《孫子註解》Vol. 12

This passage discusses the tactical use of fire attacks in ancient warfare. Cao Cao emphasized selecting the proper timing for fire assaults, while Wang Xi added that although fire attacks could aid military victory, one must guard against empty bluffs. Zhang Yu stressed that prior to executing a fire attack, spies must first reconnoiter the terrain's distances and the roads' difficulty levels.

Sunzi classified fire attacks into five types. The first is "burning personnel" — directly setting enemy camps ablaze to kill soldiers. Both Li Quan and Du Mu explained this as igniting military encampments' fences to simultaneously inflict casualties. Wu Qi once warned that armies stationed in wilderness areas overgrown with vegetation particularly feared fire attacks. During the Three Kingdoms period, when Liu Bei invaded Wu, Lu Xun employed this tactic at the Battle of Yiling: first deliberately losing a battle to make the Shu troops underestimate him, then having each soldier carry a bundle of thatch for a fire assault. Capitalizing on the flames, he shattered forty camps in succession, forcing Liu Bei to flee overnight.

Mei Yaochen noted that burning desolate areas could assist offensive momentum. He Shi traced the origins of fire attacks to Duke Huan of Lu's burning of Xianqiu in the state of Zhulou, with later military strategists developing five fire attack methods. For instance, during the Eastern Han dynasty, Ban Chao led a nighttime raid on a Xiongnu encampment in the Western Regions. Seizing strong winds, he set fires while deploying ten men to beat drums from ambush, creating chaos that secured total victory. Similarly, when Huangfu Song suppressed the Yellow Turban Rebellion despite being outnumbered, he noticed the rebels had camped in grassy terrain and launched a nighttime fire attack, decisively defeating Zhang Jiao.

(Note: "束苣" refers to bundled reeds used as torches, while "乘城" means mounting city walls for defense.)

This scripture primarily recounts several classic examples of fire attack tactics employed in ancient warfare.

The text first describes how during the Five Dynasties period, Emperor Taizu of Later Liang, Zhu Wen, faced a disadvantage when his enemy attacked with the aid of a southeastern wind at the Battle of Fish Mountain. Seizing the moment when the wind shifted, he ordered his troops to set fires, creating thick smoke, and used the flames to decisively defeat the enemy. Later, when Later Tang invaded Shu, Ren Huan similarly employed fire tactics, setting fires on all sides during the Battle of Hanzhou and leveraging the wind to overcome Kang Yanxiao’s forces.

The text then cites Zhang Yu’s commentary, emphasizing that the primary objective of fire attacks is to burn enemy encampments and inflict casualties on their troops, citing Ban Chao’s example of setting fire to the Xiongnu envoys’ quarters.

The second section focuses specifically on the "fire against provisions" tactic (burning enemy food and fodder reserves). Both Li Quan and Du Mu stress the importance of destroying the enemy’s strategic supplies, such as grain and forage. Two historical cases are provided: first, Liu Bang dispatched Liu Jia to burn Xiang Yu’s grain stores, leading to shortages in the Chu army; second, during the Sui dynasty, Gao Jiong proposed repeated fire attacks against the Chen dynasty, specifically targeting the bamboo-and-thatch granaries in the Jiangnan region to weaken the enemy by disrupting their logistics.

These examples illustrate the critical role of fire tactics in ancient warfare, particularly in leveraging natural conditions (such as wind direction) and exploiting enemy vulnerabilities (like supply lines) to gain battlefield advantage.

This passage discusses the practical application and case studies of "fire attack" tactics in ancient warfare. Several military strategists (Mei Yaochen, Zhang Yu, Li Quan, Du Mu, etc.), through their commentaries on The Art of War, provide detailed explanations of three out of the five types of fire attacks: burning provisions, burning supply trains, and burning storehouses.

Burning provisions (huo weiji) refers to setting fire to the enemy's stockpiled food and fodder. Mei Yaochen explains this tactic aims to sever the enemy's supply lines. Zhang Yu adds that destroying provisions can plunge the enemy into dire straits, citing the historical example of Liu Jia burning the Chu army's supplies, which ultimately led to their defeat.

Burning supply trains (huo zi) and burning storehouses (huo ku) both target the enemy's material reserves. Li Quan clarifies that supply trains denote military provisions in transit, while storehouses refer to supplies stored in camps. Du Mu illustrates this with the Battle of Guandu during the late Eastern Han Dynasty: Advisor Xu You advised Cao Cao to ambush Yuan Shao's supply convoy. Cao Cao dispatched 5,000 elite troops disguised as Yuan's forces, burning all of Yuan's supplies under cover of night, leading to the collapse of Yuan Shao's army.

Chen Hao proposes an alternative approach: deliberately attacking items the enemy values can force them to divert troops for rescue, thereby splitting their forces. Mei Yaochen emphasizes that burning supply trains cuts off the enemy's logistical support, while burning storehouses depletes their reserves.

He Shi cites the example of Former Qin's Fu Jian sending Wang Meng to attack Former Yan's Murong Wei: Wang Meng ordered his general Guo Qing to launch a night raid on the Yan army, setting fire to Murong Ping's supply train at Jinshan. The flames were visible even from Ye City, ultimately leading to the Yan army's destruction. Zhang Yu concludes that burning supply trains deprives the enemy of combat equipment, while burning storehouses exhausts their financial resources—just as Cao Cao's burning of Yuan Shao's supplies led to Yuan's downfall.

The fifth type of fire attack, "burning troops" (huo dui, not elaborated in the original text), likely refers to directly setting fire to enemy combat units. Through concrete historical examples, these commentaries demonstrate that the essence of fire attacks lies in destroying the enemy's logistical support system, undermining their fighting capacity at the material foundation.

Ancient military strategists discussing fire attack tactics proposed several key points:

Regarding the destruction of enemy equipment and supply lines, commentators explain: Burning the weapons and gear carried by enemy troops (duizhang) creates chaos for launching attacks. Mei Yaochen adds this is to seize enemy weapons (alternatively interpreting "dui" as "sui" meaning tunnel). Jia Lin notes "sui" refers to transportation routes - destroying grain routes and supply lines cuts off enemy logistics. Zhang Yu summarizes that damaging enemy equipment deprives them of combat tools, as the Art of War states: "With inferior weapons, one cannot properly engage the enemy."

Successful fire attacks require specific conditions. Cao Cao suggests using enemy turncoats, while Li Quan also advocates relying on internal collaborators. However, Chen Hao warns against depending solely on spies, emphasizing the need to await opportune moments. Jia Lin adds that attacks should be launched during dry weather. Zhang Yu systematically concludes: Fire attacks require dry seasons when enemy camps have thatch/bamboo structures, piled-up provisions, locations near grasslands, and favorable winds.

Fire attack materials must be prepared in advance. Cao Cao states ignition tools must be complete, while Li Quan lists fuel materials like firewood, wormwood, and grain chaff. Du Mu details preparations: Processing mugwort, reeds, firewood, and oils in advance, mentioning ancient fire weapons like fire arrows, fire curtains, and fire apricots. Mei Yaochen emphasizes covert preparations, quoting the Zuozhuan: "Preparedness prevents problems." Zhang Yu summarizes: Fire tools and combustibles should be kept ready for opportune moments.

Timing is critical for ignition. Mei Yaochen warns against rash action, while Zhang Yu stresses awaiting specific days. "Seasonal timing" refers to dry weather - Cao Cao explains this means drought periods, Mei Yaochen notes dry conditions facilitate ignition, and Zhang Yu adds that arid conditions help fires spread.

"Daily timing" relates to moon phases: When the moon aligns with four specific lunar mansions (Ji, Bi, Yi, Zhen among the ancient 28 constellations), windy days often occur. Li Quan cites astronomical records showing these positions correlate with wind. Du Mu explains these "lodgings" are the moon's stopping points, with these four mansions governing wind power. Mei Yaochen specifies Ji belongs to the Azure Dragon's tail in the east, while Bi relates to the Black Tortoise in the north. Ancient observers predicted wind direction and strength by tracking the moon's position among constellations, using this knowledge to assist fire attack planning.

This passage primarily discusses the application methods and precautions of fire attack tactics in ancient warfare.

Regarding astronomical observation, it mentions that the lunar mansions Bi, Yi, and Zhen (three of the twenty-eight lunar mansions) are located in the celestial region known as Chunwei (an ancient astronomical division). When the moon passes through these mansions, strong winds arise. Zhang Yu notes that these four mansions (including Ji) govern wind, and winds rise when the moon traverses them. By calculating the moon's trajectory, one can predict the days when winds will occur. Another method involves seasonal markers: the Bing-Ding days in spring, Wu-Ji days in summer, Ren-Gui days in autumn, and Jia-Yi days in winter. To determine wind direction, an eight-liang (approx. 300g) chicken feather was hung from a five-zhang (approx. 15m) pole, and the direction from which the wind blew was observed.

The key to fire attack tactics lies in adapting military maneuvers according to the five types of fire assaults (burning personnel, provisions, equipment, storehouses, and supply convoys). Mei Yaochen states that troop movements must align with the fire's progression, while Zhang Yu explains that forces should exploit the chaos caused by the flames.

If fire breaks out inside the enemy camp, an immediate external assault must follow. Cao Cao and others emphasize striking swiftly while the enemy is in disarray, coordinating attacks from both within and without. However, if the enemy remains composed despite the fire, it indicates preparedness—forcing an attack is unwise, and one must await the right moment. Du Mu and others caution that if the enemy does not panic, no assault should be launched.

Finally, the text stresses observing the fire's development: attack when conditions permit, but halt if they do not. Cao Cao advises seizing the opportune moment—advancing when possible, retreating when necessary. Li Quan and Du Mu agree that if the enemy remains unshaken after a fire attack, no assault should be made; instead, one must wait until the flames fully engulf the camp and assess the enemy's disorder before deciding on further action.

This passage discusses the principles of advance and retreat as well as specific operational methods when employing fire attack tactics:

Regarding timing for advance and retreat: Attack when you see advantage, withdraw when encountering difficulty. Fire attacks must fully unleash the destructive power of flames—act only when success is assured, otherwise hold back without revealing your intentions. Strike only after the flames have thrown enemy forces into chaos; if disorder doesn’t ensue, conserve your strength. For example, during the Three Kingdoms period, Wei general Man Chong anticipated a Wu night attack during strong winds and successfully counterattacked with prearranged ambushes.

Concerning fire attack methods: Flames need not always be set from within. If enemies are encamped in dry marshes, grassy areas, or other flammable locations, seize the moment to ignite fires externally without waiting for internal collaborators. Take the Western Han example of Li Ling battling the Xiongnu: when the nomads set fires upwind, Li preemptively burned a firebreak to block the flames. Timing must account for dry weather conditions (Heaven’s aridity) and astrological positions (the moon lodging among the four stars). During the Yellow Turban Rebellion, imperial forces under Huangfu Song defeated grass-camped rebels by coordinating external fires with signal flames from within the city.

Critical emphasis: Always ignite fires from the upwind position—never attack from downwind. Cao Cao explicitly warned about the severe disadvantages of downwind assaults. When Sui general Liu Yuan attacked Wang Shichong, he deliberately prepared combustibles eastward to exploit favorable winds.

This passage contains military strategists' commentaries on the fire and water attack tactics from The Art of War. Various experts explain the key principles of employing these tactics from different perspectives:

Regarding fire attacks, Du Mu emphasizes the importance of wind direction—if setting fires from the east, one must attack from the east, as advancing against the wind would bring disaster upon both sides. Mei Yaochen adds that attacking against the flames is highly disadvantageous, as it forces enemies into desperate resistance. Zhang Yu warns that after igniting fires, pursuing retreating enemies may provoke unexpectedly fierce counterattacks.

Concerning wind patterns, several commentators cite Laozi's observation that "a violent wind cannot last all morning" to illustrate natural laws—daytime winds cease by night, and nighttime winds subside by dawn.

On fire attack implementation, Du Mu stresses the necessity of astronomical observation (xingchan) to calculate wind-prone dates, cautioning against reckless deployment. Zhang Yu supplements this by advising preparedness against enemy counter-fire attacks, suggesting calculations of the Four Stars' celestial movements to predict wind patterns and arrange defenses accordingly.

Regarding auxiliary effects, both Mei Yaochen and Zhang Yu note fire attacks produce conspicuous results (ming), while water tactics disperse enemy forces to strengthen one's position (qiang). Cao Cao and Li Quan specifically highlight water's capacity to isolate enemies (jue) but its inability to seize supplies like fire attacks can (duo). All emphasize that employing these elements must strictly follow military principles (shushu) of warfare.

This passage analyzes ancient military strategies from two perspectives: the contrasting applications of water-based and fire-based attacks, and the critical importance of timely reward distribution after victory.

Regarding the comparison between water and fire tactics: Water attacks can sever enemy communications, isolating front and rear forces as seen in Emperor Guangwu's defeat of Wang Mang and Cao Cao's capture of Lü Bu. However, water tactics only achieve temporary advantage, unlike fire attacks that directly destroy enemy provisions. Du Mu notes that while water can block supply routes and reinforcements, it struggles to capture strategic strongholds. Wang Xi emphasizes leveraging water's violent momentum. Zhang Yu concludes that Han Xin's flooding of Long Ju brought momentary success, whereas Cao Cao's burning of Yuan Shao's granaries proved decisive—hence military treatises detail fire tactics more thoroughly.

Concerning the warning against "wasted victory" (费留): Cao Cao analogizes this to unreturning flowing water or delayed rewards. Li Quan stresses that rewards and punishments must be immediate, as procrastination undermines morale. Du Mu argues post-victory recognition must be prompt, or soldiers will lose motivation. Jia Lin interprets this as resource mismanagement, while Mei Yaochen advises maximizing gains through proper use of elements like water and fire rather than passive complacency. Both Wang Xi and Zhang Yu warn that failing to reward merit after victory exhausts resources and morale, rendering all previous achievements void.

This passage discusses the principles of warfare employed by wise rulers and skilled generals. Huang Shigong (a renowned military strategist of the Qin-Han period) stated that those who dominate the world must use strategy to command talent, integrity to unite people, and rewards to motivate them. If integrity weakens, capable individuals will distance themselves; if rewards are insufficient, they won't give their full service.

Several military theorists emphasize: the ruler should devise grand strategies for war, while generals are responsible for achieving victory. Military operations must follow three fundamental principles:

First, "No action without benefit." Li Quan noted that enlightened rulers and generals never mobilize troops lightly for trivial gains. Du Mu added that one must foresee clear advantages before taking action. Mei Yaochen put it more plainly: never raise arms unless it benefits the people.

Second, "No engagement without gain." Du Mu explained that troops should only be deployed after confirming victory over the enemy. Jia Lin similarly stressed acting only when tangible benefits can be secured.

Third, "No battle without necessity." Cao Cao described warfare as a last resort. Li Quan emphasized never initiating conflict except in direst emergency. Zhang Yu compared weapons to instruments of calamity and war to perilous affairs requiring utmost caution.

A special warning for rulers and generals: a ruler must never launch war from momentary anger, as when Marquis Xi attacked Zheng State over verbal conflict and brought about his own ruin. Nor should generals provoke hostilities in fits of rage, like Zhao Chuan and Yao Xiang of Jin who suffered disastrous defeats after acting on impulse.

The conclusion summarizes: military action depends entirely on strategic advantage. Both Cao Cao and Jia Lin stressed never waging war based on personal emotions, while Du Mu warned that battles fought in reckless anger inevitably fail. These principles remain essential guidelines for military decision-making to this day.

This passage discusses how rulers and generals must maintain rationality in warfare, avoiding reckless military actions driven by personal emotions. Ancient military strategists unanimously emphasized this principle:

Military campaigns should be launched with just cause ("war must be waged righteously"), never initiated out of momentary anger ("never raise armies in rage"). Victory depends on strategic advantage ("triumph through benefit"), not on stubbornness that leads to defeat ("don't fail through resentment"). The strategist Wei Liaozi stated: Warfare must not be provoked by anger - action should only follow when victory is assured, and halted when prospects are unfavorable.

Emotions are fickle - today's rage may become tomorrow's joy, present hatred may transform into future delight. But a vanquished state cannot be restored, nor fallen soldiers resurrected. The commentator Du Mu explained that nations often perish not because others destroy them, but through their own reckless military actions taken in anger despite insufficient strength. When generals hastily engage in battle out of spite, massive casualties inevitably follow.

Thus enlightened rulers must exercise military caution ("wise sovereigns act prudently"), and capable generals must guard against rash warfare ("excellent commanders remain vigilant"). This constitutes the fundamental Dao for preserving both state and army ("the way to safeguard the nation and maintain military integrity"). The commentator Mei Yaochen added that rulers should make decisions carefully while generals must maintain wariness. Zhang Yu summarized: When rulers are cautious in warfare, the state remains secure; when generals avoid reckless battles, the army stays intact.

Note: Here "resentment" (愠) refers to grudges or anger; "vigilance" (警) means alertness or wariness; "maintaining military integrity" (全军) denotes preserving the army's strength. These annotations reflect the ancient military philosophy's core tenet of "prudent warfare," emphasizing that military decisions must transcend emotional interference and prioritize rational judgment.