《孫子註解》Vol. 9

When selecting encampment locations during military campaigns, the most crucial factors are observing terrain and enemy movements (both Cao Cao and Wang Xi emphasize acting according to geographic advantages). Sun Tzu states that troop positioning and reconnaissance are key to victory. Zhang Yu explains that strategies ranging from mountain selection to ambush placement all fall under encampment tactics, while observing enemy activity and prudent judgment constitute reconnaissance work.

Regarding "crossing mountains while staying near valleys" (jué shān yī gǔ):

• Cao Cao maintains one must stay near water sources and grasslands for convenience
• Li Quan points out the need to observe both allied and enemy encampment formations, with guarding strategic points and proximity to water/grass being fundamental principles—establishing camp requires first stationing troops at passes
• Du Mu explains "jué" means traversing while "yī" means staying near—when marching through mountains, one should remain close to valleys with water sources
• Wu Qi warns against camping at valley mouths (dangerous "heaven's hearth" positions), though staying near valleys is advised
• Jia Lin adds that mountain-spanning encampments must secure rear defenses, while valley-adjacent positions require water and grass
• The historical example of Ma Yuan suppressing the Qiang people demonstrates how controlling strategic terrain and water sources forced their surrender

Concerning "occupying elevated sunny positions" (shì shēng chù gāo):

• Cao Cao interprets "shēng" as representing the sunny side
• Li Quan states sunny locations are called "shēng" while mountain heights are called "gāo"—their combination forms the ideal encampment
• Du Mu emphasizes occupying high ground facing south
• Chen Hao supplements that even on east-west terrain axes, one should select elevated sunny positions

(Note: The original military terms "jué shān yī gǔ" [crossing mountains while staying near valleys] and "shì shēng chù gāo" [occupying elevated sunny positions] are preserved, with various commentators presenting differing interpretations. The reference to Ma Yuan's Qiang campaign—a famous Eastern Han dynasty military case—illustrates the critical importance of controlling water sources.)

This passage discusses the ancient military strategist Sun Wu's tactical principles for mountain warfare and riverbank deployments, with annotations by various military experts like Cao Cao and Du Mu.

Regarding mountain warfare: Troops should encamp on elevated terrain facing the sun (east or south), occupying commanding heights for better observation. If the enemy holds higher ground, our forces must avoid attacking uphill ("zhan long wu deng" - do not ascend to fight elevated positions), as the height advantage gives defenders overwhelming superiority. Mei Yaochen summarized three key mountain combat principles: choose high ground, face sunlight, and avoid uphill assaults.

Concerning riverbank deployments ("jue shui bi yuan shui" - when crossing water, stay far from it): Cao Cao and others advised deliberately positioning troops away from riverbanks when encountering waterways. Du Mu cited a Three Kingdoms example: Wei general Guo Huai, facing Liu Bei in Hanzhong, rejected his officers' suggestion to defend right against the Han River banks, instead withdrawing strategically. This avoided showing weakness while luring the enemy to cross, allowing attacks mid-river. Liu Bei indeed hesitated to advance due to suspicion. Zhang Yu added that when encountering rivers during marches, maintaining distance from shorelines facilitates both luring enemies and troop maneuverability.

When enemy forces are crossing a river to attack, do not confront them at the water's edge. Instead, wait until they are halfway across before launching your assault—this is the most advantageous strategy.

Li Quan cites historical examples: Han Xin's defeat of Long Ju at the Wei River, and King Fugai's crushing victory over Chu forces at Qingfa River, both employed this tactic. Du Mu supplements with another Chu-Han conflict example: when Xiang Yu sent Cao Jiu to defend Chenggao, the Han army provoked them until Cao Jiu crossed the Si River to attack, whereupon the Han forces struck during the crossing and routed the Chu army. Here, "within the water" should likely be a scribal error for "at the river's bend."

Mei Yaochen observes that confronting enemies at the shore would deter them from crossing altogether. Wang Xi suggests setting ambushes at river bends—this both hinders the enemy's crossing speed and ensures optimal timing for attack. He Shi provides additional historical precedents: during the Spring and Autumn period, Duke Xiang of Song suffered disastrous defeat at the Hong River by rigidly adhering to the outdated principle of "not attacking mid-crossing"; King Fugai of Wu deliberately allowed Chu forces to partially cross before attacking when their morale wavered; during the Three Kingdoms, Wei general Guo Huai deployed his formations far from the Han River banks, making Liu Bei hesitate to attack during crossing; in the Tang Dynasty, Xue Wanjun used elderly and weak troops along the riverbank to bait Dou Jiande's forces, then ambushed them mid-crossing.

These historical cases demonstrate that attacking during river crossings remains an effective tactic against aquatic assaults, leveraging both terrain advantages and psychological impact on enemy morale.

This passage discusses tactical principles for riverine warfare in ancient military strategy, containing several key points:

When enemies are crossing a river to attack, do not engage them at the water's edge. Instead, strike when half their forces have crossed and their formation is unstable. Historical examples include Gongsun Zan's victory over the Yellow Turbans at Dongguang and Xue Wanjun's defeat of Dou Jiande at Fanyang, both employing this tactic.

If intending to engage the enemy, avoid positioning forces close to the water's edge. Commentators like Cao Cao explain that proximity to the riverbank deters enemies from attempting to cross. For genuine engagement, withdraw further inland to lure the enemy across. The standoff between Jin general Yang Chufu and Chu general Zi Shang at the Zhi River illustrates this - both sides withdrew hoping the other would cross first, resulting in no battle occurring.

When encamping, choose elevated positions facing sunlight (视生处高). Whether deploying troops or mooring boats near water, always face the sun and occupy high ground. This provides clear visibility to detect enemy movements and prevent surprise attacks.

Never station troops against the water's current (无迎水流). Downstream positions risk flooding, as demonstrated historically when Zhi Bo used water tactics against Zhao Xiangzi and Emperor Guangwu routed Wang Xun by exploiting higher elevation. Commentators like Cao Cao emphasize avoiding low-lying downstream areas to prevent drowning hazards.

This passage discusses key considerations for military operations near water bodies. Ancient strategists distilled several crucial principles:

First, armies must establish camps upstream. Downstream positions expose forces to three potential threats: (1) Enemy may release floodwaters to inundate the camp (as Zhuge Liang warned, "Never deploy against water currents"); (2) Downstream attackers gain tactical advantage (Jiang Ji cautioned Cao Ren during the Eastern Wu campaign that occupying mid-river islands invited disaster); (3) Upstream poisoning becomes possible (as seen when Sima Ziyu's insistence on securing upstream position secured victory for Chu against Wu).

Second, salt marshes require rapid transit. Commentators like Chen Hao and Jia Lin note these areas combine barren vegetation with saline soil—unsuitable for crops and lacking potable water. Mei Yaochen adds their open terrain offers poor defense, while Wang Xi emphasizes the tactical vulnerability of low-lying saline depressions. Zhang Yu cites the Legal Records to clarify "marshy wastes" (斥泽) as barren, saline wetlands with sparse vegetation that demand swift evacuation.

Synthesizing these perspectives, water-adjacent warfare demands three core principles: secure upstream advantages, avoid downstream vulnerabilities, and traverse barren wetlands rapidly. These lessons apply equally to naval engagements and land deployments near rivers.

When conducting military operations in marshy terrain, one must stay close to water sources and grassy areas while keeping forests at one's back. Cao Cao explains this as the necessary response when forced to engage enemies in swampland. Li Quan adds that encountering such conditions requires swift passage to avoid battle, relying on water sources and backing against forests to prevent becoming mired in mud. Du Mu further clarifies that barren salt flats where no vegetation grows are called "flying blades" (feifeng)—if suddenly encountering enemies here, one should camp where water and foliage are present.

Du You mentions another interpretation of "keeping forests at one's back," meaning that when forced to fight in marshes, one must rely on dense trees to fortify their position, using terrain to aid in combat. Mei Yaochen and Wang Xi both emphasize that when facing enemies in swamps, staying near water and backing against forests secures advantageous ground. Zhang Yu concludes that stationing troops in marshy regions requires proximity to water for easy access and forested areas to form natural barriers.

Regarding the principles of fighting on plains: Cao Cao points out that flat terrain must be chosen to facilitate chariot and cavalry movement. Du Mu explains that open, level ground should be selected for encampment, allowing chariots and cavalry to maneuver freely. Zhang Yu adds that in plains, one must station troops on even ground without depressions to enable effective cavalry charges.

On the general principles of terrain utilization: Cao Cao believes one should select terrain conducive to combat. Li Quan notes that since people are generally more adept with their right hands, hazardous terrain should be placed ahead to obstruct enemies while keeping safer ground in the rear. Du Mu quotes Jiang Taigong, stating that an army's left flank should have water, its right flank high ground—low positions are fatal terrain, while elevated positions are advantageous, as it is difficult to defend against attacks from higher ground. Jia Lin elaborates that high ground is advantageous, battlefields are perilous, having hills at the rear stabilizes the army, open fronts facilitate troop deployment, and placing high ground on the right enhances mobility. Mei Yaochen summarizes that flat terrain should be chosen to allow chariots and cavalry to operate effectively.

This passage elucidates the essential principles for selecting military encampment terrain. Ancient military strategists, through their commentaries on The Art of War, proposed several key doctrines.

Regarding plains encampments, Wang Xi advocated positioning troops with elevated terrain at the rear while facing open ground, ensuring both sunlight exposure and tactical advantage. Zhang Yu further noted that even on flatlands, one should select locations with high ground to the right rear, creating a forward-low, rear-high formation conducive to launching assaults. Both Mei Yaochen and Zhang Yu emphasized these dual principles as fundamental for plains deployment.

Military terrain was classified into four basic types: mountainous regions, watercourses, saline marshes, and plains. Li Quan and Zhang Yu pointed out that Zhuge Liang had synthesized four corresponding combat prohibitions: in mountains, never attack uphill; on water, never advance against the current; in grasslands, never penetrate perilous depths; on plains, never engage an enemy's weak point directly. These principles were distilled from the Yellow Emperor's strategic victories over regional lords.

Cao Cao maintained that the Yellow Emperor's initial subjugation of the four directional lords relied precisely on leveraging these four terrain advantages. Li Quan recounted how the Yellow Emperor, after learning military strategy from Feng Hou (legendary founder of warfare), applied these principles to conquer all quarters. Multiple commentators suggested "Four Emperors" might be a scribal error for "Four Armies," referring to the Yellow Emperor's adaptability to diverse terrains.

Zhang Yu cited Records of the Grand Historian, detailing how the Yellow Emperor defeated Emperor Yan at Banquan, conquered Chi You at Zhuolu, campaigned north against the Xunyu tribes, and unified the realm through seventy battles—all exemplifying masterful terrain utilization. The passage concludes by noting how all armies instinctively prefer high ground over low-lying positions, a military axiom established since the Yellow Emperor's era that remains eternally valid.

This passage discusses the principles ancient military strategists followed when selecting camp terrain. Several commentators (Mei Yaochen, Wang Xi, Zhang Yu, etc.) explain from different perspectives the essentials of campsite selection in The Art of War.

The advantages of setting up camp on high ground include: the elevated terrain is dry and well-ventilated, which helps maintain soldiers' health while also providing better visibility of enemy movements and facilitating swift attacks. Low-lying areas, by contrast, are damp and cold, prone to causing illness and difficult to defend. Here, "yang" refers to sunny southeastern areas with ample sunlight, while "yin" denotes shady, humid northwestern regions.

Three key considerations for site selection are highlighted: First, "value yang and avoid yin"—prioritize sunny high ground over shady, damp locations. This maintains troop morale while preventing equipment from moisture damage. Second, "nourish life while occupying solid ground"—camp near lush water sources and pastures for easy supply, while securing defensible terrain. Third, when encountering hills or embankments, position the camp's front facing the sun and its rear against high ground, creating a "bright front and secure back" formation.

Special attention is given to river crossings: if upstream rainfall causes foam on the water's surface (indicating turbulent flow), wait for calmer currents before attempting to cross. These terrain principles grant armies geographical advantages while preventing disease outbreaks, thereby increasing chances of victory.

All strategists emphasize that properly leveraging terrain is crucial for overcoming enemies. Mei Yaochen concludes that military success lies in securing advantageous terrain, while Zhang Yu notes that skillfully utilizing geographical advantages is key to warfare.

This passage discusses ancient military strategies for dealing with special terrain conditions during troop movements, focusing on identifying and handling six types of hazardous landscapes (known as the "Six Perils").

Judging river crossing conditions:

Military strategists like Cao Cao and Li Quan warned that when crossing rivers, one must observe water flow patterns. If foam or bubbles ("mo" referring to floating froth) are seen upstream, it indicates possible heavy rainfall in the mountains. Troops should wait until the foam dissipates and the current stabilizes before attempting to cross. Otherwise, they risk being caught mid-crossing by sudden flash floods. Du Mu specifically noted that when foam appears in mountain streams, one must wait for it to completely vanish and for water levels to settle—a crucial sign for assessing hydrological conditions.

The Six Perils and their characteristics:

1. Juejian (Precipitous Ravine): Steep cliffs on both ends with a rushing torrent cutting through the middle.

2. Tianjing (Heavenly Well): Elevated surroundings encircling a sunken depression, resembling a natural well.

3. Tianlao (Heavenly Prison): Enclosed terrain with cliffs on three sides, easy to enter but hard to escape.

4. Tianluo (Heavenly Net): Dense vegetation so thick that weapons cannot be maneuvered.

5. Tianxian (Heavenly Trap): Low-lying, muddy areas impassable to chariots and cavalry.

6. Tianxi (Heavenly Crevice): Narrow mountain paths squeezed between opposing cliffs.

Cao Cao's further explanations:

• Juejian refers to deep gorges with swift currents.
• Tianjing describes bowl-shaped depressions.
• Tianlao indicates fog-shrouded perilous zones in remote mountains.
• Tianluo denotes natural barriers capable of trapping armies.
• Tianxian marks quagmires prone to sinking.
• Tianxi are constricted passages only a few feet wide and dozens of feet long.

Du Mu's supplemental quotes from Military Admonitions:

• Tianjing includes waterlogged lowlands.
• Tianlao applies to narrow mountain defiles.
• Tianxian covers unpredictable muddy trails.
• Tianxi extends to rocky, pitted terrain.
• Tianluo also encompasses reed-choked隐蔽 zones.

Jia Lin's operational perspective:

• Juejian blocks advance routes.
• Tianjing marks the lowest elevation points.
• Tianlao features treacherous access and exit.
• Rugged, cramped paths also qualify as hazardous.

Mei Yaochen's conclusion:

Upon encountering these six terrains, troops must immediately withdraw and avoid camping nearby. These criteria reflect ancient commanders' profound observation of natural environments and hard-won battlefield wisdom.

This passage describes six types of terrain extremely unfavorable for military movement, collectively called the "Six Hazards":

The first is Juejian (precipitous ravines) - steep-sided valleys nearly impossible to traverse. The second is Tianjing (celestial wells) - depressions surrounded by high ground that collect water. The third is Tianlao (celestial prisons) - encircled mountain passes where troops become trapped. The fourth is Tianluo (celestial nets) - dense thickets that entangle movement like nets. The fifth is Tianxian (celestial quagmires) - muddy marshes that swallow chariots and cavalry. The sixth is Tianxi (celestial crevices) - narrow gullies that hinder troop movement.

When encountering such terrain, keep your forces far away while luring enemies toward it. If our army maintains distance from these hazards while facing open ground, while the enemy is forced to approach or has these dangers at their rear, we retain freedom of movement while they become constrained. This resembles the chess strategy of maneuvering opponents into disadvantageous positions.

When marching through treacherous mountain paths, swampy reed beds, or dense woodlands, thorough reconnaissance is essential as these areas are ideal for ambushes. As Cao Cao's commentary explains: "Dangerous passes" refers to rugged, uneven terrain; "marshy wells" indicates low-lying waterlogged areas; "reed beds" describes thick reed growth; "mountain forests" means heavily wooded zones; while "dense foliage" denotes vegetation thick enough to conceal troops. All such locations may harbor enemy ambushes.

The core principle is: Military movement should actively avoid disadvantageous terrain while forcing enemies into vulnerable positions. When approaching potentially ambush-prone areas, exhaustive searches must ensure safety. This represents the practical wisdom distilled by ancient military strategists.

This passage primarily explains how to assess enemy situations by observing their terrain and movements. Here's the modern interpretation:

First regarding terrain features: steep mountainous areas often have dense forests, while low-lying wetlands frequently grow reeds and thick grass—these locations easily conceal ambushes and must be thoroughly searched. Simultaneously, we must remain vigilant against enemy spies conducting reconnaissance to probe our weaknesses.

When enemy forces remain unusually quiet despite being nearby, this indicates they're relying on advantageous terrain for security. Conversely, if distant enemies actively provoke challenges, their intention is to lure our troops forward, waiting to attack after we enter favorable terrain for them.

If enemies abandon strong defensive positions to camp on flat, open ground, this necessarily means that location offers them greater advantage. Commanders compete to occupy advantageous terrain—when enemies station themselves in convenient locations, they're often baiting us into battle so they can fight rested against our weary troops.

The text quotes military principles from The Methods of the Sima: when enemies already hold strategic terrain, avoid engaging lightly; when distant enemies issue challenges, maintain full army morale without being lured into reckless advancement. These all serve as crucial criteria for assessing enemy situations.

This passage explains how ancient military scouts assessed enemy situations by observing natural phenomena:

When enemies abandon strategically advantageous terrain to camp on flat ground, they are certainly setting a trap to lure opponents in. By deliberately choosing easily assailable positions, their intention is to provoke our forces into attacking.

If distant trees appear to shake abnormally, it indicates enemy troops are clearing paths for an offensive. Ancient armies often sent scouts to high vantage points—abnormal tree movements signaled either road-clearing operations or preparations for weapon production (as recorded in the Spring and Autumn Annals when the Jin State felled trees to reinforce troops).

Sudden appearances of numerous obstacles in grassy areas reveal enemy deception tactics. These could be camouflage for incomplete fortifications or false signals arranged during retreats to deter pursuit—all designed to make our forces suspect ambushes and hesitate. Such situations demand special vigilance, as enemies may be "making noise in the east while striking in the west."

Birds suddenly taking flight in alarm betray concealed troops below, since hidden soldiers inevitably disturb roosting birds.

Wild animals fleeing in panic forewarn imminent surprise attacks. Ancient flanking maneuvers often used mountain trails, with startled beasts heralding approaching forces. This unexpected attack method was termed "fu" (encirclement and annihilation) in military strategy.

This passage summarizes ancient military strategists' field reconnaissance experience, focusing on how to discern enemy movements by observing dust patterns. Several commentators (Chen Hao, Du Mu, Mei Yaochen, Zhang Yu, etc.) provide supplementary explanations from different perspectives:

When enemies lay ambushes, they typically conceal themselves in wooded areas, waiting to launch sudden flanking or rear attacks once battle commences—much like startled beasts leaping unexpectedly. Particular attention should be paid to dust suddenly rising from treacherous terrain or dense vegetation, as this often signals the movement of hidden troops.

Tall, sharply rising dust columns indicate approaching chariot forces from the east. The dense formation of galloping warhorses and heavy chariot wheels create these vertical, towering plumes. Ancient armies employed scouts specifically to monitor such signs—for instance, during the Spring and Autumn period, Pan Dang famously deduced Jin army movements through dust observation.

Low-lying, widely dispersed dust clouds suggest infantry units. Since foot soldiers move slower in looser formations, their dust appears flatter and more spread out.

Scattered, streaky dust patterns reveal enemy foraging parties gathering firewood or provisions. As woodcutters operate in dispersed groups, their dust trails appear crisscrossed and intermittent.

When observing small amounts of dust moving back and forth rhythmically, this indicates enemy encampment preparations. Advance teams surveying terrain and establishing camps create these limited, regularly reciprocating dust trails.

Zhang Yu explains that when dividing troops to establish camps, one must always dispatch light cavalry to thoroughly survey the surrounding terrain. Only then can a comprehensive understanding of the land's steepness, flatness, openness, or narrowness be achieved. Thus, when the enemy raises minimal dust yet arrives swiftly, or when their words appear humble while secretly reinforcing defenses, these are signs of an impending attack.

Cao Cao annotates that when the enemy sends envoys speaking humbly, their true intent is to spy on us while covertly increasing military preparations. Du Mu adds that when enemy envoys use deferential language yet simultaneously heighten city walls and thicken fortifications, feigning fear of us, their real aim is to lull us into complacency—they will surely attack. He cites the example of Zhao She’s rescue of Eyu: Zhao She camped thirty li from Handan and advanced no further, warmly hosting and then releasing Qin spies. The Qin general, deceived, believed Eyu was within easy reach. Suddenly, Zhao She launched a rapid assault, crushing the Qin forces.

Mei Yaochen observes that those intending to attack outwardly speak humbly while internally hastening preparations—this is to dull our vigilance. Zhang Yu further illustrates with Tian Dan’s defense of Jimo: When the Yan general Qi Jie besieged the city, Tian Dan personally supervised fortifications, enlisted his family in the ranks, distributed food to reward soldiers, and even sent women to the walls to feign surrender. Just as the Yan troops rejoiced, Tian Dan struck decisively, achieving a great victory.

Conversely, those who speak aggressively and posture for attack often intend to withdraw. Cao Cao calls this a deceptive stratagem. Du Mu cites King Fuchai of Wu: During the Huangchi summit, when Wu and Jin vied for dominance, King Goujian of Yue seized the chance to attack Wu. Following Wang Sunluo’s advice, King Fuchai marched thirty thousand armored troops under cover of night to intimidate Jin’s camp. The Jin envoy Dong He, noting the king’s troubled expression, deduced Wu’s desperation and persuaded Jin to yield first. This exemplifies how outward bluster often masks weakness.

This passage discusses several military tactics and strategies from ancient warfare.

The first paragraph explains the tactic of "feigned retreat." When enemy forces use aggressive language while advancing their troops, it may actually signal their intention to withdraw. For example, during the Spring and Autumn period, the Qin army's envoy spoke harshly, but the Jin general Yu Pian recognized this as a sign of fear—indeed, the Qin forces fled that very night.

The second paragraph describes the tactic of "light chariots advancing first." In ancient warfare, light chariots would position themselves on the flanks of the army, signaling preparations for battle formation. This resembles the "Fish-Scale Formation" (Yuli Zhen), where chariots led the front and infantry followed behind—a clear indication of imminent engagement.

The third paragraph warns against "unexpected peace negotiations without prior agreement," as these often conceal deception. Historical examples include Tian Dan’s false surrender to Qi Jie during the Warring States period, Ji Xin’s deception of Xiang Yu, and the Tang Dynasty’s encounter with the Tibetan leader Shang Jiezan, who feigned a peace treaty due to illness among his troops—only to launch a surprise attack during the alliance ceremony. Similarly, during the Spring and Autumn period, the Chu state concealed armed soldiers at a meeting in Song, intending to ambush Jin. Thus, sudden peace overtures frequently conceal treachery.

These insights represent the accumulated battlefield wisdom of ancient strategists, teaching commanders to discern the enemy’s disguises and schemes.

When an enemy who clearly holds no disadvantage suddenly initiates peace talks, this typically signifies one of two scenarios: either they face internal crises and seek temporary respite through feigned negotiations, or they have identified vulnerabilities in our position—pretending conciliation to lower our guard before launching a surprise attack. History offers the classic example of Shi Le defeating Wang Jun by first feigning submission to propose peace, then annihilating his opponent once defenses were relaxed.

Military strategists have distilled profound insights on this phenomenon: Du You observed that unsolicited peace overtures often conceal espionage; Mei Yaochen warned that such negotiations invariably harbor hidden schemes; Wang Xi emphasized maintaining vigilance against abrupt peace proposals; Zhang Yu cited two historical precedents—Liu Bang’s feigned truce with Qin forces preceding a decisive ambush, and Jin general Li Ju’s false surrender followed by a night raid during enemy celebrations.

When enemy troops hastily form battle arrays, it signals imminent combat. Li Quan interpreted this as preparatory deployment; Du Mu added that chariots would first demarcate the battlefield, with raised banners serving as rallying points; Jia Lin cautioned that abnormally rushed formations might indicate incoming reinforcements for a pincer attack; both Mei Yaochen and Wang Xi noted that erected battle standards functioned as clear calls to arms.

Observing enemy ranks advancing and retreating in apparent disorder often reveals a deliberate ruse. Li Quan and Du Mu both highlighted how such seemingly chaotic formations intentionally project weakness to lure opponents into reckless pursuit—a tactical feint of retreat designed to mislead. This stratagem of simulated disarray exemplifies the classic "lure-them-deep" ploy.

(Note: While the original text references Chinese military history, the translation preserves the core strategic principles without italicizing names, as they function here as universal tactical examples rather than culture-specific terms requiring special markup.)

This passage describes ancient military strategists' methods for assessing enemy conditions by observing their physical state. When soldiers are seen leaning on their weapons while standing, it indicates hunger and exhaustion; when troops scramble to drink first while fetching water, it reveals the entire army is suffering from severe thirst; when advantageous opportunities for attack are ignored, it shows the forces are utterly fatigued; and when flocks of birds gather atop city walls, it suggests the area may already be abandoned.

Specifically, leaning on weapons while standing stems from physical weakness due to hunger, much like how the state of Wu once used prisoners to feign disarray and lure the Chu army. Soldiers competing to drink first when fetching water reflects the entire army's desperate thirst. Failing to attack despite clear opportunities indicates exhaustion so severe that combat is impossible. The phenomenon of birds gathering on city walls has historically been used to deduce an enemy's secret retreat—for instance, during the Spring and Autumn period, Shu Xiang discerned the Qi army's withdrawal by listening to birdsong, while during the Northern Zhou dynasty, Prince Xian of Qi burned cypress leaves to create a false impression and mislead the Gao Qi forces.

These examples demonstrate military wisdom in judging an enemy's true condition through external observations, illustrating how ancient commanders paid meticulous attention to uncovering battlefield intelligence from subtle details.

This passage describes ancient military strategist Sun Wu's (Sun Tzu) method of discerning enemy deception by observing their encampment conditions.

When enemy forces conspicuously construct fortifications yet birds gather and chirp within their camps, this indicates an empty stronghold. For instance, when Chu attacked Zheng, Zheng scouts noticed crows perched in the Chu camp, revealing that the Chu army had already abandoned it. Similarly, when Jin attacked Qi, Shu Xiang observed crows on the city walls and concluded that Qi troops had fled. These were all ruses employed by the enemy to mislead their opponents.

If loud shouting is heard from the enemy camp at night, it signifies internal fear. Cao Cao pointed out that this occurs when commanders lack courage, prompting soldiers to cry out at night to embolden themselves. The clamor of Jin troops throughout the night, for example, reflected their unstable morale.

Disorder among troops indicates a lack of authority in their commander. Li Quan argued that without a commander's prestige, soldiers would descend into chaos. Du Mu added that if a commander behaves frivolously, his troops would follow suit in disruption. During the Three Kingdoms period, when Zhang Liao's camp at Changshe suddenly erupted in turmoil at night, his composed response swiftly quelled the unrest—demonstrating the steadiness of a capable leader.

Haphazardly swaying banners signal enemy disarray. Du Mu cited the example of Duke Zhuang of Lu defeating Qi forces at Changshao. After observing Qi banners in disarray, Cao Gui advised pressing the advantage with pursuit.

When the enemy army displays the following signs, it indicates they have reached desperate straits and may be pursued: wheel tracks in disarray, banners drooping haphazardly. Du You explains that banners swinging wildly and colliding with each other reveal the troops have lost all discipline. Mei Yaochen adds that crooked, disorderly banners arranged without pattern demonstrate the collapse of military order. Zhang Yu notes that banners originally serve to unify formations; if they sway uncontrollably, it proves the army is in complete chaos.

A commander's outburst of anger also signals plummeting morale. Du Mu analyzes that when soldiers are universally exhausted, commanders lose control of their temper. Chen Hao attributes this to officers forcibly imposing unnecessary labor that exhausts the entire army. Jia Lin states that fatigue naturally breeds irritability, while Mei Yaochen emphasizes how resentment grows among officers and men when worn out, making them indifferent to military law. Zhang Yu cites the historical example of the Jin-Chu conflict, where Jin generals Zhao Zhan and Wei Qi, resentful of orders, deliberately sabotaged their own army leading to defeat.

More telling signs include: feeding grain reserves to horses, slaughtering livestock for meat, absence of cooking utensils in camp, and soldiers not returning to barracks—all indicating utter desperation. Li Quan explains that killing horses for food proves provisions are exhausted, while abandoning barracks shows troops are cornered. Du Mu elaborates: using grain stores to feed horses, slaughtering oxen and horses to feed troops, smashing cooking pots to signal no more meals, maintaining formations day and night without rest—these unmistakably reveal preparations for a death struggle. The ancient term "fou" refers precisely to cooking vessels.

Mei Yaochen summarizes that feeding grain to horses, slaughtering livestock, discarding utensils, and bivouacking in the open are extreme measures taken for decisive battle. Wang Zhe adds that while such actions may briefly sustain combat strength, destroying cauldrons and abandoning shelters prove no retreat remains—certain precursors to mortal combat. When encountering this situation, one should fortify defenses to exhaust the enemy. Zhang Yu concludes with historical precedents: Qin general Meng Ming's "burning of boats" and Xiang Yu's "sinking cauldrons and breaking boats" both exemplify such desperate last stands.

This passage discusses several problematic behaviors military commanders should avoid when leading troops.

The first scenario describes a commander who speaks to soldiers in a timid, hesitant manner or engages in secretive discussions. Cao Cao interprets this as a sign of "lost resolve," while Li Quan suggests it indicates soldiers fear their superior and thus whisper privately. Du Mu views this as revealing the commander's inner anxiety, and Jia Lin warns it leads to troop disintegration.

The second situation involves excessive rewards for soldiers. Commentators like Li Quan and Du Mu agree this suggests the army faces dire circumstances, forcing the commander to rely on incentives to boost morale. Mei Yaochen explains this as a desperate measure to prevent mutiny during critical situations.

The third case concerns frequent punishments. All annotators concur this demonstrates exhausted troops who no longer fear penalties, compelling the commander to enforce discipline through increasingly severe measures.

The final scenario depicts a commander who initially treats soldiers harshly, then fears their rebellion. Cao Cao notes this shows initial underestimation of opponents followed by belated realization of insubordination - clear signs of incompetence.

These commentaries collectively emphasize that effective commanders must maintain dignified authority without excess. Rewards and punishments should be measured - neither weak submissiveness that erodes respect, nor reckless reliance on incentives and penalties to maintain control. These behaviors all indicate serious leadership failures.

Li Quan explains that a general who initially underestimates the enemy but later cowers in fear—this so-called "bravery" fundamentally misunderstands the art of warfare. Du Mu adds that this reflects a grave misjudgment of the enemy's situation. Jia Lin points out that if military orders are unclear and soldiers lack training, such a general first seeks to conquer others through brute force, yet panics and retreats when chaos erupts in the ranks—a display of utter cowardice.

Mei Yaochen analyzes that first ruling troops with harsh and tyrannical methods, then fearing their disloyalty—this inconsistent approach to rewards and punishments is the crudest form of leadership. Wang Zhe believes that a general who first acts cruelly toward subordinates, then fears rebellion, is the most incompetent. He Shi emphasizes that balancing leniency and strictness is the true mark of mastery in command. Zhang Yu concludes that underestimating the enemy before fearing them, or being harsh with subordinates before worrying about betrayal—such reckless abuse of authority, failing to balance kindness and discipline, is the worst approach. Hence, earlier discussions specifically warned against excessive rewards and punishments.

When the enemy sends a trusted envoy bearing gifts to apologize, it often signals a desire for truce or ceasefire. Li Quan describes this as "slow in approach, swift in retreat"—a posture of superficial deference masking ulterior motives. Du Mu analyzes that such a solemn apology indicates the enemy is either in dire straits or concealing other circumstances. Jia Lin notes that dispirited demeanor and humble words usually indicate a plea for reconciliation. Du You argues that groveling for peace before the battle's outcome is clear must signify a truce attempt. Mei Yaochen adds that this shows exhaustion and a wish to halt hostilities. Zhang Yu concludes that sending a confidant with lavish gifts to apologize often signals depleted strength and a desire for ceasefire.

If enemy troops advance aggressively but neither engage nor retreat for an extended period, extreme vigilance is required. Cao Cao warns to guard against ambushes. Li Quan stresses that such situations always involve hidden forces. Du Mu analyzes that furious deployment without engagement or withdrawal surely means they await something—careful reconnaissance is needed to detect possible ambushes. Mei Yaochen summarizes this tactical analysis: troops advancing in rage but delaying action must have ambushes in place.

Regarding troop numbers—more is not always better—Cao Cao notes the key lies in unified command. Jia Lin emphasizes the principle: "Troops value quality, not quantity."

This passage discusses the art of military strategy, emphasizing that the effectiveness of armed forces lies not in numerical superiority but in proper tactics.

Several military strategists point out: when forces are evenly matched, one cannot rely solely on brute force to advance recklessly. Cao Cao believed one must await the opportune moment before acting; Jia Lin stated that reckless advancement through brute force leads to cruelty; Wang Xi stressed the importance of analyzing enemy situations with wisdom; Zhang Yu explained that "martial prowess" refers to formidable strength that should not be employed rashly.

The key lies in concentrating strength, analyzing enemy situations, and utilizing talent effectively. Li Quan noted that when forces are matched, victory goes to those who employ talent wisely; Du Mu argued that even selecting capable individuals from ordinary troops could combine strengths to achieve victory; Chen Hao observed there's no need to seek external reinforcements—proper utilization of existing personnel can defeat the enemy; Jia Lin added that even with insufficient martial strength, one could prevail through strategic wisdom.

Wang Xi particularly emphasized the importance of being adept at "division and combination" (referring to flexible troop deployment), believing that even ordinary soldiers could achieve victory when properly utilized. Zhang Yu cited The Methods of the Sima to illustrate: so-called reinforcements of 100,000 often number merely tens of thousands, and allied troops are frequently unwilling to spearhead attacks—thus relying on external aid is inferior to skillfully employing one's own forces.

The passage concludes with a warning: commanders who fail to deliberate deeply while underestimating their enemies will inevitably be captured. This serves as a reminder that military leaders must employ forces prudently and prioritize thorough enemy assessment.

Du Mu explains that if a general lacks profound strategic vision and relies solely on personal bravery to act recklessly, he will inevitably be captured by the enemy. Chen Hao adds that this principle applies not only to those who are courageous but lack strategy—even minor enemies should not be underestimated. As the Zuo Zhuan states, "Though wasps and scorpions are small, they still carry poison"—how much more so for a state?

Wang Xi points out that failure to accurately assess the enemy’s situation and instead advancing rashly by brute force will lead to certain defeat. The problem does not lie in insufficient troops. Zhang Yu cites the example of the battle between Qi and Jin during the Spring and Autumn period: the Duke of Qi, underestimating his enemy, boasted, "I will destroy the Jin army before breakfast," and charged into battle without even donning his armor—only to be soundly defeated by Jin.

Regarding troop management, if a general imposes punishments before establishing authority, his soldiers will refuse to obey. Du Mu argues that without first cultivating benevolence, trust, and righteousness, excessive penal measures will backfire. Mei Yaochen advises that soldiers should be won over by kindness; if discipline is enforced before earning their loyalty, it will only breed resentment. Both Wang Xi and Zhang Yu emphasize that a newly appointed commander who resorts to punishment before demonstrating goodwill will face resistance. Tian Rangju and Wu Shen both observed that without first establishing authority, a general’s orders will go unheeded.

Conversely, if authority is firmly established but punishment is never used, soldiers will grow arrogant and unruly. Cao Cao warns that once benevolence and trust are secured, the absence of discipline will lead to laxity. Mei Yaochen and Wang Xi both liken such an army to spoiled children. Zhang Yu concludes that excessive leniency after deep bonds of trust have been formed will render the military ineffective.

Thus, one must use wen (civil governance, or benevolent policies) to unite hearts and wu (martial discipline) to enforce order. Cao Cao interprets wen as kindness and wu as laws. Li Quan explains that wen refers to generosity, while wu signifies stern punishment. Du Mu cites the example of Sima Rangju, who excelled at using wen to win allegiance and wu to intimidate foes. Wang Xi quotes Wu Qi: "A skilled commander balances both wen and wu; the art of war lies in harmonizing firmness and flexibility." Only then can victory be assured.

Du Mu explains that a general must cultivate both benevolent governance (civil virtue) and martial discipline in daily military management to ensure victory. Mei Yaochen adds that only by combining compassionate virtue to inspire troops with stern punishments to enforce discipline—this dual application of kindness and severity—can one achieve invincibility in battle.

Zhang Yu elaborates further: Benevolent virtue makes soldiers willingly submit, while stern authority maintains strict military discipline. When troops both revere and love their commander, victory becomes certain. Some may question: The Book of Documents states "Severity prevailing over kindness brings success, while kindness prevailing over severity leads to defeat," emphasizing establishing authority first. Why then does Sun Wu advocate prioritizing benevolence? This is because the Book of Documents refers to armies of righteous kings whose profound virtue had already won popular allegiance—they only feared insufficient authority when mobilizing troops. In contrast, Sun Wu addresses Warring States period armies under hegemon rulers, where people long oppressed by harsh laws tended toward disaffection, thus requiring greater benevolence in military campaigns.

Consistent enforcement of military regulations in peacetime ensures soldiers' obedience. Mei Yaochen clarifies: "素" (su) denotes long-term practice—only when authority and laws are persistently established will instruction be followed. Zhang Yu states that when commanders maintain consistent discipline over time, troops naturally become trustworthy and willingly follow orders.

Conversely, lax enforcement of regulations in ordinary times makes soldiers disobedient when suddenly subjected to discipline. Wang Zhe observes that troops without prolonged training cannot be expected to devote themselves in battle. He Shi remarks: How can people follow instruction when they've lost their behavioral norms?

The phrase "commands being consistently followed" (令素行) refers to mutual trust and coordination between commanders and troops. Du Mu cites Han Xin's confession: "I never enjoyed my soldiers' affection—it was like driving marketplace commoners into battle"—hence his desperate back-to-the-river formation forcing individual combat, precisely because his troops lacked habitual discipline combining kindness and severity. Chen Hao contrasts Duke Wen of Jin's case: Upon returning to power, the duke wished to mobilize immediately, but advisor Zi Fan cautioned that people still didn't understand righteousness and needed livelihood stabilization first. Later, after helping King Xiang of Zhou restore his throne, the people began caring about their welfare. When preparing for war again, Zi Fan noted the people still lacked understanding of credibility—hence the "withdrawing from Yuan to demonstrate trust" incident (keeping the promise to retreat) established authority by showing the people restraint from excessive gain.

(Note: Retains historical names like "Zi Fan," "Han Xin," "Duke Wen of Jin" and典故 such as "withdrawing from Yuan to demonstrate trust"; contextualizes the "carrot-and-stick" military philosophy; maintains explanatory length within 1.5 times the original)

This passage discusses the fundamental principles of military leadership, with "trustworthiness" (信) at its core. Zifan, advisor to Duke Wen of Jin (one of the Five Hegemons of the Spring and Autumn period), proposed that soldiers should be educated in ritual propriety through grand military reviews ("大蒐" dàsōu) to demonstrate discipline. This ensures all troops, young and old, follow regulations in battle—the essence of military cultivation.

The key to establishing military orders lies in: first, repeated explanations ("三令五申" sān lìng wǔ shēn) to ensure complete understanding; second, keeping decrees concise and appropriate, enforcing them strictly once issued without capricious changes. Only then can unity be achieved. Mei Yaochen adds: if commanders maintain unwavering integrity over time, soldiers will naturally obey. Wang Zhe emphasizes: only those who grasp this principle are qualified to discuss uniting forces to overcome enemies.

Zhang Yu cites the Weiliaozi: effective military discipline should avoid altering rules for minor faults or re-explaining for trivial doubts. Unless facing major errors or genuine confusion, orders must remain consistent to build trust. He illustrates this with Zhuge Liang (Shu Han chancellor during the Three Kingdoms period): when outnumbered by Wei forces, Zhuge honored his promise to let rotating troops return home. Moved by his integrity, the soldiers voluntarily stayed and fought, ultimately crushing the Wei army. This exemplifies how a commander’s credibility inspires morale.