《孫子註解》Vol. 2

This passage details the organizational structure and logistical support systems of ancient military forces. Cao Cao explains that "chariots" (驰车) refer to lightweight war chariots drawn by four horses, while "leather-covered chariots" (革车) are heavy transport vehicles also pulled by four horses. For every ten thousand heavy chariots, thirty thousand soldiers are required—two assigned to cooking, one responsible for clothing and equipment, two tending to the horses, totaling five personnel per unit. Infantry units allocate one ox-drawn cart per ten soldiers, with two cooks and one quartermaster, making three support personnel per group.

Li Quan proposes that each chariot should be supported by seventy infantrymen, meaning a thousand chariots would require seventy thousand foot soldiers and four thousand horses. Sun Tzu uses a baseline of one hundred thousand troops for calculating army formations, from which one could extrapolate the configuration for a million-strong army.

Du Mu further elaborates that light chariots serve combat purposes, while leather-covered chariots (also called supply carts or heavy wagons) transport weapons, provisions, and clothing. According to the ancient Sima's Art of War: each combat chariot requires three armored soldiers, seventy-two infantrymen, ten cooks, five quartermasters, five grooms, and five laborers—totaling seventy-five personnel per unit; heavy transport vehicles need twenty-five crew members. Thus two vehicles form a hundred-man squad, meaning a hundred-thousand-strong army would require a thousand supply carts.

Mei Yaochen and Wang Xi separately analyze the staffing standards for light and heavy chariots: twenty-five personnel per light chariot versus seventy-five per heavy chariot, with one thousand units of each type necessitating a total of one hundred thousand troops. These commentaries collectively examine the personnel allocation and logistical frameworks of ancient military organization.

This passage explains the calculation methods for chariot deployment and logistical supply in ancient military operations.

Regarding chariot organization: Light chariots (驰车) were drawn by four horses, called a "team of four" (驷). One thousand such chariots constituted "a thousand teams." Cao Cao's commentary notes that heavy armored chariots (革车) were equipment only available to major feudal states, with each armored chariot manned by five armed soldiers. According to the military service system based on the well-field system, each chariot was assigned three armored warriors and seventy-two infantrymen, totaling seventy-five thousand men for a thousand chariots. The mention of "a hundred thousand armored troops" likely refers to temporary regulations of that period, with He Shi suggesting "a hundred thousand" was an approximate figure. Zhang Yu further explains: light chariots were used for offense, while armored chariots served defensive purposes. Cao Cao's military treatise records in detail that each offensive chariot had seventy-five personnel, while each defensive chariot had twenty-five (including cooks, quartermasters, grooms, and woodcutters). Two thousand chariots divided equally between offense and defense would correspond precisely to an army of a hundred thousand.

Concerning logistical supply: Transporting provisions (馈粮) over a thousand li incurred tremendous costs. Li Quan points out that distant campaigns would exhaust state treasuries, with routine expenses like diplomatic envoy exchanges and equipment maintenance (胶漆 referring to materials for weapon upkeep) alone consuming "a thousand pieces of gold." Du Mu adds that provisioning over a thousand li required twenty civilian laborers to support one soldier. Jia Lin emphasizes the necessity of meticulous calculation, citing Grand Marshal Li (Li Jing) who said military camps should hold special discussions about such expenditures. Mei Yaochen views the costs of maintaining a hundred thousand troops with thousand-li supply lines as a warning about protracted warfare. Wang Xi explains "internal and external" refers to domestic territory versus battlefield camps, with "guests" including both feudal lords' envoys and banquets for officers and soldiers.

This passage from Annotations on Sunzi primarily discusses the perils of prolonged military campaigns.

When a war drags on before achieving victory, the troops grow exhausted, and morale plummets. Forcing an attack on a fortified city drains both manpower and resources ("屈力殫貨" means strength is depleted and supplies exhausted). Ancient military strategists elaborate: Cao Cao explains "钝" as fatigue and "屈" as exhaustion; Du Mu argues that even if a protracted war ends in victory, it damages weapons and weakens morale; Mei Yaochen adds that prolonged sieges inevitably lead to the depletion of strength.

Keeping armies in the field for extended periods strains state finances. Mengshi points out that campaigns spanning thousands of li exhaust military provisions, just as Emperor Wu of Han’s constant warfare emptied the treasury, forcing him to issue an edict of self-reproach. Zhang Yu describes military expenditures as "a thousand gold daily," emphasizing how unsustainable prolonged warfare is for any state.

The greatest danger arises when exhausted troops and drained finances invite opportunistic attacks from rival states. Li Quan cites Emperor Yang of Sui as an example: his relentless warmongering led to defeat at Yanmen Pass, leaving his forces depleted. At that point, even the wisest strategist ("智者") could not reverse the disaster.

The passage details specific war expenditures: "宾客" refers to costs for diplomats and advisors, "胶漆" to materials for weapon repairs, and "车甲" to chariot maintenance and armaments. Sustaining an army of 100,000 requires massive daily expenses ("a thousand gold" is hyperbolic, signifying immense costs), not including additional rewards for officers and soldiers.

This commentary discusses the critical importance of achieving "quick and decisive victory" in military operations. Several strategists illustrate through historical cases how prolonged warfare exhausts a state's financial resources and military strength, creating opportunities for enemies to exploit.

When supply lines stretch across distant regions like the Liao and Huai Rivers, and armies march thousands of miles, the state's treasury is drained. Historical figures like Yang Xuangan and Li Mi rose in rebellion precisely when the Sui Dynasty's power was weakened. Even capable ministers like Su Wei and Gao Jiong could not salvage the situation at that point.

Du Mu points out that when war drags on, depleting both wealth and manpower, rival warlords will seize the moment to strike. At such times, even the wisest strategists cannot devise a perfect plan. Jia Lin puts it more bluntly: when morale collapses and resources run dry, not even legendary statesmen like Yi Yin or Lü Shang could reverse the tide. Du You adds that even if military tactics are sound at the time, they cannot prevent future calamities.

Mei Yaochen cites the example of prolonged sieges and territorial campaigns wearing down an army, leaving it vulnerable to enemy ambushes. Wang Zhe argues that such predicaments inevitably lead to national peril. He Shi further analyzes that when one's own forces are weakened and enemies exploit the opening, even the most brilliant advisors cannot guarantee survival. Zhang Yu uses the example of Wu invading Chu: after Wu forces occupied the Chu capital Ying and lingered too long, Yue seized the opportunity to invade Wu—at which point even renowned generals like Wu Zixu and Sun Wu could not remedy the situation.

Thus, military strategy emphasizes that "a crude but swift victory is preferable to a clever but prolonged one." Cao Cao and Li Quan state that even if the method is unrefined, speed is paramount. Du Mu explains that in seizing cities and territory, it is better to adopt straightforward tactics and prioritize lightning speed, avoiding the pitfalls of exhausting troops, squandering resources, and blunting military momentum. Meng and Chen Hao liken this speed to "a thunderclap too fast to cover one's ears." Mei Yaochen and Wang Zhe agree that while swift victory may appear rough, prolonged warfare—no matter how sophisticated—invites hidden dangers. He Shi cites the standoff between Later Qin’s Yao Chang and Fu Deng to illustrate that while rapid campaigns may be imperfect, protracted warfare, no matter how artful, risks breeding future disasters.

This passage recounts several historical military cases emphasizing the strategic principle that "in warfare, simplicity and speed are most valued." The first story describes how the Former Qin general Yao Chang faced off against enemy forces alongside Yao Shuode. While Yao Shuode advocated for cautious tactics, Yao Chang judged that the enemy's slow movements and lack of situational awareness called for a swift, decisive strike—a decision that led to a resounding victory.

The second case involves Xu Jingye of the Tang Dynasty, who raised an army against Empress Wu Zetian. His advisor Wei Sigong urged him to cross the Huai River swiftly and march directly on Luoyang, capitalizing on the loyalty of Shandong troops to strike quickly. However, another advisor, Xue Zhang, argued for first securing Jinling (modern Nanjing) as a base before advancing north. Xu Jingye followed the latter strategy, only to fail due to the dispersion of his forces.

The passage concludes with commentary from military strategists: Zhang Yu asserts that it is better to win through simple, rapid action than through elaborate but delayed maneuvers. Li Quan quotes the Spring and Autumn Annals to compare warfare to playing with fire—if not controlled promptly, it will consume the player. Jia Lin and Du You both warn that prolonged warfare invites unforeseen disasters, citing the example of Zhi Bo’s year-long siege of Zhao, which ultimately led to his defeat. These discussions converge on a single core principle: protracted war brings only harm to the state, while swift, decisive action remains the superior strategy.

This passage presents ancient military strategists' commentaries on The Art of War, primarily discussing the dual nature of advantages and disadvantages in warfare. The essence is:

One who fails to comprehend the dangers of military engagement cannot truly understand its benefits. Li Quan observes that advantages (li) and harms (hai) are interdependent—only by first recognizing potential dangers can one discern true benefits. Du Mu elaborates that the harm of warfare lies in exhausting the people and draining resources, while its benefit manifests in territorial expansion. If a commander fails to consider potential calamities that may befall his own forces, even his own troops may turn into enemies—how then could he possibly gain advantages from actual adversaries?

The strategists cite historical lessons: Duke Mu of Qin saw only the advantage in his surprise attack on Zheng, overlooking the disastrous defeat at Mount Xiao; King Fuchai of Wu reveled in his victory over Qi while forgetting the impending catastrophe of Gusu's fall. Mei Yaochen notes that avoiding repeated conscription and multiple grain shipments may seem advantageous, but impoverishing the populace and depleting state coffers constitutes real harm.

The master strategist achieves "no repeated conscription (bu zai ji), no triple grain shipments (bu san zai)"—as Cao Cao explains: victory should be achieved with a single conscription without needing recall; initial supply lines should be replaced by capturing enemy provisions, eliminating repetitive transport. Li Quan cites the Qin dynasty's example—excessive conscription from Guanzhong ultimately sparked the Chen Sheng-Wu Guang uprising. Du Mu concludes that one must first assess comparative strengths between enemy and ally before mobilizing troops, ensuring swift, decisive victories.

(Note: ji refers to conscription registers; san zai denotes multiple supply transports; Mount Xiao (Xiaohan) signifies the strategic mountain pass; Gusu was the Wu capital.)

Chen Hao explains that "ji" (conscription) means avoiding repeated levies. Just as with military provisions—transporting supplies during the campaign but only needing to receive troops upon victory—this prevents triple transportation, sparing both soldiers from exhaustion and the state from financial depletion, emphasizing the advantages of swift resolution. Mei Yaochen and Wang Xi both endorse Chen Hao's supplementary commentary on Cao Cao's annotations.

Zhang Yu elaborates further: "Yi" (military service) refers to large-scale campaigns, as stated in the "Shi Gua" hexagram—undertaking major military operations without success invites disaster; "ji" denotes conscription credentials (the Han dynasty had specific "foot-long conscription tallies" for troop mobilization). The emphasis lies in achieving victory with a single campaign to avoid draining state resources through repeated conscriptions. Regarding provisions: carry supplies when departing, requisition grain locally after entering enemy territory, and simply receive troops when returning—this prevents triple transportation, illustrating why prolonged warfare is inadvisable.

Weapons and equipment should be brought from one's own state, while provisions are obtained from enemy territory—this ensures adequate military supplies. Cao Cao notes that arms come from one's homeland while provisions are taken from the enemy. Li Quan adds that carrying domestic weapons while utilizing enemy grain prevents shortages even during thousand-mile expeditions. Du You cites the historical example of Jin troops requisitioning grain in Chu territory. Mei Yaochen summarizes: military equipment originates domestically, while provisions rely on enemy lands.

He Shi explains "procuring provisions from the enemy" as collecting grain from enemy fields during campaigns abroad and seizing stored supplies after capturing cities. Zhang Yu analyzes: lightweight equipment is easily transported from home, while heavy grain depends on enemy resources. Thousand-mile grain transport starves soldiers—local procurement ensures supply.

The primary cause of a state's impoverishment through war lies in long-distance transportation. Li Quan identifies frequent conscriptions and heavy taxation as contributing factors. Du Mu quotes Guan Zhong: "Grain transported three hundred li depletes a year's state reserves; four hundred li consumes two years' reserves; five hundred li brings famine to the people"—demonstrating grain's cumbersome nature. Extended transport wastes arable land and impoverishes citizens daily. Jia Lin supplements: long-haul transportation exhausts finances with severe transit losses. Meng Shi emphasizes: war chariots transporting grain over thousand-mile distances...

This passage primarily examines the economic burdens that warfare imposes on both the state and its people. When an army of 100,000 soldiers wages war a thousand miles away, it requires the support of 700,000 households to supply military provisions, inevitably leading to widespread impoverishment. Near military encampments, merchants seize the opportunity to inflate prices (selling at exorbitant rates), forcing commoners to exhaust their family resources just to purchase daily necessities.

Commentators from various perspectives offer additional insights: Cao Cao points out that once troops cross borders, surrounding regions experience drastic price surges; Li Quan emphasizes that black markets inevitably emerge near military bases; Jia Lin analyzes how people might initially profit but ultimately face bankruptcy as supplies are depleted; Du You argues that such irregular trade drains state finances; Mei Yaochen distinguishes between the hardships caused by long-distance transportation and local price gouging, both of which impoverish the people and weaken the nation.

Prolonged warfare leads to two major consequences: First, local taxation (qiu corvée labor) intensifies, potentially breaking conventions—as seen during Duke Cheng of Lu’s reign, when a single "qiu" (normally responsible for 16 wells) was forced to bear the tax burden of a "dian" (64 wells). Second, the nation’s resources are depleted, with the people losing seventy percent of their wealth. Cao Cao specifically notes that even when civilian resources are exhausted, if the war continues, grain must still be transported to the frontlines—this is the root of the "seven-tenths loss." Li Quan adds that protracted warfare also fractures families and fuels public resentment.

This passage describes the heavy burdens ancient warfare imposed on common people. According to the military taxation system recorded in The Methods of the Sima: six chi made one step, one hundred steps made one mu (measurement of land), one hundred mu supported one man, three men formed one household, three households formed one well-field, four well-fields formed one settlement, four settlements formed one hill-unit (qiu), and four hill-units formed one pasture-unit (dian). One hill-unit thus equaled the area of sixteen well-fields.

Under this system, each hill-unit had to provide military supplies including: one warhorse and four oxen; each pasture-unit had to supply four warhorses and sixteen oxen. Additionally, each hill-unit was required to furnish one chariot, manned by three armored soldiers and seventy-two infantrymen. If warfare continued without respite, these military obligations would grow increasingly burdensome, depleting the people's grain stores and exhausting their financial resources—seven-tenths of a family's wealth would be consumed.

Commentators have noted: "Hill-unit levies" (qiu yi) referred to the collection of taxes to meet military needs. Du Mu observed that people would exhaust their strength in the wilderness, losing seventy percent of their household wealth; Chen Hao warned this would drain the people's vitality, leaving everyone in hardship; Wang Xi cited the "hill-unit armor" (qiu jia) system implemented during Duke Cheng of Lu's reign as a classic example of oppressive taxation. Cao Cao explained that "hill-unit oxen" (qiu niu) were large oxen requisitioned from each hill-unit to pull the long-axled wagons transporting army provisions.

The state's military expenditures were equally staggering: damaged chariots, exhausted horses, and equipment like armor, bows, arrows, halberds, and shields—along with the requisitioned oxen and wagons—resulted in sixty percent (some say seventy percent) depletion. Li Quan pointed out these were all essential military supplies, with even greater losses incurred during long-distance transport; Mei Yaochen summarized that commoners supplying provisions and labor for the army would lose seventy percent of their wealth, while the state providing horses, oxen, and equipment would lose sixty percent of its assets. Such excessive taxation inevitably left the people destitute and the state impoverished.

Zhang Yu ultimately emphasized: "The army relies on chariots and horses as its foundation...". This reveals the catastrophic impact of ancient warfare on livelihoods, with both commoners and the government enduring immense economic strain.

This passage discusses the critical importance of logistics in ancient warfare, focusing on two key points:

Regarding the attrition of chariot equipment: Both the charging war chariots (驰车) and ox-drawn supply wagons (革车) would suffer severe damage during battles, with approximately 60% of state-owned vehicles, horses, and equipment typically being lost. The term "丘牛" refers to large oxen used for pulling heavy carts, while "彭排" was an ancient name for shields.

On the wisdom of foraging from the enemy: Astute commanders always sought to procure provisions from enemy territory. The costs of long-distance transportation were staggering—acquiring one zhong (约合六斛四斗, approximately 6 hu 4 dou) of grain from the enemy was equivalent to transporting 20 zhong from one's own territory; obtaining one dan (120 jin) of fodder equaled hauling 20 dan domestically. Commentators like Cao Cao elaborated on measurement units: bean stalks were called "𦮼", while grain stalks were termed "秆". Historical examples included the Qin dynasty's campaign against the Xiongnu, where shipping grain from coastal commanderies to northern borders consumed 30 zhong to deliver just 1 zhong, and Emperor Wu of Han's southwestern campaigns where logistical losses reached over 10 zhong per delivered dan.

Military scholars in the annotations emphasized how these enormous transportation costs validated Sunzi's "provision from the enemy" strategy. Commentators like Zhang Yu provided additional metrological details: 6 dan 4 dou constituted one zhong, noting the character "𦮼" might be interchangeable with "箕", while "秆" sometimes appeared as "芊" in ancient texts.

(Note: Through concrete comparative data, this passage vividly illustrates the challenges of ancient military logistics and the empirical basis for Sunzi's principle that "one zhong taken from the enemy equals twenty zhong from home." The examination of place names like Huangchui and Beihe, along with units like zhong and dan, reflects the precise calculations underlying ancient military supply systems.)

This passage discusses ancient military strategies concerning grain transportation and troop motivation.

Regarding grain transportation: Long-distance supply lines incurred massive losses—delivering twenty zhong (an ancient unit of measure) of grain to the frontlines would yield only one zhong upon arrival. The situation worsened when crossing treacherous terrain. During the Qin dynasty's campaign against the Xiongnu, thirty zhong of transported provisions yielded merely one dan (approximately ten dou) at the destination. Thus, skilled commanders often prioritized seizing supplies from enemy territories.

Regarding troop motivation: To make soldiers fight fiercely, their anger must be roused. Cao Cao believed in intimidating enemies through awe and wrath; Li Quan described anger as the army's driving force; Du Mu explained that unifying the army's hatred required the commander to craft the right circumstances. For instance, when defending the city of Jimo, Tian Dan deliberately allowed the Yan army to mutilate surrendered Qi soldiers by cutting off their noses, then desecrated ancestral graves of the city's residents—actions that provoked the Qi troops to furious retaliation.

Tian Dan further spread rumors expressing fear that the Yan army would desecrate graves outside the city walls. The Yan forces took the bait, exhuming and burning corpses. When Jimo's defenders witnessed this, they wept bitterly and begged to fight, their morale surging tenfold. Recognizing their battle-ready spirit, Tian Dan launched a decisive counterattack that crushed the Yan army.

During the Later Han dynasty, the diplomat Ban Chao, stationed in the Shanshan Kingdom with thirty-six subordinates, deliberately provoked his men during a drinking session: "We're trapped in desperate straits. Just days after the Xiongnu envoys arrived, the King of Shanshan began neglecting us. Soon we'll be handed over to the Xiongnu, our bones devoured by jackals." When his men erupted in rage, Ban Chao declared, "One cannot steal tiger cubs without entering the tiger's den," then led a nighttime fire attack that annihilated the Xiongnu delegation.

In Shu, Pang Tong once urged Liu Bei to attack Yizhou's governor Liu Zhang, but Liu Bei refused, considering it unvirtuous. These accounts demonstrate how ancient commanders strategically harnessed collective anger to amplify their armies' combat effectiveness.

This passage discusses ancient military strategies for motivating soldiers in battle, centering on the skillful use of two key methods: "anger" and "material incentives."

The text begins with an example from the Three Kingdoms period: Liu Bei sought to borrow troops from Liu Zhang to attack Zhang Lu, but Liu Zhang provided only four thousand soldiers and withheld their pay. Liu Bei deliberately provoked his troops by saying, "We fight powerful enemies for Yizhou, and our soldiers endure great hardship. Yet the treasury is full of wealth, and they begrudge us rewards—who would be willing to risk their lives like this?" The soldiers, enraged, ultimately turned against Liu Zhang.

The passage then cites several military strategists:

• Zhang Yu advocated stirring up soldiers' collective fury against a common enemy.
• Wei Liaozi believed that when morale was high, every soldier would willingly fight.
• Cao Cao noted that without pay, troops could not be recruited, and without rewards, they would refuse to advance.
• Li Quan and Du Mu emphasized that spoils of war (material goods) were crucial for motivation.

Du Mu also cited the example of Du Shang of the Eastern Han dynasty suppressing a rebellion: After Du Shang’s troops seized abundant treasures, they lost their fighting spirit. He secretly burned the spoils in the camp and told his soldiers, "The rebels' wealth is enough to last generations—if we win, it’s all ours." Reinvigorated, the troops swiftly crushed the enemy.

Other strategists added:

• Meng Shi and Du You argued that generous rewards made soldiers willing to charge through arrows.
• Mei Yaochen summarized: "Killing the enemy depends on stoking anger; victory depends on material incentives."
• Wang Xi stressed that the key was offering sufficiently enticing rewards.

The core principle of these strategies is clear: Anger fuels the will to fight, while material benefits drive motivation. Only by combining both can commanders inspire soldiers to throw themselves into battle without regard for life or death.

This passage discusses how ancient military leaders motivated soldiers through rewards. Zhang Yu explains that by rewarding troops with material goods, they would spontaneously fight with greater valor—this is the principle behind the saying "heavy rewards will always produce brave men."

When Emperor Taizu of Song (Zhao Kuangyin) dispatched troops to conquer Shu, he instructed his generals: "After capturing cities, distribute all the treasury wealth to the soldiers—the court only wants the territory." As a result, the soldiers fought desperately and swiftly pacified the Shu region.

Regarding specific chariot warfare reward protocols: when capturing ten or more enemy chariots, priority rewards should go to the soldiers who seized the first chariot. Cao Cao's commentary notes that the text specifically emphasizes rewarding "those who seized the chariots" rather than vaguely referring to "those who captured ten chariots," highlighting recognition for individual merit. The military system at the time organized five chariots as a squad under one junior officer (pushe), while ten chariots formed a unit commanded by a platoon leader (zuzhang). Capturing ten chariots required assigning two officers for management. This precise reward targeting ensured benefits reached the actual combatants.

An alternative interpretation suggests that even when possessing ten or more chariots already, only the crew of chariots demonstrating exceptional merit during battle would be rewarded. If fewer than ten chariots were captured—even just one—the promised rewards for the remaining nine would still be distributed to maintain morale. Li Quan concludes this exemplifies using substantial rewards to drive initiative.

Du Mu elaborates: capturing ten-plus chariots inherently reflects the entire army's effort. When widespread rewards prove financially impractical, it's better to use captured chariots and spoils to specially reward those who led the charge. Hence the earlier statement that "those who seize the enemy's advantages deserve material rewards"—the mention of ten chariots serves merely as a general benchmark.

Jia Lin adds that this approach also motivates those yet to distinguish themselves. Mei Yaochen observes that blanket rewards create implementation difficulties, making it more effective to reward one exemplary soldier and thereby inspire hundreds. Both Wang Zhe and Zhang Yu stress the importance of materially rewarding the first wave of attackers. Zhang Yu even calculates: with each chariot crewed by seventy-five men, capturing ten chariots means over a thousand combatants—making comprehensive rewards impossible, thus necessitating concentrated rewards for the vanguard. This encapsulates the ancient art of chariot warfare motivation.

This passage discusses strategies for handling prisoners of war and captured resources in ancient warfare. When the renowned Warring States general Wu Qi engaged the Qin army, he issued a command: even after victory, no merit would be recognized if captured chariots, cavalry equipment, or infantry gear couldn't be repurposed for their own use.

Regarding the use of captured enemy banners, strategists like Cao Cao advocated changing their colors to confuse adversaries. Captured chariots were to be integrated with friendly forces rather than deployed as separate units (as Cao Cao noted, "not to be employed independently"). Du Mu further suggested these chariots could be used ad hoc by soldiers without formal registration.

Prisoners were to be treated with kindness and care ("nurture captives well"). Zhang Yu explained that showing benevolence and trust could transform prisoners into loyal assets. He cited Emperor Guangwu of Han's treatment of the Bronze Horse rebels—allowing them to return to their original camps while personally offering reassurance. Deeply moved, the captives proclaimed, "Prince Xiao (Liu Xiu) treats us with utter sincerity," ultimately pledging unwavering loyalty that significantly strengthened the Han forces.

Both Mei Yaochen and Wang Xi emphasized the importance of treating prisoners well while utilizing their strengths, yet cautioned against excessive favoritism toward new captives that might demoralize veteran troops. He Shi summarized: "Using the enemy to conquer the enemy—how could this not bring formidable strength?"

The core principle concludes: "In war, swift victory is paramount; prolonged conflict should be avoided" ("In warfare, value lies in victory, not in duration"). Cao Cao employed the metaphor "War is like fire—unchecked, it consumes itself," illustrating how uncontrolled warfare ultimately turns against its wielder.

This commentary focuses on two core principles: the importance of swift resolution in warfare, and the crucial role of military commanders in national security.

Regarding the duration of military campaigns, multiple annotators emphasize the necessity of achieving rapid victory. Meng Shi (Mencius) advocates for quick triumph followed by immediate troop withdrawal. Mei Yaochen observes that all preceding arguments champion swift warfare, as rapid conclusion conserves military expenditures and alleviates civilian burdens. He Shi (He Yan) supplements this by noting the Art of War consistently warns against protracted campaigns throughout its text, demonstrating that military operations must never be treated lightly nor force employed indiscriminately. Zhang Yu synthesizes these views, explaining prolonged warfare exhausts troops, depletes national resources, and invites unpredictable calamities—thus mandating swift victory and prompt demobilization.

Concerning the commander's significance, Cao Cao asserts that virtuous and capable generals safeguard national stability. Li Quan highlights how commanders wield life-and-death authority, their strategic decisions directly determining whether enemies are repelled and the nation preserved. Both Du Mu and Mei Yaochen stress how civilian lives and national security hang upon a commander's competence. Wang Xi elaborates further: when commanders demonstrate wisdom, the people find protection and the state enjoys peace; conversely, inept leadership brings civilian suffering and national peril—hence rulers must exercise utmost caution in military appointments. He Shi and Zhang Yu reiterate that population survival and national order depend entirely on commanders' abilities, noting how truly exceptional generals have always been rare throughout history.

(Note: The "○" symbols represent traditional commentary formatting, demarcating different annotators' perspectives.)