《孫子註解》Vol. 5

The fifth chapter of The Art of War discusses the concept of "strategic advantage" (势 shi). Cao Cao explains that in warfare, one must skillfully harness the power of circumstances. Li Quan elaborates that deploying troops should create an overwhelming advantage, like water pouring from a high roof. Wang Xi argues that "strategic advantage" arises from accumulating various favorable conditions—those skilled in combat can leverage these circumstances to win without relying solely on brute force.

Sunzi states: Managing a large army is like managing a small unit—the key lies in organization and structure. Cao Cao annotates that dividing the army into different units is called "division" (分 fen), while organizing them into squads is called "numbering" (数 shu). Li Quan illustrates that an excellent commander only needs to strike a gong or wave a flag to unify the entire army's movements. Du Mu explains that "division" refers to distinguishing units, while "numbering" determines their size. Han Xin's saying, "The more troops, the easier to command," reflects this principle.

Chen Hao adds that after assembling a large force, it must be divided into units, each with its own officers. With clear division and disciplined training, the army can be commanded as one when facing the enemy. Mengshi believes that unit structure and troop numbers must be established first. Zhang Yu details the process: managing a large army begins with defining hierarchical units—for example, two soldiers form a "pair" (比 bi), three a "triad" (参 can), five a "squad" (伍 wu), scaling up to army-level formations. Through this layered structure, even a million-strong force can be managed as effortlessly as a small unit.

Regarding battlefield command, Sunzi states that directing large-scale combat should be as flexible as leading a small unit—this relies on "signals and orders" (形名 xingming). Cao Cao clarifies: flags represent "form" (形 xing), while drums and gongs convey "commands" (名 ming). Du Mu explains that using flags, drums, and gongs to standardize signals ensures unified action across the entire army.

On the battlefield, both sides employ banners, drums, and bells as command tools—why assume only we can use them to direct troops? The true essence lies in their application.

The so-called "form" (形) refers to the arrangement of military formations, while "designation" (名) pertains to the system of banners and insignia. Military strategy states that formations must maintain sufficient space for soldiers to wield their weapons. Thus, large formations contain smaller ones, each with its designated position and structure. Banners use colors corresponding to directions, some even marked with avian or bestial patterns to distinguish units, with each commander’s troops bearing specific flags. When formations and signals are clearly established, soldiers can focus solely on combat, operating as autonomous units. In this way, commanding a million troops becomes as effortless as directing a single person—this is the principle.

Chen Hao elaborates: With vast numbers of troops spread across wide areas, units often lose awareness of one another in battle, hence the need for banners to identify friendly forces. The difficulty in synchronizing advances and retreats necessitates drums and gongs to unify tempo. As military orders dictate: "Advance at the drumbeat, halt at the gong’s sound." Cao Cao shares this view.

Mei Yaochen adds: Banners manifest formations; insignia distinguish ranks. Commands must be executed swiftly and uniformly, without delay or disorder. Wang Zhe notes: Cao Cao associates banners with "form" and drums with "designation," but in truth, "form" encompasses the entire system of banners and drums, while "designation" refers to the unique identifiers of each unit.

Zhang Yu cites the Military Administration (军政): "When sound cannot carry far, drums and bells are used; when vision is obstructed, banners are raised." Modern warfare involves massive scales and vast distances where mere sight and hearing cannot convey orders. Thus, soldiers must act upon visual signals and move to auditory commands—ensuring the brave do not recklessly charge ahead, nor the timid lag behind. This is the method for commanding large forces.

To ensure an entire army engages the enemy without defeat, the key lies in the interplay of "orthodox" (正) and "unorthodox" (奇) tactics. Cao Cao explains: "Facing the enemy head-on is 'orthodox'; striking unexpectedly is 'unorthodox.'" Li Quan illustrates with the example of Liu Bi, Prince of Wu during the Han Dynasty, who led an attack on Daliang. His general Tian Bolu proposed dividing 50,000 troops to launch a surprise assault along the Jiang-Huai route, but Liu Bi rejected the plan. Defeated by Zhou Yafu, this became a lesson in relying solely on "orthodox" tactics while neglecting the "unorthodox."

This passage discusses the application of "unconventional (qi) and conventional (zheng)" tactics in ancient military strategy, with various strategists offering distinct interpretations:

Du Mu posits that deploying conventional formations (zhengbing) to engage the enemy while using surprise troops (qibing) to secure victory—with coordinated maneuvers from all directions—ensures perpetual success. Mei Yaochen observes that mobile forces constitute the unconventional element while stationary defenses represent the conventional, advocating patient waiting for decisive moments to strike. Wang Xi suggests a textual emendation where "bi" (必) might be "bi" (毕), emphasizing that the mutual transformation between unconventional and conventional tactics creates comprehensive responsiveness against adversaries.

He Shi presents a more profound perspective: military operations involve infinite variations where no absolute "conventional" or "unconventional" exists. Righteous armies represent the conventional (zheng), while battlefield adaptability manifests as the unconventional (qi). What one side considers conventional might be perceived as unconventional by the enemy, and vice versa. He cites Han Xin’s tactics—deploying conventional formations with backs to the river while sending troops to capture enemy banners on mountains as unconventional maneuvers; massing forces at Linjin as conventional strategy while launching surprise attacks from Xiayang as unconventional. The strategist Wei Liaozi asserts that mastery of these tactics renders even the strongest armies vulnerable.

Zhang Pre synthesizes these views: Cao Cao believed initial engagements were conventional while follow-up strikes were unconventional; Li Jing considered advancing conventional and retreating unconventional. Yet Emperor Taizong of Tang’s insight proves most profound—deliberately letting the enemy mistake unconventional forces for conventional, then attacking with true unconventional tactics; disguising conventional troops as unconventional, then striking with conventional forces when the enemy anticipates unconventional moves. This creates an indistinguishable interplay of solid (shi) and void (xu) that represents strategic perfection.

The passage concludes with the metaphor "using stone to strike eggs," illustrating the principle of applying absolute superiority (solid) against vulnerabilities (void). Both Cao Cao and Li Quan emphasize concentrating overwhelming force against the enemy’s weakest points.

This military treatise discusses the application of "substantial and insubstantial" tactics (xushi) and "unorthodox and orthodox" strategies (qizheng) in warfare. The core principle lies in seizing battlefield initiative, striking the enemy's weak points with one's own strengths.

Regarding substantial-insubstantial tactics: Just as a hard stone can crush an egg, when troops are well-trained, properly commanded, and accurately assess enemy vulnerabilities, they can use strength against weakness. Mei Yaochen explains that attacking vulnerable points with substantial force is like breaking fragile objects with solid ones. Zhang Yu further clarifies that skilled commanders maneuver enemies without being maneuvered themselves, maintaining their own substantial position (shi) while keeping adversaries in an insubstantial state (xu).

Concerning unorthodox-orthodox strategies: Troop assembly must first establish organizational structure (fenshu), which enables standardized command signals (xingming). Only with standardized signals can conventional troops (zhengbing) be distinguished from mobile units (qibing), and only with clear qizheng differentiation can substantial-insubstantial positions be discerned. In battle, orthodox troops engage frontally while unorthodox forces achieve surprise victories. Cao Cao's commentary notes that zhengbing pins down enemies frontally while qibing attacks vulnerable flanks.

Two historical examples illustrate these principles: During the Warring States period, when Zhao Kuo replaced Lian Po, Qin forces feigned retreat to lure Zhao troops while dispatching two qibing units to sever their retreat and supply routes, achieving decisive victory. In the Sui dynasty, facing Turkic invasion with numerical inferiority, Emperor Gaozu of Tang chose desperate resistance that ultimately reversed the battle's outcome. Both cases exemplify the military doctrine of "engaging with orthodoxy, prevailing through unorthodoxy" (yi zheng he, yi qi sheng).

This passage discusses classic military campaigns and tactical concepts involving the use of extraordinary troops (unexpected tactical units) in ancient warfare.

Emperor Taizong of Tang, Li Shimin, once handpicked 4,000 elite cavalry as a mobile strike force, completely adopting the Turkic nomadic lifestyle to blend in. When enemy scouts were spotted, they deliberately pretended to be hunting to lull opponents into complacency. Upon encountering the main enemy force, they deployed in a pincer formation, with specially selected master archers forming elite squads that kept adversaries guessing about their true strength. Ultimately achieving victory through surprise tactics, they captured the enemy chieftain's prized steed and slaughtered over a thousand foes.

In another campaign, Li Shimin again selected a thousand elite cavalry clad entirely in black armor, dividing them into left and right divisions commanded by legendary generals like Qin Shubao and Cheng Yaojin. He personally led charges wearing black armor, seizing critical moments to defeat larger forces through shock tactics that left enemies terrified at the mere rumor of their approach.

During the Five Dynasties period, Later Han's founding emperor Liu Zhiyuan stationed in Jinyang when general Guo Jin defected to him. Recognizing Guo's talent, Liu sent him to recapture Anyang city occupied by northern nomads. Guo employed extraordinary troops to launch a surprise attack via mountain paths, successfully reclaiming the city and earning appointment as Prefect of Fangzhou. Later, Liu Zhiyuan again deployed unexpected forces through the Jingxing Pass to ultimately pacify the Hebei region.

Military strategist Zhang Yu summarized: When armies face off, first engage the enemy's main force directly, then suddenly deploy extraordinary troops to strike flanks or rear for victory—like when Zheng state resisted Yan forces by confronting them head-on with three armies while secretly encircling them from behind.

Masters of extraordinary warfare make tactical variations as endless as heaven and earth's movements, as inexhaustible as rivers flowing to sea. These transformations mirror the sun and moon's alternation or the four seasons' eternal cycle. Li Quan explains that shifts between conventional (zheng) and extraordinary (qi) tactics resemble lunar phases and seasonal changes; Du You adds this operates like the sun and moon's daily rise and fall or nature's seasonal waxing and waning. Zhang Yu further analogizes: The interplay of conventional and extraordinary tactics flows like celestial motions—apparently chaotic yet perfectly ordered, endlessly recurring without exhaustion.

The passage concludes by noting that while there are only five fundamental musical tones (gong, shang, jue, zhi, yu), they combine into infinite melodies—just as basic tactical elements, through variations of conventional and extraordinary deployments, can generate limitless strategic combinations.

Li Quan explains that the five basic musical notes—gong, shang, jiao, zhi, and yu—can be combined in endless variations to produce countless melodies, far beyond what the human ear could ever fully appreciate. Similarly, while there are only five fundamental colors—blue, yellow, red, white, and black—their blending and transformation create an inexhaustible spectrum for the eyes. Flavors, too, are limited to sour, pungent, salty, sweet, and bitter, yet their harmonious combinations yield tastes beyond complete sampling.

Cao Cao observes that the phrase "boundless as heaven and earth" serves as a metaphor for the infinite variations of "orthodox (zheng) and unorthodox (qi)" tactics in warfare. Li Quan adds that this is akin to how a chef blends the five flavors to create endless dishes. Du Mu interprets this passage as illustrating the relationship between the eight battle formations and the interplay of orthodox and unorthodox tactics. Zhang Yu concludes that the transformations of the five sounds, five colors, and five flavors symbolize the limitless possibilities of orthodox and unorthodox tactics in mutual generation and overcoming.

In warfare, all strategies ultimately boil down to the two fundamental approaches of orthodox (zheng) and unorthodox (qi), yet their combinations are inexhaustible. Li Quan notes that tactics such as ambushes, interceptions, and surprise attacks are too numerous to count. Mei Yaochen compares the endless variations of orthodox and unorthodox tactics to the infinite permutations of the five sounds, five colors, and five flavors. Wang Xi emphasizes that the interplay of orthodox and unorthodox tactics is the essence of military command—adaptability is crucial, as rigidity leads to defeat. Meng Shi cites the Six Secret Teachings (Liutao), stating that orthodox and unorthodox tactics stem from an inexhaustible wellspring of wisdom. Zhang Yu summarizes that while battlefield dynamics are rooted in these two basic principles, their application yields countless variations.

The mutual transformation of orthodox and unorthodox tactics is like a seamless circle with no beginning or end—who can fully grasp its mysteries? Li Quan explains that orthodox and unorthodox tactics depend on each other, just as a circle has no endpoints. Mei Yaochen states that this cyclical transformation knows no limits. Wang Xi argues that such fluidity prevents the enemy from discerning one’s patterns. He Shi elaborates that the interchange between orthodox and unorthodox is like tracing a circle with no discernible start or finish. Zhang Yu adds that the orthodox can shift into the unorthodox, and vice versa—this endless cycle defies fixed boundaries.

A raging torrent can carry away boulders due to the power of momentum (shi). Meng Shi explains that when water flows with great force, even the heaviest stones cannot remain stationary. Du You notes that while water is inherently soft and stones inherently hard, under the right conditions, the yielding water can move the unyielding rock.

This passage presents ancient military strategists' commentary on the concepts of "momentum" (势) and "timing" (节) from The Art of War. The core idea explains:

Though water appears soft and yielding, when rushing through steep rapids it can carry away massive boulders—this demonstrates the power of formidable momentum. Similarly, birds of prey achieve lethal strikes by mastering precise timing and distance. Just as an eagle folds its wings to descend silently before seizing the perfect moment to strike.

Thus, skilled commanders must master two essentials: First, "momentum" should be as perilously concentrated as a fully drawn crossbow, storing tremendous explosive force. Second, "timing" must be as abrupt as a bird's strike—launching attacks at point-blank range like a raptor pouncing to ensure maximum impact.

Commentators universally emphasize: water moves rocks through gravitational momentum from great heights, while raptors succeed through exact distance calibration. Military theorists like Wei Liaozi and Li Jing further note that true masters conceal their strength like birds folding wings before attack, conserving energy until the decisive moment arrives.

Victory in battle comes from skillfully utilizing treacherous terrain and deploying elite troops for swift strikes at close range. Mei Yaochen observes that combat in precarious locations demands ferocious momentum, with battle rhythms that are rapid and concise. Just as a bird of prey, though it may soar from afar, delivers its final strike with sudden intensity, so too must an army seize opportunities with decisive brevity.

Cao Cao explains that "short" refers to close-quarters combat. A skilled commander first assesses the terrain's proximity and the battlefield's breadth, then deploys troops with appropriate spacing between formations. The optimal assault range is limited to fifty paces—any greater distance diminishes effectiveness. Swift, overwhelming attacks leave enemies no time to defend; proximity ensures victory.

The battlefield dynamic should resemble a drawn crossbow, the assault triggered like releasing its mechanism. Li Quan notes that a slowly drawn bow cannot shoot far, and arrows fired from excessive distance miss their mark—thus attacks must be fast-paced with rapid cadence. Du Mu elaborates: just as a loosed crossbow bolt kills instantly, earlier passages emphasize creating precipitous offensive pressure. The crossbow's trigger requires close-range precision to hit its target, hence the earlier insistence on concise rhythm. In warfare, prolonged pursuit at distance risks disorganized ranks, inviting enemy counterattacks.

Chen Hao adds that a crossbow's mechanism succeeds at close range just as swift action prevails in battle. Hesitation or excessive distance undermines victory. Zhang Yu synthesizes these principles: treacherous terrain favors rapid combat, where close-range strikes prove most effective. As Jiang Taigong taught, launching an assault must mimic the crossbow's precise release—only then can an enemy's finest troops be shattered.

This passage elucidates the essence of military formation and command in ancient warfare. Just as a drawn bow must not slacken and a triggered mechanism must not delay, one must swiftly seize opportunities in battle and launch fierce attacks at close range. Jiang Taigong (a founding minister of the Zhou dynasty) said that launching an assault should be as precise as a triggered mechanism, only then can the enemy's most sophisticated defenses be shattered.

When banners flutter chaotically and soldiers engage in melee on the battlefield, the surface may appear disordered, but internally, strict order must be maintained. It resembles the complete circular formation hidden within chaos—seemingly penetrable yet unbreakable. Cao Cao explained that deliberately making the banners appear chaotic was to confuse the enemy, while in reality, the troops were coordinated through the unified signals of drums and gongs (ancient military command instruments). Though the movements of infantry and cavalry may seem erratic, their advances and retreats follow a disciplined pattern, maintaining overall cohesion.

Li Quan further elaborated: The apparent disorder is an illusion. The arrangement of banners and the signals of gongs are meticulously planned, ensuring no actual confusion arises. "Hundun" (chaos) refers to a formation that appears mixed and disordered, yet has no discernible front or rear, making the enemy believe it can be defeated while remaining impregnable—the key lies in strict command.

Du Mu interpreted this as the crux of ancient battle formations. According to the Wuoqi Jing (Classic of Grasping the Extraordinary) by Feng Hou (a strategist from the Yellow Emperor's era), armies were divided into four regular and four irregular units, with the remaining irregular forces held in reserve by the commander. Scouting troops were first dispatched to secure the battlefield flanks, marking the beginning of formation deployment. "Qi" (irregular) refers to scattered, mobile units. A complete formation comprised nine sections, with the commander stationed immovably at the center, controlling the arrangement in all directions. Soldiers were positioned face-to-face and back-to-back, supporting one another.

The Rites of Zhou records hunting drills (sou miao xian shou) where chariots dashed and infantry sprinted, halting only at the banners' designated positions. This rhythm of advance and retreat, speed and spacing, mirrored actual battle formations. Banners served as rallying points for soldiers. The Wuoqi Jing states that scouting troops first secured the flanks—this meant vanguard units marked boundaries with their banners before the main force advanced, completing the transformation between irregular and regular formations beneath the banners.

The author notes that among the five ancient weapons (dagger-axe, club, halberd, long spear, and short spear), none rivaled the bow and arrow (hushi) in power. Why did the sages particularly emphasize the bow's ability to awe the world? Because its superiority is fully realized in battle formations. Just as the Yellow Emperor defeated Chiyou by using Central Plains chariots and infantry to subdue minority cavalry, this exemplifies the bow's formidable role in tactical formations.

This passage illustrates the crucial role of battle formations in warfare through historical examples. During the Jin dynasty, when the Qiang people captured Liangzhou, General Ma Long recruited three thousand elite warriors—men capable of drawing a 36-jun (an ancient unit of weight) crossbow or a 4-jun hard bow. While crossing the Wen River westward, they were intercepted by the enemy leader Shu Jinen leading ten thousand troops. Ma Long employed the Eight Formation Tactics (Ba Zhen Bingfa), advancing while fighting with unerring arrows, ultimately pacifying Liangzhou.

In the Sui dynasty, when the Turks invaded, the renowned general Yang Su revolutionized conventional tactics. Previously, commanders, fearing Turkic cavalry charges, often mixed chariots with infantry, setting up deer-antler defenses (lujiao) to form square formations protecting their cavalry. Yang Su abolished these outdated methods, allowing each unit to deploy infantry and cavalry independently. The Turkic khan, overjoyed, led over a hundred thousand elite horsemen to attack but was decisively crushed by Yang Su in a single battle. This proved that only by mastering the principles of opening and closing formations, with coordinated front and rear actions, could infantry effectively counter cavalry.

The Book of Rites (Liji·Qu Li) records that military marches should follow the celestial pattern: "Vermilion Bird in front, Black Tortoise behind, Azure Dragon to the left, White Tiger to the right" (symbolizing the four directional constellations). Zheng Sinong (a Han dynasty scholar) explained that this imitated astronomical formations. Kong Yingda (a Tang dynasty scholar) added that while the exact method was unclear, He Che believed it involved painting the four symbols on military banners to mark directions. "Swiftly marshaling their fury" described soldiers as fierce as heaven’s wrath, while "Zhaoyao" referred to the seventh star of the Big Dipper—hinting that the entire formation mirrored the celestial arrangement of the Northern Dipper.

The text also cites the Book of Documents (Shangshu·Mu Shi) to emphasize the rhythm of marching: "Six or seven steps forward, four or five strikes" (coordinating steps and weapon swings). Zheng Sinong explained that "left and right have their divisions" meant troops were arrayed in orderly ranks, each with distinct roles in attack and retreat. Finally, it stresses the resolve for vengeance: "For a father’s killer, one shares not the same sky; for a brother’s, one carries arms always; for a friend’s, one refuses to dwell in the same land." A besieged city was a disgrace to ministers and nobles, and once battle was joined, victory was imperative. These examples all underscore that warfare demands strict adherence to formations and unified resolve.

This passage reveals the mysteries of ancient military formations. Its core message is that seemingly chaotic battle arrays actually conceal profound order—this represents the deeper wisdom of sage-like commanders in warfare.

The Military Records state: Battle formations must maintain adequate spacing, with the front lines capable of resisting frontal assaults and the rear guard prepared to defend against attacks from behind, while both flanks remain protected. During movement, troops should flow like schooling fish; when arrayed, they maintain goose formation precision. Long formations incorporate short elements, while short formations integrate extended components. When wheeling to reposition, front and rear units may flexibly exchange places. Advances and retreats follow strict sequence, with all surrounding forces ready to provide mutual support. Should enemies penetrate the formation, both ends can swiftly reinforce. These principles align with the Book of Rites' dictum: "Numbers begin with five and culminate in eight."

Zhuge Liang famously arranged stones in Kuizhou to demonstrate his eight-row square formation (the renowned "Eight Arrays Diagram"), from which all variations of conventional and unconventional tactics derive. Unconventional maneuvers can transform into conventional ones, and conventional tactics may shift to unconventional—their permutations being truly limitless. Later, when Zhuge Liang marched through Xie Valley with reduced forces using only six formation variants, Sima Yi's 100,000-strong army still dared not engage, fully aware of the formation's brilliance.

Du You explains: The apparently disordered banners and flags actually follow unified drum and gong commands. Chariots and cavalry wheeling in circular arrays create controlled chaos—seemingly formless yet perfectly orchestrated. Mei Yaochen adds: Though troops may scatter and regroup in apparent confusion, their strict hierarchical organization (defined fenshu structure) ensures chaos contains order. Wang Xi interprets Cao Cao's "banners displaying chaos" as surface-level disarray masking rigorous discipline (controlled looseness). This external laxity concealing internal precision precisely aims to deceive enemies and conceal true capabilities.

(Note: Fenshu refers to military organizational structure; xingming denotes command signals like banners and drums; qizheng indicates the interplay between conventional and unconventional tactics—all being specialized terminology in classical military science.)

This passage elucidates the wisdom in ancient military strategy concerning battle formations and combat psychology.

Regarding the explanation of the "Hundun" (Chaos) formation: Hundun refers to a formation that appears disordered on the surface yet conceals methodical organization. When skilled commanders lead troops, their movements may seem chaotic in advancing and retreating, yet in reality, both soldiers and cavalry undergo rigorous training, and banner commands follow strict protocols. This formation appears simultaneously dispersed and united—outsiders might perceive it as vulnerable, yet it maintains disciplined commands and measured transformations. The circular formation seems to lack fixed ranks, yet secretly embodies profound tactical principles.

Zhang Yu further explains this originates from the Yellow Emperor's "Eight Formations Method": troops arranged in a well-shaped pattern with the central space reserved for the commanding general, surrounded by interconnected forces on all sides. In battle, it could disperse into eight smaller formations or unite as one cohesive whole. Later developments like Zhuge Liang's (Marquis Wu) square formation, Li Jing's Six Petals formation, and Emperor Taizong of Tang's victory dance all stem from this origin.

On the psychological principles of warfare regarding "disorder arising from order":

• Chaos often emerges from excessive pursuit of discipline: The Qin dynasty's destruction of weapons and burning of books after unification, believing their rule would last millennia, only to be overthrown by Chen Sheng and Wu Guang's rebellion
• Cowardice frequently stems from extreme boldness: Fu Jian of Former Qin marched against Jin with overwhelming momentum, yet after defeat trembled at mere rumors
• Weakness often follows excessive strength: King Fuchai of Wu once dominated the world, yet ultimately fell to Yue

Cao Cao and Li Quan note these outcomes result from concealing true circumstances. Du Mu adds that to feign disorder and lure the enemy, one must first achieve genuine discipline to make deception convincing. These examples illustrate the dialectical relationship between appearance and substance in military affairs.

On the battlefield, to feign cowardice and deceive the enemy, one must first possess extraordinary courage to convincingly simulate timidity. To disguise oneself as weak and lure the enemy into underestimation, one must first be truly strong to successfully appear feeble.

Ancient military strategists had profound insights into this: Jia Lin remarked that excessive reliance on order can lead to chaos, and excessive display of bravery can expose vulnerabilities. Mei Yaochen pointed out that only a disciplined army can deliberately feign disorder, only truly courageous troops can pretend to be timid, and only a powerful force can feign weakness. Wang Xi concurred with this view.

He Shi further explained: In warfare, one must skillfully employ both orthodox (zheng) and unorthodox (qi) tactics to confuse the enemy. Our army, well-trained in peacetime, is inherently courageous and strong. But if we do not conceal these advantages, how can we entice the enemy into a trap? We must deliberately display disorder, timidity, and weakness to deceive them. When the enemy is misled by these illusions, they can be easily defeated. Zhang Yu summarized: Those who can show disorder to the enemy must have a disciplined army; those who can feign cowardice must possess true bravery; those who can appear weak must be genuinely strong. All these are strategies of misleading the enemy by concealing the truth.

Regarding "order and disorder depend on organization" (the discipline or chaos of an army lies in its structure): Cao Cao believed the key lay in the management of military units. Li Quan interpreted it from the perspective of yin-yang numerology, suggesting that order and disorder follow celestial patterns. Du Mu emphasized that an army must have a clear organizational system—only by being truly disciplined can it feign chaos. Signs of feigned disorder include irregular schedules, uncontrolled foraging for firewood, and lax night watch duties. Jia Lin noted that there must be a measured balance between order and disorder. Mei Yaochen and Wang Xi both agreed that this depends on institutional organization. Zhang Yu concluded: Being truly disciplined yet deliberately appearing chaotic demonstrates the perfection of its organizational system—this is the principle mentioned earlier that "commanding a large army is as easy as commanding a small one."

Regarding "courage and timidity depend on circumstances" (bravery or fear is shaped by the battlefield situation): Li Quan stated that when an army holds a favorable position, even the timid become brave; when the advantage is lost, even the brave grow fearful. Military strategy has no fixed formula—the key lies in adapting to circumstances. Du Mu explained this as the tactic of disguising courage as timidity, holding back when facing a favorable opportunity to make the enemy believe we are truly afraid. Chen Hao added that true courage lies in seizing the moment and acting swiftly.

This passage discusses the military strategy of "feigning weakness to lure the enemy." On the battlefield, deliberately displaying timidity or vulnerability can make the enemy underestimate you and advance recklessly, creating an opportunity for counterattack. It recalls how Han Xin pretended cowardice against Long Ju, or how the Zheng army lured enemies deep into their territory.

When Pang Juan attacked Han, the Qi general Tian Ji came to the rescue. The strategist Sun Bin advised: "The Wei army has always looked down on Qi troops, believing them cowardly. Let's exploit this perception by reducing the number of cooking stoves daily as we enter Wei territory." Pang Juan took the bait, assuming Qi desertions were increasing, and pressed forward arrogantly—only to meet crushing defeat at Maling Road.

The dynamics of strength and weakness can be artificially manipulated. The Xiongnu chieftain Modu deliberately showed envoys like Lou Jing only aged and feeble soldiers, while the Chu king disbanded central forces to deceive the Sui state—both employing such ruses. Before Emperor Gaozu of Han attacked the Xiongnu, his scouts saw only the weak and infirm; only Lou Jing recognized this as bait. Unfortunately, Liu Bang ignored the warning and got besieged at Baideng Mountain.

Truly skilled commanders manipulate enemies through deception. When Jin attacked Qi, they planted banners and raised dust on mountains to mislead Qi's assessment. Thus, the essence of superior tactics lies in this: whatever illusion you project, the enemy will dance to your tune.

This passage illustrates the strategic use of illusion and deception in ancient warfare through two famous historical battles.

The first example is the Battle of Maling between the states of Qi and Wei during the Warring States period. The Qi strategist Sun Bin (a renowned military tactician) deliberately reduced the number of cooking stoves each day during the march, shrinking them from 100,000 to 50,000. This tricked the pursuing Wei general Pang Juan into believing that Qi troops were deserting in large numbers. Falling for the ruse, Pang Juan grew overconfident and recklessly advanced, only to be ambushed in the narrow Maling Pass. Sun Bin had earlier carved the words "Pang Juan dies beneath this tree" on a trunk—when Wei soldiers lit torches to read it, hidden archers unleashed a deadly volley, leading to Pang Juan’s defeat and death. This exemplifies the classic tactic of "feigning weakness to lure the enemy."

The second case occurred during the Sui dynasty when Turkic forces besieged Emperor Yang of Sui at Yanmen Pass. The young Li Shimin (later Emperor Taizong of Tang) advised General Yun Dingxing to carry an abundance of banners and war drums, stretching them for miles during the day and beating the drums at night to create the illusion of massive reinforcements. The Turkic khan, deceived, believed Sui reinforcements had arrived and lifted the siege. This demonstrates the method of "bluffing to repel the enemy."

Military commentators note that when strong, one should feign weakness to entice the enemy into attack; when weak, one should exaggerate strength to intimidate them into retreat. The key lies in manipulating the enemy’s perception by altering the outward appearance of one’s forces, guiding them to act precisely as intended. Scholar He particularly emphasizes the importance of shifting formations to confuse the enemy, leading them unwittingly into a trap. Zhang Yu concludes that during the Jin-Chu conflict, Miao Benhuang’s advice for Jin forces to alter their battle array to mislead the enemy followed the same principle.

These historical examples embody the highest military ideal articulated in The Art of War: "The ultimate skill in deploying troops is to appear formless." Through the interplay of illusion and reality, one achieves the strategic advantage of "compelling the enemy without being compelled."

This passage discusses the "lure the enemy deep" tactic in military strategy. The Chu state deliberately feigned weakness, leading the Sui army to underestimate them and advance recklessly, resulting in Chu's decisive victory. Ji Liang points out this was Chu's deliberate entrapment strategy.

Cao Cao's commentary explains how to use benefits to entice enemies away from their fortified positions, then attack when their defenses are weakened. He cites his own example from the Battle of Guandu: pretending to retreat, he intentionally abandoned supplies, prompting Yuan Shao's general Wen Chou to pursue with five to six thousand cavalry—only to be ambushed and annihilated by Cao's force of fewer than six hundred men, with Wen Chou himself slain.

Other military theorists expand on similar principles:

• Mei Yaochen states that deliberately displaying fear and timidity lures the enemy into attacking.
• Wang Xi notes that small temptations will inevitably draw the enemy to seize them.
• Zhang Yu cites historical examples like Wu using prisoners to bait Yue and Chu using woodcutters to trap Jiao.

The latter section explores the tactic of "entice with profit, ambush with troops." Li Quan references the Eastern Han general Deng Yu's campaign against the Red Eyebrows rebels: the rebels feigned retreat, abandoning supply carts filled with dirt (topped with a layer of beans). When Deng's troops scrambled for the spoils, their formation collapsed, leaving them vulnerable to a devastating ambush.

Du Mu summarizes the core principle: first bait the enemy with gains, then strike with elite forces once they take the lure. He Shi adds that greedy enemies will disrupt their own ranks, allowing pre-positioned troops to secure victory. The passage concludes with Cao Cao's western campaign against Ma Chao: while feigning a river crossing at Tong Pass to draw Ma's forces, Cao secretly had Xu Huang establish a bridgehead overnight.

These cases all illustrate the same lesson: master the art of tempting the enemy with profit, then deliver a fatal blow with concealed elite troops when they overextend.

This passage recounts several ancient military cases, illustrating the core principle of "skillfully utilizing circumstances without harshly blaming one's troops" in warfare.

The first story describes Cao Cao's stratagem: He intentionally released cattle and horses to lure enemy troops into plundering, then crossed the river amidst the chaos. He then constructed walled passageways (yongdao) along the riverbank for southward advancement, feigned retreat to Weikou while secretly transporting troops by boat to build a floating bridge across the Wei River, and finally established a camp south of the Wei under cover of darkness. When the enemy launched a night attack, his ambush forces struck and achieved complete victory.

The second case involves Tufa Rutan of Southern Liang defending Guzang City against the massive army of Later Qin's Yao Bi. He deliberately pastured livestock in the suburbs, then launched divided attacks when enemy troops scattered to plunder, crushing their forces.

The third narrative tells of Northern Wei general Yu Jin's scheme: Anticipating that rebel leader Poliuhan Baling would intercept surrendered tribes, he turned this expectation against the rebels by setting an ambush. As predicted, the rebels fell into the trap and suffered heavy defeat, allowing Yu Jin to successfully incorporate over thirty thousand tribal households.

Zhang Yu summarizes that these cases all demonstrate the tactic of "using profit to bait the enemy." Li Jing (the renowned Tang dynasty strategist) maintained that military operations should treat soldiers as fundamental—skilled commanders focus on creating advantageous situations rather than demanding excessive sacrifice from troops. This mirrors how Duke Mu of Qin didn't replace general Meng Mingshi after defeat, ultimately achieving reversal of fortune.

Du You points out that true commanders must understand how to select personnel according to circumstances: deploying the courageous for offense, the prudent for defense, and the clever for diplomacy—making optimal use of each talent. Cao Cao adds that skillfully utilizing circumstances means understanding strategic flexibility, while not harshly blaming others reflects comprehension of adapting to changing situations.

(Note: "Yongdao" refers to walled passageways; "kuanfu" means surrender or allegiance; "Tiele" denotes ancient northern nomadic tribes; "zheng bing" refers to regular combat troops)

A master of warfare first assesses the battlefield situation, then assigns tasks according to his officers' distinctive capabilities. When Cao Cao (courtesy name Mengde) campaigned against Zhang Lu in Hanzhong, he left Zhang Liao, Li Dian, and Yue Jin to defend Hefei with just over a thousand troops. Cao gave Xue Ti, the defense supervisor, a sealed letter with instructions: "Open only when the enemy arrives." Soon enough, Sun Quan attacked with a hundred thousand troops. Upon opening the letter, they read: "If Sun Quan attacks, Zhang Liao and Li Dian shall engage the enemy, Yue Jin will hold the city, and the defense supervisor must not participate."

The generals were perplexed, but Zhang Liao explained: "Our lord is campaigning far away. By the time reinforcements arrive, we'd already be defeated. His orders mean we must strike first before the enemy completes their encirclement—to blunt their momentum and steady our morale before fortifying our position." Zhang Liao and Li Dian launched a joint assault that routed Sun Quan's forces. With Wu's morale broken, Wei strengthened its defenses. After ten days of failed assaults, Sun Quan withdrew.

The historian Sun Sheng (Eastern Jin dynasty) commented: Warfare values the interplay of solid and void. With Hefei's defenders outnumbered, using only bold officers risked reckless aggression, while relying solely on cautious ones would undermine morale. Against overwhelming odds, the enemy grows complacent—precisely when a desperate counterstrike against their lax forces guarantees victory. After winning, fortifying becomes unshakable. Thus Cao Cao (Emperor Wu of Wei) meticulously paired officers of contrasting temperaments, prearranged meticulous plans, and executed them with seal-and-tally precision when the moment came.

Jia Lin elaborated: The crux lies in selecting the right men and creating inevitable victory. Have troops fight from advantageous positions rather than demanding individual prowess decide outcomes. Assign offensive or defensive roles according to each person's courage or caution. Chen Hao added: Great commanders focus on shaping favorable circumstances, act swiftly when opportunities arise, and never let the enemy strike first. They rely chiefly on battlefield adaptability, not individual heroics—reserving handpicked talent only for direst needs.

Du You held: Wise commanders flexibly deploy subordinates' strengths according to circumstances. Mei Yaochen noted: Leveraging circumstances makes employing men easy; demanding individual excellence makes it hard. The key is selecting the right people and skillfully using circumstances. He Shi emphasized: Mastering circumstances ensures victory without depending solely on personal bravery. Wang Xi concluded: When a commander selects suitable men and harnesses advantageous circumstances, triumph follows naturally. Here "men" refers to specialized officers of complementary talents.

The art of employing people lies in assigning roles according to each individual's characteristics—whether greedy, dull, intelligent, or courageous—one must follow their inherent nature and never force them beyond their capacities. As the strategist Wei Liaozi advised, we must utilize each person's strengths: some excel in infantry tactics while others shine in cavalry maneuvers; only by matching assignments to talents can all abilities be fully realized. The Marquis of Jin (rulers of the Jin state during the Spring and Autumn period) likewise appointed officials based on merit.

Commanding troops should resemble rolling logs and stones—aligning with natural principles. The nature of wood and stone dictates that they remain still on level ground but roll down slopes; square objects stabilize easily while round ones roll readily. Cao Cao remarked that this exemplifies following the natural propensity (Shi 势). Li Quan believed commanders must grasp this dynamic in troop deployment. Du You explained: positioning forces in secure terrain ensures safety, while dangerous placements invite peril—just as inanimate objects lack volition, this reflects cosmic patterns. The distinction between square and round shapes mirrors the shifting dynamics between victory and defeat in warfare. Mei Yaochen added: heavy objects like logs and stones move effortlessly through momentum (Shi) but resist brute force. Similarly, vast armies operate most effectively through strategic advantage rather than mere coercion—this is the Dao of nature.

Thus, the momentum created by skilled commanders resembles boulders tumbling from thousand-zhang peaks—unstoppable in their descent. Li Quan cited Kuai Tong's analogy of pellets rolling effortlessly down slopes. Du Mu elaborated: stones falling from towering cliffs cannot be halted, for their power resides not in the rocks themselves but in the mountain's precipice. A general's hundred victories stem wholly from strategic positioning (Shi), not individual prowess. Du Yu (style name Yuankai) illustrated this with Yue Yi's conquest of mighty Qi through a single decisive battle at Jixi—once momentum was established, it split bamboo-like, overcoming initial resistance before proceeding effortlessly. This unstoppable "momentum" allowed his subsequent eastward campaign to capture Jianye (modern Nanjing) and ultimately conquer Wu. The passage emphasizes warfare's essence: leveraging strategic advantage (Shi) through terrain and rapid maneuver achieves maximum results with minimal effort. Mei Yaochen concluded: round stones poised atop peaks appear static, yet once set in motion, their momentum becomes irresistible.

This passage discusses how military strategy should skillfully harness the power of "strategic advantage" (势 shì). It's like a boulder rolling down a mountain—while one person can set it in motion, a thousand couldn't stop it (commentator Wang Xi explains: the stone itself doesn't move—it's the mountain's slope that creates its unstoppable momentum). Victory in battle doesn't come from brute force alone, but from understanding how to leverage the inherent power of an army's position (commentator Zhang Yu adds: just as a stone keeps rolling down a slope until it stops naturally, an army positioned in strategically advantageous terrain becomes nearly invincible—both demonstrate the principle of "strategic advantage").

Li Jing (a renowned Tang dynasty general) identified three types of military momentum: First, "spiritual momentum" (气势 qìshì), achieved when commanders remain vigilant and troops maintain morale soaring like clouds or sweeping like gales. Second, "terrain momentum" (地势 dìshì), exemplified by holding narrow mountain passes where one soldier can thwart a thousand. Third, "opportunistic momentum" (因势 yīnshì), striking when enemies are exhausted, hungry, thirsty, or caught mid-maneuver—like attacking while their vanguard hasn't yet camped or their rear guard is still crossing rivers.

The passage concludes with a vivid metaphor: masters of warfare maneuver strategic advantage like sending a round boulder down a steep slope—the slightest push yields tremendous results.