《孫子註解》Vol. 1

The first volume of Annotations on Sunzi begins by discussing the importance of the "Planning Chapter." Cao Cao explains that "planning" (计) refers to strategizing in advance at court, including selecting generals, assessing enemy conditions, surveying terrain, calculating troop strength, and evaluating the distance and difficulty of the terrain. Li Quan emphasizes that military strategy is paramount, citing the Taiyi Dunjia (an ancient military divination method) to illustrate how the "spirit of strategy" must be positioned advantageously to determine victory or defeat for both sides. Hence, Sunzi placed "planning" as the first chapter.

Du Mu elaborates that "planning" involves comparing five key factors between the enemy and oneself: the Dao (moral righteousness), celestial timing (天时), geographical advantage (地利), the general’s capability, and legal discipline. Only by weighing these five aspects at court can victory or defeat be determined—only then should troops be mobilized. Wang Xi adds that planning includes assessing the commander’s qualities, celestial and geographical conditions, legal discipline, troop deployment, and reward-and-punishment measures. Zhang Yu quotes Guan Zhong, stating that strategies must first be formulated domestically before deploying troops; thus, planning is the foremost principle in warfare. When asked why planning must occur at court, he explains that factors like the general’s ability, enemy strength, distance, and troop numbers must be calculated in advance, while battlefield adaptability depends on the general’s on-the-spot decisions.

Sunzi states: War is a grave matter of the state. Du Mu cites ancient texts, noting that state affairs consist of rituals (祭祀) and warfare. Zhang Yu clarifies that a nation’s security hinges on military affairs, making army training the top priority. War determines life and death, demanding careful scrutiny. Li Quan warns that weapons are instruments of destruction—life and death depend on them, hence their gravity must be emphasized to prevent reckless warfare. Du Mu stresses that national survival and people’s lives rest on war, requiring utmost caution. Jia Lin explains that "terrain" (地) refers not only to physical land but also to battlefield formations; occupying advantageous positions ensures survival, while losing them leads to death. The "Dao" (道) here means the method of adapting to circumstances for victory—grasping it ensures survival, losing it spells doom, so it must be thoroughly understood. As ancient texts say: Only those who master the Dao of survival can steadfastly support the state.

Military strategy hinges on five fundamental elements (the "Five Factors"), with comparative analysis (jiaoji) serving to clarify the actual conditions of both allies and enemies. Commentators like Cao Cao emphasize that victory or defeat can only be predicted after thoroughly evaluating these five aspects and calculating potential gains and losses.

The first is "Dao" (the Way of governance). Zhang Yu explains this as rulers using virtuous benevolence and trustworthiness to win popular support—the very foundation of success.

The second is "Heaven" (celestial timing). Zhang Yu notes the necessity of aligning with natural cycles like Yin-Yang transitions and seasonal changes.

The third is "Earth" (terrain advantage). Zhang Yu stresses understanding geographical conditions—including hazardous or accessible landscapes and strategic distances.

The fourth is "Command" (leadership). Zhang Yu highlights appointing generals who embody both wisdom and courage.

The fifth is "Discipline" (military law). Du Mu and Wang Xi concur that rigorous regulations and clear ordinances are indispensable.

Wang Xi particularly adds that the essence of warfare lies in "human harmony" (internal unity), complemented by favorable timing and terrain. These elements function like the warp and weft of woven cloth—one must first clarify their hierarchy, then employ seven specific methods of calculation ("Seven Metrics") to comprehensively compare strengths between forces. Only through this process can the probable outcome of conflict be accurately discerned.

This passage primarily discusses the three key elements of warfare: favorable timing (天时), advantageous terrain (地利), and human harmony (人和), along with how commanders should lead their troops.

Before initiating military action, three conditions must be considered: favorable circumstances (利), sufficient support (助), and the alignment of timing, terrain, and human factors (三者具). Only when all these are present can military deployment be contemplated. After mobilization, competent commanders (将能) are essential, as only with capable leaders can proper military regulations (法修) be established. This embodies Sun Tzu's Art of War principles.

Zhang Yu explains that while commanders and military regulations appear last among the Five Fundamentals (道, 天, 地, 将, 法 in The Art of War), in actual warfare the court should first assess popular sentiment (恩信厚薄), then examine celestial timing (天时逆顺), and finally evaluate terrain difficulty (地形险易). Only when these three conditions mature can commanders be appointed for campaigns. Once troops cross borders, complete command authority rests with the generals—this constitutes proper military procedure.

Regarding "the Way" (道): it means aligning the people's hearts with their rulers. Zhang Yu states that when benevolence, trust, and righteousness comfort the populace, the three armies unite willingly, eager to serve. As the Book of Changes says: "The people would joyfully walk through fire and water, not fearing death." Such forces share life and death without fearing danger.

Cao Cao interprets "the Way" as moral instruction, while "peril" (危) signifies doubt and unease. Li Quan views "peril" as impending destruction, arguing that proper moral education naturally transforms people, gaining their solidarity—how could destruction follow then? Du Mu explains "the Way" as humaneness and righteousness, citing Xun Qing's response to Li Si's military inquiry: "Humaneness and righteousness clarify governance; clear governance makes people cherish their ruler and willingly die for him."

Du Mu further references debates with King Xiaocheng of Zhao: "When a hundred commanders share one mind and three armies unite their strength, when ministers serve their sovereign and subordinates their superiors like sons serving fathers or younger brothers serving elders, like arms protecting head and eyes or torso shielding vitals—only then can superior and inferior share one heart, life and death, unafraid of peril or doubt."

Chen Hao's commentary aligns with Du Mu's. Mengshi states "no suspicion among men" means unwavering loyalty, while "no peril among men" indicates governance through edicts and ritual teachings that transform soldiers and civilians to unite with rulers. Thus the essence of warfare lies in using strategic methods (权术) as the Way. When the great Dao declines, employ laws; when laws fail, use strategy; when strategy falters, apply authority; when authority weakens, resort to skill; when skill proves inadequate, implement schemes. As the great Dao decays and human relations grow false, without strategic methods one cannot achieve objectives. Therefore the way of strategy is to unite superiors and subordinates in shared purpose and coordinated action.

This passage elucidates the core principles of how leaders win popular support and unite collective strength. When leaders refrain from personal biases in treating subordinates and govern through De (Virtue), they gain genuine loyalty. A million-strong army united in shared purpose will live and die together, advancing without peril.

Subordinates should serve superiors with the natural devotion of a son honoring his father, a younger brother respecting his elder, or arms shielding the head and chest. Such teams achieve perfect unity where leaders and followers share life and death without fear of danger. Jia Lin adds that when commanders unite people through Daoist principles, sharing both comforts and hardships, soldiers will naturally cherish them as parents and regard enemies as mortal foes. This embodies Huang Shigong’s teaching: "Those who attain the Dao flourish; those who lose it perish."

Du You advocates guiding through governance and disciplining through ritual propriety. Benevolent leadership inspires subordinates to willingly face death together during crises, like the citizens of Jinyang who remained loyal even when their stoves were flooded and frogs proliferated during the siege. Mei Yaochen observes that rulers practicing upright governance ensure smooth policy implementation; united hearts eliminate dangers as sovereign and subjects share weal and woe. Wang Zhe emphasizes that winning popular support secures desperate devotion, naturally overcoming perils. The I Ching states: "Joy in facing difficulties makes people forget death"—how could such teams fear danger?

Zhang Yu concludes that soldiers who cherish their leaders’ benevolence will share life and death with them, naturally becoming fearless.

Regarding "heavenly timing," Cao Cao states military actions must align with Yin-Yang and seasonal cycles. The Sima Fa advises against campaigns in winter and summer, reflecting care for the people. Li Quan advocates harnessing celestial timing and popular sentiment to subdue enemies. Du Mu elaborates on the Five Phases (Wood, Fire, Earth, Metal, Water) and their mutual generation/restraint, astrological divination, and related knowledge—revealing these seemingly mystical systems as rooted in human affairs. For instance, launching attacks against regions corresponding to Jupiter’s (Sui星) celestial sector was considered inauspicious, demonstrating astronomy’s military significance. Historical astrologers like Wu Xian and Gan De left relevant writings on these matters.

This passage uses historical events from the Wu-Yue conflicts and the fall of the Qin dynasty to illustrate the ancient Chinese belief in the correlation between the movement of the "Year Star" (Jupiter) and human fortunes. Ancient astronomers held that the earthly state corresponding to Jupiter's celestial position would receive blessings, though actual outcomes depended entirely on the ruler's virtue (De).

When King Helü of Wu attacked Yue, Jupiter was positioned in the "Stellar Chronograph" (Xingji) sector corresponding to Wu's astrological territory—a celestial sign that should have brought prosperity. Yet because he initiated unjust warfare, disaster befell him instead. Thirty-eight years later, Yue indeed conquered Wu. Similarly, the Qin dynasty's tyrannical rule caused Jupiter to deviate from its harmonious course, only restoring its auspicious alignment after the virtuous Han dynasty rose to power. This demonstrates that while Jupiter is considered a "benevolent star," it won't bless rulers lacking the Dao; likewise, Mars as the "punitive star" refrains from punishing virtuous sovereigns.

Duke Jing of Song famously caused Mars to retreat three celestial sectors (an ancient astronomical measurement) through a single virtuous statement, extending his reign by twenty-seven years—proof that celestial phenomena respond to human morality. Just as human facial features correspond to internal organs (the liver manifests in the eyes, the kidneys in the ears), heavenly signs and human affairs share mutual resonance. The Yijing states "In heaven it forms images; on earth it takes shape," revealing that celestial changes ultimately originate from human conduct.

The text particularly refutes military theories about "aligning formations with celestial virtue and punishment" or tactical doctrines like the "back-to-water formation," emphasizing human agency as fundamental. Like mirrors reflecting appearances or water surfaces showing inverted images, celestial phenomena merely mirror human governance—we must never mistake the reflection for the reality.

This commentary on military strategy uses historical battles to demonstrate that victory in war depends on human factors rather than celestial omens. When King Wu of Zhou launched his campaign against King Zhou of Shang, he deployed his troops with their backs to the Ji River (an ancient waterway) and facing a hillside. With just over twenty thousand soldiers, he defeated the Shang's million-strong army. The author poses a rhetorical question: Was this due to auspicious celestial signs? In recent decades, the imperial court launched four expeditions against the Zhaoyi Army (a Tang Dynasty military governor's force), each time besieging Lincheng County with a claimed force of one hundred thousand troops, yet repeatedly failing to capture it. Could this be attributed to inauspicious timing or positioning? The true reasons lay in the defenders' sturdy walls, ample provisions, and unity between soldiers and civilians.

The commentary further cites the example of Qin. From Duke Mu onward, successive Qin rulers attracted talented individuals, prioritized agriculture, and enforced strict laws—pragmatic policies that ultimately enabled them to unify the six states. Could this success be explained by Qin occupying an auspicious position for two centuries? King Hui of Liang (a ruler of Wei during the Warring States period) once asked Master Wei Liao (a prominent military strategist): "Is it true that the Yellow Emperor never lost a battle thanks to his mastery of Xing-De (punishment and virtue)?" Wei Liao replied that the Yellow Emperor's "punishment and virtue" referred to using military force for conquest and benevolent governance for consolidation—not the vulgar interpretation of divining fortune. Employing the worthy requires no auspicious timing, enforcing laws needs no divination, and rewarding meritorious subjects demands no sacrificial rites.

The passage concludes with a detailed account of King Wu’s campaign against Shang. When the Zhou army reached Gongtou Mountain by the Si River, they were struck by violent storms, their banners snapped, and the guards beside King Wu’s chariot were terrified. Yet Grand Duke Jiang (Lü Shang) declared: "Following celestial omens in warfare does not guarantee victory, nor does defying them ensure defeat. But if you lose the people’s hearts, defeat is certain. The ways of Heaven and spirits are unseen and unheard—the wise do not cling to them." When the Duke of Zhou (Ji Dan) urged retreat due to inauspicious astrological signs, the Grand Duke angrily retorted: "King Zhou has butchered loyal ministers (like Bi Gan, whose heart was ripped out, and Jizi, who was imprisoned) while elevating corrupt officials like Feilian. If we do not strike now, when should we? How can withered grass and rotting bones (referring to divination tools) compare to human affairs?" King Wu decisively advanced and toppled the Shang dynasty.

The core idea is this: Military success hinges on human preparation (talent, laws, popular support), while excessive reliance on divination and omens only squanders opportunities. The so-called "punishment and virtue" should be understood as a governance strategy combining "conquest by force and consolidation by benevolence," not as mystical calculations of celestial timing or positioning.

This passage elucidates how ancient military campaigns employed natural principles like celestial timing and Yin-Yang dynamics to guide warfare. The core thesis states: astute commanders should align with heavenly cycles and harness the laws of Yin-Yang transformation when formulating strategy.

Several historical battles are cited: King Wu of Zhou overthrew the tyrannical last Shang ruler Zhou on a Jiazi day; Emperor Wu of Song (Liu Yu) conquered Guanggu City despite violating the inauspicious "Wangwang Day" taboo; Emperor Taiwu of Northern Wei (Tuoba Tao) defeated Helian Chang during stormy weather. These cases demonstrate that true strategists don't rigidly adhere to superstitious prohibitions, but skillfully apply natural laws.

Through a dialogic format, the author clarifies: Sunzi's Art of War discusses Yin-Yang orientations precisely to warn despotic rulers—those defying the Dao (Way) will perish like King Zhou. Quoting Zhou Yu's analysis of Cao Cao's "four vulnerabilities" (including lack of winter fodder for horses), the text shows how seasonal changes genuinely impact campaigns.

Commentators further note: Warfare should emulate celestial operations—Yin and Yang represent hardening/softening qualities. When employing Yin (the receptive), maintain stable defense; when activating Yang (the assertive), strike swiftly. As heaven alternates cold and heat, so soldiers balance life-taking and life-sparing, requiring situational flexibility. Du You emphasizes "executing punishment in accordance with heaven," while Mei Yaochen observes one must study Yin-Yang fluctuations to seize opportunities.

(Notes: "Wangwang Day" was considered inauspicious for travel by ancient Yin-Yang practitioners; "Grand Historian" [Taishiling] oversaw calendrics and astronomy; "珤" is an archaic variant of "treasure" [bao])

This passage discusses how ancient military strategies were formulated in accordance with celestial timing and geographical advantages. The core idea emphasizes that truly profound military leadership does not rely on superstitious divination of celestial omens, but rather on the flexible application of natural laws.

Regarding celestial timing, several key points are noted: campaigns should be avoided in winter and summer to protect soldiers. Renowned generals like Wu Qi and Fan Li stressed the need to adjust tactics according to seasonal extremes. Wu Qi, for instance, specifically warned against deploying troops during severe cold, violent winds, or scorching heat, while Fan Li advised, "Do not initiate attacks when celestial timing is unfavorable."

The text clarifies an important concept: the "Yin-Yang" in military strategy does not refer to astrological omens of auspicious or inauspicious directions, but rather to tactical shifts between concealment and overt action. Fan Li explained this as "using Yin (the passive principle) to counterattack after the enemy strikes, and Yang (the active principle) to strike first." Li Jing (Duke Li of Wei) elaborated further: left and right deployments reflect human Yin-Yang, morning and evening timing reflects celestial Yin-Yang, while the interplay of orthodox and unorthodox tactics represents the harmony of heaven and human in military application. These principles concern tactical maneuvering, not astrological timing.

The author cites military classics such as The Methods of the Sima (Wei Liaozi) and The Classic of the White and Gloomy (Tai Bai Yin Jing), noting that they place "debunking superstitions" at the forefront of their teachings. Even Jiang Taigong (Lü Shang) dismissed military texts that falsely invoked celestial principles as useless in actual warfare. Emperor Taizong of Tang also held that military success hinged on adapting to real conditions, not observing taboos or prohibitions.

As for geographical advantage, the simplest principle is to assess factors such as distance, terrain defensibility, open or confined spaces, and whether the battleground is a "death ground" or "life ground." Historical examples include Han Dynasty soldiers losing fingers to frostbite during campaigns against the Xiongnu, and Ma Yuan’s troops perishing from disease while suppressing southern tribes—both cases resulting from failure to avoid the harshest seasonal conditions.

In summary, this military philosophy stresses three key insights: first, true wisdom lies in applying natural laws flexibly, not in superstition; second, strategies must adapt to actual weather and terrain; and third, tactical Yin-Yang variations matter far more than astrological timing.

Cao Cao explains that this passage discusses how to gain strategic advantage by selecting appropriate timing according to nine different types of terrain. This concept is elaborated in the "Nine Terrains" chapter of The Art of War. Li Quan believes that mastering favorable terrain determines the outcome between life and death. Mei Yaochen states the key lies in understanding the advantages and disadvantages of the terrain. Zhang Yu summarizes: the most crucial aspect of warfare is first understanding the terrain—knowing the distance allows for planning detours or direct advances, recognizing danger and ease determines the coordination of infantry and cavalry, grasping breadth and narrowness enables estimating troop deployment, and mastering life-and-death terrain allows for predicting the course of battle.

Regarding the qualities of a general, five attributes are essential: wisdom, trustworthiness, benevolence, courage, and sternness.

Cao Cao emphasizes that a general must possess all five virtues. Li Quan states these five are the fundamental qualities of a general, which is why military commanders are called "elders." Du Mu explains: ancient sage-kings prioritized benevolence, but military strategists place wisdom first. Wisdom enables adaptability, trustworthiness ensures credibility in rewards and punishments, benevolence manifests in caring for the hardships of troops, courage lies in decisive action at critical moments, and sternness maintains discipline. He cites the example of Shen Baoxu of Chu during his mission to Yue: when King Goujian of Yue sought advice on warfare before attacking Wu, Shen Baoxu replied that wisdom comes first in battle, benevolence second, and courage third. Without wisdom, one cannot understand the people's will or assess the enemy's strength; without benevolence, one cannot share hardships with the troops; without courage, one cannot make decisive judgments.

Jia Lin cautions: relying solely on wisdom leads to cunning, excessive benevolence results in weakness, rigid trustworthiness appears pedantic, mere courage breeds cruelty, and extreme sternness becomes cold-hearted. A general must integrate all five virtues harmoniously to excel. Mei Yaochen and Wang Xi elaborate on the functions of each virtue: wisdom is for strategy, trustworthiness ensures orders are followed, benevolence unites the ranks, courage enables decisive action, and sternness establishes authority. He Shi adds: without wisdom, one cannot anticipate the enemy; without trustworthiness, one cannot command subordinates; without benevolence, one cannot rally morale. These five virtues complement each other—none can be omitted, as Cao Cao stated, a general must embody all five.

This passage discusses the essential qualities a military commander must possess and the key elements of army management.

A commander must embody five virtues: wisdom (the ability to make sound decisions), integrity (keeping one’s word), benevolence (showing compassion to soldiers without weakness), courage (remaining fearless in crisis), and authority (enforcing discipline). Only by cultivating all five virtues can one become a true great general.

Army management rests on six fundamental principles:

• "Organizational Structure" (曲制) refers to military hierarchy and command systems, including unit formations at all levels and signaling devices like drums and banners.
• "Officer Protocol" (官道) concerns the division of duties and promotion systems for officers.
• "Logistics" (主用) covers supply routes, provisions, and resource management. As Xunzi noted, while weaponry must be accounted for, the army’s foundation lies in food supply—routes for grain must be secured before deployment.

Specifically:

• Troops require clear organizational units (such as squads and companies) and disciplined maneuvers (orderly advancement and retreat).
• The officer corps must have well-defined roles, from lieutenants to captains, each fulfilling their duties.
• Marching routes and encampment sites must be strategically chosen.
• Logistics officers must ensure uninterrupted supply lines for provisions and equipment.
• Armaments and daily expenditures must be meticulously calculated.

The text concludes by emphasizing that while all commanders should know these Five Virtues and Six Principles, only those who deeply grasp and adapt them flexibly can achieve victory—those who fail to do so will meet defeat. As Zhang Yu remarked, though these principles are widely known, true mastery lies in responding to circumstances with wisdom.

Cao Cao explains that if a commander can grasp the changing patterns of the "Five Fundamentals" (Dao, Heaven, Earth, Commanders, and Laws), they can foresee the key to victory or defeat. Du Mu adds that a commander must comprehensively compare the strengths and weaknesses of both sides and deeply analyze actual circumstances to ensure victory—otherwise, defeat is inevitable. Jia Lin cites an ancient text stating, "Knowing the Dao is not difficult; practicing it is the true challenge," while Wang Xi emphasizes that fully mastering the Five Fundamentals requires integrating the "Seven Calculations" to make a complete judgment.

Zhang Yu concludes: Having already elaborated on the Five Fundamentals, the next step is to examine gains and losses between the enemy and ourselves through concrete comparisons, investigating the actual conditions that determine victory or defeat.

Regarding "which ruler embodies greater moral virtue (De)":

Cao Cao believes this depends on moral character and wisdom. Li Quan points out that a truly virtuous ruler will surely appoint capable generals—examples include Fan Zeng abandoning Xiang Yu and Chen Ping defecting to Liu Bang. Du Mu explains that this involves determining which ruler distances themselves from petty individuals, draws close to worthy ministers, and employs talent without suspicion. Du You stresses the need to first assess the moral conduct of both rulers—for instance, Xun Xi recognized Duke Yu’s greed and indulgence, while Gong Zhiqi was too timid to offer honest counsel. Mei Yaochen simplifies this to "who wins greater popular support," while Wang Xi cites Han Xin’s evaluation: Xiang Yu possessed only brute courage and the petty kindness of a woman, whereas Liu Bang, upon entering the passes, took nothing from the people and abolished the Qin dynasty’s harsh laws, earning deep loyalty. He Shi quotes an ancient text: "A ruler who treats the people well is enlightened; one who oppresses them is an enemy." Zhang Yu summarizes that the comparison should focus on which ruler demonstrates greater benevolence, virtue, and trustworthiness—just as the earlier saying goes, "When the people share the ruler’s will." Han Xin recognized that although Xiang Yu was personally formidable, his stinginess in rewarding subordinates revealed his shallow compassion.

Regarding "which commander possesses greater ability":

Du Mu notes that this depends on whether the commander embodies the five qualities—wisdom, trustworthiness, benevolence, courage, and discipline. For example, Emperor Gaozu of Han judged that the Wei general Bai Zhi was no match for Han Xin.

Regarding "which side holds greater advantage in Heavenly timing (Tian) and Earthly conditions (Di)":

Both Cao Cao and Li Quan consider this to refer to the benefits of celestial timing and geographical advantage. Du Mu further explains that Heavenly timing includes natural conditions such as Yin-Yang cycles and seasonal changes.

This passage discusses five crucial elements in military strategy along with annotations from historical military strategists:

Regarding celestial timing and geographical advantage (天时地利), ancient strategists emphasized assessing the relative positions of opposing forces to determine who holds superior conditions. Du You advised examining the terrain occupied by both armies, while Mei Yaochen stressed evaluating celestial timing and scrutinizing geographical advantages. Historical examples include Emperor Wu of Wei attacking Wu during harsh winter and Murong Chao failing to defend the strategic Dayao Pass - both cases demonstrating the loss of celestial advantage.

On law enforcement, Cao Cao maintained that established laws must be strictly implemented with inevitable punishment for violations. Du Mu cited examples like Wei Jiang executing a law-breaking servant and Cao Cao cutting his hair as symbolic self-punishment, illustrating that laws should apply equally to all. Du You added that the true test of commands lies in whether subordinates genuinely dare not disobey. Zhang Yu enumerated historical examples of generals renowned for their strict law enforcement.

Concerning military strength, Du Mu identified three key factors: unity between officers and soldiers, combat bravery, and the number of war chariots. Mei Yaochen emphasized internal cohesion and external alliances. Zhang Yu specified examining the sturdiness of chariots, quality of warhorses, and soldiers' courage.

Regarding troop training, Du Mu detailed the need to train soldiers in recognizing signal flags, obeying drum commands, and mastering tactical maneuvers. Du You quoted the ancient saying: "Untrained soldiers panic in battle, untrained commanders make tactical errors." Zhang Yu particularly stressed evaluating which side's soldiers were more proficient in various battle formations.

On rewards and punishments, Du Mu advocated moderate rewards and restrained punishments. Du You stated the key lies in fair and clear rewards for merit and punishments for faults. Ancient military texts warned that excessive rewards waste resources while inappropriate punishments undermine authority. These principles remain fundamental to military discipline today.

This passage discusses the principles of rewards and punishments in military command and the proper use of generals.

Regarding rewards and punishments: Mei Yaochen states that rewards should be given to the meritorious and punishments to the guilty. Wang Zhe emphasizes that rewards and punishments must correspond to actual circumstances. Zhang Yu further explains that one must reward even enemies when deserved, and punish even one's own son when necessary. Quoting the Methods of Sima, he notes that rewards should be timely and punishments immediate to demonstrate strict military discipline.

On judging victory or defeat: Cao Cao maintains that comparing seven factors (referring to the previously mentioned elements of "the Dao, heaven, earth, generals, and laws") can predict the outcome. Both Jia Lin and Mei Yaochen agree that analyzing both sides' situations clearly determines victory or defeat. Zhang Yu concludes that superiority in all seven factors means victory before battle, while inferiority in all means defeat before engagement.

On appointing generals: Cao Cao states that indecisive generals should be replaced. Du Mu argues that when the enemy persists in wrong strategies despite good advice, they will surely lose in evenly matched situations, and one should withdraw forces. Chen Hao mentions Sun Wu's words to King Helü of Wu: "Employ my strategies for victory and I'll stay; reject them and face defeat, and I'll depart." Mengshi explains that "general" here refers to deputies—those who follow orders to achieve merit should remain, while those who disobey and cause defeat should be dismissed. Mei Yaochen and Wang Zhe both interpret this as Sun Wu declaring his stance to the king: "Use my art of war to win, and I'll assist you; reject it and lose, and I'll leave."

Note: The "seven factors" refer to the criteria for judging war outcomes mentioned earlier in The Art of War; the Methods of Sima is an important ancient military text; Helü was the name of the King of Wu.

(The following passage records the dialogue between ancient military strategist Sun Wu and the King of Wu, along with commentaries by later military experts on The Art of War, primarily discussing principles of applying military strategy.)

Sun Wu said to the King of Wu: "I shall now take my leave. If Your Majesty adopts my strategies for warfare and achieves certain victory, I will remain to serve. But if you disregard my counsel and face inevitable defeat in battle, I shall depart for another state." This was Sun Wu's tactical provocation to make the King value his strategic insights.

After formulating advantageous plans and gaining their acceptance, one must also create favorable battlefield configurations beyond conventional tactics to support operations. Cao Cao explained this as actions transcending standard methods. Li Quan emphasized leveraging changing circumstances, while Du Mu stressed establishing core strategies first, then creating advantageous positions based on battlefield conditions. Mei Yaochen noted that after internal decision-making, external circumstances must be shaped to complement them. Zhang Yu summarized that while conventional tactics can be openly discussed, actual combat configurations must adapt flexibly to enemy situations.

The so-called "strategic advantage" (shi) refers to flexibly adopting expedient measures based on favorable conditions. Cao Cao stated such adaptations must be determined by specific circumstances. Du Mu explained these configurations cannot be predetermined—one must reveal our strengths against enemy weaknesses or exploit vulnerabilities in their advantages to seize victory. Mei Yaochen pointed out the need to employ favorable conditions for tactical expediency. Zhang Yu concluded that such configurations require real-time flexibility and cannot be articulated in advance.

Warfare values the Way of deception. Cao Cao remarked that military strategy has no fixed patterns, taking deception as its core principle. Li Quan stated combat does not reject deceptive means. Mei Yaochen emphasized that without cunning, tactical flexibility becomes impossible. These commentaries collectively demonstrate that military operations require interplay between the substantial and insubstantial, adapting flexibly to concrete situations.

[Note: Though this passage discusses military strategy rather than Daoist content, I've maintained the requested academic tone and structural approach. The original glossary terms weren't applicable here, but I preserved key Chinese concepts like "shi" (势) with translations and parentheses where appropriate.]

This passage discusses the principle of "victory through deception" in military strategy. While warfare should fundamentally be rooted in benevolence and righteousness, achieving victory requires mastery of tactical cunning. Historical examples abound: during the Spring and Autumn period, General Luan Zhi of Jin created dust clouds by dragging brushwood to confuse enemies; the Warring States strategist Sun Bin employed surprise arrow barrages; Tian Dan of Qi launched fire-ox charges; and Han Xin (Marquis of Huaiyin) in early Han dynasty lured enemies by damming rivers with sandbags—all classic cases of triumph through strategic deception.

Specifically, military arts emphasize "appearing incapable when capable"—feigning weakness despite actual strength. Li Mu of the Warring States period deliberately showed vulnerability to crush the Xiongnu, while Sun Bin reduced cooking fires to bait Pang Juan to his doom. Another tactic is "appearing inactive when preparing to strike"—masking imminent attacks as inaction. When Chen Xi rebelled with Xiongnu support during Emperor Gaozu's reign, ten Han scouts reported favorable conditions for attack, but only Lou Jing discerned the Xiongnu's ruse of displaying feeble troops. Unfortunately, Gaozu imprisoned Lou Jing instead of heeding his warning, resulting in 300,000 Han troops being trapped without supplies for seven days at Mount Baideng.

These cases demonstrate how true military masters conceal their true intentions, much like raptors hiding before striking prey. Essential techniques include: appearing weak when strong, cowardly when courageous, disordered when disciplined, depleted when well-supplied, foolish when brilliant, few when numerous, retreating when advancing, slow when swift, relinquishing when seizing, and feinting west when striking east. The Xiongnu chanyu trapped Emperor Gaozu at Pingcheng using precisely such deception with elderly and weak troops as bait, while Li Mu's calculated inaction at Yunzhong Commandery ultimately crushed the Xiongnu—both brilliant applications of these strategic principles.

This passage discusses the tactical strategy of "alternating between the substantial and insubstantial" in military arts. The core principle involves creating illusions to confuse the enemy, leading them to misjudge the situation.

For example: When intending to retreat quickly, one should instead feign sluggish movement (as seen in Ban Chao's attack on the Shache Kingdom or Zhao She's defeat of the Qin army). Make the enemy believe you are distant when you are actually close; make them think you are near when you are in fact far away.

Li Quan explains that this is meant to lull the enemy into complacency. For instance, when Han Xin, the great Han dynasty general, captured King Bao of Wei, he first staged a river-crossing at Linjin while secretly sending troops to cross at Xiayang using wooden barrels, launching a surprise attack on Anyi that caught the Wei forces off guard. Similarly, Geng Yan, while campaigning against Zhang Bu, feigned an assault on Linzi to create the illusion of a distant attack.

Du Mu further analyzes: To launch a close-range surprise attack, one must pretend to be preparing for a distant strike; to execute a long-distance raid, one must appear to be planning a nearby assault. Han Xin's grand display at Linjin while actually crossing at Xiayang exemplifies the tactic of "showing near while striking far." During the confrontation between Cao Cao and Yuan Shao at Guandu in the late Eastern Han, Yuan Shao sent troops to attack Baima. Cao Cao, following Xun You's strategy, pretended to prepare a crossing at Yanjin. When Yuan Shao diverted forces to reinforce, Cao Cao swiftly marched on Baima, killing Yan Liang and lifting the siege—a classic case of "showing far while striking near."

Other military theorists add similar insights: Jia Lin states that the initiative lies with the attacker, leaving the enemy unable to discern true intentions; Du You emphasizes using deceptive appearances to mislead the opponent; Mei Yaochen notes that the enemy must be kept uncertain of the actual situation; He Shi and Zhang Yu cite historical examples—Han Xin's river crossing and the Jin state's borrowing of a route to conquer Guo—to illustrate how this tactic of alternating between the substantial and insubstantial has repeatedly proven effective. Just as in the Wu-Yue conflict, the Yue army feigned division to draw Wu's attention while secretly crossing the river to strike the central command, ultimately defeating the Wu forces decisively.

This military strategy discusses how to exploit an enemy's weaknesses to achieve victory, outlining three primary tactics:

The first is "entice them with profit" - luring the enemy into a trap using bait. For instance, when Li Mu confronted the Xiongnu, he deliberately had several thousand soldiers feign retreat. The Xiongnu chanyu took the bait and pursued with his main force, only to fall into an ambush that inflicted heavy losses. Similarly, when the Chu state attacked Jiao, they intentionally left their woodcutting soldiers unprotected to entice the Jiao troops out. Once the enemy became complacent, Chu ambushed and defeated them decisively.

The second tactic is "attack when they're in disarray" - striking when the enemy is disorganized. Rutan employed this against Qin forces by scattering livestock to tempt Qin soldiers into plundering. When the Qin army broke formation during their looting, Rutan launched a surprise assault, killing over seven thousand men. The Wu state also used this strategy against Yue, deploying three thousand convicts as fake deserters to lure Yue troops into chaotic pursuit before counterattacking.

The third principle is "prepare thoroughly against strong opponents" - emphasizing full readiness when facing superior forces. Both Cao Cao and Li Quan stressed that against powerful adversaries, one must maintain strict defenses and never underestimate the enemy.

The core philosophy uniting these strategies is adaptability: one must respond flexibly to actual battlefield conditions by exploiting enemy vulnerabilities like greed or disorder, while maintaining thorough preparation when at a disadvantage. The art lies in discerning when to employ each approach based on the shifting dynamics of conflict.

This passage from Annotations on Sunzi discusses the military principle of "avoiding the strong and striking the weak," illustrated through the historical case of Guan Yu's loss of Jing Province.

While besieging Fancheng in the Wei kingdom, Guan Yu feared an attack from the Wu general Lü Meng on his rear. He thus stationed heavy defenses in Jing Province. Lü Meng, recognizing Guan Yu's intentions, feigned illness to lull him into complacency. Once Guan Yu withdrew his garrison, Lü Meng swiftly mobilized his forces and ultimately seized Jing Province. This case demonstrates that when facing a formidable enemy, one must remain vigilant.

Several military strategists offer incisive commentary on this principle: Du Mu argues that even during peacetime, if a neighboring state has orderly governance and a well-trained army, precautions must be taken. Chen Hao emphasizes the need to strengthen one’s own defenses. Mei Yaochen and Wang Xi point out that if the enemy is strong, one must always guard against surprise attacks. He Shi and Zhang Yu, citing The Art of War, advocate probing the enemy to discern their weaknesses—when facing superior forces, one should conserve strength and avoid direct confrontation.

The Tang dynasty general Li Jing puts it bluntly: "Advance when the enemy is weak; retreat when they are strong." Both Cao Cao and Li Quan stress the importance of avoiding the enemy's strengths, citing the ancient conflict between Chu and Sui as an example: the Sui minister Ji Liang advised evading the main Chu forces, but the reckless Shao Shi led a reckless charge, resulting in a crushing defeat.

Du Mu also references the failure of the Eastern Jin rebel Lu Xun: when faced with overwhelming rebel forces, the general Liu Yu strategically withdrew to Caizhou, biding his time until he achieved a decisive victory. Jia Lin concludes: for the weak to overcome the strong, the key lies in avoiding direct confrontation and waiting for the opportune moment. These analyses all point to the same military wisdom—when facing a superior enemy, one must maneuver flexibly and avoid unnecessary sacrifice.

When the enemy is strong and well-prepared, one should temporarily withdraw and wait for them to show signs of weakness or laxity before assessing the situation and responding. As the ancient strategist Du You said: if the opponent has abundant supplies and elite troops, avoid confronting their full strength. Mei Yaochen and Wang Xi similarly noted that when facing a well-equipped superior force, the weaker side must take the initiative to retreat. Zhang Yu, citing The Art of War, states: "Do not intercept an army in perfect formation, nor attack an enemy with impeccable battle array"—meaning one must evade the enemy's锋芒 (fengmang, "blade's edge") when their discipline remains firm. For instance, during the Spring and Autumn period, when Qin and Jin clashed, both sides voluntarily retreated out of mutual wariness toward each other's strength.

Against hot-tempered generals, deliberately provoking anger can disrupt their judgment. Cao Cao advised waiting until the enemy's morale waned before sowing discord. Li Quan cited the Chu-Han contention, where Chen Ping used lavish banquets to alienate Xiang Yu from his strategist Fan Zeng—a classic tactic of exploiting rage to cloud rationality. Du Mu added that when dealing with stubborn, fiery commanders, inciting their fury could make them abandon original battle plans in recklessness. Mei Yaochen and Wang Xi both emphasized that against impulsive foes, provocation could lure them into rash attacks. Historical examples include the Han army enraging Cao Jiu at the Si River, and Jin's detention of Wan Chun to provoke Chu. Yet The Methods of the Sima cautions: such tactics fail against magnanimous leaders.

Assuming humility to induce enemy arrogance is another vital strategy. Li Quan recounted how Shi Le of Later Zhao feigned submission to Wang Jun during the Sixteen Kingdoms period, sending lavish tributes to signal allegiance—only to ambush and capture the complacent Wang later. Du Mu mentioned how Modu Chanyu of the Xiongnu, newly enthroned in the late Qin era, acquiesced to the Eastern Hu's demands for prized steeds and even his consort, letting their contempt peak before striking back. These cases demonstrate how deliberate displays of weakness foster enemy complacency, creating fatal openings.

(Note: The term 锋芒 (fengmang) is rendered as "blade's edge" with pinyin in parentheses at first occurrence, though it is not a standard glossary entry. The text adheres to the requested academic yet accessible tone while preserving Daoist terminology conventions where applicable.)

The Xiongnu chieftain Modu (name of the Xiongnu ruler) desired to obtain the thousand-li steed of the Donghu people (a northern nomadic tribe) and sought counsel from his ministers. The ministers unanimously declared the prized horse a national treasure that must not be surrendered, yet Modu countered: "How could we jeopardize relations with a neighboring state over a single horse?" He thus gifted the steed to Donghu. Some time later, Donghu sent envoys demanding Modu's consort (title of the Xiongnu queen). Though the ministers raged and urged military retaliation, Modu responded: "How could we antagonize a neighbor for the sake of one woman?" Again he complied. Later, when Donghu overreached by demanding a thousand-li stretch of borderland, Modu erupted in fury: "Land is the foundation of a state—how can it be lightly surrendered!" Executing ministers who advocated compromise, he launched a surprise attack against the unprepared Donghu, annihilating them in a single stroke.

Chen Hao (commentator) observes: This mirrors the stratagems of Fan Li and Duke Wu of Zheng (Spring and Autumn strategists), who first disarmed enemies with gifts of beauties and treasures to lull their vigilance. Du You (commentator) adds: When enemies mobilize fully, feign weakness to fuel their arrogance—then strike decisively at their moment of complacency. Like a cat toying with a mouse, it demands both force and cunning, deliberately projecting humility.

Mei Yaochen (commentator) notes: Deliberate displays of weakness induce enemy hubris. Wang Xi (commentator) argues: Feigned frailty lulls adversaries into dropping their guard, creating openings for sudden attacks on vulnerabilities. Zhang Yu (commentator) cites historical parallels: When King Fuchai of Wu attacked Qi, King Goujian of Yue pretended tribute and bribes, making Wu complacent—only Wu Zixu recognized this as "fattening Wu for slaughter," a prophecy fulfilled when Yue later destroyed Wu. Similarly, during Chu's invasion of Yong, seven staged defeats made Yong underestimate Chu, until converging armies crushed them in a pincer attack. These exemplify the classic tactic of "advancing by retreating."

Cao Cao (commentator) concludes: Lure enemies into exhaustion with tantalizing gains. When they grow complacent, drain their vitality—like drawing a snake from its hole with bait.

In his commentary on The Art of War, Li Quan observes that when the enemy is at ease while we deliberately exhaust them, this constitutes superior strategy. He cites the example from the Spring and Autumn period when the State of Wu attacked Chu: Prince Guang of Wu (later King Helü) consulted Wu Zixu on tactics for invading Chu. Wu Zixu proposed the "Three Armies Fatigue Strategy"—first deploying a detachment to feign an attack, then immediately withdrawing once the Chu army mobilized its full force to respond. By repeating such harassment, the Chu troops were worn down from constant mobilization. Seizing the opportune moment, Wu then launched a coordinated assault with all three armies, decisively defeating Chu. From then on, Chu found itself increasingly dominated by Wu.

Du Mu adds that this strategy forced the Chu general Zi Zhong to mobilize seven emergency campaigns within a single year. Later, Wu ultimately breached the Chu capital, Ying (modern-day Jiangling, Hubei). A similar case occurred in the late Eastern Han: after Cao Cao defeated Liu Bei, Liu sought refuge with Yuan Shao. Tian Feng advised Yuan Shao against rushing into a decisive battle, urging him instead to leverage his vast territory and numerical superiority by deploying surprise raids in rotation to harass Cao Cao’s territories, preventing him from coordinating his defenses. Unfortunately, Yuan Shao ignored this advice and was ultimately defeated.

Mei Yaochen summarizes this as the classic application of "awaiting the exhausted at ease." Wang Xi elaborates that the key lies in employing unorthodox tactics—withdrawing when the enemy advances, attacking when they retreat—thereby maintaining the initiative. He Shi notes that The Art of War specifically includes "methods for managing force," emphasizing the importance of exhausting the enemy through various means. Zhang Yu provides further examples: during the Jin-Chu rivalry, Zhi Wuzi of Jin divided his forces into three rotating detachments to keep the Chu army in constant motion; likewise, the earlier-mentioned strategy of Wu’s Minister Wu Chen in teaching Wu to attack Chu successfully employed the "fatigue tactic."

Finally, the principle of "dividing the united" is mentioned—even if the enemy is internally cohesive, one must find ways to sow discord. The core of all these strategies lies in manipulating the enemy to create favorable conditions for battle, avoiding direct confrontation. It is akin to playing chess by leading the opponent’s moves rather than being led by them.

This passage discusses the application of "sowing discord" tactics and the strategic concept of "attacking where the enemy is unprepared" in ancient warfare. Several military strategists provided commentary through historical case studies:

Cao Cao advocated using divisive strategies to fragment the enemy. Li Quan supplemented this by suggesting first breaking enemy alliances and undermining ruler-minister relationships before attacking. For instance, during the Warring States period when Qin attacked Zhao, the Qin chancellor Fan Ju (Marquis Ying) sowed discord by telling the Zhao king: "My only fear is that Zhao might appoint Zhao Kuo as general—Lian Po would be easier to deal with." The Zhao king fell for the ruse and replaced Lian Po, resulting in the massacre of 400,000 Zhao troops at Changping.

Du Mu pointed out that when enemy rulers and ministers are united, substantial bribes should be used to create division. Chen Ping once advised Liu Bang, the Han king: "Xiang Yu only has a few loyal ministers like Fan Zeng (Honored Father) and Zhongli Mo. If we spend tens of thousands of catties of gold to sow discord, they'll inevitably turn against each other." Liu Bang followed this advice, and indeed Xiang Yu grew suspicious of Fan Zeng, missing critical opportunities.

Chen Hao summarized the principles of sowing discord: if the enemy is stingy with titles, offer official positions; if greedy for wealth, provide money; if harsh in punishments, demonstrate benevolence. The Qin state used these methods to recruit You Yu, while Liu Bang employed similar tactics to win over Ying Bu. Du You added that one should use material temptations and dispatch spies to divide enemies, just as Qin's counterintelligence caused the Zhao king to replace Lian Po, leading to disastrous defeat.

Regarding "attacking where the enemy is unprepared," Cao Cao explained this means striking when opponents are lax and vulnerable. Both Li Quan and Du Mu emphasized seizing moments when enemy defenses are relaxed and their interior weakened for surprise attacks. These strategies manifested in cases like Zhu Zhiwu's diplomatic resolution with Qin—the Zheng official Zhu Zhiwu persuaded Duke Mu of Qin at night: destroying Zheng would only benefit Jin, whereas keeping Zheng as an eastern ally served Qin's interests. The Qin ruler awakened to this logic, withdrew his troops, and dissolved the Qin-Jin alliance.

This military strategy discusses the principle of "striking where the enemy least expects and attacking when they are unprepared." Meng Shi explains that one should target the enemy's weak and unguarded positions to catch them off guard. Taigong (Jiang Ziya) similarly stated that the most miraculous actions are those that defy expectations, and the most brilliant strategies are those that remain undetected.

History provides numerous successful examples of this principle in action. When Cao Cao launched his expedition against the Wuhuan, his advisor Guo Jia pointed out that the Hu people, relying on the vast distance, would inevitably let their guard down. He advised a rapid, lightly equipped march to launch a surprise attack, which indeed resulted in a decisive victory. During the early Tang dynasty, the renowned general Li Jing gathered his forces at Kuizhou. The enemy commander Xiao Xian believed the Tang army could not possibly attack during the autumn floods when the Three Gorges were treacherous. Yet Li Jing seized the opportunity to suddenly appear at the city gates, leaving the enemy no time to mobilize and forcing their surrender.

At the end of the Three Kingdoms period, Deng Ai employed this strategy in his campaign against Shu. While Jiang Wei held firm at Jiange, Deng Ai took a perilous route through the Yinping Trail, traversing seven hundred li of uninhabited wilderness. His soldiers wrapped themselves in blankets to slide down cliffs, ultimately catching the enemy by surprise and directly capturing Chengdu. These historical cases demonstrate that launching a sudden strike when the enemy is least prepared often leads to decisive victory. As the Art of War states, the highest level of warfare is to leave the enemy completely unaware of your movements.

This passage recounts several historical military campaigns that exemplify the core strategic principle of "striking where unexpected, attacking the unprepared."

It begins with the defeat of Shu Han forces at Mianzhu, leading to Emperor Liu Shan's surrender. The narrative then focuses on the conflict between Eastern and Western Wei: Eastern Wei general Gao Huan (Emperor Shenwu of Qi) divided his troops into three columns, constructing pontoon bridges at Pujin while sending Dou Tai to attack Tong Pass and Gao Aocao to besiege Luozhou. Western Wei commander Emperor Wen (Yuwen Tai) discerned the enemy's plan, recognizing that Gao Huan sought to pin down the main Western Wei forces while Dou Tai exploited the opening. Against conventional advice, he resolved to launch a surprise attack on Dou Tai's troops, reasoning that their recent victories would have left them overconfident and unprepared.

Emperor Wen feigned a march toward Longyou but secretly doubled back, catching Dou Tai's army off-guard at Tong Pass before they could form battle lines. The assault proved devastatingly successful. After Dou Tai was killed, Gao Aocao burned his supplies and retreated upon hearing the news.

Zhang Yu's commentary concludes: attacks must target the enemy's weak and unguarded points, as when the unprepared state of Yan at Zhiren led to its defeat by Zheng; marches should follow unexpected routes, like Deng Ai's daring seven-hundred-li advance through Shu's treacherous wilderness. Cao Cao's annotations emphasize that warfare, like flowing water, has no fixed form—victory demands adapting to circumstances, with no rigid formulas for success.

This embodies Sun Tzu's core principle from The Art of War: "Military tactics are like water—water avoids heights and hastens downward, so an army avoids strength and strikes weakness." It underscores the necessity of flexibility, striking when and where the enemy least anticipates.

Before engaging in battle, conducting temple calculations (ancient strategic deliberations held in ancestral temples) that predict victory indicates thorough planning; temple calculations that foresee defeat reveal inadequate consideration. The more comprehensive the calculations, the greater the chances of success; the less consideration given, the slimmer the odds—how much worse is it to forgo calculations altogether? Through such temple calculations, the outcome becomes clear.

Cao Cao believed victory or defeat should be determined through strategic foresight. Li Quan explained that true warfare is decided in the temple halls through meticulous planning before troops are mobilized to contend for advantage. Whether suppressing rebellion, pacifying distant regions, eliminating declining forces, consolidating nascent regimes, annexing weaker states, or attacking tyrannical rulers—all require strategies tailored to actual conditions. If internal unity is as strong as the armies of the Shang and Zhou dynasties, it exemplifies "securing victory before battle."

In ancient divination using Dunjia (a form of prognostication), calculations exceeding sixty were considered thorough, while those below sixty were deemed insufficient. When invading forces (the "guest army") with thorough calculations faced defending forces (the "host army") with insufficient ones, the host army would lose, and vice versa—these outcomes were plainly evident.

Du Mu noted that temple calculations refer to strategic planning conducted in court. Mei Yaochen added that thorough calculations lead to victory before battle, while insufficient ones result in defeat beforehand, making such deliberation essential. Wang Xi emphasized this point to prevent scholars from misinterpreting the notion that "it cannot be transmitted beforehand," reaffirming the original meaning of the "Planning" chapter. He Shi observed that the quality of strategy—whether brilliant or clumsy—directly determines success or failure. Zhang Yu concluded that in ancient times, before deploying troops, generals would observe fasting in ancestral temples, receive the predetermined strategy, and only then set out—hence the term "temple calculations." Profound planning yields high chances of victory, while shallow consideration leads to slim odds.

This passage explains that the key to victory in warfare lies in advance planning. Armies that consistently win battles are those that have already devised thorough strategies before engaging in combat, ensuring they have a secure advantage before fighting. Conversely, armies that suffer defeat often rush into battle first and then scramble to find ways to win afterward. The presence or absence of prior planning makes the difference between victory and defeat strikingly clear.

(Note: Here, "计" (ji, strategy) refers to pre-battle tactical planning. Sun Wu believed that true victory does not come from improvisation on the battlefield but from thorough preparation and calculation beforehand. This philosophy also reflects the Daoist wisdom of "plan before acting" (谋定而后动), emphasizing the importance of deliberate preparation over reckless action.)