot be sought through deliberate contrivance, nor can it be allowed to run dry. If one does not follow the underlying principles of things, one falls into contrivance; if one does not put wisdom to continued use, it will dry up. To follow those principles is to move with the natural course; to keep using wisdom without exhausting it is to keep it flowing. The way to stop an error is to decide at once when the moment comes; the calls used to guide horses and chariots must be quick and sharp. Indecision and sluggishness are both enemies of wisdom. Without these three qualities, a person cannot govern and cannot take even a single step—how much less could they handle the affairs of the realm? Thus Kou Zhun’s words truly struck at the heart of the matter.

When the Khitan invaded Chanzhou, in the area of present-day Puyang, Henan, the emperor was greatly alarmed and asked Kou Zhun what to do. Kou Zhun replied, “If Your Majesty wishes to settle this matter, it will take no more than five days. I ask Your Majesty to go in person to Chanzhou.” His colleagues were all afraid when they heard this. Some wanted to withdraw, but Kou Zhun stopped them and told them to wait for the emperor to set out. The emperor also felt troubled and was preparing to return to the inner palace. Kou Zhun earnestly urged him to stay: “If Your Majesty returns to the palace, I will never see you again, and the great cause will be lost.” Bi Shian strongly urged the emperor to follow Kou Zhun’s advice. The emperor then discussed leading the campaign in person and summoned his ministers to ask for their plans.

Wang Qinxuo, a native of Linjiang, asked the emperor to go to Jinling; Chen Yaosou, a native of Langzhou, asked him to go to Chengdu. The emperor asked Kou Zhun again. Kou Zhun understood what the two men were up to, but pretended not to. He said, “Who gave Your Majesty this advice? It deserves death! Your Majesty is wise and courageous, and your generals and ministers can work together with one heart. If Your Majesty leads the campaign in person, the enemy will naturally flee. Otherwise, we can also prevail through an unexpected stratagem, disrupt the enemy’s plans, and then hold our positions until their forces are worn down. In this way, we will be rested while they are exhausted, and victory will be ours. Why abandon the ancestral temples and the state altars to travel to distant Chu or Shu? Wherever Your Majesty goes, the people’s confidence will collapse. If the enemy wins and presses forward, can the realm still be preserved?” The emperor then resolved to go to Chanzhou.

The Hongdao Lu comments: During the Jisi Crisis of our dynasty, when the court was thrown into turmoil after the Tumu Fortress disaster of 1449 and Emperor Yingzong was captured, Xu Youzhen advocated moving the capital south. Fortunately, Yu Qian, whose courtesy name was Zisu and posthumous title was Sumin, persuaded the court against it, and the capital was not moved. Which of these two situations was harder to handle? In my view, during the Battle of Chanyuan, the Song ruler had not failed in his duty, and the ancestral temples and state altars were secure. But during the Zhengtong-era crisis, the emperor was trapped in the wilderness, and the court was shaken from within and without. The decision whether to move the capital was one on which the nation’s survival depended from one moment to the next. Yet at the time, Wang Qinxuo, Xu Youzhen...

This could have been avoided. Given the ability of the two ministers, why did they not quickly eliminate these sources of trouble, instead allowing them to seize the opportunity and later give rise to crimes and calamities? Why was this so? A wise ruler can readily distinguish right from wrong, while a ruler who is merely indulgent and lenient finds it difficult to tell the upright from the wicked. Once accustomed to ease and abundance, people become arrogant and extravagant; once they forget the dangers of disorder, the seeds of calamity begin to sprout. During the Jingde era, the court yielded to the two ministers’ sound remonstrance, bringing the matter to a temporary resolution, but the penalties and calamities were thereby left for the future. The sage wrote in the Changes: “In the eighth month, there is danger.” How could a noble person take this lightly, or fail to seek a way to avoid it?

When the emperor reached the southern city of Chanzhou, he saw the Khitan army massed in great strength. His attendants asked him to halt and remain there for a time. Kou Zhun firmly urged him: “If Your Majesty does not cross the river, the people’s hearts will grow even more unsettled. The enemy’s momentum will also remain unchecked. This is no way to establish authority and defeat the enemy.” The others were all fearful as they debated the matter. Kou Zhun argued his case forcefully, but no decision was reached.

After leaving the palace, Kou Zhun encountered Gao Qiong, commander-in-chief of the palace guard, and asked, “The Grand Marshal has received the state’s favor. Can you repay it today?” Gao Qiong replied, “I am only a man of arms, but I am willing to give my life.” Kou Zhun then went back into the palace, with Gao Qiong following him to stand in the court. Kou Zhun said sharply, “If Your Majesty thinks my words are wrong, why not ask Gao Qiong and the others?” Gao Qiong immediately looked up and declared, “Kou Zhun is right.” He then ordered the guards to push the imperial carriage forward. The emperor crossed the Yellow River and ascended the tower above the northern city gate. People near and far saw the imperial carriage. The troops were jubilant, shouting “Long live the emperor!” Their voices carried for dozens of miles. The Khitan army’s momentum was broken.

The emperor entrusted all military affairs to Kou Zhun, granting him authority to make decisions on the spot. His commands were strict and clear, and the soldiers both feared and trusted him. Kou Zhun did not want to bribe the Khitan with goods. Instead, he wanted to make them submit and cede the lands around Youzhou and Jizhou. He therefore proposed: “If we do this, we can secure a hundred years of peace. Otherwise, in a few decades, the Rong people—the Khitan in this case—will again harbor disloyal intentions.” Kou Zhun probably wanted to launch an attack and leave the enemy with not a single piece of armor intact. But the emperor was tired of war at the time and said, “I cannot bear to plunge the people into hardship again, so for now I will agree to peace negotiations.”

The Hongdao lu comments: Chanzhou in the Song dynasty is today’s Daming. The Song capital, Bianjing, is not very far north to south from the capital of the Yan region today. When the Khitan invaded, they attacked Dingzhou and Baozhou, then went on to attack Shun’an Army and Beiping Stockade. Their route was broadly similar to that of the present invasion. The Song forces first had Wei Neng and Shi Pu repel the enemy vanguard, then Tian Min and Wang Chao hold off the enemy in the rear. Thus, each time they fought…

Whenever the Song army suffered even the slightest setback, it immediately withdrew, seeming hesitant and lacking the will to fight. At the Battle of Chanyuan, when the Northern Song fought the Liao around Chanzhou, Kou Zhun, a senior Song official, again stood alone at the forefront. He wanted to seize the moment to ambush the enemy and leave them unable to get even a single cart back home. Yet Emperor Zhenzong of Song said both that he would permit peace negotiations and that he abhorred war. When the annual gifts of goods were discussed, the emperor even said, “If it truly cannot be avoided, even a million would be acceptable.” Can all these accounts in the histories really be exaggerations?

Moreover, when the Han and Tang dynasties made peace with foreign peoples, they generally relied on just one method: marriage alliances. The Song treaty, however, adopted two methods at once. Why not lay out all these circumstances at court, so that the ruler and his ministers could choose together? This year they said they would recover the Hetao region; the next, they replaced the commander. The whole year passed in unrest, with everyone merely hoping the enemy would not come and letting them withdraw on their own.

Another view held that the enemy only wanted to plunder and posed no serious threat, so there was no need to defend against them. This thinking fell straight into what I call the “Five Baits,” a strategy for luring the enemy into a trap. Why not put it to the test, instead of allowing the people to suffer terrible losses?

I therefore used the Battle of Chanyuan to offer counsel to those in power: what more urgent matter could there be for a wise person to address first?