《孫子註解》Vol. 3

The "Attack by Stratagem" chapter in The Art of War primarily discusses how the highest achievement in warfare lies not in conquering through brute force but in compelling the enemy to surrender intact through strategic planning. Ancient military strategists like Cao Cao provided detailed commentaries on this principle.

The supreme rule of warfare states: The best outcome is to make an enemy state surrender whole; resorting to military force to crush it is an inferior alternative. Cao Cao explains that the ideal scenario is when a large army swiftly advances to besiege the enemy's capital, cutting off all internal and external connections, thereby forcing the entire state to capitulate. While defeating an enemy state by force may still achieve victory, it is already a lesser strategy. Li Quan cites the example of Han Xin: Han Xin captured King Bao of Wei, seized Xia Yue, and executed Lord Chengan—these were actions of "destroying the state." Later, however, he employed the strategy of Lord Guangwu, sending only a single envoy with a letter to induce the surrender of Yan—this was the superior approach of "preserving the state whole."

The same principle applies to military units: The best outcome is to make an entire "army" (an ancient unit of approximately 15,500 soldiers) surrender intact; dispersing it through combat is the lesser choice. For a "brigade" (a unit of 500 soldiers), inducing its full surrender is preferable to breaking it apart. Similarly, securing the surrender of an entire "company" (an ancient military unit) is superior to defeating it in battle.

These commentaries emphasize the military philosophy of "subduing the enemy without fighting," asserting that compelling surrender through strategy and deterrence is far more skillful than relying on brute force. As Wei Liaozi proposed, "victory through strategy" (depriving the enemy of morale through cunning) surpasses "victory through force" (defeating the enemy by sheer military might). The finest triumph is one that preserves the enemy state intact while absorbing its forces whole; resorting to armed destruction should only be a last resort.

Cao Cao (military strategist of the Three Kingdoms period) explains: This discusses ancient military organization. A unit of over one hundred soldiers was called a "zu." Li Quan (Tang dynasty military theorist) adds: Any unit exceeding one hundred men constituted a "zu."

Du You (Tang dynasty historian) notes: From the "xiao" (an ancient military unit) down to units of one hundred men, all were significant military formations.

Regarding combat strategy, preserving an intact "wu" (five-man squad) represents the highest tactical achievement, while breaking the enemy's wu unit is secondary. Cao Cao clarifies: This refers to small-scale combat units ranging from under one hundred men down to five soldiers. Li Quan, Du Mu (Tang dynasty strategist), and Mei Yaochen (Song dynasty military scholar) all agree that five men forming a "wu" constitutes the most fundamental combat element.

Wang Xi (Song dynasty strategist) emphasizes: The most brilliant strategy is maintaining complete military integrity. Whether large armies or small squads, preserving wholeness demonstrates maximum De (Virtue/Power), whereas defeating enemies yields lesser effects. Scholar He (one commentator) adds: From major forces to the smallest combat units, all should employ strategies of complete preservation. Zhang Yu (another commentator) cites Zhou dynasty military organization: 12,500 men formed one "jun," 500 a "lü," 100 a "zu," and five a "wu," asserting that subduing enemies without battle represents supreme strategy.

Thus, winning a hundred battles isn't the pinnacle of military art. Cao Cao observes: True victory makes enemies submit without fighting. Li Quan advocates achieving triumph through wisdom. Chen Hao (commentator) notes warfare inevitably causes casualties. Jia Lin (commentator) adds: The optimal outcome uses military might to intimidate enemies into complete surrender; breaking them through strategy is secondary. Both Du You and Mei Yaochen consider minimizing casualties the superior approach, with Zhang Yu concluding that battlefield victories necessarily incur heavy losses.

The supreme strategy subdues enemies without combat. Both Cao Cao and Du Mu stress winning through stratagems. Chen Hao cites Han Xin adopting Li Zuoche's counsel—capturing Yan territory with just one letter. Scholar Meng values court-level strategic victories. Wang Xi observes military affairs prioritize planning over fighting. Scholar He recounts Eastern Han general Wang Ba's example: when challenged by Zhou Jian and Su Mao, Wang Ba maintained defensive positions until the enemy forces disintegrated spontaneously.

When provisions are insufficient yet one deliberately provokes the enemy seeking temporary victory, it is better to close the camp gates and let the troops rest. This represents the supreme military strategy of "subduing the enemy without fighting." Like Mao (possibly a person's name) who ultimately chose retreat.

Zhang Yu (commentator) explains: Establishing clear reward and punishment systems, enforcing strict military discipline, perfecting weaponry and equipment, training soldiers' quality, and fully utilizing one's advantages to make the enemy tremble at the mere mention—this is the highest form of strategy. Like when the King of Wu held the Huangchi alliance meeting, the State of Jin submitted because of his strict military governance.

Thus the supreme art of warfare is to thwart the enemy's strategies. Cao Cao's commentary states: It's easiest to succeed when disrupting the enemy's plans at their inception. Li Quan explains: Strike at the enemy's original schemes. During the Later Han period, Kou Xun besieged Gao Jun, who sent his strategist Huangfu Wen to negotiate. Huangfu Wen behaved arrogantly, so Kou Xun executed him on the spot, sending a message to Gao Jun: "Your strategist has been executed for his disrespect. Surrender quickly if you wish, otherwise continue defending your city." That very day, Gao Jun opened the city gates to surrender. The generals wondered: "Why did killing their envoy make them surrender?" Kou Xun explained: "Huangfu Wen was Gao Jun's brain. Keeping him would mean continued scheming, but killing him left Gao Jun without his mastermind. This illustrates 'the supreme warfare attacks strategies.'" The generals sighed: "This indeed surpasses our understanding."

Du Mu cites an example from the Spring and Autumn period: Duke Ping of Jin wanted to attack Qi and first sent Fan Zhao to assess the situation. Duke Jing of Qi hosted a banquet where Fan Zhao deliberately requested to drink from the duke's cup when wine flowed freely. Duke Jing said: "Give my cup to our guest." After Fan Zhao drank, Yanzi (Qi's famous minister) immediately replaced the cup. Feigning drunken displeasure, Fan Zhao rose to dance and demanded the court musicians play the "Music of Chengzhou"—reserved exclusively for the Son of Heaven. The Grand Musician refused: "This old servant cannot comply." After Fan Zhao left, Duke Jing worried about offending Jin's envoy, but Yanzi said: "Fan Zhao's deliberate breaches of etiquette sought to humiliate Qi, hence my refusal to indulge him." The Grand Musician explained: "The Chengzhou music belongs to the Son of Heaven. As a minister requesting imperial music, I couldn't play it." Fan Zhao reported back: "Qi cannot be attacked. My attempt to shame their ruler was detected by Yanzi, and my trespassing ritual propriety was seen through by the Grand Musician." Confucius remarked: "Deciding victory a thousand miles away at the banquet table—this describes wise men like Yanzi."

During the Spring and Autumn period when Qin attacked Jin, Jin general Zhao Dun sent deputy commander Yu Pian to defend.

The State of Qin was incapable of sustaining prolonged warfare, so the suggestion was made to fortify our encampments and stabilize our forces in response. Duke Mu of Qin consulted Shi Hui (a minister of Jin): "How should we conduct this campaign?" Shi Hui replied: "The Zhao clan (a powerful Jin minister) has just dispatched his confidant Yu Pian—this is undoubtedly a scheme to exhaust our military strength."

There was a collateral descendant of the Zhao family named Zhao Chuan (son-in-law of the Jin ruler). Though favored, he lacked military experience, was reckless and impulsive, and particularly envied Yu Pian's position as deputy commander of the Upper Army. If such an impetuous commander were sent to battle... Indeed, when Qin forces suddenly attacked Jin's Upper Army, Zhao Chuan recklessly pursued them without success. Returning in fury, he declared: "We carry rations and wear armor precisely to fight! When the enemy arrives yet we don't engage, what are we waiting for?" When officers explained they were awaiting the opportune moment, Zhao Chuan retorted: "I know nothing of stratagems!" and led his personal troops out alone.

Chief Minister Zhao Dun (Zhao Chuan's cousin) sighed: "If Qin captures Zhao Chuan, it would be as though they've taken a high minister. Should Qin return victorious, how could we justify this?" Thus the entire Jin army mobilized. After brief skirmishing, both sides withdrew.

Here we see two classic stratagem cases: Master Yan (renowned Qi statesman) exemplified anticipating enemy attacks by preemptively disrupting their plans, while Shi Hui demonstrated thwarting enemy defenses when initiating our own offensives. Both represent pinnacle examples of "destroying enemy stratagems" (famo)—either crushing schemes before they form or subverting them during execution.

Commentator Meng adds that tactical engagements like "nine assaults and nine repulsions" constitute contests of strategy. Tang scholar Du You notes that when enemies plot major operations, the supreme approach is overcoming them through wisdom rather than force, as Jiang Ziya (legendary strategist) stated: "Eliminate calamities before they arise; defeat enemies before they gain momentum."

Annotations by Mei Yaochen, Wang Xi and others all emphasize wisdom's superiority over brute force. Scholar He particularly clarifies: preempting enemies during initial planning stages is most effective, requiring precise strikes after discerning their intentions. Zhang Yu concludes that foiling enemy plans at inception inevitably makes them submit due to thwarted schemes—exemplified by Yanzi thwarting Fan Zhao's (Qi minister) plot. "Destroying stratagems" means defeating opponents through superior calculation, achieving victory without battle.

(Note: The subsequent "next best is disrupting alliances" refers to secondary strategies of sabotaging enemy coalitions. Cao Cao explains this as breaking emerging enemy alliances, while Li Quan advocates disrupting alliances at their formation.)

During the Warring States period, Su Qin's alliance of six states against Qin kept the Qin forces from advancing eastward for fifteen years. Du Mu observed that this success wasn't merely about coalition-building, but demonstrated how any allied state could become a target. For instance, Zhang Yi once promised six hundred li of Qin territory to King Huai of Chu to lure him into severing ties with Qi; Sui He assassinated a Chu envoy at Ying Bu's banquet to sow discord in Xiang Yu's camp; Cao Cao's nostalgic battlefield conversation with Han Sui aroused Ma Chao's suspicion; and Gao Yang of Northern Qi feigned peace talks with Liang dynasty while actually undermining Hou Jing, ultimately leading to the fall of Liang's capital. These all exemplify the stratagems of victory through disrupting enemy alliances, employing diverse methods.

Chen Hao added that when enemies have already mobilized troops, disrupting their alliances before attacking becomes a secondary strategy. For example, Duke Wen of Jin first severed relations between Cao and Wei when dealing with Song. Mengshi believed allying with powerful states could deter enemy action. Mei Yaochen emphasized winning through intimidation, while Wang Zhe pointed out that when unable to completely thwart enemy schemes, isolating their allies could leave opponents vulnerable—with allies they're strong, without them they're weak.

He Shi further explained that the four aforementioned cases all demonstrate the "estranging the intimate" strategy. "Attacking alliances" means employing deceptive tactics when armies are about to engage, creating dilemmas for the enemy while securing neighboring support to isolate them. Zhang Yu concluded that when battle looms and alliances form, one must strike first to disrupt them. As the Zuozhuan states: "Preemptive action can break the enemy's will"—exemplified by Sunshu Ao's defeat of Jin forces and Churen Pu's routing of the Hua clan. Alternatively, it means "conquering through diplomacy"—forming pincer alliances with neighboring states before mobilizing troops, thereby strengthening our position while weakening the enemy.

When diplomatic measures (attacking alliances) fail, only direct military engagement (attacking armies) remains. Cao Cao noted this marks the point when military confrontation becomes inevitable. Li Quan considered battlefield confrontation the inferior option, while Jia Lin maintained that even with flawless strategy, armed conflict remains undesirable. Jiang Taigong (Taigong) said: "Generals who rely on bloody victories cannot be called skilled." Both Mei Yaochen and Wang Zhe emphasized war's inherent dangers. Zhang Yu summarized that when unable to thwart initial enemy plans or break their alliances, victory must rely on superior weaponry. Here "arms" encompass all military equipment, as Jiang Taigong stated: "The path to certain victory treasures refined instruments of war."

The passage discusses the drawbacks and specific implementation methods of siege warfare in ancient military campaigns.

Several military strategists considered siege tactics the least favorable form of military action. Cao Cao pointed out that when the enemy had already gathered all provisions from outside the city walls, leaving no choice but to besiege and assault the city directly, the situation became most disadvantageous. Li Quan added that if an army laid prolonged siege to a well-fortified city, exhausting its soldiers while facing an overwhelming disparity between offense and defense, such a siege would yield the poorest results. Both Du You and Mei Yaochen emphasized the immense financial and human costs of siege warfare. Zhang Yu concluded that sieges not only drained military resources and finances but also resulted in heavy casualties.

Regarding situations where siege became unavoidable, Zhang Yu explained that this tactic was only employed when no other options remained.

The actual methods of siege required extensive preparation: Cao Cao noted that constructing large shields (橹 lu) and four-wheeled siege vehicles (轒輼 fenwen), along with various other siege engines, took three months, while building earthen siege ramps (距闉 juyin) required an additional three months. Li Quan elaborated on these tools: the shields provided cover for advancing troops, the four-wheeled vehicles could conceal dozens of soldiers beneath them and withstand attacks from logs and stones, while the siege engines included scaling ladders (云梯 yunti). The juyin were earthen and wooden ramps used to breach city walls. Du Mu further detailed these devices: large shields (彭排 pengpai), oxhide-covered siege wagons (木驴 mulü), and earthen assault pathways (垒道 leidao). The three-month preparation period accounted for the considerable time needed to craft these siege implements.

These commentaries collectively emphasize the tremendous cost and risk of siege warfare, which was only undertaken as a last resort.

This passage primarily discusses the use and preparation time of ancient siege weaponry. Guanzi (a statesman of the Spring and Autumn period) once stated that failing to properly prepare one's equipment would lead to dire straits, leaving one unable to counter the enemy. Taigong (Jiang Ziya) similarly emphasized that the key to certain victory lay in superior weaponry. The Book of Han records that military techniques were divided into thirteen schools of thought, all of which trained soldiers to skillfully employ various mechanical devices to gain tactical advantages in both offense and defense.

The text enumerates multiple siege engines, including battering rams, hook carts, scaling ladders, "toad-wood" devices, disassembly carts, "deer-fox" carts, shadow carts, high-barrier carts, horse-head carts, single-wheeled carts, and earth-moving "pig-fish" carts. Chen Hao argued that Du Yu (a Western Jin scholar) was mistaken in interpreting "lu" as "pengpai" (a type of shield), asserting instead that it referred to a large shield. Preparing these siege engines required three months, while constructing the earthen siege mounds (known as juyin) took another three months, totaling six months. If a general grew impatient and launched a reckless assault, it would result in heavy casualties among the troops.

Du You (a Tang dynasty statesman) explained that the fenyun was a wheeled siege vehicle designed to shield advancing soldiers as they approached city walls. Juyin referred to the practice of piling earth into mounds to approach enemy fortifications, allowing observation of the defenders. Mei Yaochen (a Song dynasty poet) added that the fenyun cart had four wheels and could be pushed to the base of city walls, with a protective canopy (lu) covered in leather to deflect arrows and stones. Zhang Yu (a Song dynasty scholar) used records from the Zuo Zhuan to confirm that "lu" indeed denoted a large shield, citing an instance where Jin troops repurposed armored chariot wheels as makeshift shields.

The passage concludes by stressing that preparing these siege engines required approximately three months—a reasonable estimate based on careful calculation. Hastily launching an attack would only result in needless casualties.

This passage discusses the dire consequences when military commanders, blinded by rage, hastily launch reckless assaults on fortified cities. The original text, through annotations by various military strategists, employs the metaphor of "ants scaling a wall" to warn against such folly.

Ancient siege warfare required extensive preparation: three months to forge siege engines and another three to construct earthen ramps (yin) for observing the city or mounting assaults. Yet enraged commanders often dispensed with these preparations, ordering soldiers to scale walls barehanded like swarming ants. The result? One-third of the troops perish needlessly while the city remains unconquered—a calamity born of blind aggression.

Cao Cao's commentary notes this stems from commanders too furious to await proper siege equipment, forcing soldiers to climb like flesh-and-blood ladders. Li Quan adds that such assaults expose troops to deadly logs and boulders rolled from the walls, with mortality reaching one-third. Du Mu cites Emperor Taiwu of Northern Wei's siege of Xuyi: humiliated envoys provoked such fury that the emperor ordered wave after wave of climbers until corpses piled level with the battlements. After thirty days of half his army dead or wounded, he withdrew defeated.

Other strategists concur: Jia Lin warns such assaults shatter morale; Du You advises changing tactics if a city resists beyond two watch-periods (four hours); He Shi and Zhang Yu stress how a commander's impatience squanders lives. As Han Feizi cautioned, "One failed assault brings disaster upon the entire army"—such emotional command remains warfare's cardinal sin.

This military strategy discusses the perils of siege warfare and the wisdom of "subduing the enemy without fighting."

When a general acts rashly and presses a siege for over two months without success, soldiers will be forced to scale walls like ants, resulting in the loss of a third of the troops while the fortified city remains unconquered. This is the harm of brute-force sieges. Some generals, unwilling to wait even six months for proper preparations, launch hasty attacks with even graver consequences.

Thus, a true master of warfare subdues the enemy through strategy rather than direct confrontation. Li Quan cites an example from the Three Kingdoms period: When Wei general Guo Huai besieged Qucheng, Shu general Jiang Wei led reinforcements to relieve it. Guo Huai preemptively occupied Niutou Mountain, cutting off Jiang Wei’s supply routes and retreat path. Terrified, Jiang Wei fled without a fight, forcing Qucheng’s defenders to surrender. This exemplifies "subduing the enemy without fighting."

Du Mu supplements with the case of Zhou Yafu during the Han dynasty’s suppression of the Rebellion of the Seven States: Zhou deliberately abandoned Liang but dispatched light cavalry to sever the supply lines of the Wu-Chu alliance. Only when the enemy, starved of provisions, retreated did he strike and crush them. Similarly, during the Three Kingdoms, Wei general Chen Tai besieged Qucheng but adopted a strategy of containment rather than direct assault, eventually compelling Jiang Wei to withdraw and the defending general to surrender.

Mei Yaochen concludes that warfare inevitably inflicts harm. Wang Zhe cites Li Zuoche’s advice to Lord Cheng’an to ambush Han Xin at Jingxing Pass, illustrating how cunning strategy surpasses brute force. He Shi emphasizes victory through diplomacy and stratagem, as stated in The Methods of the Sima: "The highest form of warfare is to attack the enemy’s plans." Zhang Yu adds that the renowned general Tian Rangju, by enforcing discipline and treating soldiers well, made the states of Yan and Jin flee at the mere rumor of his approach—another example of winning without battle.

Finally, the text stresses that sieges should be won by wisdom, not force. Li Quan cites the Eastern Han example of Zang Gong suppressing rebels at Yuanwu: After months of fruitless siege, with troops falling ill, the Prince of Donghai advised lifting the siege to feign weakness, then pursuing the enemy when they fled—the superior strategy.

This military strategy expounds the wisdom of "subduing the enemy without fighting." Its core principle lies in making the enemy collapse through tactical maneuvering rather than through brute force assaults.

When deliberately leaving an escape route for enemies who still have means to survive, they will scatter in disarray—at which point even a minor constable can easily capture them. Numerous historical battles attest to this truth:

When Sima Zhao besieged Zhuge Dan at Shouchun, most generals advocated forceful attacks. But Sima Zhao recognized the city's strong defenses and numerous defenders, realizing a direct assault would deplete his troops and risk encirclement if reinforcements arrived. Choosing to encircle without attacking, he ultimately saw Zhuge Dan's forces collapse on their own after ten months.

Similarly, when the Former Yan general Murong Ke campaigned against Duan Kan, he adopted a prolonged siege strategy. He explained: when forces are evenly matched and the enemy has strong reinforcements, one should gradually exhaust them. Ultimately, he captured Guanggu City without bloodshed by fortifying his positions and waiting.

Other historical examples illustrate the same principle: Duke Zhuang of Zheng surrendering to King Zhuang of Chu by baring his torso, or Emperor Taizong of Tang accepting Xue Ren'gao's surrender—all exemplify victory without combat. Specific tactics include:

1. Attacking places the enemy must defend, then ambushing their relief forces

2. Cutting off enemy reinforcements and prolonging sieges to induce collapse

3. Sabotaging agricultural production—as Gao Jiong of Sui suggested by feigning attacks during Chen's farming seasons to disrupt their harvests

4. Exploiting southern bamboo-wood construction by sending spies to burn granaries

Both Cao Cao and Li Quan emphasized that destroying an enemy state need not involve prolonged warfare. Gao Jiong's strategy against Chen exemplifies this—periodic harassment exhausted Chen's forces, supplemented by indirect methods like fire attacks to weaken them. These approaches prove far more effective than frontal assaults.

This passage elucidates the core principles of military strategy. Several strategists emphasize the importance of swiftly exploiting an enemy's weaknesses without prolonged engagement. Du Mu cites historical examples like Liu Bang's rapid conquest of Guanzhong, the Jin dynasty's swift overthrow of Eastern Wu, and the Sui dynasty's quick defeat of the Chen state—all demonstrating decisive victories achieved through prompt action. Jia Lin further notes that protracted warfare invites instability, advocating instead for campaigns like King Wu of Zhou's overthrow of the tyrant Zhou Xin, which targeted oppressive rule while sparing the populace.

Regarding the "complete victory" strategy, Cao Cao defines it as achieving total triumph without bloodshed. Li Quan advocates using comprehensive stratagems to secure victory, while Mei Yaochen elaborates that true complete victory avoids direct assaults on fortified cities and prolonged devastation, instead relying on wisdom to compel the enemy's submission. Zhang Yu synthesizes these views, noting that such an approach preserves one's own strength while preventing resource depletion, thereby enriching the state and strengthening its military.

On tactical specifics, Cao Cao proposes surrounding the enemy with tenfold numerical superiority, citing his own encirclement of Xiapi that led to Lü Bu's capture. Du Mu details encirclement tactics requiring four-directional coordination, contingent upon sufficient troop numbers for airtight defense. He analyzes Lü Bu's defeat as stemming from internal discord and betrayal among his ranks rather than Cao Cao's numerical advantage alone. These commentaries collectively embody the essence of "strategic attack"—prevailing through wisdom rather than brute force.

This passage elucidates the core principles of ancient military strategy. Eminent strategists like Cao Cao, Li Quan, and Du Mu provided detailed interpretations of Sun Tzu's tactical doctrine that "with tenfold strength, surround them; with fivefold strength, attack them":

When possessing ten times the enemy's forces, one should employ encircling tactics. This requires comparable strategic acumen and courage between commanders, along with roughly equivalent weaponry. If internal divisions already plague the enemy (as when Lü Bu was besieged in Xiapi City), victory becomes possible even without numerical superiority. Effective encirclement demands complete perimeter containment to prevent enemy breakthroughs.

With fivefold numerical advantage, commanders should take the offensive. Cao Cao advocated the "three regulars and one surprise" tactic: deploying three-fifths of troops for frontal assault while keeping two-fifths in reserve for unexpected maneuvers. General Dugu Xin of Western Wei exemplified this during his campaign against Liangzhou Governor Yuwen Zhonghe, launching nighttime frontal attacks with main forces while preparing surprise assault units.

These military theorists particularly emphasized that such tactics presuppose: commanders of comparable ability and roughly matched equipment. When defenders hold strategically advantageous terrain, ten soldiers might withstand a hundred attackers—this embodies the military axiom "one defending against ten." Practical application requires flexible adaptation to battlefield conditions rather than rigid adherence to numerical ratios.

The northeastern forces, led by the commander-in-chief, launched a surprise attack toward the southwest and ultimately achieved victory. Chen Hao explains that when our forces outnumber the enemy by five times, we naturally hold the advantage, forcing the enemy to disperse their strength. This is not merely about attacking the enemy from three directions—it specifically refers to siege warfare, hence the subsequent mention of "the smaller enemy holding firm in defense, the larger enemy being captured."

Du You argues that if the enemy concentrates their forces in defense and refuses to engage, we must outnumber them fivefold before launching an attack. However, if the enemy lacks internal or external reinforcements, it may not be necessary to wait for a fivefold advantage before striking. Mei Yaochen agrees with Du You's annotation. Wang Xi states that with ten times the enemy's strength, we can encircle them, and with five times, we can attack—such offensives are sufficiently powerful without needing to wait for the enemy to weaken or grow lax. This also applies when both sides are evenly matched in wisdom and courage.

He Shi adds that when both sides are comparable in intelligence and bravery, and we outnumber the enemy fivefold, we can divide our forces into three routes for the siege while using two for unexpected maneuvers. Zhang Yu points out that with a fivefold advantage, we should employ tactics of feinting east while striking west—without such numerical superiority, this strategy cannot be used. Cao Cao's principle of "three routes as the main force, two as the unexpected" illustrates this. If the enemy lacks external support and we have internal allies, there is no need to wait for a fivefold advantage before attacking.

Regarding the principle of "divide when you double the enemy’s strength":

Cao Cao believes that when outnumbering the enemy twofold, half the forces should serve as the main body, and half as the unexpected. Li Quan states that with twofold superiority, half should be allocated as surprise troops. When we vastly outnumber the enemy, controlling the battle becomes difficult. Fu Jian’s failure at the Fei River was due to not dividing his forces, while Wang Sengbian’s victory at Zhanggong Isle came from splitting his troops.

Du Mu offers a differing view: when doubling the enemy’s strength, we should use part of our forces to strike at critical or vulnerable points, compelling the enemy to divide their troops for rescue, then attack with the remaining forces. The art of war does not depend solely on numbers—every formation must balance main and surprise forces, not just when we have superior numbers. Even Xiang Yu, with only twenty-eight cavalry left at the Wu River, still employed alternating main and surprise tactics—how much more so in other circumstances?

Chen Hao states plainly: when we double the enemy’s strength, dividing our forces to attack their vulnerabilities means splitting our twofold advantage to strike their dispersed troops. Though Du Mu grasps this principle, his explanation lacks thoroughness.

When your forces are twice the size of the enemy's, divide your army into two parts. One part serves as the main force (zheng bing) to engage the enemy head-on, while the other acts as the mobile strike force (qi bing) to achieve victory through unexpected maneuvers. If enemy forces match your own, devise methods to disperse their troops. As Jiang Taigong said: "One who does not understand troop division and deployment cannot speak of using surprise tactics to secure victory."

Mei Yaochen explains that when forces are evenly matched, the key lies in dispersing the enemy's strength. Wang Xi adds that the purpose of dividing forces is to attack the enemy from both front and rear, thereby gaining a two-fold advantage. He Shi further elaborates that when your troops outnumber the enemy, half may be designated as the surprise force. So long as your numbers exceed the enemy's, flexible troop division becomes possible. When the strength of both sides appears balanced, the commander skilled in warfare will prevail.

Zhang Yu maintains that when your forces double the enemy's, they should be split into two units: one to pin down the enemy frontally while the other circles to attack from behind. When the enemy responds to the frontal assault, strike from the rear; when they turn to face the rear, attack from the front. This embodies the tactic of "one as main force, one as surprise force." He criticizes Du You for failing to grasp this principle of dividing for surprise attacks while concentrating for conventional engagements.

Even when forces appear equal, skilled commanders can still achieve victory. Cao Cao observes that when numbers are matched, experts can prevail by deploying ambush forces for surprise attacks. Li Quan believes that when host and guest forces are balanced, victory goes to the side demonstrating superior combat skills. However, Du Mu points out that ambushes merely exploit terrain for concealed attacks and don't necessarily constitute surprise forces. Chen Hao emphasizes that when forces are equal, commanders must first formulate surprise strategies before engaging.

Both Mei Yaochen and Wang Xi agree that in situations of parity, success depends on the commander's ability to inspire soldiers to fight desperately. He Shi and Zhang Yu note that true masters can fluidly alternate between main and surprise forces during stalemates, keeping the enemy perpetually off-balance—this represents the essence of achieving victory through well-planned ambushes and surprise maneuvers.

This passage discusses military tactics when facing overwhelming enemy forces. When confronted with superior numbers, the correct approach is not direct confrontation but flexible strategy.

Du Mu, the Tang Dynasty military strategist, argued that when facing a vastly stronger opponent, one should temporarily avoid the enemy's momentum and wait for the opportune moment to strike unexpectedly. He cited the example of Tian Dan, the renowned Qi general during the Warring States period, who famously defeated the Yan army at the Battle of Jimo using fire oxen—a classic case of first avoiding the enemy's strength then launching a surprise attack.

Chen Hao, another Tang strategist, added that such tactical withdrawal isn't mere passive endurance, but deliberately displaying weakness to induce enemy arrogance, thereby creating opportunities for counterattack. He referenced Emperor Taizong of Tang's feigned weakness to lure Song Laosheng into eventual decisive defeat.

Other military thinkers offered similar perspectives: Jia Lin advocated concealing troops and setting ambushes; Du You emphasized building high fortifications and deep trenches; Mei Yaochen and Wang Xi both recommended defensive positioning using favorable terrain. He Shi proposed holding fortified positions to observe developments before striking at the right moment.

Zhang Yu of the Song Dynasty provided crucial clarification: Withdrawal isn't simple retreat but must adapt to circumstances. If enemy troops, though numerous, lack cohesion while our forces maintain high morale, victory against odds becomes possible—as demonstrated by Wu Qi's 500 chariots defeating 500,000 Qin troops, or Xie Xuan's 8,000 elite soldiers routing Fu Jian's million-strong army. The essence lies in discerning the moment—knowing when to withdraw and when to engage.

This passage discusses military strategies for dealing with strength disparities. When the enemy occupies strategic positions, controls key crossings and bridges, and has encircled our forces, retreat becomes extremely difficult. Du You advises that when facing overwhelming odds, one should lead the troops to withdraw and await favorable conditions before acting. Mei Yaochen and Wang Xi both emphasize that when both commanders and soldiers are inferior to the enemy in capability, forced engagement will inevitably lead to defeat. Zhang Yu adds that when outmatched in troop numbers, strategy, and courage, one should proactively retreat to avoid confrontation and wait for the enemy to expose vulnerabilities.

The phrase "the persistence of a weak force leads to its capture by a strong enemy" conveys that when an inferior army stubbornly holds its ground, it will ultimately be captured by superior forces. Commentators like Cao Cao, Li Quan, and the Meng family note that when smaller states overestimate their capabilities to confront greater powers—even if temporarily defending cities—they cannot escape eventual defeat. They illustrate this principle with historical examples: General Li Ling's 5,000 infantry being annihilated by 100,000 Xiongnu cavalry, or Han dynasty commanders Su Jian and Zhao Xin's 3,000 troops being overwhelmed by the Xiongnu chanyu's tens of thousands despite fierce resistance.

A notable case involves General Su Jian, whose entire army was destroyed before he alone escaped. While some advocated his execution to enforce military discipline, others invoked the strategic principle that "a weak force's stubborn defense leads to capture by a strong enemy" in his defense. They argued that Su Jian's against-all-odds resistance shouldn't be punished, as doing so would demoralize officers and soldiers. Zhang Yu concludes that weaker forces who inflexibly fight head-on will ultimately be subdued by stronger opponents.

A militarily weak state that engages in battle without assessing the relative strength of forces will inevitably be captured by the stronger enemy. Historical examples include the defeat of the ruler of Xi State by Duke Zhuang of Zheng, and Li Ling's surrender to the Xiongnu. As Mencius observed: "Small states by nature cannot contend with large ones, weak armies cannot oppose strong ones, and fewer troops cannot withstand greater numbers."

Generals serve as the pillars of the state. When a general's strategies are thorough (considering all aspects), the nation prospers. Cao Cao explained "thoroughness" as keeping plans from being leaked; Li Quan said when a general's capability suffices, the army naturally grows strong; Du Mu emphasized the need for comprehensive ability; Jia Lin added that a state's strength fundamentally depends on its generals—if a general can loyally assist the ruler with complete competence, the state thrives, otherwise it declines. Therefore, the selection and appointment of generals must be meticulous. He Shi further clarified that "thoroughness" means the general must possess comprehensive wisdom, ensuring the state's stability and prosperity.

Conversely, deficiencies in a general's capability will weaken the state. Cao Cao noted that flaws manifest externally; Li Quan interpreted "flaw" as insufficient ability; Du Mu considered it incomplete competence; Mei Yaochen said obtaining worthy talent brings thoroughness, while losing it creates flaws; Wang Xi distinguished that "thorough" means the general is wise, loyal, and fully capable, whereas "flaw" indicates shortcomings. He Shi particularly stressed that a general's ability must be comprehensive, handling affairs with meticulous care, mastering the "Five Fundamentals, Six Conducts, and Five Authorities" as well as tactics of "Nine Changes and Four Opportunities" to command armies and assess battle situations. Zhang Yu concluded that when a general's strategies are thorough, enemy states find no opening, and the nation remains strong; the slightest negligence allows adversaries to exploit weaknesses.

Jiang Taigong (Lü Shang) said: "Obtaining talent brings prosperity to the state; losing it leads to decline."

Rulers are prone to three military errors: Mei Yaochen pointed out the ruler's ignorance of military affairs; Meng Shi said what follows explains this; Zhang Yu explicitly identified the three issues below.

The first error is: commanding the army to advance when unaware it cannot advance, or ordering retreat when unaware it cannot retreat—this is called shackling the army. Cao Cao explained "shackling" as restraint; Li Quan likened it to hobbling a thousand-mile steed's legs, preventing it from running—the defeat of Chu general Long Ju (by Han Xin) exemplifies this.

This passage discusses the dangers of rulers improperly interfering in military operations. Using examples like Han Xin who turned defeat into victory when pursued, and Fu Rong (a general of Former Qin) whose army suffered a crushing defeat after a minor retreat, it illustrates how commanders must independently decide advance or retreat based on battlefield conditions. Just as reining a horse too tightly robs it of flexibility, excessive control stifles effectiveness.

A ruler directing campaigns remotely from the capital is the greatest calamity for an army. The famed Han dynasty general Zhao Chongguo wanted to settle troops for farming, yet Emperor Xuan forced a decisive battle; when Eastern Wu's Sun Hao faced imminent collapse, Jia Chong still advised withdrawal—both cases demonstrate ignorance of proper military timing. As the Six Secret Teachings (Liutao) states: "Methods for governing a state cannot be applied to external affairs, nor should court officials remotely command armies"—a principle the Great Duke (Jiang Ziya) recognized long ago.

When rulers ignorant of battlefield realities attempt remote control, they effectively leash their armies like tethered dogs. Outstanding commanders should emulate Zhou Yafu (who refused to kneel before Emperor Wen, demonstrating military discipline) or Wei Shang (defender of Yunzhong, whose minor offense prompted Feng Tang's famous protest)—both exemplifying independent authority. Governing a state emphasizes ritual propriety (li), while commanding troops prioritizes adaptability (quanbian); their operating principles are fundamentally distinct.

The worst scenario? Forcing attacks when conditions forbid them, or demanding retreat when momentum favors advance—such constraints are like hobbling a warhorse. Thus military texts warn: campaigns destined to fail when court officials dictate every movement. Similarly, meddling in military affairs without expertise bewilders troops—as seen with Yan's corrupt general Murong Ping, who profited by selling spring water to his own soldiers, utterly clueless in command. Cao Cao's insight cuts to the core: "Courtly rituals (liyi) have no place in the barracks, nor should military discipline (junji) govern court proceedings."

Governing a state and commanding an army require entirely different methods. If benevolent policies for ruling civilians are applied to military management, soldiers will become confused and uncertain about how to act.

The ancient military classic The Art of War by Sunzi clearly states: governance requires trustworthiness, while military leadership demands strategy. Chen Hao (a Tang dynasty military strategist) explains that if a general fails to understand the actual conditions of the army and forces decisions against majority opinion, the result will be disastrous—just like the case of Zhi Ji of Jin recorded in The Commentary of Zuo. Ignoring his strategist’s advice, Zhi Ji recklessly led a small detachment forward and was utterly defeated by the Chu forces. Mei Yaochen (a Song dynasty scholar) adds that interfering in military decisions without understanding the principles of command inevitably leads to chaos in morale.

Cao Cao (a Three Kingdoms military leader) cites the classic principle from The Methods of the Sima: the rituals of the court must not be applied to the barracks, nor should military discipline be imposed on governance. He Shi (a commentator) elaborates further—governing a state and commanding an army each have their own distinct characteristics. Attempting to manage troops with leniency only backfires. Zhang Yu (a Song dynasty military theorist) concludes: benevolence and righteousness may govern a state but not an army, while tactical flexibility may command an army but not a state—this is a fundamental rule.

History provides many lessons that confirm this: the ruler of Guo was destroyed by Jin due to his lack of benevolent governance, and the Marquis of Jin was defeated by Qin for failing to uphold moral principles—these are the consequences of neglecting virtue in statecraft. Meanwhile, the Marquis of Qi lost to Jin by showing excessive chivalry to his enemies, and the Duke of Song was defeated by Chu for refusing to capture elderly enemy soldiers—these are the costs of lacking strategic adaptability in warfare. Thus, when strategy is needed but benevolence is applied instead, the state is endangered (as with Jin and Guo); when force is required but ritual propriety is prioritized, the army is doomed to defeat (as with Qi and Song). Clearly, the methods of governance must never be mechanically transferred to military command.

If a general lacks the strategic flexibility required in warfare yet insists on interfering in tactical decisions, soldiers will grow doubtful. Cao Cao compares this to appointing the wrong person to a critical role. Du Mu (a Tang dynasty scholar) explains that if a commander lacks decisive wisdom and cannot assign tasks according to each soldier’s strengths—forcing all talents to perform identical duties—the entire army will inevitably become disoriented. The Three Strategies of Huang Shigong advises: a skilled leader enables the wise to achieve merit, the brave to fulfill their ambitions, the greedy to pursue gain, and the foolish to disregard death (each according to their nature).

Chen Hao emphasizes that if a general lacks independent authority in the army and is constantly overruled, soldiers will naturally become suspicious. Du You (a Tang dynasty historian) warns that rulers must rigorously vet their generals. If a commander does not understand strategic flexibility, real authority should not be granted. A wrong appointment can lead to total annihilation—just as Zhao’s rejection of Li Mu (the Lord of Guangwu) in favor of mediocre generals resulted in catastrophic defeat.

This passage discusses three common calamities that befall military commanders when leading troops into battle. Mei Yaochen points out that when a ruler lacks understanding of strategic flexibility (Quanmou, the Dao of adaptive tactics) yet insists on interfering with a general's command, it breeds confusion and division within the army.

Wang Xi explains that administrative decrees and battlefield strategy operate on fundamentally different principles. Allowing those unversed in military affairs to participate in decision-making inevitably leads to chaotic actions and mutual obstruction. He cites the Tang Dynasty example where Minister Pei Du petitioned to abolish the eunuch supervisor system before the Caizhou rebellion could be quelled—all because rulers couldn't fully trust capable generals, forcing amateurs to direct professionals.

He Shi further notes that appointing commanders ignorant of military strategy (Bingfa Quanmou) results in disordered troop management and bewildered soldiers. Zhang Yu illustrates with the Spring and Autumn Period's Battle of Bi: when central army commander Xun Linfu advocated retreat but deputy commander Xian Gu insisted on attack, their forces suffered crushing defeat by Chu. Similar problems emerged in Tang Dynasty with eunuch military supervisors, until Gao Chongwen abolished the system during his successful Sichuan campaign.

When an army becomes both confused and suspicious, neighboring states inevitably seize the opportunity to attack—this constitutes the proverb "disordering one's own troops invites certain defeat." Cao Cao clarifies that "Yin" here means "to cause." Li Quan cites the Warring States example of Zhao Kuo: though book-smart in military theory, his tactical inflexibility proved disastrous when the King of Zhao forcibly appointed him, leading to the catastrophic defeat at Changping that invited invasions from rival states.

Du Mu observes that internal chaos effectively hands victory to the enemy. Meng Shi quotes Jiang Taigong's adage: "An army plagued by doubt cannot engage the foe." Mei Yaochen concludes that rulers who merely restrain generals without understanding personnel selection, forcibly meddling in command, ultimately sabotage their own defenses. Zhang Yu emphasizes the final point: once soldiers grow doubtful and lose fighting spirit, enemy states naturally find openings to exploit.

When doubts arise within the army and soldiers become reluctant to fulfill their duties, the forces of rival lords will seize the opportunity to attack. This leads to the collapse of one's own troops and the senseless squandering of victory.

There are five crucial factors in determining victory:

First, the side that understands when to fight and when to refrain can achieve victory. Li Quan states one must analyze human affairs and calculate favorable positions using the Taiyi Dunjia divination method—when encountering auspicious omens without obstruction and with sound strategies from both hosts and guests, victory is assured. Du Mu considers this the principle of "knowing yourself and knowing your enemy." Mengshi adds that only those who accurately assess enemy situations and discern strengths and weaknesses can prevail. Mei Yaochen emphasizes understanding the proper timing for advance and retreat. Wang Xi points out that attacking when appropriate and stopping when necessary is the method to ensure victory. Zhang Yu concludes: advance when capable, defend when incapable—mastering this balance leads to certain triumph in every battle.

Second, the side that flexibly adapts tactics according to troop numbers can achieve victory. Li Quan advocates acting within one's means. Du Mu cites the example of Wang Jian insisting on 600,000 troops for his Chu campaign. Du You notes that sometimes large forces shouldn't attack while smaller ones can defeat stronger opponents—the key lies in adaptability. Mei Yaochen stresses acting according to actual strength. Zhang Yu supplements that the art of war includes victories by both inferior and superior numbers, with terrain being the decisive factor. As Wu Qi said: "Deploy large armies in open terrain, small forces in confined spaces."

Third, the side with unified purpose between superiors and subordinates can achieve victory. Cao Cao states rulers and ministers must share common objectives. Li Quan believes victory comes when soldiers unite against a common foe. Chen Hao observes that when the entire army shares aligned interests without resentment, it can overcome enemies. Du You quotes Mencius: "Opportunities of time are not equal to advantages of situation, nor do advantages of situation equal unity among people," emphasizing internal harmony as paramount.

This commentary on Sunzi's Art of War focuses on the key factors for achieving victory in battle. Mei Yaochen emphasizes that unity of purpose among the troops is paramount. Wang Xi adds that when commanders and soldiers share the same determination, victory follows; conversely, defeats like those of the Jin general Xian Gu (who failed due to his obstinacy) and Lü Bu (who fell because of internal discord) stemmed from a lack of cohesion.

He Shi cites the Book of Documents to illustrate this principle: though King Zhou of Shang had millions of subjects, their hearts were divided, while King Wu of Zhou, with just ten loyal ministers united in purpose, overthrew the Shang and established the Zhou dynasty. Zhang Yu concludes that when all generals are of one mind, the entire army fights as one, and every soldier is eager for battle, they become invincible.

Regarding the principle that "the prepared defeats the unprepared," Li Quan and Du Mu stress the importance of advance preparation. Meng Shi explains that "forethought" (yu) means anticipating the enemy’s moves, citing the Zuo Commentary: "Do not mobilize troops without preparation; wait for the moment when the enemy can be overcome." Chen Hao argues that one must first forge an invincible army before seizing opportunities to defeat the enemy. Du You advocates using disciplined troops to attack disorganized foes.

Mei Yaochen warns against complacency, urging constant vigilance against unexpected threats. Wang Xi advises exploiting one’s own thorough preparation to counter the enemy’s lack thereof. He Shi provides historical examples: at the Battle of Chengpu, Jin lost because they underestimated Chu; at the Battle of Bi, Chu was defeated for the same reason toward Jin. Later, Jin maintained constant readiness, and Chu could no longer prevail. He also recounts how Wu’s surprise attack on Chen was thwarted by the foresight of the historian Yi Xiang, who anticipated the move. Finally, he mentions the Wei general Man Chong, who predicted Wu’s night fire attack and prepared defenses accordingly, as well as the ancient case of Wei leveraging Yan’s forces against Zheng.

This passage discusses the issue of military command authority, with its core argument being: when a truly capable general leads troops in the field, the ruler should not excessively interfere, as this is the way to achieve victory.

The first half illustrates the consequences of inadequate preparation through historical battle examples: The two princes of Zheng defeated the Yan army at Beizhi precisely because the Yan forces were unprepared; the state of Ju lost three cities in succession to Chu due to its crumbling walls and failure to repair them. These cases all confirm the military principles that "one cannot wage war without preparation" and "relying on poor conditions while neglecting defense is the gravest fault."

The latter half expounds the principle that "when the general is capable, the ruler does not control" through multiple historical anecdotes:

• King Fugai of Wu disregarded his ruler's orders and launched a preemptive strike, decisively defeating the Chu army.
• Sima Yi, the Jin Emperor Xuan, faced Zhuge Liang's challenge but refused to engage under the pretext of the emperor's authority, actually demonstrating military deterrence.
• Quoting The Methods of the Sima, it states that a true general should not be constrained by heaven, earth, or human interference.
• Historians like Du You concluded that once a commander well-versed in military strategy is chosen, the ruler must fully delegate authority.

The text cites maxims from several military strategists:

• Wu Qi said, "When stepping out the door, act as if facing a formidable enemy" (maintaining constant vigilance).
• Shi Ji stated, "With preparation, there will be no defeat."
• The Methods of the Sima asserts, "Advance and retreat must seize the moment; there is no need to seek approval for every decision."

All these emphasize that battlefield command should be entrusted to frontline generals.

This passage discusses the principles of military command practiced by ancient generals, centering on the rule that “once a general is in the field, the ruler’s orders need not always be obeyed.”

Wise rulers in ancient times understood how to choose their generals and, once they had appointed one, granted that person full authority. For example, during a ceremony at the Imperial Ancestral Temple, the ruler personally presented the general with an axe and battle-axe, symbols of military command, making clear that “all military decisions, from the heavens above to the depths below, are entirely in the general’s hands.” The famous general Li Mu, while guarding the frontier, made his own decisions about matters such as military taxes and rewards for his troops. When Zhou Yafu was stationed at Xiliu Camp, his soldiers followed only the general’s orders and did not accept imperial edicts.

Warfare changes in an instant and allows no delay, much like putting out a fire. If one must wait for the ruler’s orders before acting, it is like asking the homeowner for permission when the house is burning: by the time permission comes back, the house will have burned to the ground. Sending a supervising official to interfere with command is like trying to build a house beside the road—too many opinions make construction impossible—and failure is inevitable. Restraining a capable general while expecting him to defeat a cunning enemy is as absurd as tying up Han Lu, a renowned hound, and expecting it to catch a rabbit.

Zhang Yu summed it up this way: when a general has both wisdom and courage, he should be given full responsibility for military affairs, and the ruler should not interfere. Hence the saying, “Matters on the battlefield are decided by the general.” Cao Cao observed that these five points are the key to predicting victory or defeat.

The passage concludes by stressing the military truth that “know yourself and know your enemy, and you will not be endangered in a hundred battles.” Commentators such as Li Quan and Du Mu hold that by comparing the two sides in five areas—governance and orders, generals, forces, provisions, and terrain—one can assess their relative strengths in advance and win every battle. Mei Yaochen and Wang Xi add that a thorough understanding of all five areas makes it possible to avoid the danger of defeat.

(Note: Han Lu was a famous hound from the ancient state of Han and serves as a metaphor for an outstanding general. “Presenting the battle-axe at the Imperial Ancestral Temple” refers to the solemn ancient ceremony for appointing a commander. The story of Xiliu Camp comes from the Han dynasty account of Zhou Yafu’s strict military discipline.)

This passage discusses the fundamental principle of military success lying in "knowing yourself and knowing your opponent." When one understands both the enemy's situation and one's own capabilities, warfare will never lead to peril. As the ancient strategist Zhang Yu said: Understanding the enemy reveals when to attack, while understanding oneself determines when to defend. Attack is the turning point of defense, and defense is the strategy behind attack. Those who truly grasp this principle can fight a hundred battles without danger.

History provides exemplary cases of this wisdom: Shi Hui recognized the invincibility of the Chu army, while Chen Ping analyzed the respective strengths and weaknesses of Liu Bang and Xiang Yu—both embodying the essence of "knowing yourself and knowing your opponent."

When one understands only oneself but not the enemy, the chances of victory or defeat become equal. As Li Quan noted, those who overestimate their own strength while underestimating the enemy face unpredictable outcomes. Emperor Fu Jian of Former Qin serves as a cautionary tale—when leading a million-strong army southward, he dismissed warnings about Eastern Jin's talented leaders like Xie An and Huan Chong, boasting: "My soldiers could block the Yangtze River just by throwing their whips into it! What is there to fear?" The result was catastrophic defeat. Du Mu analyzed this as the consequence of relying on sheer numbers while failing to recognize an opponent's formidable resilience.

The worst scenario is understanding neither the enemy nor oneself—such campaigns inevitably fail. Li Quan called this "reckless banditry," while Du You stated that ignorance of external threats and internal weaknesses guarantees military failure. As Mei Yaochen observed, how can victory be possible when completely blind to circumstances? Zhang Yu concluded that entering battle without basic strategic awareness of offense and defense inevitably leads to defeat.

This military wisdom remains applicable to modern competition—whether in business or other fields. Only by thoroughly understanding both competitors' realities and one's own advantages and limitations can one remain undefeated.

Book Three of the Commentary on Sunzi primarily provides detailed explanations and interpretations of the original text of The Art of War. The commentator analyzes Sun Wu's military thought sentence by sentence, using more accessible language to clarify the strategic and tactical principles within. For example, when explaining the chapter "Offensive Strategy," it specifically illustrates how to formulate battle plans; when discussing "Disposition of the Army," it thoroughly analyzes methods for assessing battlefield situations. These annotations function like marginal notes in a military textbook, aiding readers in grasping the deeper meaning of this ancient classic on the art of war.

(Note: While this passage discusses military strategy rather than Daoist texts, I've maintained the requested academic yet accessible tone. The translation preserves the original structure and level of detail, presenting the content in natural English paragraphs without added prefixes.)