《孫子註解》Vol. 7

This passage discusses strategies for gaining advantage when two opposing armies face each other in ancient warfare. Cao Cao explains that "military contention" (junzheng) refers to competing for favorable conditions during standoffs. Li Quan adds that such contention fundamentally involves vying for advantageous positions, requiring clear understanding of both the enemy's and one's own strengths and weaknesses before taking action.

When a general receives the sovereign's command to lead troops, several crucial steps must be completed: First is "assembling the army and gathering the masses" (he jun ju zhong), meaning mustering the nation's military forces to form an army. Cao Cao notes this includes organizing units and establishing encampments. Wang Xi specifies that the standard formation for a major state consists of 37,500 soldiers, with full mobilization potentially reaching 75,000. Zhang Yu concludes this process integrates citizens into military units, gathering soldiers into battle formations.

Next comes "facing each other and making camp" (jiao he er she), referring to the standoff where opposing armies establish positions. Cao Cao explains ancient military camps had distinct gates: the main entrance called the Harmony Gate (hemen), flanked by Banner Gates (qimen), with chariots forming the Outer Gates (yuanmen) and soldiers guarding the Personnel Gates (renmen). Li Quan particularly emphasizes that during this phase, soldiers of varying strength and courage become intermingled, requiring unified coordination. Du Mu cites the Rites of Zhou (Zhouli), noting how banners were erected at camp entrances as markers called Fortification Gates (leimen), used to regulate troop movements. Jia Lin clarifies that "making camp" (she) means establishing positions, where soldiers must maintain discipline while poised for action during the standoff.

Mei Yaochen observes that when armies face off, their respective Harmony Gates stand directly opposite each other. He Shi specially cautions that this gate-to-gate confrontation signals imminent military contention, representing warfare's most challenging circumstance. Zhang Yu's commentary systematically summarizes these essential principles of military deployment.

This passage discusses the most challenging aspect of military operations—strategies for contending over advantageous terrain between opposing forces. Ancient texts state that before deploying troops, internal harmony must be achieved: a state lacking unity cannot mobilize its army, and an army without cohesion cannot arrange its formations. Yet the true difficulty lies in the actual battlefield struggle for favorable positions.

Cao Cao explains that the period from receiving marching orders to engaging the enemy is most fraught when contesting strategic advantages. Du Mu emphasizes the core challenge lies in weighing gains and losses during such contention. Mei Yaochen and Zhang Yu both stress that competing with the enemy for battlefield superiority ranks among the most difficult military endeavors.

How then should commanders proceed? The fundamental strategy is to "make detours into shortcuts, and transform disadvantages into advantages." Cao Cao notes that one should deliberately show the enemy a distant route while actually advancing rapidly to secure key positions first. Du Mu elaborates that initial feigned detours confuse the opponent, allowing sudden forced marches when their guard drops. Chen Hao observes that only those who grasp this principle can truly contend with adversaries.

Jia Lin provides concrete details: the entire army must seize superior terrain—failure to do so guarantees defeat. Du You clarifies that when enemies take circuitous routes, we must preemptively occupy strategic points. Mei Yaochen concludes that true mastery lies in this transformative thinking.

Wang Xi cites Cao Cao's view that showing distant routes creates opportunities for surprise attacks, suggesting sending elite units along hidden paths. He Shi illustrates with historical examples: during campaigns in Shu's mountainous terrain, commanders should divide forces for unexpected maneuvers, following guides along direct routes for sudden strikes—just as Deng Ai's surprise advance forced Shu's unprepared surrender. Zhang Yu ultimately summarizes: the art of turning detours into direct paths and disadvantages into advantages constitutes military contention's supreme difficulty.

This passage discusses the tactical wisdom of "taking the circuitous route as the direct path" in military strategy. Simply put, it involves deliberately taking a longer route to confuse the enemy and luring them with minor advantages, thereby actually reaching strategic positions faster than the opponent. Cao Cao explains: Taking a detour makes the enemy perceive our movements as slow; starting later than the enemy yet arriving first is achieved through precise calculations of distance and timing.

Li Quan adds: Deliberately choosing a winding path while pretending not to rush forward, while secretly accelerating, allows one to start later but arrive first. Du Mu cites the example of the famous Warring States general Zhao She rescuing Eyu (modern-day Heshun, Shanxi): Zhao She first feigned fear of battle, camping thirty li from Handan for twenty-eight days and treating Qin spies to lavish meals to spread false intelligence. Once the Qin forces lowered their guard, he marched rapidly for two days and nights to reach the battlefield, seizing the northern high ground first and ultimately defeating the Qin army.

Both Jia Lin and Mei Yaochen point out: One can use elderly or weak soldiers or minor advantages to lure the enemy onto diverging paths, delaying their main force. He Shi further explains: The so-called circuitous route is actually the proper path for the main force, while deploying surprise troops in coordination to confuse the enemy with illusions. By using small advantages to tie down the enemy, the surprise troops, though setting out later, can still reach the battlefield first.

The key to this tactic lies in: appearing weak on the surface to make the enemy complacent, using benefits to disrupt their judgment, then launching unexpected rapid marches. Like the modern warfare strategy of "making a feint to the east but attacking in the west," what seems like a detour is actually the fastest way to achieve strategic objectives.

In military operations, securing advantageous positions requires anticipating the interplay between circuitous and direct maneuvers—victory comes through striking where least expected. The principle of "dispersing and concentrating forces with fluid adaptability" (分合为变) operates like "moving swift as the wind" (其疾如风). As Zhang Yu explained, whoever first occupies strategic terrain gains the upper hand. To seize nearby advantageous ground, one may feign deploying main forces elsewhere while luring the enemy with minor gains, rendering them both perplexed by our intentions and covetous of trivial benefits—thus enabling our army to "arrive last yet strike first." This embodies the wisdom of "turning detours into shortcuts" (以迂为直) and "transforming disadvantages into advantages" (以患为利). Historical examples like Zhao She's victory over Qin forces by occupying Northern Mountain, or Guo Huai's defense of Northern Plateau repelling Zhuge Liang, demonstrate mastery of this principle. Commanders who achieve "later arrival, earlier strike" excel in strategic calculation and comprehend the subtleties of indirect warfare.

Military contention carries both promise and peril. Cao Cao observed that skilled commanders reap benefits while unskilled ones court disaster. Li Quan emphasized the commander's capability as the decisive factor. Du Mu added that only through meticulous planning can opportunities be seized. Jia Lin analyzed: when our troops preemptively occupy favorable terrain, we gain superiority; but if the enemy secures it first, forced contention leads to vulnerability. Mei Yaochen concluded that military contention inherently balances gain and risk. An alternate version states "armies contend for advantage, masses contend at peril"—as He Shi explained, this underscores how marshaling entire armies for decisive confrontation demands prudence, where success brings profit and failure invites catastrophe. Zhang Yu noted that the wise comprehend indirect-direct dynamics to reap rewards, while fools court danger through ignorance.

When an entire army advances with all equipment to seize advantage, mobility inevitably suffers. Both Cao Cao and Li Quan identified cumbersome supply trains as hindering rapid movement. Jia Lin supplemented: troop movements must prioritize favorable routes—attempting to contest advantages with full logistical burdens impedes swift arrival, necessitating covert planning of alternative paths. Du You, Mei Yaochen, and Wang Xi unanimously stressed that transporting complete military provisions inevitably slows progress.

Zhang Yu explains that if an entire army marches with all its equipment, the pace will inevitably slow, making it impossible to seize advantageous opportunities in time. Conversely, if they abandon their supplies to move lightly, there’s the risk of losing essential provisions and gear.

Cao Cao worries that bringing supplies invites the danger of them being discarded. Li Quan points out that abandoning provisions would lead to shortages of military resources. Du Mu analyzes that marching with all the army’s equipment inevitably makes movement heavy and slow, while pursuing lightly risks losing supplies. Jia Lin fears that the enemy might cut off the rear supply routes. Du You adds that if troops march lightly and the enemy exploits this vulnerability to sever their retreat, all provisions will be lost. Mei Yaochen and Wang Xi both align with Cao Cao’s view, while He Shi supports Du You’s interpretation.

Thus, rolling up armor and marching urgently day and night—Cao Cao notes that this denies soldiers rest. If they force-march a hundred li to seize an advantage, all three commanding officers risk capture. Du You cites the example of Duke Mu of Qin’s surprise attack on Zheng, where all three generals were captured.

Forced marches result in the strong soldiers arriving first while the weak lag behind, leaving only a tenth of the force combat-ready. Cao Cao argues that competing for gains over a hundred li is inadvisable, as all three commanders will be captured. Li Quan illustrates with an example: marching 120 li in a day constitutes a forced march, where the strong arrive ahead and the weak straggle, leaving few troops usable. He references Cao Cao’s pursuit of Liu Bei, covering 300 li in a day and night, only to suffer a crushing defeat at Red Cliff—like an arrow from a strong bow that, by the end, cannot even pierce thin silk. Pang Juan’s pursuit of Sun Bin, ending in his death at Maling, follows the same logic. Du Mu adds that a normal day’s march is 30 li (one she), while a forced march means covering two she (60 li) day and night without rest.

This passage discusses the tactical risks of "contending for advantage over a hundred li" in ancient warfare. Multiple military strategists, through their commentaries on The Art of War, pointed out that forced marches over a hundred li (approximately forty kilometers, as thirty li equaled one ancient resting station) to seize strategic positions would leave troops utterly exhausted.

Du You and others argued that if an entire army marched a hundred li at forced pace, only one-tenth of the elite soldiers could maintain combat readiness. The proper method was to select the strongest troops to advance first, with others following in waves: the vanguard arriving at daybreak, the second wave between mid-morning and early afternoon (9 AM to 1 PM), and the third contingent in late afternoon (3 PM to 5 PM). This approach maintained continuous military pressure while preventing total exhaustion.

Chen Hao particularly cited Tang Taizong's classic maneuver—deploying 3,500 cavalry to preemptively occupy Hulao Pass and block Dou Jiande's 180,000-strong army—as proof that success depended not on numbers but on preserving combat effectiveness. However, Jia Lin warned that long-distance forced marches created a situation where "we exhaust ourselves while the enemy remains fresh," making counterattacks highly likely. Mei Yaochen added that normal marches required rest after thirty li per day; attempting a hundred-li march could result in the capture of an army's entire command structure.

Wang Zhe employed the metaphor "an arrow at the end of its flight cannot pierce thin Lu silk" to illustrate the vulnerability of exhausted troops. Even exceptional cases like Zhao She's victory after a forced two-day-and-night march against Qin forces succeeded only because his troops had conserved their Jing (essence) through prolonged inactivity. Sima Yi (Emperor Xuan) concluded that "marching double distance without rest" constituted a fundamental military taboo. The core insight of these commentaries is that military operations must respect soldiers' physical limits—blind pursuit of speed ultimately forfeits strategic advantage.

This passage discusses ancient military strategies concerning marching speed and troop deployment. The main ideas are:

A skilled general must understand how to conserve strength while deliberately appearing weak to make the enemy overconfident. Take the Battle of Yanyu as an example - the Qin forces never expected the Zhao army to appear suddenly. By the time they reacted and sent reinforcements, it was too late. The Zhao troops had arrived two days early to rest and prepare, while the Qin army exhausted themselves covering fifty li in forced march. Thus the well-rested Zhao forces, holding higher ground, easily achieved victory.

However, excessive pursuit of speed is dangerous. If an entire army marches light and fast without rest day and night, only one-tenth of even the strongest soldiers can keep up. With exhausted troops facing well-rested enemies while being numerically inferior, defeat becomes likely. The historical case where Jin captured three Qin generals resulted precisely from such reckless Qin advancement.

Regarding marching speeds: Normally, troops should rest after thirty li per day. Anything beyond sixty li counts as forced march. Attempting to cover one hundred li with heavy supply trains to seize advantage leaves lightly-equipped vanguards separated from slower supply lines. When soldiers become hungry and thirsty, sudden enemy contact puts them at severe disadvantage. Hence the military adage: "Pushing fifty li for advantage will cripple the vanguard" - because only half the forces can maintain such pace.

Cao Cao explains "crippled" (jue) means suffering setbacks. Li Quan adds: Forced hundred-li marches deliver only one-tenth of forces, while fifty-li efforts bring half - this weakens military prestige but avoids total annihilation. Du Mu interprets "half arriving" means selecting five elite soldiers from every ten to advance first. These commentaries all emphasize that marching must consider whole-army coordination, not just vanguard units.

This passage presents military strategists' commentaries across dynasties on the "contending for advantage" tactics from The Art of War, focusing on two core issues: marching speed and logistical support.

Regarding marching speed, the discussions note: When troops force-march thirty li to seize strategic advantage, typically only two-thirds arrive promptly. Cao Cao observed that short-distance marches allow more soldiers to arrive intact, reducing vulnerability to collapse. Li Quan pointed out that short marches prevent excessive fatigue, while Du Mu added that six or seven out of ten soldiers would arrive first within thirty li. Du You emphasized the unpredictability of short-distance engagements, noting that ancient armies considered thirty li per day the standard pace for coordinated infantry and cavalry operations.

Several commentators cited Tang Taizong's exceptional pursuit of Song Jingang—covering over two hundred li in a day and night—as a special case. This extraordinary speed succeeded because Song's army was already demoralized, enabling rapid pacification of the Hedong region, diverging from Sun Tzu's conventional tactics for contending advantage.

The logistical discussions stress: An army without baggage (military supplies) perishes; without food perishes; without material reserves (weiji) perishes. Cao Cao directly identified these three as existential factors. Li Quan cited the Guandu Campaign, where Cao Cao followed Xun You's strategy to burn Yuan Shao's supply trains, achieving victory against numerical odds—validating Sun Tzu's axiom that "an army without baggage is lost."

Commentators generally agreed that during short-distance contention, even with partial forces arriving, maintaining formation coherence and adequate soldier stamina could still secure victory. These analyses, all premised on full mobilization for strategic advantage, reflect ancient strategists' practical applications of The Art of War's tactical principles.

Even with ample grain reserves, they are no match for solid city walls without sufficient provisions. Confucius once said: "With abundant food and strong military forces, the people will have trust." Thus, during the Han dynasty, the Red Eyebrows rebels, despite numbering a million, were forced to surrender at Yiyang due to food shortages. Therefore, skilled commanders always prioritize agriculture before considering warfare. Without material reserves (weiji: stockpiles of military supplies), financial resources will be depleted. Just as Liu Bang (Emperor Gaozu of Han) without Guanzhong, Emperor Guangwu without Henei, or Cao Cao without Yanzhou as their base regions, once their armies suffered defeat, they found it difficult to recover.

Du Mu explains: "Baggage" refers to weapons, equipment, and soldiers' clothing and gear, while "reserves" refer to financial and material resources. Chen Hao interprets this as warning against the danger of abandoning military supplies to pursue gains. Mei Yaochen points out that these three—baggage, food, and reserves—are indispensable; one must never discard supplies for the sake of advantage. Wang Zhe adds that reserves also include firewood, salt, vegetables, and other essentials, on which the army relies and must not recklessly abandon. Zhang Yu summarizes: Without baggage, there is a lack of equipment; without food, provisions are insufficient; without reserves, financial resources are exhausted—all of which lead to destruction. These three illustrate the consequences of abandoning supplies to chase profit.

Without understanding the intentions of other feudal lords, one cannot form alliances in advance. Cao Cao states: "Without understanding the enemy's situation and plans, alliances cannot be established." Li Quan believes that preparations must be made beforehand, and only by knowing the enemy's intentions can diplomatic relations be formed. Du Mu offers a different view, interpreting yu (豫) as "in advance" and jiao (交) as "engaging in battle," emphasizing that one must first understand the feudal lords' strategies before initiating conflict. Chen Hao considers both Cao Cao's and Li Quan's explanations valid—one must grasp the enemy's plans while also securing external support in advance. Mei Yaochen says: Without knowing the enemy state's intentions, one cannot preemptively seek alliances with neighboring states for aid. Zhang Yu elaborates further: One must first ascertain the true situation of the feudal lords before forming alliances; otherwise, harm may result instead. Securing support from neighboring states is also a crucial part of military strategy, as mentioned later: "The place that arrives first and gains widespread support becomes the qudi (strategic crossroads)."

Without familiarity with mountains, forests, hazardous terrain, or marshes, one cannot effectively march an army. Cao Cao specifies: "Lofty heights are mountains; where trees gather is a forest; deep ravines are hazards; undulating terrain is obstruction; wetlands overgrown with water plants are marshes."

When marching to war, if one does not first understand the terrain where the army will encamp and the distribution of surrounding mountains, rivers, and waterways, military operations cannot proceed smoothly.

Mei Yaochen explains: It is essential to thoroughly survey the dangerous topography of mountains and forests, as well as the difficult-to-traverse marshy areas. Zhang Yu elaborates further: Towering and steep formations are mountains; densely wooded areas are forests; uneven and pitted ground constitutes hazardous terrain; undulating elevations create natural barriers; waterlogged regions overgrown with vegetation are marshes (沮泽, Juzé); and where multiple waters converge without flowing are great lakes (大泽, Dazé). Only by fully mastering these geographical features can one properly deploy troops when contending with the enemy for strategic advantage.

Without employing local guides, it is difficult to gain the benefits of terrain. Li Quan points out: When entering enemy territory, concerns arise over encountering treacherous mountain passes, narrow roads, muddy ground, or insufficient water sources—one must rely on guides to secure favorable terrain. The Book of Changes states, "Chasing wild deer without a guide"—this illustrates the principle.

Du Mu quotes Guanzi: A military commander must first study maps to understand strategic passes, treacherous waters where chariots may sink, key mountain ranges, major river valleys, and the positions of hills and highlands. He must also observe the growth of grasses, reeds, and vegetation, calculate distances, assess the size of walled cities, and be familiar with prosperous or abandoned towns and the distribution of farmland. Li Jing (Duke of Wei) adds: The enemy often favors ambushes, so one must select brave and alert soldiers, cooperating with local guides to move covertly. They may disguise their tracks as animal prints or conceal themselves in thickets wearing bird feathers, carefully listening for distant movements and keenly observing all signs—judging the enemy’s river-crossing time by water traces and deducing their movements from the swaying of trees. Beacon signals must be precise, banner commands unified, and rewards and punishments strictly enforced. Only then can one anticipate enemy actions and thwart their schemes.

Chen Hao concludes: These advantages of terrain cannot be grasped without the guidance of locals. Du You emphasizes: Without appointing those familiar with the land to lead the way, the army will not gain the convenience of mobility.

Mei Yaochen explains: When it comes to the contours of hills and plains or the winding paths through cities and roads, an army cannot grasp the actual situation without local guides. He Shi quotes from the "Guide Manual" saying: If hunters lack mountain forest officials (Shanyu) who can assess the terrain's suitability, they may enter the woods yet fail to catch deer; if an expeditionary army lacks local guides to show the twists and turns of the roads, they may reach enemy territory yet fail to capture foes.

When marching under imperial orders into unfamiliar lands where languages differ and courier routes are cut off, advancing into perilous terrain becomes extremely difficult. Our forces penetrate deep in isolation while the enemy waits at ease, rested and prepared—the disparity between host and guest is already stark. Moreover, the enemy will employ all manner of deceptive tactics to mislead us. To charge forward without proper planning risks ambushes by day and nighttime raids on encampments. Falling haphazardly into enemy traps is tantamount to delivering elite troops straight into their nets—how then could we storm their strongholds or sweep through their lairs?

Therefore, one must thoroughly understand the enemy state's mountains and rivers, identify strategic defensive positions, note where dense vegetation could conceal troops, ascertain road distances, city wall dimensions, village distributions, field fertility, ditch depths, supply reserves, troop numbers, and weapon quality. When all these are mastered, the enemy becomes as visible as if before one's eyes, making their capture no difficult feat. Consider Zhang Qian's mission to Daxia (modern Afghanistan): though detained by the Xiongnu for years, he later guided Han troops using his knowledge of water and pasture locations, sparing them thirst and hunger—a prime example of leveraging geographical advantage.

Regarding guide usage: If the guides are temporarily captured civilians from the enemy state, guard against feigned surrender. Observe their expressions, cross-check testimonies among multiple sources, and generously reward their families to win their loyalty. Ideally, however, cultivate professional guides familiar with routes beforehand—they need not be locals—and dispatch astute, courageous officers to accompany them, ensuring accurate guidance.

Zhang Yu adds: The strategic points of mountains and rivers, the shifting advantages of terrain—all require guides to illuminate. Just as night travel needs torches and river crossings demand boats, armies cannot do without guides. Recall Li Jing's campaign against the Turks, where he used captured chieftains as guides, or Zhang Qian's Western Regions expeditions relying on local pathfinders. Even sages and worthies in warfare must depend on guides' assistance.

This passage discusses military strategies and tactical principles primarily derived from commentaries on The Art of War. Here is a modern interpretation:

When marching into battle, one must rely on local guides (villagers) to understand the terrain—whether the mountains and rivers are gentle or treacherous, whether the roads wind or run straight—so as to seize advantageous positions and secure victory. For example, when the state of Wu attacked Lu, it was only by relying on the guidance of the people of Zeng that they captured Wucheng.

Military operations must rely on deception to establish a foothold. Du Mu explains that victory is achieved by deceiving the enemy so they remain unaware of our true situation. Mei Yaochen states that without deception, success is difficult to attain. Wang Xi argues that one must turn winding paths into straight roads and transform disadvantages into advantages. He Shi adds that one must create illusions to mislead the enemy. Zhang Yu summarizes that deception is fundamental—keeping the enemy uncertain of our strengths and weaknesses allows us to maintain our position.

Military movements must be guided by advantage. Du Mu says action is taken only when there is clear benefit. Mei Yaochen emphasizes that without advantage, one should not act rashly. Wang Xi points out that advantage should be used to lure the enemy. He Shi believes one should assess the enemy’s vulnerabilities before striking. Zhang Yu explains that action should be taken only when advantageous, never recklessly. As stated in The Zuo Commentary: "The movements of the three armies are all driven by advantage."

Forces must be capable of dividing and uniting flexibly. Cao Cao says the division and concentration of troops must adapt to the enemy’s situation. Li Quan argues that deception should be used to seize opportune moments—sometimes concentrating forces, sometimes dispersing them to create unpredictability. Du Mu explains that by dividing and uniting, one confuses the enemy, observes their response, and then adapts to secure victory. Chen Hao says one must adjust division and concentration according to circumstances. Meng Shi notes that military strategy emphasizes deception—using advantage to sway the enemy, whether through concentration or dispersal. Zhang Yu concludes that whether dispersing formations or concentrating forces, all must adapt to the enemy’s movements. Another view holds that variation means alternating between orthodox (zheng) and unorthodox (qi) tactics to keep the enemy guessing. Li Jing (Duke of Wei) states in his military treatise: "When forces are dispersed, concentration becomes the unorthodox move; when forces are concentrated, dispersal becomes the unorthodox move. After repeated practice, one ultimately returns to the orthodox path."

When moving swiftly, troops should be like a gale. Cao Cao says one must strike where the enemy is weak. Li Quan states that advance and retreat should be like the wind—arriving without trace, departing without shadow. Mei Yaochen says movement should leave no trail. Wang Xi argues that speed must be used to exploit gaps. Zhang Yu explains that an overwhelming momentum crushes all in its path.

When moving slowly, troops should be like a forest.

Cao Cao explains that when marching troops, one should not advance rashly without seeing favorable conditions. Li Quan emphasizes maintaining strict formation during movement. Du Mu adds that during slow marches, formations should remain as orderly as a dense forest to prevent sudden enemy attacks. Meng Shi shares this view, stressing that slow marches require forest-like formations. Du You offers an analogy: like wind passing through trees—small branches may sway, but the main trunks remain unmoved. Mei Yaochen describes this state as resembling the disciplined order of a forest. Wang Xi highlights the importance of solemn uniformity. Zhang Yu notes that slow marches should proceed with the composed density of a thriving woodland—all being approaches when no advantageous opportunity is yet visible. The Wei Liaozi contains similar advice: steadiness should resemble mountains and forests, while swiftness must be like the suddenness of cannon fire.

Regarding "invading swiftly like fire," Cao Cao advocates the speed of a gale. Li Quan compares it to wildfire consuming grasslands, leaving no blade untouched. Du Mu portrays such offensives as overwhelmingly unstoppable. Jia Lin states that attacking enemy territory should resemble flames sweeping across plains, allowing no respite. Zhang Yu quotes the Book of Songs: "Like blazing fire, none can withstand it."

On "immovable as mountains," Cao Cao interprets this as defensive doctrine. Li Quan advises stability like stationed war chariots. Du Mu describes it as standing firm like impregnable city walls. Jia Lin adds that even when enemies attempt provocation, one must remain unshaken like great peaks. Mei Yaochen speaks of defenses so majestic they command awe. Wang Xi stresses holding positions steadfastly. He Shi uses mountain-like solidity as metaphor. Zhang Yu cites Xunzi: "Deploy formations like bedrock—any assailant will break upon them."

Concerning "unfathomable as darkness," Li Quan states military movements should be as unpredictable as overcast skies. Du Mu likens it to clouds obscuring sun, moon, and stars. Mei Yaochen describes concealment so profound it defies measurement. Wang Xi advocates complete disappearance of traces. He Shi recommends impenetrable secrecy. Zhang Yu illustrates it as overcast heavens where celestial patterns vanish.

Finally, for "moving like thunderclaps," Li Quan speaks of heaven’s wrath. Du Mu compares it to lightning cleaving the sky.

The passage discusses two key principles in ancient military strategy: "plundering villages by dividing forces" (掠乡分众) and "expanding territory by sharing benefits" (廓地分利).

Regarding "plundering villages by dividing forces," the idea is to disperse troops when raiding enemy villages. Commentators emphasize striking with the suddenness of "thunder too quick to cover ears, lightning too fast to blink at" (疾雷不及掩耳，迅电不及瞬目), leaving the enemy no time to prepare. The specific method involves dividing forces into multiple units to take turns plundering undefended villages, ensuring all soldiers receive a share of the spoils rather than letting only a few monopolize them. This motivates the entire army to fight vigorously. Flags should be used to coordinate dispersed movements while maintaining disciplined combat readiness.

Concerning "expanding territory by sharing benefits," this refers to the distribution strategy after seizing enemy land. Commentators note that after expanding borders, the captured land and resources should be allocated to meritorious officers and troops. As Han Xin advised Liu Bang, the King of Han, Xiang Yu’s reluctance to reward his followers contrasted with Liu Bang’s generosity in granting fiefs, which won him loyalty. The Three Strategies (Sanlüe) military text similarly advocates "dividing conquered land" (获地裂之). Specific measures include stationing troops in occupied areas for garrison farming, assessing the strategic value of enemy strongholds, and converting advantageous conditions into one’s own strengths.

These strategies embody the military philosophy of "adapting to the enemy to secure victory" (因敌制胜), where tactics are flexibly adjusted based on the enemy’s situation. Strategists like Cao Cao, Li Quan, and Du Mu stress that the art of warfare lies in leveraging enemy resources ("living off the enemy" 因粮于敌), but requires fair distribution systems to boost morale.

Mei Yaochen explains that in military campaigns, rewards should be distributed based on merit. Wang Xi adds that one must first survey the terrain and secure advantageous positions, preventing the enemy from monopolizing favorable ground. Zhang Yu further clarifies that open and flat areas must be guarded with divided forces to deny the enemy any advantage. Some interpret this as distributing rewards after occupying territory, but given the context, this likely isn’t the intended meaning.

Regarding the tactical principle of "acting only after careful assessment" (悬权而动): Cao Cao emphasizes evaluating the enemy’s situation before taking action. Li Quan uses the metaphor of a scale, stating that one must weigh the balance of power between the enemy and oneself (a zhu was an ancient unit of weight, with 24 zhu equaling one liang; a yi was 20 liang). The side that strikes first is the "guest army," while the one that responds is the "host army," with the guest army facing greater challenges in battle. Du Mu explains that this is like weighing a situation clearly before acting, a view echoed by He Shi. Zhang Yu cites the Wei Liaozi, stressing the need to assess the enemy’s strength and the commander’s competence before deploying troops.

A commander who anticipates whether a route will be circuitous or direct will achieve victory—this is the essence of military strategy. Li Quan notes that the distance of the march directly affects troop fatigue and supply lines. Du Mu argues that routes must be calculated with precision, as exact as weighing on a scale, to ensure victory. Mei Yaochen states that only those who act after weighing advantages and disadvantages, and who can foresee the nature of the march, will triumph. Wang Xi adds that one must evaluate the enemy’s weaknesses while mastering the tactics of circuitous and direct routes. Zhang Yu concludes that when contending for advantage, one must first consider the route’s nature—acting prudently to avoid exhaustion and seize the right moments for advance or retreat.

Regarding the ancient military text Jun Zheng (《军政》): Mei Yaochen identifies it as a traditional military manual. Wang Xi notes that ancient military writings mention using metal instruments (jin) and drums (gu) to convey signals. Du You explains that jin includes instruments like zheng and duo, which transmit commands through sound. Mei Yaochen emphasizes that auditory signals must be clear and distinguishable. Wang Xi elaborates that drums (gu pi), zheng, and duo regulate troop movement speed, spacing, and rhythm.

(Note: Ancient units of measurement like zhu and yi are retained with brief explanations in parentheses; military concepts such as "guest army" and "host army" are clarified; the commentators’ views are synthesized into coherent modern prose, avoiding rigid literal translation.)

In military operations, banners and drums serve as the command tools to unify soldiers' movements. Du You explains that soldiers discern command intentions by observing the waving of banners; Mei Yaochen adds that the vivid colors of banners allow troops to clearly identify them. Wang Xi holds that banners function to maintain orderly formations among troops.

Bronze drums and banners collectively coordinate the senses of the entire army. Li Quan specifies: drumbeats signal advance, the clanging of large bells (duo) signals retreat, raised pennants (jing) indicate rewards, while waved military flags signify punishment. When soldiers listen to the drums and watch the banners, their actions remain disciplined. Zhang Yu further elaborates: In large-scale battles where troops are widely dispersed and front/rear coordination becomes difficult, commands must be conveyed through drum signals and instructions transmitted via banner formations. Thus even a million-strong army can move with the unity of a single person.

The commander must ensure unified action throughout the army: the courageous must not recklessly charge forward, nor may the timid privately retreat. Du Mu cites ancient military law: those who advance or retreat without orders shall be executed. He recounts the story of Wu Qi (renowned general of the Warring States period): when a brave warrior independently attacked and took an enemy head, though achieving merit, he was still executed for violating orders. Mei Yaochen emphasizes that unified command requires all to move according to banner directions and drum rhythms, never acting independently based on personal courage or timidity. Wang Xi points out that precisely through drum and banner commands does the army maintain synchronized movement. Zhang Yu concludes that soldiers must completely obey command signals, with violators strictly punished. Wei Liaozi (representative military strategist) also cautions: brave warriors who charge without orders must not be rewarded, lest they disrupt the army's coordinated actions.

(Note: The duo is an ancient military signaling bell; jing refers to banners decorated with yak tails, often used ceremonially; Wei Liaozi was a military theorist of the Warring States period)

In night battles, make extensive use of torches and war drums; in daylight battles, employ numerous banners—this serves to confuse the enemy's sight and hearing.

Li Quan explains that torches and drums are the means of commanding troops at night, while banners serve this purpose during the day. Du Mu adds that this ensures the soldiers' eyes and ears follow the movements of the banners, torches, and drums in unison.

Someone might ask: Why emphasize torches and drums in night battles? When darkness falls, it's impossible to deploy formations in open terrain as one would during daylight or to arrange scheduled engagements with the enemy. If we beat drums and light torches while raiding an enemy camp, wouldn't that alert the enemy and expose our own position? What advantage does this offer?

The answer is: This is an excellent question! Herein lies the profound wisdom of Sun Tzu's Art of War. Night battles typically occur when the enemy attacks our encampment, forcing us to respond. The essence of night combat lies in establishing camps with formations similar to battle arrays. Ancient military texts state: When stationary, it's called an encampment; when mobile, it's called a battle formation. Large formations contain smaller ones, just as major camps encompass minor ones. The vanguard, rearguard, and flanking units each have their own camps, surrounding the central command post. These camps interconnect with winding paths facing each other, arranged like constellations in the sky. The distance between camps should never exceed a hundred paces nor be less than fifty, with clear passageways for troop movements. Camps must remain within sight of one another to facilitate mutual archer support. At every crossroads, small fortifications should be built—stacking firewood above while digging concealed tunnels and staircases below, all guarded by sentries.

When darkness falls and drums sound from all directions, immediately light the torches. Thus, even if the enemy launches a night assault, upon breaching the outer gates they'll discover inner sub-campments—each holding its ground. The attackers won't know where to strike. Should the central command or any sub-camp detect the enemy first, deliberately let them enter before sounding the drums as a signal. All camps respond in unison, every fortress igniting torches until the scene blazes bright as noon. Soldiers immediately secure gates and mount walls, raining arrows and crossbow bolts from elevated positions. Even if the enemy possessed generals as brilliant as Han Xin or Bai Qi, or armies as formidable as supernatural beings, they'd be powerless. Indeed, we'd welcome their night attack—for their certain defeat. Should foes infiltrate one camp, the others instantly light torches and deploy, encircling them from all sides while forbidding any undisciplined movement within the ranks.

This passage discusses ancient military tactics of using torches, drumbeats, and banners to confuse enemies. Sima Yi (Emperor Xuan) once marveled at Zhuge Liang's ingenious camp layout, noting that if enemies attacked at night, the winding design could simultaneously alarm ten thousand troops. Even with vigilant scouts, darkness would blur friend from foe, rendering numerical superiority ineffective.

Chen Hao refuted Du Mu's view, arguing that night battles weren't confined to open-field formations. He cited Tang dynasty general Li Guangbi, whose 500 cavalrymen carrying torches during a night march intimidated Shi Siming's tens of thousands into retreat. Jia Lin added that torches, drums, and banners served different purposes by day and night. Mei Yaochen and Wang Xi emphasized these methods primarily disrupted enemy perception, creating illusions of overwhelming strength.

Zhang Yu concluded that during engagements, maintaining constant fires and drums at night and unbroken banners by day would bewilder foes. He cited two historical examples: When Yue attacked Wu, shifting drumbeats and shouts left and right at night split Wu's defenses, leading to collapse; when Jin invaded Qi, soldiers waving flags in mountainous terrain frightened Duke Jing of Qi into fleeing overnight.

Regarding "depleting an army's morale" (三军可夺气), Cao Cao referenced the Zuo Zhuan: "First drumbeats rouse spirit, second weaken it, third exhaust it." Li Quan explained this using the Battle of Changshao—Lu's Cao Gui attacked only after Qi's third drumroll, when their morale had waned, exemplifying morale depletion. Du Mu likewise endorsed this tactic of draining enemy vigor.

This passage discusses the critical importance of "morale" (qi 气) in ancient warfare. Using the Battle of Changshao during the Spring and Autumn period as an example, when Qi attacked Lu, the Lu strategist Cao Gui observed that soldiers' morale peaked at the first drumbeat, weakened at the second, and was exhausted by the third. Only after the Qi army's morale had depleted did Lu launch its counterattack to secure victory.

Later, during the Three Kingdoms period, the Wei general Sima Shi applied this same principle when suppressing the rebellion of Wen Qin and Qiu Jian. Though Wen Qin's son Wen Yang was exceptionally brave, his troops could not sustain their momentum after three consecutive drumbeats. Recognizing the enemy's waning morale, Sima Shi seized the opportunity and achieved a decisive victory.

Military strategists have offered insightful commentary on this concept:

• Wang Xi noted: When fear and exhaustion set in, an army's morale is lost.
• He Shi, quoting the Huainanzi, explained: Only when commanders are courageous and soldiers resolute can an army's overwhelming momentum intimidate the enemy. Wu Qi similarly emphasized that the entire army's morale hinges on the commander's leadership.
• Zhang Yu elaborated: Warfare relies on this vital energy (qi). Soldiers fight without regard for life precisely because of high morale. Thus, skilled commanders avoid confronting the enemy at their peak, instead striking when their morale declines. This aligns with Wei Liaozi's principle: "With strong morale, troops dare to fight; when morale falters, they flee."

Li Jing further added: Defense is not merely about fortifying walls or arranging formations—it fundamentally depends on maintaining one's own morale. These discussions collectively demonstrate how ancient generals regarded "mastering the rise and fall of morale" as the key to military strategy.

This passage discusses how to undermine an enemy commander's will through psychological tactics in warfare. The concept of "maintaining one's Qi (vital energy)" refers to keeping one's own troops' morale consistently high, thereby weakening the enemy's fighting spirit.

Li Quan explains that methods like provoking anger, creating confusion, sowing discord, or feigning weakness can disrupt an enemy commander's mental state. For instance, Du Mu recounts how during the Eastern Han dynasty, Kou Xun was suppressing Wei Xiao's rebellion when Wei's general Gao Jun sent Huangfu Wen to negotiate. Recognizing Huangfu Wen's arrogant demeanor as indicating no intention to surrender, Kou Xun decisively executed him. Deprived of his key strategist, Gao Jun surrendered the city that very day.

Another example occurred when Murong Chui of Later Yan sent his son Murong Bao to attack Northern Wei. Emperor Daowu of Wei (Tuoba Gui) employed psychological warfare by spreading false rumors of Murong Chui's death. The Murong brothers believed the deception and retreated hastily at night, only to suffer a crushing defeat at the Battle of Canhebei when ambushed by Northern Wei forces.

Mei Yaochen notes that creating illusions through changing banners and drum signals can disrupt enemy morale. Wang Xi adds that generating noise and confusion can also shake a commander's resolve. He Shi emphasizes that one must first stabilize one's own mind before influencing the enemy, as stated in the Methods of Sima: "When the fundamental mind is steadfast, renewed Qi prevails."

Zhang Yu concludes that a commander's mental state is the foundation of military leadership. Skilled strategists employ various means to disrupt enemy commanders' judgment. As military texts state, "To preempt others is to seize their minds first"—the art of disrupting opponents' original plans. Li Jing also observed that true attack involves not just assaulting cities and formations, but prioritizing psychological warfare—what's known as "attacking the mind as the supreme strategy."

This passage discusses how to discern and utilize the shifting morale patterns of military forces during warfare. The core principle is to skillfully observe the enemy's state of morale, avoid their peak vigor, and strike when their energy wanes.

The text first explains the commander's mental discipline: A general must maintain inner calm and composure at all times to accurately assess the enemy's psychological state. Like the morning army (morning qi) that typically displays peak morale, this is not the time for direct confrontation. By midday (daytime qi), their energy begins to slacken, and by evening (dusk qi), soldiers grow homesick and weary. Thus, skilled commanders avoid engaging when enemy morale is high, waiting instead to attack when their spirit declines and thoughts turn homeward.

Commentators elaborate this principle from different perspectives:

• Chen Hao advises against clashing head-on with newly arrived troops at their most vigorous
• Meng Shi quotes the Sima's Art of War about fresh energy overcoming exhausted forces
• Wang Xi notes soldiers are most valiant when first deployed but grow lax over time
• Mei Yaochen uses the morning-noon-evening metaphor for morale's three phases

Li Quan and Du Mu further explain through yin-yang theory: Yang qi emerges at midnight (zi hour), peaks at dawn (yin hour), begins declining at noon (wu hour), and withdraws in late afternoon (shen hour). Thus one should avoid confrontation at yang's morning zenith and attack during its decline. Du Mu cites Tang Taizong's victory at the Sishui River: Dou Jiande's army, arrayed since dawn until midday, grew exhausted—soldiers sat resting and scrambled for water—whereupon Taizong seized this moment to strike decisively.

Chen Hao adds that timing need not be rigidly chronological; the key lies in observing tangible signs of enemy fatigue. Like Taizong, who withdrew when facing the enemy's full assault but deployed cavalry to harass their retreat. The essential principle remains flexible response: evade when enemy morale surges, engage directly when conditions permit.

This passage explains the principles of managing military morale (the fighting spirit of troops) during warfare. As the renowned strategist Cao Gui of the Spring and Autumn period observed, one should avoid confronting an enemy at the peak of their morale and instead strike when they become lax and exhausted.

Mei Yaochen elaborates that one shouldn't clash head-on when enemy morale is high—victory comes more easily when their vigor wanes. He Xi further analyzes human nature: people naturally seek comfort and loathe danger, cherish life, and fear death. If soldiers are forced onto a battlefield strewn with corpses without just cause, lacking true righteous fury, they will shrink from danger in fear. Yet when ordinary men are provoked, even cowards may recklessly fight to the death—this is the power of rage. Once the fury passes, regret and fear return. Thus, a skilled commander must know how to rouse righteous indignation. For instance, in the Battle of Jimo, 5,000 Qi troops repelled the Yan army by harnessing the people’s outrage over Yan’s atrocities—mutilating corpses and desecrating graves. Similarly, the Qin army’s combat effectiveness doubled when fueled by rage after three acts of kindness went unreciprocated.

Zhang Yu uses the metaphor of a day to describe morale’s ebb and flow: morning symbolizes the initial battle fervor, noon the stalemate, and evening the exhaustion. A master of warfare holds firm when enemy morale is sharp and strikes only when they grow weary and withdraw. This is the method of controlling one’s own morale to break the enemy’s. History offers examples like General You Ziyuan of Zhao defeating the Yiyu Qiang and Emperor Taizong of Tang crushing Dou Jiande—both employing this very tactic.

As for "meeting chaos with order, meeting clamor with calm," this refers to psychological strategy. Li Quan advises observing enemy movements to seize the opportune moment. Du Mu quotes The Methods of the Sima: a general must first steady his resolve, remaining composed and undisturbed by trivialities or temptations, then strike when the enemy shows disorder and agitation. Chen Hao specifies: chaotic governance and inconsistent rewards/punishments signal "disorder"; disordered banners and noisy formations signal "clamor"—these are the signs to attack.

Jia Lin explains: Use our strict discipline to counter the enemy's disorder, employ our calm composure to face their clamor and agitation—this is the method for mastering the mind. Thus, Jiang Taigong once said: "In military operations, securing victory is paramount, and the key to victory lies in profound concealment and silent strategizing."

Mei Yaochen and Wang Xi both hold that maintaining composure before the enemy naturally stabilizes the army's morale. He Shi further elaborates: A general, with a single body and mind, commands a million troops to confront formidable foes, navigating intricate webs of interests and rapidly shifting battle conditions. Without broad-mindedness and unshaken focus, how could one adapt to circumstances? Consider how Zhou Yafu stood firm as Mount Tai before enemy forces, or how Luan Zhi remained utterly composed in battle—these renowned commanders could remain unshaken precisely because they cultivated mental discipline and steadfastness in daily practice.

Zhang Yu concludes: Use discipline against chaos, stillness to counter movement, stability to face impatience, forbearance to overcome anger, and strictness to prevent laxity—these are the secrets to dissolving the enemy's fighting spirit through self-cultivation.

Regarding the application of force, it is wise to conserve strength while awaiting the enemy's exhaustion: engage nearby enemies who have marched from afar, meet weary troops with well-rested forces, and face starving opponents with well-fed soldiers. Commentators like Li Quan and Du Mu point out this as an astute tactic to preserve one's own strength while depleting the enemy's. Mei Yaochen particularly emphasizes avoiding excessive depletion of one's own forces, while Wang Xi adds the importance of leveraging superior strength to suppress the enemy's vulnerabilities.

Concerning principles of battlefield adaptation: Do not intercept an enemy formation that maintains strict discipline; do not attack an adversary displaying overwhelming momentum. Cao Cao annotates that "zheng zheng" refers to orderly ranks, while "tang tang" describes formidable battle arrays. Military strategists like Li Quan recognize this as embodying the wisdom of flexible response according to battlefield dynamics.

This passage discusses ancient military wisdom, primarily encompassing two key principles:

The first concerns how to confront an enemy's well-ordered battle formation. When adversaries advance with impeccable discipline (zhengzheng) and imposing grandeur (tangtang), it signals their complete lack of fear—this is not the time for direct confrontation. The text cites Cao Cao's siege of Ye City when Yuan Shang came to relieve it: Cao analyzed that if Yuan approached via the main road, he should retreat; but if Yuan took the mountain paths, he could capture him alive. When Yuan Shang indeed took the western mountain route, Cao Cao crushed him. This teaches that warfare requires adaptability—when facing superior forces, one must know when to withdraw and await opportune moments.

The second principle involves terrain utilization: never attack uphill against elevated enemies (gaoling wu xiang), nor confront foes descending from hills (beiqiu wu ni). Attacking upward exhausts one's strength, while descending offers momentum advantages. As Du Mu explained: when enemies hold high ground, avoid uphill assaults; when they array with hills at their back, shun frontal engagement. Mei Yaochen supplemented that in such situations, one should maintain defensive readiness while awaiting changing circumstances. Historically, when Qin forces attacked Han and Zhao sent Zhao She for relief, the Qin troops—unprepared for Zhao's swift arrival and high morale—found Zhao She adopting defensive postures while biding his time.

These principles emphasize military flexibility—adapting strategies according to enemy conditions and terrain rather than rigid confrontation. Only those who comprehend this Dao of transformation truly master the art of warfare.

This passage discusses the essentials of mountain warfare and strategies for dealing with feigned retreats.

Regarding mountain combat: When the enemy arrays their forces on high ground, never attack upward. Cavalry charges and archery volleys become severely limited during uphill assaults. Zhuge Liang also advised against attacking elevated positions in mountain warfare—if enemies charge downward, avoid direct confrontation as the situation becomes unfavorable. Instead, lure them onto level ground before engaging decisively. Historically, Zhao She secured victory in the Battle of Yanyu by first occupying the northern highlands to crush Qin forces; similarly, Northern Qi general Duan Shao during the Mangshan campaign exhausted Zhou infantry through cavalry harassment before dismounting to deliver the final blow.

Concerning feigned retreats: Never pursue hastily when enemies appear to flee. Commentators like Li Quan and Du Mu warn this could be a ruse to lure troops into ambush. Jia Lin cautions that sudden withdrawals without visible defeat signals almost certainly indicate埋伏 (ambushes). Du You further explains that organized retreats while combat strength remains unbroken invariably conceal奇兵 (unconventional tactics)—reckless pursuit proves fatal. The Battle of Changping exemplifies this: Qin general Bai Qi feigned retreat while secretly deploying two flanking forces. When Zhao Kuo pursued to Qin fortifications, 25,000 troops severed his retreat while 5,000 cavalry divided Zhao formations, culminating in severed supply lines and total annihilation.

The Taigong's Art of War also emphasizes that suddenly disordered troop movements often mask hidden schemes. Commentators Mei Yaochen and Wang Xi concur, asserting that unless defeat is unequivocal, deception must be presumed. He Shi particularly advises—as Zhang Yu noted—to verify genuine enemy exhaustion before pursuing.

This passage documents several classic examples of "feigned retreat to lure the enemy" from ancient warfare, where forces pretended to withdraw to entice opponents into reckless pursuit before launching sudden counterattacks to secure victory.

The first account describes how during Zhao State's forty-six-day siege and food blockade, Liu Biao of Shu dispatched Liu Bei northward to attack Yecheng. Cao Cao sent Xiahou Dun and Li Dian to intercept. When Liu Bei abruptly burned his camps and retreated, Li Dian suspected an ambush, but Xiahou Dun ignored the warning and gave chase—straight into the trap. Only Li Dian's timely reinforcements forced Liu Bei's withdrawal.

Another stratagem occurred during Western Wei when general Shi Ning allied with the Turks against Tuyuhun. Feigning retreat, they lured defenders beyond city walls before wheeling about to seize the gates, capturing Tuyuhun's Prince Zhengnan and abundant treasures.

During Northern Qi's Gao Cheng era, the rebel Hou Jing defected to Liang and besieged Pengcheng. Knowing Liang troops' ferocity, Murong Shao-zong warned his men he would pretend defeat to draw pursuers into ambush from behind. True to plan, Liang forces overextended their chase and suffered devastating losses.

In the An Lushan Rebellion of Tang dynasty, Guo Ziyi besieged Weizhou after concealing three thousand archers. When enemies pursued, sudden volleys of arrows enabled the capture of rebel leader An Qingxu.

Strategist Zhang Yu concluded: discerning genuine from feigned retreat requires observing whether banners remain orderly and commands unified. Apparent chaos masking discipline signals deception, while toppled standards and panicked troops indicate true collapse. These cases demonstrate how successful "retreat lures" demand precise timing and coordinated ambush forces.

This passage discusses the military principle of "avoid attacking troops at their peak morale" (锐卒勿攻).

Li Quan explains that this means evading the enemy's strongest momentum. Du Mu illustrates with a historical example: when the State of Chu attacked Sui, Sui's minister Ji Liang advised avoiding the main force led by the Chu king and instead targeting the weaker right flank. However, Sui's junior marshal ignored this counsel and insisted on a frontal assault, resulting in a crushing defeat.

Chen Hao elaborates that this principle goes beyond merely avoiding the enemy's strengths—it emphasizes refraining from rashly engaging troops brimming with fighting spirit. One should wait until the enemy grows weary and slackens before striking. Forces arriving from afar are initially at their most formidable, making them difficult to confront directly.

Mei Yaochen and He Shi cite examples from the Three Kingdoms period: when Liu Bei launched a massive campaign against Wu, the Wu general Lu Xun wisely avoided confronting his full momentum. Liu Bei had established hundreds of miles of interconnected camps in the Yiling region and sent Wu Ban to set up a provocative position on open ground. Though Wu's generals clamored to attack, Lu Xun recognized that Liu Bei's entire army, riding high on morale and holding strategic terrain, would inflict heavy losses even if defeated. He chose to bide his time until conditions shifted. Sure enough, Liu Bei's prolonged stalemate eroded his troops' vigor, allowing Lu Xun to defeat him with fire attacks.

Another example is Zhuge Ke's siege of Xincheng, where Sima Shi (a Wei general) employed the same strategy. Facing Zhuge Ke's expeditionary force deep in hostile territory, Sima Shi understood they were in a "death ground" and avoided immediate decisive battle. These are classic applications of "avoid attacking troops at their peak."

This passage recounts several tactical cases from ancient warfare, all embodying the core military strategy of "avoiding the enemy's vanguard while awaiting their exhaustion."

The first story describes the Three Kingdoms period when Zhuge Ke (courtesy name Yuansun) attacked Xincheng. Sima Shi (posthumously titled King Jing) ordered his generals to fortify their defenses and wear down the enemy. After days of stalemate, Zhuge Ke's assault failed with over half his forces lost. Sima Shi then dispatched Wen Qin with elite troops to cut off the retreat route, forcing Zhuge Ke into complete withdrawal.

The second case occurs during the Former Zhao dynasty when Liu Yao sent You Ziyuan to suppress the Qiang chieftain Quan Qu. Facing Quan Qu's exceptionally brave son Yi Yu, You Ziyuan adopted a strategy of steadfast defense without engagement. Waiting until enemy morale waned, he launched a night assault that ultimately captured Yi Yu alive.

The third example features Tang Emperor Taizong Li Shimin. During the campaign against Liu Wuzhou, when confronted with the enemy's overwhelming momentum, Li Daozong advised constructing deep trenches and high ramparts to blunt their offensive edge. Adopting this counsel, Taizong eventually saw the enemy forces collapse when provisions ran out. Similarly, during the expedition against Xue Rengao, Taizong again employed this strategy—keeping gates closed to avoid battle while depleting enemy supplies, then striking decisively when internal divisions emerged from starvation.

These historical battles demonstrate identical military wisdom: when enemy forces surge with momentum, one should never meet strength with strength, but rather fortify positions to exhaust them. By awaiting the opponent's fatigue, supply shortages, and morale collapse before attacking, victory can often be achieved at minimal cost. Sunzi's Art of War encapsulates this tactical philosophy as "avoid the enemy when their spirit is keen; attack when it is sluggish and they retreat."

This passage illustrates the tactical wisdom of conserving strength while awaiting an exhausted enemy and avoiding direct confrontation with their initial momentum in ancient warfare.

The first section recounts Emperor Taizong of Tang's strategy against Zong Luohe, the enemy's top general. Confident in his superior forces yet frustrated by the lack of battle opportunities, Zong Luohe grew increasingly agitated. When he finally led his elite troops to attack Liang Shi (a Tang commander), hoping for a swift victory, Liang Shi held his strategic position without engaging, blunting the enemy's offensive edge. Observing Zong's increasingly desperate assaults, Taizong remarked to his officers: "Their momentum is waning—now is our moment." At dawn the next day, he ordered Pang Yu to deploy forces south of Qianshui Plain as bait. Zong Luohe took the bait and concentrated his attack on Pang Yu. Just as Pang's forces seemed about to collapse, Taizong personally led the main army in a surprise assault from the north. Caught off guard, Zong scrambled to redeploy, but the Tang forces attacked from both fronts with thunderous battle cries, shattering enemy morale and securing total victory.

The second section describes Li Jing (the renowned Tang general) accompanying Prince Li Xiaogong in the campaign against Xiao Xian. When Xiao's general Wen Shihong stationed tens of thousands of crack troops at Qingjiang, Li Xiaogong advocated immediate attack. Li Jing advised against it: "Wen is Xiao's fiercest commander with battle-hardened troops. Having just marched from Jingmen at full strength, they fight with desperate vigor—we mustn't meet them head-on. Better to encamp south of the river, let their spirit wane before striking." Ignoring this counsel, Li Xiaogong suffered defeat and retreated south.

The conclusion distills key military principles: When facing an enemy's overwhelming initial assault, temporarily yield and await their exhaustion; never consume abandoned enemy provisions carelessly—they may be poisoned. Historical examples like the Prince of Jiyin's poisoned wine ruse during the Northern Wei dynasty prove this—feigning retreat after leaving tainted supplies, he easily triumphed when enemy troops drank the poison. These cases exemplify the Daoist strategic wisdom of yielding to overwhelming force and overcoming hardness with softness (以柔克刚).

This commentary elucidates the subtleties of the "baiting troops" tactic through multiple historical battle examples.

Chen Hao points out that Sun Tzu emphasizes victory is never accidental but follows discernible principles. Using fishing bait as a military metaphor, just as fish must resist carelessly biting the lure, commanders must remain clear-headed when enemies deliberately feign weakness or dangle temptations—they must not act out of greed. The commentary specifically cites Xun You recognizing the enemy's "fishing" tactic during Cao Cao's engagement with Yuan Shao's general Wen Chou.

Mei Yaochen and Wang Zhe further explain: when the enemy lures us with apparent gains, hidden ambushes often await. He Shi lists four classic examples: during the Spring and Autumn period, the Chu state used woodcutters to bait the Jiao army; the Red Eyebrows rebels of the Eastern Han feigned retreat while leaving behind supply carts; Cao Cao used cattle and horses to entice Ma Chao; and Northern Wei's Yuan Shen tempted the Baling tribe with material goods. These cases demonstrate that "baiting troops" is not limited to poisoned food—any method of luring the enemy with benefits qualifies.

Zhang Yu cites The Three Strategies to conclude: just as fragrant bait inevitably attracts big fish, armies that covet petty gains will fall into traps. Cao Cao's use of livestock to bait Ma Chao, his spoils to entice Yuan Shao, and Li Ju's deployment of cattle to mislead Shi Le all exemplify classic "baiting troops" tactics.

Finally, the commentary addresses the military principle of "do not obstruct retreating troops." Li Quan explains this refers to soldiers whose homesickness fuels unstoppable morale. Du Mu adds that forcibly blocking a withdrawing enemy is unwise, as troops longing for home often fight with heightened ferocity.

Cao Cao personally led his army to attack Zhang Xiu, who was stationed at Rangcheng. Liu Biao dispatched troops to reinforce Zhang Xiu, cutting off Cao Cao's retreat route. When Cao Cao prepared to withdraw, Zhang Xiu's forces pursued relentlessly, preventing an orderly retreat. With Liu Biao and Zhang Xiu joining forces to hold strategic positions, Cao's army found itself trapped between two fronts. Under cover of night, Cao Cao had his engineers dig concealed tunnels through the treacherous terrain to evacuate supply trains, while secretly positioning ambush troops. When the enemy forces gave chase thinking Cao's army was fleeing, the hidden troops and cavalry launched a pincer attack, crushing the pursuers. After the battle, Cao Cao told his strategist Xun Yu (courtesy name Wenruo): "By blocking an army yearning for home, our enemies forced us into a fight to the death—that's why I knew victory was certain from the outset."

Military theorists' commentary on this battle across dynasties:

Meng Shi observed: When soldiers burn with homesickness, they will fight desperately—such forces should never be intercepted rashly. Du You noted: All men long for home; obstructing a retreating army only hardens their resolve to fight to the last. Commanders must first assess changing circumstances. Mei Yaochen emphasized: In this state, the enemy inevitably fights with desperate courage. Wang Xi added: Never intercept divided forces unless specific concerns dictate otherwise.

Later, when Cao Cao attacked Ye City and Yuan Shang came to relieve it, his generals argued they should avoid the reinforcing army per the axiom "Never intercept homebound troops." But Cao Cao judged differently: "If Yuan Shang takes the main road, we'll yield; if he follows the western mountain path, we can capture him." His reasoning—troops taking the highway demonstrate unified determination to return home, while those sneaking through hills betray fear and reliance on treacherous terrain.

He Shi cited additional historical examples: In 495 CE during Southern Qi's Jianwu era, Northern Wei forces retreating from Zhongli left ten thousand men at Shaoyang Island requesting safe passage. When Cui Huijing wanted to ambush them, Zhang Xintai dissuaded him by citing the ancient maxim. Earlier, after Former Qin's Fu Jian retreated from Feishui to Chang'an, Murong Hong's interception at Huaze triggered the Qin army's total collapse. These cases prove: Armies on homeward journeys, driven by desperate survival instincts, unleash fearsome combat power. Wise commanders avoid confronting such "cornered forces."

This passage discusses two key tactical principles from ancient warfare: "do not intercept returning troops" (归师勿遏) and "always leave an opening when surrounding the enemy" (围师必阙), along with their practical applications and explanations.

Regarding "do not intercept returning troops": When enemy forces fighting abroad become homesick, forcibly blocking their retreat will provoke desperate resistance. Several historical examples illustrate this: Yao Chang advised against intercepting the Xianbei troops eager to return home, but his counsel was ignored, resulting in defeat; Duan Ye disregarded Juqu Mengxun's warning that "a cornered foe should not be pursued" and chased Lü Hong's retreating army, only to be defeated in turn. Both Cao Cao and Han Xin emphasized the need for caution when dealing with homesick troops.

Concerning "always leave an opening when surrounding the enemy": When encircling the enemy, one must deliberately leave an escape route. Cao Cao, quoting the Methods of Sima (司马法), advocated surrounding on three sides while leaving one side open to give the enemy a way out. Li Quan explained this prevents the enemy from fighting to the death, citing battles involving Xiang Yu and Cao Cao. Du Mu further clarified this tactic weakens the enemy's will for desperate resistance. During the Later Han period, Emperor Guangwu adopted the Donghai Prince's suggestion to loosen the encirclement when suppressing rebel sorcerers, which caused the insurgents to disperse and be captured. A similar successful case occurred during the Tang Dynasty's Tianbao era.

These examples demonstrate how ancient military strategists advocated providing psychological escape routes for the enemy to avoid triggering their desperate fighting spirit—a highly sophisticated psychological tactic in warfare.

This passage explains the ancient military wisdom of "leaving an escape route when encircling the enemy" (weisui bi que). During the Tumeng battle, Li Guangbi deliberately left the southeastern corner open for enemy retreat, resulting in their panicked rout and complete annihilation. Du You's commentary explains that in open terrain, commanders should intentionally leave an escape route to weaken the enemy's determination to fight to the death. However, when enemies hold strategic positions or have reinforcements nearby, total encirclement becomes necessary.

Several historical battles illustrate this principle: When Geng Yan attacked Zhu'a city, he purposely left an opening allowing defenders to flee to Zhongcheng, whose garrison then abandoned their posts upon hearing of Zhu'a's fall. Zhu Jun suppressed the Yellow Turban Rebellion by lifting his siege to lure out enemies who were fighting desperately with no retreat. During Cao Cao's siege of Huguan, Cao Ren advised against threatening massacre, and the defenders surrendered when shown mercy. In late Northern Wei, Gao Huan (Emperor Shenwu of Qi) similarly applied this tactic when surrounded by four Erzhu clan armies in Hebei.

These cases demonstrate that military encirclement requires psychological strategy—creating illusions of escape often proves more effective than relentless assault. Yet its application demands flexibility, with commanders judging battlefield conditions to determine when to "leave the net open on one side" or "form an iron wall of encirclement." The essence lies in adapting to circumstances while understanding that trapped enemies fight most desperately.

During the Battle of Nanling Mountain, Emperor Shenwu (referring to Gao Huan of Northern Qi) commanded only two thousand cavalry and fewer than thirty thousand infantry. When the enemy forces led by Erzhu Zhao and others attempted to encircle them but had not yet completed the formation, Emperor Shenwu ingeniously linked oxen and donkeys together to form a barrier, cutting off his own retreat and compelling his troops to fight desperately. In the end, they launched assaults from all sides and decisively defeated Erzhu Zhao's army.

Zhang Yu commented on this strategy: When surrounding an enemy, one should deliberately leave an opening to provide them a way out, preventing them from fighting to the death. A similar tactic was employed when Zhu Jun of the Eastern Han Dynasty suppressed the rebel Han Zhong at Wancheng. After fierce attacks failed, Zhu Jun loosened the encirclement, and upon seeing an escape route, the rebels lost morale and were swiftly crushed. Likewise, during Cao Cao's siege of Huguan, Cao Ren advised leaving the defenders a path to retreat, warning that cornered enemies would resist fiercely. Cao Cao heeded this counsel and ultimately took the city.

One must not press desperate enemies too hard. Du Mu cited an example from the Spring and Autumn period: When Wu pursued the Chu army, Prince Fugai warned that "a cornered beast will still fight." Only when the Chu troops were halfway across the river did Wu strike, securing victory. Similarly, during the Han Dynasty, Zhao Chongguo deliberately slowed his pursuit of the Qiang tribes, allowing them to collapse in disarray while crossing the river.

Chen Hao drew an analogy from animal behavior: "A bird, when cornered, will peck; a beast, when trapped, will lash out." Mei Yaochen added that this reflects a natural law. He Shi cited the example of Murong Ke of Former Yan, who, when suppressing Lü Hu, rejected his officers' calls for a swift attack. Murong Ke argued that a cunning enemy, if pushed to desperation, becomes even more dangerous—demonstrating the profound wisdom behind the principle of "do not pursue a desperate foe."

This passage discusses military strategy, with the core principle being: when enemies are driven into desperate straits, one should not press them too hard, as this may provoke a desperate counterattack.

Several historical battles illustrate this point: The first example describes the six-month siege of Yewang City, which ultimately led to surrender. This demonstrates how prolonged encirclement—cutting off provisions and external aid—can achieve victory without direct combat, sparing one's own troops from casualties. Next is the case of Jin general Fu Yanqing, who was besieged by 100,000 Hu forces. With their water supply severed, his soldiers were reduced to drinking muddy water, and warhorses perished in droves from thirst. In this dire situation, Fu led elite cavalry in a breakout, coinciding with a dust storm. Seizing the moment, they engaged in decisive combat and routed the enemy. This shows how trapped forces will fight desperately for survival, and any opposing commander who fails to recognize this will meet defeat.

Zhang Yu summarizes: When enemies burn their boats and smash their cooking pots (signifying a do-or-die resolve), they must not be pushed too aggressively, just as cornered beasts will lash out fiercely. Three historical anecdotes follow: During the Jin-Qi Battle of An, the defeated Duke of Qi demanded to "regroup his remaining troops and make one last stand with their backs to the city walls" (a final desperate defense). The Jin army, wary of their cornered ferocity, agreed to negotiate peace. Wu's Prince Fugai remarked that "even a trapped beast will struggle." Han strategist Zhao Chongguo likewise observed that "harrying broken troops makes them flee, but pressing them urgently incites desperate resistance." These examples all embody the same strategic wisdom.

(Note: "Making a last stand with backs to the city walls" refers to defeated forces taking a final defensive position; "burning boats and smashing pots" alludes to Xiang Yu’s famous act of cutting off retreat options to demonstrate unwavering resolve.)