《孫子註解》Vol. 8

The "Nine Changes" chapter in Sunzi's Art of War primarily discusses the need for military commanders to adapt flexibly according to varying circumstances. Ancient military strategists held different interpretations of "nine changes": Cao Cao viewed them as nine tactical adaptations during combat, Wang Xi considered them the ultimate application of strategic variations in warfare, while Zhang Yu emphasized adjusting tactics flexibly based on actual conditions.

Sunzi points out that after receiving the sovereign's command to mobilize troops, generals must pay special attention to several types of terrain:

In "yi-di" (low-lying flood-prone terrain surrounded by higher ground), one should never encamp, as such areas are vulnerable to flooding or enemy encirclement, lacking reliable support. Zhuge Liang called this terrain "hell."

In "qu-di" (strategically vital crossroads connecting multiple regions), commanders should establish alliances with neighboring states to secure reinforcements.

In "jue-di" (perilous valleys lacking water sources or resources for grazing and firewood), troops must not linger but pass through swiftly.

These explanations all emphasize the military principle of adapting to local conditions—employing corresponding strategies according to different terrains—demonstrating the ancient military wisdom of flexible adaptation.

Mei Yaochen explains that when an army first departs from its homeland and crosses the border, it is as if it has left a place of ease and safety—such terrain cannot be lingered in for long. Zhang Yu adds that lands far from one’s own territory, beyond the border where battles are fought, constitute "desperate ground" (juedi). These perilous and isolated locations are even more severe than "heavy ground" (zhongdi), making prolonged stay impossible.

Regarding "in encircled ground (weidi), devise stratagems": Cao Cao asserts that in such terrain, one must employ extraordinary schemes. Li Quan states that only by utilizing the terrain can an escape route be found. Jia Lin explains that so-called "encircled ground" refers to being surrounded by dangers on all sides, where the enemy can move freely while one’s own troops struggle to advance or retreat. Those caught in such a predicament must devise ingenious plans beforehand to prevent the enemy from inflicting harm and secure an escape. Mei Yaochen notes that in treacherous, winding terrain where movement is constrained, extraordinary stratagems are essential. He Shi cites the next chapter, which also states "in encircled ground, devise stratagems," meaning that when confronting the enemy in perilous and obstructed terrain, one must employ unconventional and deceptive tactics to avoid destruction. Zhang Yu illustrates this with the example of Liu Bang, who, when besieged by the Xiongnu, relied on Chen Ping’s ingenious plan to break free.

Concerning "in death ground (sidi), fight": Cao Cao advises engaging in desperate combat. Li Quan cites Han Xin’s victory over Zhao as an example—by placing his troops in a position where they had no choice but to fight for their survival, he ensured their resolve. Mei Yaochen explains that when blocked front and rear, the only option is to fight to the death. He Shi points out that the next chapter also mentions "in death ground, fight," emphasizing that swift and decisive battle is the path to survival in such terrain. Hesitation leads to waning morale and exhausted supplies, sealing one’s fate. Zhang Yu references Han Xin’s deployment with his back to the river, demonstrating that when there is no retreat, one must fight with absolute desperation.

From "do not encamp in difficult ground (yidi)" to "in death ground, fight," nine types of terrain variations are listed, yet only five are discussed here, highlighting the most critical. Similarly, the "Nine Terrains" chapter (Jiudi Pian) outlines six variations, again summarizing key points. Terrain possesses both fixed configurations and mutable conditions—the first half of the "Nine Terrains" chapter addresses fixed configurations, while the latter half explores their transformations. The reason we know the "nine changes" (jiubian) refer to the "variations of the nine terrains" is that the text later states: "If a general does not understand the nine changes, even if he knows the terrain, he cannot exploit its advantages." The "Nine Terrains" chapter likewise declares, "The variations of the nine terrains and the advantages of flexibility must be thoroughly examined"—thus clarifying the connection. Since the following passage discusses the nine terrains...

This passage presents commentaries on the "Nine Adaptations" (九变) from The Art of War. Before discussing the five advantageous conditions (五利), Sun Tzu first elaborates on nine situational variations because these two concepts are mutually complementary.

Regarding the principle "some roads must not be taken" (途有所不由):

Cao Cao explains that treacherous terrain should generally be avoided and only traversed when absolutely necessary—this exemplifies adaptability. Li Quan argues that roads that are narrow and perilous, potentially concealing enemy ambushes, should not be used. Du Mu cites the example of Ma Yuan of the Eastern Han Dynasty during his campaign against the Wuxi tribes: faced with two possible routes, Ma Yuan chose the shorter but more hazardous Hutou Path, which ultimately led to failure due to the oppressive heat and widespread illness among his troops. Both Jia Lin and Du You emphasize that even if a path is shorter, it should be avoided if it is unsafe. Mei Yaochen advises steering clear of dangerous terrain. Wang Xi provides the example of Zhou Yafu bypassing the treacherous Xiaoshan route in favor of the Lantian passage. Zhang Yu adds that routes too narrow for chariots and cavalry to maneuver should not be taken—unless, like Han Xin, one has confirmed the absence of ambushes before daring to advance through Jingxing Pass.

Concerning the principle "some armies must not be attacked" (军有所不击):

Cao Cao points out that while certain enemy forces may appear vulnerable, if the terrain is too hazardous to hold for long, the gains from victory would be minimal. Moreover, an enemy cornered in a desperate situation will fight with heightened ferocity.

Du Mu explains that when encountering elite troops, one should not attack forcefully; retreating enemies should not be blocked; cornered foes should not be pressed, and those in desperate straits should not be assaulted. Even if our forces are strong and the enemy weak, if their vanguard has already secured advantageous terrain, it is unwise to attack, lest we provoke them into retreat. These are the principles of "when not to attack" that commanders must understand. Only those who adapt flexibly deserve to be called skilled generals, which is why these teachings are included in the chapter "Nine Variations."

Chen Hao adds that if a minor victory cannot decisively weaken the enemy, one should refrain from reckless attacks to avoid needlessly expending troops. Jia Lin argues that when the enemy might surrender under intimidation, there is no need to attack; forcing desperate defenders in perilous positions will only provoke a fight to the death—better to hold firm and strike when their morale wanes. Du You further clarifies: some enemies, though beatable, occupy terrain too treacherous to hold, making victory barely worthwhile; against cornered beasts or troops holding narrow passes, one should fortify and wait for vulnerabilities to emerge.

Mei Yaochen summarizes with the phrase "no gain in advancing," emphasizing that movement is unwise when no advantage can be gained. Wang Xi cites Cao Cao’s view: certain cities may be conquerable but are too hazardous to garrison, rendering occupation fruitless. He particularly warns against being misled by appearances—"bait troops," elite soldiers, orderly banners, or imposing formations. Zhang Yu concludes: if bypassing the enemy causes no harm and victory brings no real benefit, avoid battle. For instance, during the Jin-Chu standoff, Shi Hui argued that Chu’s orderly governance and robust laws made invasion unwise—a perfect illustration of this principle.

Regarding "cities not to attack," Cao Cao cites his own campaign: abandoning the fortified, wealthy Hua-Fei region to capture fourteen counties in Xuzhou followed this rule. Du Mu analyzes that precisely because Cao Cao avoided heavily defended Hua-Fei, he preserved strength for decisive victories elsewhere. Key strongholds often feature deep moats, high walls, and ample supplies; failed assaults demoralize troops, while success leaves indefensible positions—better to bypass them. During Emperor Shun’s reign in the Southern Dynasties, Shen Youzhi’s rebellion from the impregnable, well-provisioned Yingcheng (modern Jiangling, Hubei) exemplified such an unwise target for attack.

This passage illustrates the military principle from The Art of War that "there are fortified cities one should not attack, and territory one should not contest" through multiple historical examples.

During the Eastern Jin dynasty, General Shen Youzhi disregarded this strategic wisdom and stubbornly besieged the heavily fortified city of Yingcheng (modern-day Jiangling, Hubei). The prolonged siege led to his army's eventual collapse. Similarly, Emperor Wu of the Northern Zhou dynasty ignored the advice of his minister Yuwen Bi and insisted on attacking Northern Qi from the heavily defended Henei region, only to retreat without success. It was only after adopting Yuwen Bi’s revised strategy—launching the assault from the more accessible Fenqu—that he ultimately conquered Qi.

The text further cites four failed campaigns against Northern Wei over a thirty-year span: the cities of Nangong County, Lincheng County, and Hexing Town all proved impregnable due to their strong defenses and ample supplies, forcing the attackers into protracted sieges before being repelled by reinforcements. These cases demonstrate that frontal assaults against well-prepared defenders often prove futile.

Commentators offer nuanced interpretations: Jia Lin advises against attacking cities defended by loyal and determined troops; Mei Yaochen emphasizes weighing the potential harm of a siege; Wang Xi adds that even if a city lacks strategic value, one must consider the risks of attrition or enemy reinforcements; Zhang Yu stresses that a city is not worth attacking if it cannot be held afterward or if its defenses are too formidable. This echoes the Spring and Autumn period example when Shi Gai proposed attacking the small but sturdy city of Biyang, only for Xun Ying to argue: "A minor city’s resilience means capturing it brings no glory, while failing invites ridicule."

Collectively, these examples affirm that in warfare, not every city is worth besieging, nor every territory worth contesting. Commanders must carefully assess costs and benefits to avoid exhausting their forces in futile struggles.

Cao Cao explained that places offering only minor advantages are not worth contending for if they prove difficult to hold, even if captured. Du Mu cited the story of Wu Zixu advising King Fuchai of Wu: when Wu attacked Qi, the seized lands were like barren stone fields—impossible to cultivate and utterly worthless. When the Eastern Jin general Tao Kan garrisoned Wuchang, some suggested stationing troops in Zhucheng north of the Yangtze, but Tao Kan remained silent. Later, during a hunt with his officers, he explained: "We rely on the natural barrier of the Yangtze for defense. Zhucheng is isolated north of the river—cut off from reinforcements and bordering minority territories. If our forces covet its profits and oppress the tribes, calamity will follow. Even with troops stationed there, it would bring no strategic benefit to our southern defenses." Indeed, Yu Liang later suffered a crushing defeat after garrisoning the city.

Mei Yaochen concluded that land offering no real advantage should not be contested. Wang Xi added that some strategic locations, even if seized by the enemy or temporarily captured, are not worth holding if they cannot be defended. Zhang Yu elaborated further: if occupying a place hinders military operations while losing it causes no harm, it should not be contested. Distant territories, for instance, cannot be retained long-term even if briefly occupied. When Wu attacked Qi, Wu Zixu warned that gaining Qi’s lands would be like acquiring uncultivable stone fields—better to focus on defeating Yue. Sadly, the king ignored this advice, leading to Wu’s eventual destruction by Yue.

Regarding the principle that "a general need not obey all sovereign commands," Cao Cao held that military necessity may override royal orders. Li Quan cited examples like Sima Rangju executing Zhuang Jia and Wei Jiang putting Yang Gan to death. Du Mu quoted The Wei Liaozi: "War is perilous; a general at the front must adapt flexibly." Jia Lin stressed that decisive opportunities must not await royal approval—if actions benefit the state, generals may act autonomously. Meng Shi noted that field commanders must exercise independent judgment. Mei Yaochen advocated pragmatic flexibility, while Zhang Yu summarized that strategic advantage, not rigid adherence to orders, should guide decisions. These constitute the five principles of advantageous warfare.

This passage discusses a commander's ability to adapt flexibly on the battlefield. The core idea is that a true master of military strategy must grasp the essence of the "Nine Changes" (jiu bian) - nine adaptive methods.

Ancient commanders were permitted to make autonomous decisions without seeking approval when encountering nine specific situations: avoiding impassable terrain (roads not to be taken), not camping in hazardous locations (ground not to be occupied), not contesting strategically worthless positions (terrain not to be fought over), etc. These fall within a commander's discretionary authority, hence the saying "A general in the field may disregard sovereign's orders."

Military theorists throughout history have interpreted this differently. Li Quan viewed all nine situations as requiring situational adaptability; Du You emphasized their lack of fixed patterns; Jia Lin stressed the need for commanders to adjust strategies flexibly according to circumstances. Mei Yaochen and Wang Xi believed only truly wise commanders could fully master these principles of change.

Notably, He Shi observed that while ten scenarios are listed, "disregarding sovereign's orders" doesn't actually relate to terrain classification. Sunzi's original intent was that when obeying royal commands would endanger troops, commanders should refuse - whether ordered to camp or attack. This is corroborated by the subsequent passage: "If a commander doesn't understand the advantages of the Nine Changes, even perfect terrain knowledge won't bring positional advantage."

Zhang Yu concluded that only commanders capable of breaking conventions through flexible adaptation truly understand warfare. As stated in the Terrain chapter: "When victory is certain, fight even if the sovereign forbids it; when defeat is inevitable, refuse even if ordered to attack." This embodies true mastery of the Nine Changes' essence.

This passage discusses how military commanders must master the art of adaptability. Jia Lin remarks that even with thorough knowledge of terrain, inflexibility not only nullifies geographical advantages but may bring harm. The excellence of a commander lies precisely in adapting to changing circumstances. Mei Yaochen adds: How can one utilize terrain effectively by knowing its features yet lacking flexibility?

Zhang Yu elaborates further: Terrain has both fixed forms and dynamic configurations. If one only understands static features without grasping their mutable aspects, how can geographical advantages be properly leveraged? Commanders who fail to comprehend the "Nine Adaptations" (nine tactical variations) cannot fully deploy their forces' combat potential, even when aware of the "Five Advantages" (five favorable conditions).

Cao Cao observes that the "Five Fundamentals" mentioned here are actually encompassed within the "Nine Adaptations." Jia Lin considers both the Five Advantages and Five Variations as subsets of the Nine Adaptations, emphasizing that flexibility according to circumstances brings benefits, while rigidity invites disaster. Specifically, the Five Variations include: avoiding paths with confirmed ambushes; abstaining from attacking enemies who may fight desperately; bypassing isolated cities with well-provisioned garrisons; relinquishing territories difficult to defend; and disregarding royal orders that would create tactical constraints. These five adaptations require on-the-spot judgment, rejecting dogmatic thinking. Blind pursuit of the Five Advantages—taking shortcuts regardless of risk, attacking perceived weak points, assaulting isolated positions, seizing attractive territories, and mechanically obeying orders—without adaptive thinking not only paralyzes troop mobility but causes heavy losses.

Mei Yaochen and Wang Xi both stress that understanding favorable conditions without mastering adaptation is like trying to play a zither with glued tuning pegs (metaphor for rigid inflexibility)—making proper troop deployment impossible. Zhang Yu specifically clarifies that Cao Cao's "Five Advantages" refer to five concrete situations within the Nine Adaptations, distinct from the later-discussed "balanced consideration of advantages and disadvantages."

Thus, truly wise strategists invariably weigh both beneficial and harmful aspects simultaneously. Cao Cao advises contemplating potential dangers when seeing advantages, and seeking opportunities within difficulties when facing adversity—crucial moments demand tactical flexibility. Both Li Quan and Jia Lin assert that wisdom requires integrated assessment of gains and losses; such comprehensive analysis forms the essence of prudent military command.

This passage discusses the wisdom of weighing advantages and disadvantages in military affairs. A commander who understands various transformations can fully grasp the interplay of gains and losses. When wise strategists deliberate, even in favorable circumstances they consider potential dangers; when in perilous situations, they seek advantageous opportunities—this embodies the principle of adaptability.

In advantageous conditions, one must incorporate considerations of potential harm to ensure plans proceed smoothly. Cao Cao remarked that we must anticipate how the enemy might be prevented from exploiting the "five terrains" (referring to the "Nine Grounds" in The Art of War) to our detriment—only then can a strategy be reliable. Du Mu added that when seeking gains from the enemy, one must not focus solely on advantages but also account for possible threats the enemy may pose; only then can action succeed. Jia Lin noted that in favorable times, vigilance against danger is essential, and strict discipline must govern the troops to ensure orders are followed. For example, after the state of Zheng defeated Cai during the Spring and Autumn period, only Zichan warned that "a small state lacking civil governance yet flaunting military prowess invites disaster"—later, Zheng was indeed attacked by Chu, illustrating the principle of "considering harm amidst advantage."

In perilous situations, one must incorporate considerations of benefits to resolve crises. Cao Cao pointed out that since advantages are weighed, harms must also be calculated—even if disaster looms, it can be overcome. Li Quan said that the wise handle advantages and disadvantages in accordance with the Dao (the Way), avoiding extremes. Du Mu illustrated this with an example: when surrounded by the enemy, if troops focus solely on breaking out and fleeing, morale will weaken and invite pursuit; instead, inspiring soldiers to fight courageously can secure victory and lift the siege. Jia Lin concluded that in times of crisis, focusing on advantages helps avert disaster—this is the military principle of "placing troops in mortal danger to ensure their survival."

This passage discusses military strategies for controlling feudal lords through the use of "harm" (害) and "burden" (业).

Regarding the application of "harm": Cao Cao advised targeting what the enemy detests. Li Quan proposed undermining their governance. Du Mu explained that by capitalizing on the adversary's grievances, one could force their submission. Jia Lin detailed various methods of inflicting harm: sowing discord among virtuous ministers, planting spies, driving wedges between rulers and subjects, depleting financial resources, corrupting social customs, and employing honey traps—all to be executed covertly without leaving traces. Mei Yaochen summarized that control should be exercised through calculated threats. Zhang Prefect supplemented this by advocating either cornering the enemy or damaging them through stratagems like sowing discord and exhausting civilian resources, citing historical examples like Wei Xiaokuan's alienation of Hulü Guang and Gao Jiong's tactics during the conquest of Chen.

Concerning the use of "burden": Cao Cao defined it as creating disturbances to keep the enemy constantly occupied. Li Quan suggested disrupting agricultural production. Du Mu emphasized the prerequisite of strengthening one's own forces (with robust troops, prosperous citizens, and efficient governance) before effectively burdening opponents. Du You illustrated this with historical precedents like Han's strategy of exhausting Qin through canal construction projects, or debilitating rival states with extravagant technological demands.

The core principle lies in using harm to intimidate feudal lords and burdens to exhaust them. These tactics must be adapted flexibly to circumstances, with the essential focus on maintaining initiative to keep opponents perpetually reactive.

This passage contains annotations by ancient military strategists on The Art of War, focusing on tactics to exhaust and manipulate enemies, as well as the importance of military preparedness.

Regarding strategies to wear down adversaries, several strategists proposed methods: Mei Yaochen suggested overwhelming enemies with trivial matters to keep them off balance, while Wang Xi advocated creating false appearances of imminent attack to drain their resources. Zhang Yu added that demonstrating overwhelming national power could also intimidate neighboring states, citing how the Spring and Autumn period states of Zheng were forced to pay tribute when caught between the powerful Jin and Chu.

On manipulating enemy movements, Cao Cao and others emphasized using bait to lure opponents. Li Quan advised tempting enemies with tangible benefits, and Du Mu elaborated on leading adversaries into prearranged traps. Wang Xi stressed the importance of controlling enemy actions through strategic incentives, with Zhang Yu noting how minor advantages could induce foes to move as desired.

The commentary concludes by underscoring defensive philosophy: The essence of warfare lies not in hoping enemies won't attack (as Mei Yaochen noted, true security comes from unrelenting vigilance), but in maintaining such formidable readiness that adversaries dare not strike. Cao Cao warned against complacency even in peacetime, while Li Quan emphasized indispensable preparation. Du You advocated maintaining wartime alertness during peace, with He Shi citing historical examples: The Spring and Autumn state of Jin's impregnable defenses deterred Qin invasions; Wu forces withdrew upon seeing Chu's preparedness; Han dynasty general Cheng Bushi's disciplined garrisons repelled Xiongnu raids. These cases prove that meticulous preparedness constitutes the ultimate defense.

This passage expounds the essential principles of military preparedness and commander qualifications. The core message states: Even in times of peace, armies must conduct rigorous daily drills at dawn and dusk, maintaining soldiers in constant readiness to keep adversaries uncertain of their true capabilities. Truly exceptional commanders contemplate crises during stability and prepare for turmoil during tranquility, eliminating potential threats while they're still nascent.

Several fundamental defensive measures must be implemented: controlling strategic thoroughfares, clarifying sentry duties, reinforcing border fortifications, stockpiling ample provisions, and maintaining weaponry. As ancient wisdom states, "Without prior preparation of resources, one cannot handle emergencies," and "Only through comprehensive readiness can calamities be avoided." By exhausting the enemy through constant maneuvering while preserving our own strength, victory can be achieved without direct confrontation.

Historical examples like the states of Ju, Qi, Guo, and Lu all perished due to underestimating enemies—these are lessons written in blood. Therefore, we must ensure: when we are thoroughly prepared, the enemy finds no opening to strike.

The text particularly emphasizes a commander's "five fatal flaws": First, commanders who "know only reckless combat" are easily lured to their doom. Figures like Cao Cao observed that such men possess courage without strategy, relying solely on brute force. True martial prowess constitutes but a minor aspect of a commander's qualifications—those who rashly engage in battle through mere boldness are unfit for command. The Methods of Sima states "Mere willingness to die cannot secure victory," emphasizing strategy's superiority over blind sacrifice. Against such reckless commanders, one should employ stratagems and ambushes to eliminate them.

Cao Cao explained that a general who sees only the advantages but hesitates to advance due to fear of military discipline will become indecisive. Li Quan added that such hesitant and timid generals are easily captured.

Du Mu cited the example of the Eastern Jin general Liu Yu pursuing Huan Xuan: Leading several thousand righteous troops upstream along the Yangtze, Liu Yu engaged the numerically superior Huan Xuan at Zhengrong Island. Huan Xuan, fearful of defeat, always kept light boats tied to his warships for escape, which demoralized his troops. Liu Yu’s forces took advantage of the wind to launch a fire attack, pressing forward with full vigor and ultimately crushing Huan Xuan.

Meng Shi noted that if a general is cowardly, preoccupied with retreat and survival, unwilling to personally engage in battle, and leads poorly disciplined troops with indecisive command, such an army can be swiftly defeated. The ancient military text Xin Xun states that timid generals hesitate to advance even when opportunities arise. Jiang Taigong also warned that missing the right moment invites disaster.

Mei Yaochen and Wang Xi agreed that a general lacking fighting spirit not only fails to seize advantages but also flees easily in the face of danger. He Shi quoted The Methods of the Sima: "A doubting general is the greatest liability." Zhang Yu concluded that troops who fear the enemy and think of retreat should be attacked with overwhelming momentum—they can surely be captured. For instance, during the Jin-Chu conflict, the Jin general Zhao Yingqi prepared boats by the river in advance for retreat, a classic example of such weakness.

Regarding hot-tempered generals, Cao Cao pointed out that they can be provoked into reckless action. Li Quan cited Emperor Taizong of Tang, who used taunts to lure Song Laosheng to his death, securing Huo County. Du Mu explained that such generals, being impulsive and inflexible, can be baited into rash advances through insults and challenges. He gave the example of Yao Xiang attacking Huangluo during the Sixteen Kingdoms period: the Former Qin general Fu Huangmei, following Deng Qiang’s advice, exploited Yao Xiang’s fiery temper by boldly advancing on his camp, provoking him into battle and eventual capture.

Du You and Mei Yaochen both emphasized that impatient and short-tempered generals tend to act recklessly without considering consequences, making them easy to manipulate. Wang Xi summarized that a great general values steadiness, whereas a volatile temper leaves one vulnerable to interference.

Zhang Yu's commentary notes that those with obstinate and extreme temperaments are easily provoked into falling for enemy stratagems. He cites the example of General Ziyu of the Chu state during the Spring and Autumn period: the Jin state deliberately detained his envoy to anger him, causing Ziyu to impulsively engage in battle, ultimately leading to his defeat by the Jin forces.

Regarding the tactic of "exploiting the honorable with humiliation," several commentators agree that commanders who value reputation and maintain personal integrity can be disrupted through insults. Cao Cao suggests that such generals can be provoked through slander. Du You further explains that when enemies refuse to engage, if their commander is both hot-tempered and concerned with honor, contemptuous insults may draw them out. For instance, Zhuge Liang sent Sima Yi (styled Zhongda) women's headwear to humiliate him—though even a seasoned commander like Sima Yi was nearly provoked, let alone ordinary generals. Mei Yaochen adds that such individuals often prioritize reputation over practical considerations.

Concerning the tactic of "harassing the benevolent," commentators observe that commanders who care deeply for civilians may exhaust themselves through constant rescue operations. Cao Cao points out that such leaders will inevitably rush day and night to save civilians, thereby wearing themselves out. Li Quan states that attacking populations the enemy cares about can force them into exhausting maneuvers. Du Mu analyzes that compassionate commanders cannot bear to see civilians suffer and often rescue them at any cost, which can be exploited to deplete their forces. Chen Hao contrasts Xiang Yu's necessary rescue of Zhao with Fan Zeng (styled Yafu) abandoning Liang territory (a non-essential rescue) to illustrate the distinction. Jia Lin concludes that honorable commanders dislike aggression while benevolent ones avoid conflict—both can be thrown into disarray through humiliation and harassment.

Zhang Yu ultimately emphasizes that these five vulnerabilities (including the two discussed above) represent common command flaws and major military taboos. While civilians should be protected, commanders must distinguish between critical and peripheral concerns—indiscriminate rescue operations regardless of scale or distance will leave them at the enemy's mercy, trapped in exhausting cycles of response.

Chen Hao remarked that an exceptional commander neither stubbornly insists on fighting to the death nor clings blindly to survival, but adapts flexibly according to actual circumstances. They never launch distant campaigns out of anger nor act impulsively when humiliated. When opportunity arises, they strike like a tiger; when the situation turns unfavorable, they fortify their defenses. Every decision—whether to act or refrain—must stem from meticulous planning, never emotional influence.

Mei Yaochen observed that these are precisely the errors commanders frequently commit, leading to military peril. He Xi supplemented this by noting that throughout history, selecting capable generals has been exceptionally difficult because human temperament often inclines toward extremes. Hence, The Art of War begins by emphasizing the five essential qualities of a commander: wisdom, trustworthiness, benevolence, courage, and discipline.

Zhang Yu analyzed that mediocre commanders rigidly adhere to a single approach without adaptability—a danger both to themselves and their troops. Truly wise commanders, however, are different: though courageous, they do not recklessly seek death; though cautious, they do not cling to life out of fear; though resolute, they do not underestimate the enemy; though upright, they are not troubled by humiliation; though compassionate, they are not burdened by trivial matters.

(Note: The "five hazards" mentioned here refer to a commander’s dangerous temperamental extremes: recklessness, cowardice, hotheadedness, inflexible integrity, and excessive compassion.) The collapse of an entire army or a commander’s demise often stems from these five rigid dispositions, which must be carefully examined.

Jia Lin stressed that those exhibiting these five temperaments must never be appointed as supreme commanders, for their leadership would inevitably lead to defeat. Mei Yaochen cautioned that this issue demands serious consideration. Zhang Yu concluded that the key lies in understanding expediency and adaptability—never obstinately clinging to a single principle.